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Abstract 
 
 
This empirical study is based on interviews with 26 grandchildren of Nazi 
perpetrators, followers and Wehrmacht soldiers and examines how they remember 
their Nazi family histories and the Holocaust and the Third Reich more generally. 
Most studies of this ‘third generation’ are framed in the terms of purely 
constructivist theories of collective (Halbwachs [1925] 1992) or communicative and 
cultural memory (Assmann 1999) and thus cannot take account of present but 
unrecognized aspects of the past. In contrast, this thesis draws on the traumatic 
realism of Dominick LaCapra and others to examine questions concerning the 
memory and representation of extreme events and makes use of the psychoanalytic 
notions of working-through and acting-out/mourning and melancholia. It does so to 
distinguish between what is remembered and what remains dissociated, marginalized 
and excluded in the grandchildren’s accounts of their Nazi family pasts. It 
furthermore draws on this non-binary distinction to acknowledge the two interrelated 
dimensions that remembering the National Socialist past entails in ‘the double “post” 
of the postmodern and the post-Holocaust’ (Santner 1990: 18): 1) coming to terms 
with the absence of essential, unfractured and stable identities, i.e. with what Eric 
Santner and Dominick LaCapra term structural trauma and 2) mourning the suffering 
caused by the Nazis and countless ordinary Germans, i.e. what both theorists refer to 
as historical trauma. This study explores how these two dimensions intersect in the 
generation of the grandchildren to find that the structural dimension has been receding 
into the background since German unification. This implies that the cultural and 
official memory of the Holocaust is increasingly either used for the purposes of 
national identity building, and thus in a redemptive way, or rejected because it is 
considered to obstruct a return to an essential and pure national identity. In drawing 
on recent theories of shame, this thesis argues that efforts of ‘coming to terms’ with 
the NS past can only be ‘successful’ if working-through structural trauma is part of 
the process. 
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Preface 
        
 
‘One wants to get free of the past: rightly so, 
since one cannot live in its shadow, and since 
there is no end to terror if guilt and violence are 
only repaid, again and again, with guilt and 
violence. But wrongly so, since the past one 
wishes to evade is still so intensely alive. National 
Socialism lives on, and to this day we don’t know 
whether it is only the ghost of what was so 
monstrous that it didn’t even die off with its own 
death, or whether it never died in the first place . . 
.’1 
 
 
 
The sociologist Norbert Elias ([1989] 1996: 16)2 remarked in his study The Germans 
that ‘[e]very new generation has to come to terms with the fact that the self image of 
the Germans is contaminated by the memory of Nazi excesses . . .’ In doing so, Elias 
already alludes what I will in this thesis treat as the intimately linked issue of how 
the memory of the Holocaust (i.e. the working-through of historical trauma) and the 
formation of individual self-identity (i.e. the working-through structural trauma) 
intersect in the ‘third generation.’ The question I am thus asking in this study is how 
the ‘third generation’, i.e. the grandchildren of Nazi perpetrators, followers and 
Wehrmacht soldiers, tackles the task of coming to terms with a self-image 
contaminated by the memory of the Nazi genocide. How do they deal with this 
contamination? To what extent does it lead them to reject the memory of National 
Socialism and particularly the Holocaust to keep their self-image as Germans ‘clean’ 
and to what extent does remembering the Holocaust and NS become part of a process 
of revising one’s self-image as a German? And relatedly, how do the grandchildren 
negotiate between the public commemoration of the Holocaust and their family 
memories of the Third Reich? What is the role of family memory of NS in keeping 
the self-image of ‘third generation’ Germans ‘clean’?  
 
                                                
1 Adorno ([1959] 1986: 115). 
2 I am here citing a translation of this extract from Elias ([1989] 1996), which I found in Vikki Bell’s 
(2002: 65) article Generation and Genealogy and consider much better than the one by E. Dunning 
and S. Mennell.  
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I began asking myself these questions after I had moved to the United Kingdom at 
the age of 20 and took a first stab at tackling them in my final dissertation for my BA 
in History and Sociology. The question, which particularly interested me at that time 
was a rather narcissistic one – why is it so difficult for young Germans to feel good 
or proud about their own country – struggling as I myself was with precisely the 
contamination of the self-image Elias speaks of and that seemed to have occurred 
only after I had left Germany, but resulted in intense but for a long time 
unacknowledged feelings of shame.  
 
I subsequently became more and more interested in the grandchildren’s family 
memory of NS. In the process I also gradually became more alert to the way in which 
the NS past has been and still is dissociated in my own family. It was at this point 
that a photograph of my paternal grandfather in Wehrmacht uniform – displayed in 
the sitting room at my parents’ house – which had always somehow been invisible to 
me, suddenly emerged and became perceptible as a trace that pointed to another, 
hidden past, which I sensed was at odds with the very few heroic stories I knew 
about him. This photograph and an album containing images my grandfather took 
during the war – among them photographs of occupied Poland, which showed long 
trains of Polish POWs – then became one of the central means with which I tried to 
think through various modes of memory transmission in families of Nazi 
perpetrators, followers and Wehrmacht soldiers.  
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 9 
memory of the Holocaust in Germany and the private, family memory of National Socialism.  
The latter, connected as it is to the grandparents’ experience of National Socialism is 
increasingly considered as more authentic and immediate than a history often felt to be 
burdensome by young Germans, tending as it does to marginalize exactly these (often 
positive) everyday experiences of community, collective cohesion, war-time suffering and 
heroism, recounted to them by their grandparents.  What are the strategies and practices of  
identification for dealing with or resolving this conflict in the generation of the grandchildren 
of the war and perpetrator generation in Germany?   
 
 
Illustration 1. My paternal grandfather. 
 
In conjunction with thinking about this image and the album, which raised important 
issues about the Holocaust, memory and representation, I became interested in the 
exhibition ‘War of Extermination – Crimes of the Wehrmacht between 1941 and 
1944’ which travelled through Germany between 1995 and 1999. It described in 
graphic detail – by displaying hundreds of photographs taken by Wehrmacht soldiers 
– the Wehrmacht’s active and passive participation in the perpetration of the 
Holocaust and war crimes. The exhibition and its images have come to play an 
important and varied role in this thesis. Firstly, as a public event, whose main 
message pervaded the private realm, the exhibition had the potential to facilitate the 
revision of family myths about grandfathers as innocent soldiers. The photographs it 
used thus contained a critical and subversive ‘counter-memory’ (Mösken 2007: 248; 
Davies & Starn 1989) to the officially cultivated myth of the ‘clean’ army and 
changed the memory of WWII in Germany. 
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Secondly, it represented – what Mösken (2007: 243; Hüppauf 1997) calls – a 
‘‘Bildbruch’’ [iconoclasm] by broadening the condensed established canon of 
Holocaust images. This canon had fostered a rather compressed view of the 
Holocaust by limiting itself to images that show the victims and the concentration 
camps after the murderous machinery of industrialized death had already stopped 
functioning; by demarcating the actual act of perpetration (in the gas chambers) as an 
unrepresentable blank space and by only showing individual perpetrators that 
belonged to a clearly defined group (SS, SA, Gestapo, the Einsatzgruppen, etc.) from 
which one could easily distance oneself. The images of the Wehrmacht exhibition 
evidently break with this visual practice by showing ‘ordinary’ Wehrmacht soldiers 
as perpetrators engaged in horrendous acts of perpetration. In thus enlarging the 
circle of perpetrators to include ‘normal’ soldiers, it also made it more difficult to 
distance oneself and one’s family members from the perpetrators. Furthermore, in 
‘representing’ what had so far remained largely unrepresented, the exhibition 
rendered the perpetrators visible and made it possible for their grand/children to get a 
more concrete idea of what their grand/fathers were involved in and/or witnessed. 
While the central status the Wehrmacht exhibition occupies in this thesis underlines 
my argument that there is a need to move away from the idea of the Holocaust as 
ineffable, unrepresentable and incomprehensible, because it contains an exculpatory 
moment, I will in chapter 2, elucidate how this does not imply a concomitant 
assertion that the Holocaust becomes a historical event like any other, by endorsing 
the traumatic realism of Eric Santner (1990, 1992) and Dominick LaCapra (1994, 
1998, 2001).  
 
However, the Wehrmacht exhibition’s use of perpetrator images and my decision to 
reproduce some of these photographs in this thesis obviously raise issues relating to 
an ‘ethics of perception’ (Hüppauf 1997: 26) or an ethical aesthetics (Hirsch 2001), 
which is particularly concerned about the viewer sharing the same perspective as the 
perpetrator/photographer – the Nazi gaze – and ‘thereby do[ing] continuing violence 
to the dead in memory’ (Prager 2008: 23). There is however an ongoing discussion, 
which seems to be gathering pace with the succession of younger academics (Baer 
 14 
2002; Bathrick 2008; Hüppauf 1997; Prager 2008) in Holocaust studies, who argue 
that such images should not be rejected outright. These academics try to find new 
ways of reading these images ‘against the grain’ (Baer 2002); against the Nazi gaze 
and regard the use of these images as disruptive of the rather selective visual memory 
of the Holocaust and thus as potentially educative.   
 
I use these perpetrator photographs not so much as illustrations or evidence, but 
rather in a constructive sense, as montages, in order to disrupt conceptions of the 
past as thoroughly and securely past. In a similar way to Walter Benjamin’s idea and 
method of the dialectical image, which is also based on the principle of montage, I 
selected and placed a number of perpetrator images in such a way as to upset and 
unsettle notions of the family as untainted by NS and especially the Holocaust. I did 
so by juxtaposing family photographs of the time with images of the Wehrmacht 
exhibition and other perpetrator photos. I used this method of montage to expose the 
family as a ‘tangled site of memory’ (Silverman 2006: 8), which harbours hidden 
meanings, that can be brought to light through montage. In this way, I aimed to 
estrange and defamiliarize the familiar object of the innocuous family photograph ‘in 
order to make [it] relevant for the present’ (Wolin 1982: 125). Thus, I agree with 
Benjamin (cited in Buck-Morss 1989: 67), who describes montage ‘as a progressive 
form because it “interrupts the context into which it is inserted” and thus 
“counteracts illusion”’.  
  
While most of the academic research about the children of Nazi perpetrators and 
followers is either kept within the theoretical terms of clinical psychoanalysis or is of 
a more journalistic nature (Sichrovsky 1988; von Westernhagen 1987), most studies 
on the grandchildren (Leonhard 2002a, 2002b; Kohlstruck 1997; Schneider, Co. 2004; 
Welzer et al. 2002) are framed in social theories of memory, and here especially in the 
theories of Maurice Halbwachs (1992) and Jan Assmann (1999). However, as I will 
argue in chapter 2, neither the more or less exclusive focus on the family that the 
psychoanalytic studies convey, nor the oversocialization of the individual that comes 
with ideas such as collective and cultural memory, are necessarily helpful when 
looking at how the ‘third generation’ remembers NS. This is the case as for the latter 
 15 
the family is no longer the only or most important ‘institution’ of memory, but a 
highly developed official and (trans)cultural memory of NS and especially the 
Holocaust – that often challenges, but also, as we will come to see in chapter 5, 
paradoxically reinforces the often exculpatory stories transmitted in the family – has 
been tasked with educating the younger generations and encouraging them to 
remember. On the other hand, I found the use of social theories of memory 
unsatifying, because these theories do not have an adeaquate language with which to 
understand the continuing presence of the past, because they are primarily concerned 
with questions of how the past is constructed in the present. What I thus also missed 
in these theories was a vocabulary that would allow me to make certain normative 
distinctions between different ways of narrating the NS past. Hence I am in this 
thesis following the traumatic realist approach of particularly Eric L. Santner (1990, 
1992) and Dominick LaCapra (1994, 1998, 2001), which provides me precisely with 
such a language, allows me to take account of the presence of the past and is not 
limited to the family. 
 
Especially since the late 1990s, the voices of the ‘third generation’ have become 
increasingly audible in public debates about the NS past. However, while many 
commentators find the grandchildren to be sufficiently removed from the past and as 
having come to terms with it, I am perhaps more hesitant, especially because these 
increasingly audible voices, such as for example that of Mareike Ilsemann, a 23-year 
old student from Cologne, share much with Martin Walser’s (1998: 18)3 rant against 
what he called the ‘Dauerpräsentation unserer Schande’ [‘constant presentation of 
our disgrace’] in their ever more vociferous complaints about ‘the über-confrontation 
with the Holocaust’ (Ilsemann 1998). Another student, Kathie Gesa Klafke (1998), 
                                                
3 Martin Walser, an eminent German writer, gave a speech, upon receiving the peace price of the 
German book trade in 1998 in the Frankfurt Paulskirche. In his speech he fulminated against the 
instrumentalization of Auschwitz by the media, which according to him uses it as a ‘Moralkeule’ 
(moral cudgel) to engender contrition and consternation. He argued for the privatization of the memory 
of National Socialism, which would allow everyone to remember the time as s/he experienced it. He 
said he did not want to be reminded of German shame every time he turned on the television, opened 
a newspaper, or went to Berlin (in reference to the Holocaust memorial). He lamented the political 
correctness that characterized public memory and described it as alienating him from his more 
‘authentic’ childhood memories of the time. It thus brought ‘into sharp relief the divergence between 
public and private memory of the Nazi era in Germany’ (Schmitz 2007: 4). Like many interviewees, 
Walser was especially annoyed about the institutionalized and ritualized commemorative culture of 
the Holocaust and its attendant politics of guilt and contrition, which he and many interviewees feel 
to be prescribed. 
 16 
as so many of the young, ‘third generation’ Germans I interviewed for this study, 
thus pleads for the NS past to become history, rejects the idea of a responsibility 
that goes beyond the individual perpetrators, and thus views references to 
transgenerational forms of historical responsibility or obligation towards the memory 
of the victims of the Holocaust as an accusation of Erbsünde [original or inherited 
sin].  
 
Yet, it must here be added that the grandchildren are caught in a fundamentally 
contradictory situation, which is represented by the tension that historian Dirk 
Moses (2007c: 141-42) detects ‘between demanding in the name of multiculturalism 
that Germany today is too diverse to admit of national modes of identification (i.e., 
Germany as a community of descent or fate) and’ an insistence ‘that the supposedly 
ontologically stable entity called “the Germans” must confess guilt, express 
contrition and atone for the Holocaust’ (Moses 2007c: 141-42). It is thus that many 
grandchildren see this insistence as nationalistic and use it as an argument for the need 
to historicize the Holocaust and NS. Yet, this line of argument is often pursued to 
render German national identity available again for unproblematic and straightforward 
identification. While, as we will see, the voices of the ‘third generation’ are manifold 
and include many less resentful, open and tolerant perspectives4 than the two 
mentioned here, a preliminary description of this generation would need to stress that 
there is a growing desire for national belonging and/or regret that this belonging is not 
yet or can never be straightforward, unfractured and ‘normal’, because of the 
Holocaust, prevalent among its members.  
 
Before I proceed to provide a historical overview of the development of an official 
and cultural memory of the Holocaust and NS in (West) Germany in the following 
chapter, I want to briefly clarify the term ‘third generation’. The concept of ‘second 
generation’ emerged out of an initially primarily psychoanalytic concern with the 
psychological after-effects of the Nazi genocide in the survivors and their offspring. 
                                                
4 For a wide variety of perspectives of members of the ‘third generation’, see especially the edited 
collections Das Unbehagen in der ‘dritten Generation’ (Villigster Forschungsforum zu 
Nationalsozialismus, Rassismus und Antisemitismus 2004) and Was bleibt von der Vergangenheit? 
Die junge Generation im Dialog über den Holocaust (Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger 
Generationen 1999). 
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What was in the 1980s called ‘second-generation-syndrome’ (Bergman & Jucovy 
1982: 18-29) describes how the trauma of the victims and survivors was transmitted 
to the subsequent generation. Thus the concepts of ‘second’ and ‘third generation’ 
are often explicitly about the transgenerational transmission of traumatic memories 
and entail – especially when used beyond clinical psychoanalysis in cultural studies 
and the wider academic and cultural discourse – a genealogical understanding of 
history, that has as its origin the ‘first generation’s’ experiences of the Holocaust and 
NS. The concepts of ‘second’ and ‘third generation’ have also come to be employed 
to understand the process of memory transmission in families of Nazi perpetrators 
and followers and have increasingly been adopted beyond psychoanalytic studies. 
The interdisciplinary and intercultural borrowing of the term ‘second’ or ‘third 
generation’ is however deeply problematic because it ‘already produces an 
indifference with respect to the incompatible position of victims and perpetrators – 
that is, between the descendants of survivors and those that were responsible for 
their suffering’ (Weigel 1999: 270). Although I still use it, I never do so without 
putting it in inverted commas, to indicate that the term is not unproblematic. This 
seemed a more sensible choice than the perhaps even more problematic phrase 
‘young Germans’, which implies an ascription of an exclusionary ethnic identity by 
raising the issue of who belongs to that category and who does not.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction – A short history of official and cultural 
memory of the Holocaust and National Socialism in Germany 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Two ‘mnemonic orthodoxies’5 and their decline 
 
I begin with a history of the memory of the Holocaust in Germany because it helps 
us to put current developments concerning this memory into context: it also provides 
the reader with the historical, political and cultural background to the later analysis of 
the interviews with 26 ‘third generation’ Germans that I conducted for this study. As 
the memory of the Holocaust represents very different things for the interviewees – 
for some it constitutes the beacon of an enlightened and moral Germany, for others it 
is no less than an object of scorn, experiencing it as they do as precluding a return to 
an untainted national identity – it seems essential to take a closer look, not only at 
how the Holocaust became an integral part of unified Germany’s cultural memory, 
but also how it could come to incite such starkly differing reactions.  
 
The old Federal Republic was marked by what Jeffrey Olick (2005: 340) calls the 
two ‘mnemonic orthodoxies’: on the one hand, the left-liberal model of a postnational 
identity and a critical memory of National Socialism, whose practitioners wanted to 
make the Holocaust central to the self-understanding of the FRG,6 often also called 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung7 and, on other hand, conservative and neo-conservative 
efforts to defuse the memory of the Holocaust via its relativization in attempts to 
                                                
5 (Olick 2005: 340). 
6 This is of course a reference to Jürgen Habermas’ (1989b) concepts. In this thesis, I treat Habermas 
and his conception of dealing with the NS past as an emblem for the left-liberal discourse of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Like many others, historian Charles Maier (1988: 168) argues that 
‘Habermas can be taken as the Federal Republic’s preeminent spokesman for what might be called the 
liberal-democratic or social-democratic “metanarrative.”’ 
7 This term is usually translated as coming to terms with, coping with or mastering the past. Implicit 
in the term is the word bewältigen which means overcoming, thus suggesting a ‘closure and a break 
with the past’ (Kattago 2001: 38). This is also why it has been criticized, especially by Adorno 
([1959] 1986) in his early and influential piece on the topic of ‘What does coming to terms with the 
past mean?’ in which he proposes the term verarbeiten [working-through] rather than Aufarbeitung 
and Vergangenheitsbewältigung. The former is less ambiguous and translates as ‘critical reappraisal 
and working through’ (Kattago 2001: 38; see also König et al. 1998).  
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‘normalize’8 national identity. In what follows, I will trace, albeit in very broad 
strokes, the ascendancy of these two ‘mnemonic orthodoxies’ in the Federal 
Republic, to then look at how unification destabilized both and inaugurated the rise 
of a liberal discourse of contrition (Wilds 2000), which seems to be, as we will come 
to see, much more successful in ‘normalizing’ the NS past via a ritualized and 
regularized memory of the Holocaust (Olick 1998). I will devote this chapter to the 
FRG (see Appendix H, page 287, for GDR), firstly because it is to a large extent the 
latter’s model of memory that unified Germany adopted and, secondly, because the 
majority of the interviewees grew up in West Germany.  
 
The question of how to write the history of Holocaust memory in Germany is a very 
difficult one. Unlike the sociologists Levy and Sznaider (2006) in their book The 
Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, I do not think that it can be recounted as a 
progressive narrative which ends on the quasi Hegelian and triumphal note of 
Germany now – after an initial and long silence – standing at the end of a long, but 
successful ‘collective moral learning process’ (Moses 2007a: 5); of Germany now 
having finally worked through its past, by having integrated the Holocaust into its 
cultural memory and national identity as a negative foundational event. As I will 
show in chapter 7, many interviewees subscribe to some version of this success 
story, that ‘normalizes’ the NS past and features the Germans as the leaders in ‘the 
new moral frame’ of international politics (Barkan 2000: xvi). Yet, as I will contend 
in the following chapter, working-through the past entails more than the performance 
of official commemorative days and institutional education, implying as it also does 
an affective dimension. As David Eng (2010: 171) argues, taking ‘responsibility for a 
historical event [one] never actually experienced . . . is as much an affective as it is a 
political affair.’ 
                                                
8 The term ‘normalize’ or ‘normalization’ has a very specific meaning in the context of debates about 
German Holocaust memory and needs to be distinguished from Michel Foucault’s (1979) notion of 
normalization, which he elaborated as part of his theory of (disciplinary) power, especially in his 
earlier work, such as Discipline & Punish. As we will see below, in the German context, 
‘normalization’ during the 1980s, implied the historicization of NS, the universalization of 
victimhood and ‘[t]he “proper” acknowledgement of German suffering’ (Taberner & Cooke 2006: 7), 
while after unification ‘normalization’ was understood to reside in the regularization and ritualization 
of Holocaust memory in Germany and the elaboration of a culture of contrition, which included 
restitution payments and other reconciliatory efforts. In what follows, I place the concept in inverted 
commas to indicate the still contested status of the concept. 
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Neither do I, however, think it is a story of doom and gloom in which unification 
features as the historical point at which Germans begin to regress back to a dangerous 
non-civic ethnic nationalism. Rather, I assert that this history of memory is marked 
by ‘idiosyncratic dialectics’ [‘eigenwilligen Dialektiken’]9 (Rensmann 2001: 337) 
between memory and forgetting. In trying to take account of these dialectics, I 
particularly want to draw attention to the latest episode in this tale, which shows, 
perhaps paradoxically, how German politicians and cultural producers find in the 
Europeanization and globalization of the Holocaust also the tools that facilitate their 
most recent attempts to ‘normalize’ the Nazi past.  
 
However, before I can begin, I want to point out two particular characteristics of the 
memory cultures considered here. The first is the strong generational dynamic that 
carried and still carries many of Western and now unified Germany’s mnemonic 
transformations and, secondly, the at times strong disjuncture between public and 
private (family) memory, which was particularly pronounced in the GDR, but also 
present in the FRG, albeit to a lesser extent. In relation to the generational dynamic, 
Mary Fulbrook (1999: 16; see also Assmann 2006a, 2007a), for example, points out 
that, in Germany, national identity construction is not only shaped by the political 
and intellectual elites, but also and particularly different generational experiences 
‘serve to transform what it is that the “imagined community” of belonging is felt to 
consist in’. As we are currently witnessing yet another generational shift, this time 
from ‘second’ to ‘third’ generation, I am also endeavouring – in anticipation and 
preparation of chapters 7 and 8 – to draw out some of the changes in memory culture 
and conceptions of national identity and belonging that accompany such generational 
shifts.10 
                                                
9 Or what Atina Grossmann (2000: 90) alludes to as the pull between memory and forgetting when 
she writes that the entire postwar West German history ‘can be read as a continual oscillation between 
the drive to forget – to draw the proverbial Schlussstrich and aim for “normality” – and the injunction 
to remember, to commemorate, and to work through questions of guilt and responsibility.’ 
10 The link between memory and generation is explored in a large corpus of sociological literature, 
often drawing on the seminal work of Karl Mannheim (1952), who argued that when age cohorts share 
particularly formative common experiences during their adolescence they develop a common 
generational consciousness. This literature suggests ‘that memories [are] structured along the age 
dimension in ways that allow us to identify various generations’ (Misztal 2003: 86). So similar to 
class, gender and ethnicity which, to some extent, structure our perception, experience and memories, 
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This brings us to the disjuncture between public and private memory, which is in 
many ways at issue in chapters 4 and 5, which look at family memory and chapter 6, 
which examines how the interviewees experienced their school education about NS 
and confrontations with cultural representations of NS and the Holocaust more 
generally. German memory culture of the Holocaust and NS is marked by ‘tension’ 
(Schmitz 2007: 4), ‘dissonances’ (Fulbrook 1999: 18), ‘asymmetry’ (Assmann 2003: 
127) or even disjuncture between communicative memory and official and cultural 
memory. With respect to the FRG and unified Germany, Aleida Assmann (2003), for 
example, holds that while cultural memory of the Holocaust finds no support in 
communicative memory – the Nazi genocide of the Jews and others as absent from or 
external to family memory (see also Welzer et al. 2002; Rosenthal et al. 1997 and 
chapter 4) – the latter is, or rather was until recently largely missing from cultural 
memory.  
 
In order to think about the relation between these two mnemonic levels, in this 
chapter, I will draw on the work of Jan (1995, 1999, 2005) and Aleida Assmann 
(2006a) as well as Harald Welzer (2001). Building on Maurice Halbwachs’ (1992) 
notion of collective memory, Jan Assmann (1995, 1999) added another dimension to 
Halbwachs’ distinction between history and collective memory, namely that between 
communicative and cultural memory. He (1995: 126) maintains that communicative 
memory, or what he also calls ‘everyday memory’ entails the memories of the recent 
past and is formed ‘purely through personally authenticated and communicated 
experience’ (1999: 50). It thus reaches back no further than three to four generations 
and is passed on in everyday (oral and written) communication. Unlike cultural 
memory, communicative memory does not presume specialists, but its transmission 
is secured in informal everyday communication and practice. Harald Welzer et al. 
(2002: 13) draw attention to family memory as a subdomain [‘Teilbereich’] of 
communicative memory.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
‘differences in generational perspectives on the “same” event can be seen to be a consequence of 
varying locations in historical time’ (Schuman and Scott 1989: 378).  
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Cultural memory, on the other hand, according to J. Assmann (1995: 129), ‘has its 
fixed points’, i.e. ‘fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through 
cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication 
(recitation, practice, observance).’ It is transmitted by experts (intellectuals, teachers, 
politicians, etc.) in especially designated and ‘meticulous instruction’ (1999: 55) or 
commemorative rites.11 The knowledge about the past thus imparted across 
generations serves ‘formative . . .[i.e.] “educative, civilizing, and humanizing 
functions” as well as normative . . . function[s] of providing rules of conduct’ (1995: 
132) and its transmission occurs in ‘ceremonial communication’ (1999: 56).12 
Cultural memory thus entails ‘that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific 
to each society in each epoch, whose “cultivation” serves to stabilize and convey 
that society’s self-image’ (1995: 132), unity, and identity.13 What is important to 
note here is that the young Germans I interviewed – the grandchildren of Nazi 
perpetrators, followers and bystanders, as well as Wehrmacht soldiers – find 
themselves at the crucial juncture when communicative memory begins to fade and 
solidify into cultural memory. Although I am hesitant about Assmann’s duo of 
cultural and communicative memory, which is based on the assumption of 
unruptured transmission, and is thus too narrowly conceived to take account of 
silences, dissociations and memory beyond the communicable I will here nevertheless 
use it as a heuristic device to draw out the changing relation between the two. 
 
 
                                                
11 My own translation: ‘sorgfältiger Einweisungen’. 
12 My own translation: ‘zeremonielle[r] Kommunikation’. 
13 Assmann (1995: 130) asserts that ‘[c]ultural memory exists in two modes: first in the mode of 
potentiality of the archive whose accumulated texts, images, and rules of conduct act as a total 
horizon, and second in the mode of actuality, whereby each contemporary context puts the 
objectivized meaning into its own perspective, giving it its own relevance.’  
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1.2 Official and cultural memory of the Holocaust and NS in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1945-1989-90 
 
1.2.1 The victim discourse in the 1950s in the FRG 
 
While the East German state strictly sanctioned the public articulation of memories 
of the expulsions of Germans from territories in the East, the FRG was much more 
accommodating to memories of German suffering. Ruth Wittlinger (2006b: 203) notes 
that ‘[u]ntil recently, a consensus existed in academic literature which suggested that 
the period immediately following the end of the Second World War in West Germany 
was characterised by silence and amnesia.’ Historian Robert Moeller’s work, 
however, demonstrates that this was a very ‘selective amnesia’ (Wittlinger 2006b: 
203) that included only the memory of the suffering that Germans inflicted on others, 
not their own suffering. Thus, while many historians (Frei 1996; Reichel 2001) who 
write about the early phase of Vergangenheitsbewältigung concentrate on political 
and legal efforts to deal with the perpetrators, they tend to neglect what Robert 
Moeller (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2003, 2005) makes the focus of his studies, 
namely how German suffering entered the politics of memory of the early Federal 
Republic. After the Allies’ prosecution of Nazis and war criminals at the war crimes 
tribunal in Nuremberg (1945-49) and their attempts to de-Nazify and re-educate the 
population, further efforts of Vergangenheitsbewältigung slowed markedly down 
until perhaps the late 1950s, when a violent anti-Semitism returned and the 
Einsatzgruppen trial in Ulm (1958) reminded the public of NS.  
 
Although the crimes against Jews were acknowledged on the political level in the 
ratification of Adenauer’s ‘financial reparations treaty’ [Wiedergutmachung] in 
March 1953 (Rabinbach 1988: 160), many, including high-ranking politicians of all 
colours saw reparation payments to the victims of NS as competing and interfering 
with what they thought was the much more urgent task of providing financial 
restitution to the Kriegsgeschädigte, e.g. expellees, bombing victims and POWs. The 
‘Law for the Equalization of Burdens’ [Lastenausgeleich], was passed in 1952, 
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showing that bombing victims and expellees were at the top of the agenda. Much of 
the politics and culture of memory of the 1950s was shaped by notions of 
‘competing victimhood’ (Levy & Sznaider 2005: 11) and West Germans were much 
more concerned about the ‘crimes committed against Germans who were not Jews’ 
(Moeller 2001: 2-3). This focus on German suffering was furthermore aided by an 
intensifying Cold War, which facilitated the return of a virulent anti-Communism, 
which ‘deflect[ed] attention from the Nazi past to the Soviet threat in the present’ 
(Herf 1997: 297). 
 
While there was some official acknowledgement of the Nazi genocide against the 
Jews, communicative memory at the time was a memory ‘of fighting and 
imprisonment, evacuation and expulsion and stories of loss and rape’ (Wittlinger 
2006a: 64). ‘By focusing on the experiences of expellees and POWs in the Soviet 
Union, [West Germans] could talk about the end of the Third Reich without 
assuming responsibility for its origins’ (Moeller 2001: 3). They furthermore saw 
themselves as the victims of Hitler and his criminal elite, who started the war, the 
consequences of which ordinary Germans were now suffering from. Cultural memory 
was based on films, popular literature and the pulp fiction of the Landserhefte,14 
portraying for example Wehrmacht soldiers as heroically protecting the ‘Fatherland’ 
and/or suffering at the hands of the Russian and Allied armies. Official 
commemoration also propagated an image of the NS past, which turned everyone 
into a victim. This is evident in the reintroduction of the national ‘People’s day of 
Mourning’ in 1950, which was designed to commemorate all victims of war and 
tyranny. Moeller (1996: 1013, 2001: 3, 2003: 155) thus argues that ‘in the first post-
war decade’ ‘private memories’ of wartime suffering ‘structured public memory’ in 
the Federal Republic. But he adds that, although the later institutionalization of a 
memory culture that commemorated the victims of the Holocaust to a large extent 
displaced these memories of wartime suffering into the ‘private’ sphere, it never did 
so completely, as many now argue when they invoke the taboo on German suffering. 
 
                                                
14 Extremely popular in the 1950s, these ‘novels’, which came in the form of booklets, could be 
bought at newsagents. They were explicitly glorifying war, portraying it as one great adventure. 
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1.2.2 The 1960s: Protest and democratization 
 
It is widely accepted among historians of and commentators on postwar West 
Germany that the year 1968 constitutes a break with the long and silent 1950s. 
However, historians Gassert and Steinweis (2006) provide an important qualification 
of this often-repeated but perhaps too simplistic view. Both the date, 1968, and the 
role of the rebellious students are becoming increasingly contested (see Jarausch 
2006; Schildt 2002; Siegfried 2000). The claim that the radical students broke the 
silence in 1968 with their protests against the perceived fascism and authoritarianism 
of the FRG is often premised on the assumption that the Nazi past was drowned in 
the frantic reconstruction effort. Cultural and communicative memory largely 
corresponded, perhaps until the early 1960s, when the broadcast of the Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem in 1961 and the Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt am Main 1963-1965 
marked something of a turning point. During these trials the public was for the first 
time confronted with the gruesome details of the industrialized mass murder 
committed in the concentration and death camps (Siegfried 2000: 94). Social historian 
Axel Schildt (2002) thus claims that, almost a decade before the student protests 
reached their pinnacle, the crimes of the Nazi period were increasingly subjected to 
greater public attention and a more pluralistic and democratic political culture 
gradually began to evolve.  
 
In 1967, psychoanalysts Margarete and Alexander Mitscherlich published their 
famous study The Inability to Mourn. It diagnosed Germans with a repressed 
collective melancholy, arguing that this led them to deny and de-realize their recent 
murderous past. It became hugely influential among the students. This book, in 
conjunction with critical theory, and the teachings of the ‘re-immigrants’ Adorno and 
Horkheimer at the Frankfurt School of Social Research was a great inspiration to the 
students at the time, the ‘children of the rubble who had been raised on tales of a 
suffering Germany’ (Moeller 2005: 170). It was thus that many students began to 
view their fathers, professors and the entire war and perpetrator generation as 
fascists. Hence, with the 1960s’ generational shift from ‘first’ to ‘second generation’, 
attention also began to shift from German victims to German perpetrators and their 
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victims. Although the politically radical part of the children’s generation 
instrumentalized the Nazi past in their generational conflict with their guilty parents 
– by employing it as a weapon in their violent attempts to dissociate themselves 
from them and their generation, in a quest for an innocent origin – it is not solely due 
to the radical students of 1968 that a more critical engagement with the Nazi past 
developed in West Germany (Jarausch 2006: 21; Schildt 2002: 129; Siegfried 2000: 
99-105; Wittlinger 2006: 67). Even though the students radicalized and intensified the 
debate about the NS past and in their attacks on the FRG’s authoritarianism, 
inaugurated and accelerated the process of democraticization (especially in the 
educational system), they did not necessarily instigate it (Siegfried 2000: 104).   
 
The students turned the question of their parents’ guilt into a central issue. However, 
they did so by politicizing it: by attacking the ‘fascist’ behaviour of the FRG’s 
authorities, they carried their thinly-veiled hate of their parents into the public 
sphere. Radicalized at the universities and sensitized to the structural continuities 
with the Third Reich, the students began to perceive the FRG as a fascist state, not 
much better than the National Socialist state itself and organized in the SDS (Socialist 
Students Union of Germany) and APO (extra-parliamentary opposition). Against the 
then common theories of totalitarianism – advocated by the ‘quasi-official guardians 
of the cultural imperatives of the Cold War’ (Rabinbach 1988: 177) – the students’ 
endorsement of the theory of antifascism can be seen as a reaction against this 
conservative consensus. Yet, this endorsement also functioned as a form of self-
defence, as seen through the prism of their ‘psychoanalytically informed antifascism’ 
(Rabinbach 1988: 175), the students displaced the Nazi genocide of the Jews that 
Adenauer had recognized in the reparations treaty by stressing Nazism’s 
authoritarianism and anticommunism and overemphasizing the continuities between 
fascism and capitalism.  
 
Hence, Peter Schneider (cited in Schlant 1999: 84), a writer and member of the 
generation of 1968 retrospectively assesses: ‘If National Socialism was the 
“conspiracy” of a couple of powerful industrialists, our parents, no matter what they 
had done, were the victims of the conspiracy.’ Furthermore, as Siobhan Kattago 
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(2001: 44; Rabinbach 1988: 175) maintains in her study on The Nazi Past and 
German National Identity, the German New Left, which grew out of the student 
movement, not unlike the official anti-fascism in the GDR, ‘universalized National 
Socialism into fascism, thereby omitting the Holocaust as the defining moment of 
German fascism.’ This constituted what she calls ‘a second kind of repression’. By 
impregnating themselves with abstract theories of fascism, the students not only 
spared themselves the confrontation with their parents’ concrete actions during the 
Nazi period, but also to some extent reversed the trend which had become apparent 
in the Federal Republic’s dealing with the Nazi past in the early sixties, and 
decontextualized the Third Reich again (Jarausch 2006: 22; Schildt 2002: 130). Many 
members of the children’s generation, especially those who were politically active, 
identified with the victims of their parents. However, this (over-)identification often 
led to a strange reversal: while the students identified with the victims of the 
Holocaust and saw themselves as the victims of their parents’ entire generation, 
violently accusing and attacking it, they at the same time protected their parents by 
adhering to theories of fascism (Schlant 1999: 83).  
 
 
1.2.3 The 1970s and the beginnings of the institutionalization of the memory of the 
Holocaust and National Socialism 
 
The term Vergangenheitsbewältigung not only signifies the complex political and 
judicial processes of dealing with the consequences of the transition from the Nazi 
regime to democracy and thus to matters concerning restitution, justice, and re-
integration, but also indicates a collective and individual ‘cross-generational political-
ethical obligation’ to come to terms with the past (Reichel 2001: 21). Thus, it also 
implies a normative demand. With the growing distance from the past, the juridical 
dimensions of Vergangenheitsbewältigung receded, while the educational and ethico-
political aspects increasingly came to the fore. This became obvious, for example, in 
the political speeches that Social Democratic Chancellors Brandt (SPD, 1969-1974) 
and Schmidt (SPD, 1974-1982), as well as President Scheel (FDP, 1974-1979) held 
on days of commemoration, such as 8th May. The question of how younger Germans 
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were to deal with the past was a recurring theme in these speeches and although these 
politicians did not regard them as guilty, they acknowledged that younger generations 
still had a particular responsibility towards the past (see Olick 2007: 68-71). 
During the 1970s, the victims of the Nazi genocide, especially Jewish victims, were 
increasingly officially and culturally acknowledged. Olick (1998, 2007) furthermore 
argues that this decade saw the growing institutionalization and ritualization of 
commemorative practice and public discourse about NS. The Holocaust gradually 
became, as Levy and Sznaider (2006:102; see also Olick 1998) assert, ‘an integral 
component of official German memory culture.’ Important here, above all, is 
Brandt’s – the first social democratic Chancellor of the FRG – hugely significant 
symbolic act of falling to his knees before the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in December 
1970. Subsequently, acts and days of commemoration, such as the 8th of May 1945 – 
increasingly commemorated as a day of liberation rather than defeat (Olick 2007: 55-
85) – and 9th November 1938 (Kristallnacht), became more institutionalized and 
ritualized. Yet, while the historian Bill Niven (2002: 5; see also Levy & Sznaider 
2006) attributes enormous importance to Brandt’s commemorative gesture, arguing 
that it ‘marked the beginning of a discourse that makes the ‘critical memory of 
Germany’s crimes a cornerstone of German national identity’ (cited in Fuchs 2004: 
175), thus endorsing a progressive, redemptive narrative, the sociologist and historian 
Olick (1998: 551) injects a critical note when he adds that although this represented 
the beginnings of the FRG constituting itself as a ‘moral nation’, it also sowed the 
seeds of the current discourse of contrition (Wilds 2000) which ‘normalizes’ the past 
via ritualized commemoration.  
 
Perhaps even more significant than Brandt’s genuflection was the broadcast of the 
American mini-series Holocaust in 1979 on West-German state television. It was 
watched by about 15 million people (Levy & Sznaider 2006: 117) and not only 
introduced the term Holocaust15 into the German vocabulary, but, as many argue 
                                                
15 It is also interesting to note here that ‘Holocaust’ more or less coincided with the Hitler-Welle – a 
wave of cultural products that concentrated purely on the person Hitler (Caplan 2000: 151) and was 
subsequently ‘matched’ by a German answer to the series: in 1981 state-owned television broadcast a 
three-part television series, which detailed experiences of flight and expulsion (Moeller 2003: 164).  
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(Neiman 1992; Huyssen 1980; Landsberg 1997; Zielinski 1980), instigated Germans 
to empathize with the suffering of the victims of the Nazi genocide, thus provoking 
an emotional reaction hitherto not shown by the public in relation to this past.16 
Levy and Sznaider (2006: 117), like Huyssen and Zielinski, argue that in its appeal to 
emotions and inviting viewers to identify with individual victims, the series had an 
enlightening effect and ‘played a big role in making the Holocaust central to debates 
about German identity’. With these and other political and cultural events and 
developments, a ‘Holocaust-centred memory regime’ (Langenbacher 2003: 14) 
became increasingly established and accepted. But it never became hegemonic, as 
some critics claim, because it was repeatedly challenged and contested, especially 
during the 1980s, leading to public scandals such as Helmut Kohl’s and President 
Reagan’s visit to the Bitburg military cemetery (1985) and the Historians’ debate 
(1986/87), to which I will now turn. 
 
 
1.2.4 The ‘geistig-moralische Wende’ and the Historians’ Debate: A debate about 
‘the Federal Republic’s self-understanding’17 
 
The increasing readiness to acknowledge responsibility and commemorate the victims 
of the Nazis was not shared by conservatives, who ‘saw calls for a “mastering” of 
the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) as an insidious feature of New Left ideology . . 
. and sought to reformulate this term as a code word for German self-hatred, a 
condition that undermined a positive identity’ (Olick 2007: 69). So when, in 1982, 
the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl was elected Chancellor, the return of a 
conservatism which championed a politics of memory that was eager to rehabilitate 
an untainted and more positive version of German ‘tradition, history and identity’ 
(Wilds 2000: 86) was programmed. This politics of memory was marked by a desire 
‘to establish contemporary west German “normality” via a relativisation of the 
                                                
16 Neiman (ibid.: 129) writes: ‘. . . the series had achieved something which years of more informed 
Vergangenheitsverarbeitung had not. . . . , it unleashed a storm of emotional discussion among the 
populace at large. Amid all scholars’ scorn, Günther Anders praised the film precisely because it 
reduced the abstract fate of 6 million to the story of a particular family, enabling millions of Germans 
to shed tears, for the first time, for the people next door. … Maybe tearjerkers are needed in a land 
where rage is so easy, mourning so hard.’  
17 Habermas (1989b: 250). 
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damaging legacy of the NS past’ and to broaden the perspective on German history 
(Wilds 2000: 87; see also Olick 1998). Eager to be fully integrated into the Western 
alliance as an equal partner, ‘Kohl pursued a symbolic rehabilitation of German 
identity and history that demanded from Western powers a gesture of forgiveness for 
the Nazi past – indeed, of forgetting it’ (Olick 2007: 71).  
 
This strategy became particularly obvious during the Bitburg affair (1985) when 
Kohl and U.S. President Reagan visited the Bitburg military cemetery, where Waffen-
SS members were buried alongside “ordinary” Wehrmacht soldiers, to perform a 
highly controversial act of reconciliation. In order to assuage critics, a visit to the 
former concentration camp Bergen-Belsen was hastily added to the itinerary to also 
acknowledge the suffering of the victims of Nazism. Hence this act of reconciliation 
aimed to universalize victimhood, while ‘normalizing’ national identity by turning 
Germany into a regular ally of the Americans. Although growing outrage in the U.S. 
and Germany turned the whole endeavour into a public relations disaster, Reagan 
(cited in Olick 2007: 73) did Kohl a huge favour when in defending his decision to 
visit Bitburg; he said that the ‘soldiers’ buried at the cemetery ‘were victims, just as 
surely as the victims in the concentration camps.’18  
 
While Kohl tried to free politics from the constraints of the past at Bitburg, a number 
of historians attempted to liberate historiographical and public discourse from these 
very same constraints. In 1986, the left-liberal paradigm, represented by one of its 
most outspoken supporters, the philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas, 
met head on with conservative historians in the public forums of the feuilletons. 
‘[T]he central issue’ of the debate was ‘whether Nazi crimes were unique,’ and thus 
so radically evil that they could not be compared to any other historical atrocity in 
the past and as a consequence ‘irreparably burden[ed] any concept of German 
nationhood’, or whether they could be compared (to Stalin’s Gulags) (Maier 1988: 
                                                
18 Thus Rabinbach (1988: 180) notes that this ‘commemorative incident’ revealed ‘that the Kohl 
government was the first to abandon the singularity postulate and to publicly relativize the Holocaust 
in relation to all other suffering inflicted by “the war”’. 
 31 
1). If the former were the case, German national identity would be irredeemably 
tainted; if the latter were the case, it could become ‘normal’ again.  
 
The Historians’ Debate was sparked by the publication of Andreas Hillgruber’s 
(1986) book Zweierlei Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des deutsches Reiches und das 
Ende des europäischen Judentums.19 While the ‘end of European Jewry’ was 
relegated to a short essay at the end of the book, in the bulk of it, Hillgruber 
recounted the Wehrmacht’s defense against the Red Army from the perspective of 
the latter and its soldiers. Furthermore, he ‘sought to justify the Wehrmacht’s bitter 
resistance against the advancing Soviet forces’ (Maier 1988: 19), without 
acknowledging that this also facilitated the continued mass murder in the 
concentration camps and on the death marches. In rejecting a distanced and moral 
view of NS and inviting identification with the Wehrmacht and its soldiers, 
‘Hillgruber has pressed into service a flawed historicism . . .’ (Maier 1988: 25; 
Schmitz 2006a), and opened the door to an equation of Jewish and German victims 
(see Friedlander 1993). In June 1986, historian Ernst Nolte’s (1993) notorious article 
Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will20 appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. There, he suggested that the Gulag Archipelago was “more original” than 
Auschwitz, for which it provided the precedent. No longer unique, Auschwitz 
becomes not only comparable to Stalinist communist terror, but is turned into a pre-
emptive self-defense against what Nolte (1993: 22) calls the more original ‘“Asiatic” 
deed’.  
 
Historicism was also the issue in a largely separate and less public debate between 
Saul Friedlander, survivor and eminent historian of the Holocaust, and Martin 
Broszat, then director of the Munich Institute for Contemporary History. While 
Broszat (1990), who is not to be counted among the above conservative historians, in 
his article of May 1985 entitled Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des 
Nationalsozialismus21 argued for the removal of the moral boundaries guarding 
                                                
19 ‘Two sorts of demise: The shattering of the German Reich and the end of European Jewry’. 
20 ‘The Past that will not Pass: A Speech that could be written but not delivered.’ 
21 ‘A Plea for the Historicization of National Socialism’. 
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interpretations of NS, for the Third Reich to be embedded into the longue dureé of 
the history of modernity and thus for treating this period like any other, Friedlander 
rebutted that this would amount to a careless neglect of the Holocaust as the core of 
NS. I devote so much attention to the Historians’ Debate because it raises one of the 
central issues of the analysis of the empirical material in chapters 5 and 6: Hillgruber, 
Nolte and Broszat, like the majority of the interviewees are eager to remove the moral 
boundaries surrounding interpretations of the Holocaust – the limits of 
representation – and to open up the NS past to a plurality of narrative perspectives 
and interpretations. In a similar way to Broszat, who rejects moral questions 
determining historical research agendas in order to advocate an oral history-based 
approach to NS, called Alltagsgeschichte, which concentrates primarily on the 
everyday life of ‘ordinary’ Germans during the Third Reich, many interviewees do 
the same in order to rehabilitate their grandparents’ perspective on NS.  
 
In distinction to the conservative historians, for left-liberal historians and 
commentators, Auschwitz remained unique. Unlike the former, Habermas claimed 
that history could only be used as an educator and admonisher, and never for the 
purposes of Sinnstiftung [creation of meaning]. It must always be ‘mediated by the 
self-critical reflection of indigenous national traditions and normative values’ (Wilds 
2000: 88-89). Habermas (1989b; see also Huyssen 1995a) thus charged the 
conservative historians and politicians with aiming to recover history and tradition as 
compensation for the insecurities and ‘damages entailed by modernization’ (Maier 
1988: 44). While left-liberals sought to keep Germany’s political identity separate 
from its pre-political cultural identity, conservatives sought to return to a continuous 
and heroic narrative of the nation’s past cultural and historical achievements without 
having to acknowledge the Holocaust as unique. An ardent advocate of the 
Enlightenment and ‘Kantian normative liberalism’ (Maier 1988: 39), Habermas 
(1989c) was concerned about ‘apologetic tendencies,’ evident in this conservative 
turn in German historiography and politics. Rejecting Hillgruber’s use of the 
hermeneutic method of Verstehen [empathy], Habermas rather stressed the 
importance of social, political and economic analysis, ‘”critical reflection”  . . . [and] 
“reflective memory”’ (Maier 1988: 43) during the debate. He (1989b, 1991) 
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continuously stressed that Auschwitz made any conventional German national 
identity, that took a continuous national history as its basis, impossible, and asserted 
that the only viable options left to post-Holocaust Germans were the adoption of a 
postnational identity and a ‘constitutional patriotism’ while ‘any proper coming to 
terms with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) . . . was’ for Habermas, a member 
of the Hitler-Youth generation, as well as for many 68ers ‘predicated on the end of 
the German nation state’ (Huyssen 1995a:  68).  
 
 
1.3 Unification and post-Wende challenges to the ‘mnemonic orthodoxies’: 
The rise of the ‘discourse of contrition’22 
 
While Habermas may have emerged victorious from this intellectual battle, his 
victory was a pyrrhic or at least an ambiguous one (LaCapra 1998: 71; see also Olick 
2007: 53; Nolan 2001: 115). With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the end of the 
Cold War, and German unification in 1990, the geopolitical constellation changed 
dramatically and not necessarily in favour of left-liberal leanings, as unification 
implied ‘the restoration of Germany as a nation’ (Kattago 2001: 117): no longer ‘a 
civic state-nation’ (Habermas 1991: 87) but a nation-state. Furthermore, the almost 
immediate discrediting of East German antifascism added a second past, that needed 
to be ‘worked through’, to the register. One consequence was the return of 
totalitarian theories or as Nolan (2001: 116; Moller 2003: 77) puts it, ‘neototalitarian 
comparisons’, especially in conservative circles. The traditional ideological positions 
and securities, particularly of the left but also the right – entailed in the two 
mnemonic orthodoxies, elucidated above – thus suddenly saw themselves becoming 
redundant, outwitted as they were by history.  
 
Andreas Huyssen (1995a: 67) in his essay on ‘German identities after unification’ 
notes that the ‘anti-nationalist’ or postnationalist ‘consensus’ entailed in the left-
liberal tradition of Vergangenheitsbewältigung which had shaped much of the 
political culture and cultural memory of the FRG was challenged to the core, even 
                                                
22 (Wilds 2000). 
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‘clearly delegitimised’ (Wilds 2000: 92) by the events of 1989/90. And although 
conservatives continued to pursue their customary memory politics, especially 
evident in their proposal of the Neue Wache as unified Germany’s central ‘memorial 
to all victims of war and tyranny’, thereby ‘neither [distinguishing] between 
dictatorships nor between perpetrator and victim’ (Kattago 2001: 129), they soon 
realized they had to change their tactics.  
 
In addition to the debate about the Neue Wache, the 1990s witnessed a veritable 
eruption of events, debates and scandals relating to the NS past. Unlike ten years 
earlier at Bitburg, the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII in 
1995 showed the world that Germany had become very well versed in a discourse of 
contrition (Wilds 2000) and a commemorative practice that had by now ‘solidified 
the ritualistic “normalcy”’ (Olick 2007: 79). Furthermore, there was the release of 
Schindler’s List (1994), the publication of Goldhagen’s hugely successful Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners (1996), the institution of ‘a National Day of Remembrance for 
the Victims of National Socialism on 27 January 1996’ (Wilds 2000: 94) – which has 
been commemorated Europe-wide as Holocaust Memorial Day since 2000 (Leggewie 
2009) – the Wehrmacht exhibition (1995-98), the Walser-Bubis debate (1998), and 
the ten-year-long debate about the Memorial for the murdered Jews of Europe23 to 
name but a few.  
 
This eruption of the past into the present can, however, be seen as entailing a 
paradox or contradiction since, as many (Kansteiner 2006; Olick 2007; Wilds 2000) 
have observed, the mid-1990s also marked a ‘decisive turning point’ (Kansteiner 
2006: 290-91), when German politicians, especially conservatives, came to the 
realization that their goal of ‘normalization’ was not well-served by silence about the 
Holocaust, nor indeed by inappropriate and offensive comparisons but was much 
                                                
23 Critics of the memorial often remarked that the memorial was less about the victims of the 
Holocaust and more about the Germans themselves (see Ball 2008a; Kattago 2001: 141), who in their 
appropriation of Jewish Holocaust memory managed to reinvent themselves as moral. Controversial 
from the outset, among other reasons because of its exclusive focus on Jewish victims, but later also 
because of its size and location in the middle of Berlin, it was initiated by a private initiative in 1988. 
One outspoken critic of the memorial, German-Jewish journalist and writer Henryk Broder, argued 
that its purpose was rather to clear the consciences of Germans and ‘to publicly display [to the world] 
their acceptance of history’ (Kattago 2001: 147; see also Ball 2008a).  
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better advanced by acknowledgements of responsibility and expressions of regret and 
contrition. In the geo-political climate of the post-Cold War world ‘the Soviet empire 
could no longer lend legitimacy to Western democracies, and the West turned to its 
own shameful past as a source of self-validation’ (Kansteiner 2006: 290-91). Within 
this new and increasingly global ‘culture of self-incrimination and humanitarian 
intervention’ (ibid.; see also Barkan 2000; Olick 2007) nations, rather than hiding 
their crimes and emphasizing their own suffering and heroism, ‘now competed for the 
privilege to confess their crimes to the world’ (ibid.). This new moral international 
politics provided Germans and their politicians with the opportunity to go beyond 
‘the polarised discourse over the German past’ by integrating ‘the critical 
consciousness of National Socialism . . . [as] a central tenet of contemporary 
formulations of national identity’ (Wilds 2000 83).  
 
Levy and Sznaider (2006: 83; see also Niven 2002) see in this development a move 
toward greater self-reflexivity, as the national narrative becomes de-heroized and 
skeptical. Kansteiner (2006) however remains unconvinced, detecting as he does in 
this an instrumentalization of the Holocaust for the validation of a more assertive 
German national identity, while Rensmann (2001) argues that one of the 
consequences of the institutionalization of the memory of the Holocaust is the return 
of socially and politically reactionary forces. Olick (1998) points out that 
ritualization constitutes a much more successful form of ‘normalization’, which has 
its roots in the 1970s.24 Wilds (2000: 95) also notes that politicians like Germany’s 
first Social Democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder soon realized ‘that the 
articulation of German “normality” is best served not by denying the crimes of the 
past but by displaying to the world German contrition and thereby regaining a 
domestic sense of collective self and enabling a more assertive international 
representation of national interests.’ The institutionalization and regularization of the 
memory of the Holocaust in memorials, days of commemoration, a public Holocaust 
pedagogy and a more or less ritualized repetition of official statements of contrition 
                                                
24 Olick (1998: 553) distinguishes between two forms of ‘normalizing’ the past; firstly through 
ritualization and institutionalization, secondly ‘normalization’ through relativization. A prime 
example of the latter is the Historians’ Debate. 
 36 
and regret, allowed for a simultaneous expression of a more assertive, even proud 
national identity, based on a sense of moral obligation and mission that arose out of 
an acknowledgement of the NS past. This is best exemplified in the Red/Green 
coalition’s (1998-2005) response to the Kosovo conflict. In this instance, Auschwitz 
was invoked not to argue against any German participation in the military 
intervention because of the horrors of the past, but the Holocaust was referred to 
precisely in order to legitimize the Bundeswehr participation in the NATO 
operation. 
 
 
Interlude: 
The exhibition ‘War of Extermination: The German military in World War II 1941-
1944’ (1995-1999): The ‘ordinary’ soldier as collaborator and perpetrator 
 
As chapters 4 and 5 examine how the grandchildren I interviewed narrate their Nazi 
and war family histories, and how the Wehrmacht exhibition in showing ‘ordinary’ 
German soldiers as perpetrators and collaborators influenced family memory, the 
exhibition about the crimes of the Wehrmacht deserves extra attention here. However, 
before beginning to discuss the reception of the exhibition, I will first briefly elucidate 
the ‘social history’ of the myth of the ‘clean’ army, as it not only facilitated the re-
integration of former soldiers into post-war social structures, especially the family, 
but was also functional and foundational to the new Federal Republic (Naumann 
2000; Moeller 1998). In the course of West Germany’s post-war history, the myth 
took on a variety of meanings. In the immediate postwar period, it was ‘the 
ostensibly “apolitical and supra-political” role of the Wehrmacht . . . , its “clean” and 
chivalrous” way of waging war, and the secondary role it played (to Hitler) in 
decision-making’ that the myth stressed ‘in an effort to defend [the Wehrmacht’s] 
professionalism and elite standards,’ (Naumann 2000: 418) thereby providing the 
basis for a thorough distinction between the war the Wehrmacht fought and the mass 
murders committed behind especially the Eastern front, by the SS, SD and the 
Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing squads). Within the context of an escalating Cold War, 
the myth emphasized the victimization of the ‘ordinary’ soldier by the Red Army 
and/or Hitler’s regime as well as his distance to the Holocaust and massacres of other 
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civilian populations (ibid). The soldiers were seen as victims of the time, fatefully 
caught in a disastrous war, rather than in their actively destructive role as violent 
aggressor and occupier. Essentially, WWII was divided into two different and 
unrelated wars. 
 
Apart from the few Wehrmacht generals indicted for war crimes at the Nuremberg 
trials, the rest of the army was soon after the war absolved from any responsibility 
and involvement in the Nazi genocide (Niven 2002: 146). Furnishing the institution 
Wehrmacht and its former members with a clean image was a precondition for 
German rearmament in 1955, based as the Bundeswehr was on a strong personnel and 
ideational continuity with the Wehrmacht. In the immediate post-war period 
returning soldiers were put on par with the rest of the civilian population, which was 
portrayed almost exclusively in its role as victim. In this way the myth relieved 
families from having to raise the issue of potential participation in war crimes and the 
Final Solution of returned husbands and fathers and enabled them to draw on 
common experiences of suffering. The myth remained unscathed by the social and 
cultural upheavals of the 1960s as well as by advancements in historical research on 
the Holocaust and the Second World War. Thus historian Geoff Eley (2000: 28) 
describes it as ‘perhaps the most obstinate of all the fictions blocking discussion of 
Germany’s responsibility after 1945.’ 
 
This changed with the arrival of the exhibition – curated and financed by the 
privately-run Hamburg Institute for Social Research – in Munich in 1997, where it 
was greeted by public uproar, instigated by members of the CSU regional 
government, who saw it as an attempt to dishonour the Wehrmacht and its soldiers. 
Yet, this only helped its popularity:  between 1995-1998, ‘more than 550,000 
visitors in . . . twenty-six cities in Germany and Austria’ saw the exhibition, making 
it ‘the contemporary history exhibition in the Federal Republic: the longest-lasting 
and the most-visited’ (Heer 1998b: 188). In claiming that the Wehrmacht as an 
organisation as well as many of its soldiers were directly and indirectly involved in 
the perpetration of the genocide of the Jews and war crimes against especially 
Russian POWs, the exhibition can be seen as part of a wider trend at the time that 
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drew attention to the willingness of ordinary Germans, soldiers, and policemen to 
actively participate in the persecution and murder of Jews and other minorities. 
Atina Grossmann (2000: 116) thus sees Daniel Goldhagen’s book, to which I would 
add the exhibition, as part of a (brief) shift in German cultural memory towards 
looking at the perpetrators, and argues that ‘[t]his attention complemented, if it did 
not displace, a preceding and often romanticized fascination with Opfer (victims), 
especially Jews, [and] Jewish culture.’ Like Goldhagen’s book, which argued that the 
perpetration of the Holocaust involved the willing and active ‘participation of 
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of “ordinary” Germans’ (Eley 2000: 5) and 
not only the Nazi elite, the Wehrmacht exhibition drew attention to the active and 
passive participation of 18 million Wehrmacht soldiers.  
 
In stark contrast to the predominantly exculpatory family narratives of NS, the 
exhibition showed the gruesome and brutal everyday of this war – by drawing on 
three locations: the war against ‘partisans’25 in Serbia, the 6th army on its way to 
Stalingrad, and the occupation of Ukraine – thereby making the barbarous actions of 
the Wehrmacht and its soldiers shockingly visible. Furthermore, it exposed the 
‘Wehrmacht-run POW camps’ as ‘sites of mass-killing’ (Niven: 2002: 145).26 It also 
called into question the convenient distinction between SS, SA, the Einsatzgruppen 
and the army and showed how the Wehrmacht directly and indirectly assisted these 
Nazi paramilitary organizations in committing genocide, by supporting the SS, SD 
and mobile killing squads with the army’s manpower and infrastructure. The 
Wehrmacht provided guards, personnel assisting in ‘selections’ and mass executions, 
as well as transport. In full knowledge of the intentions and consequences, 
                                                
25 The term ‘partisan war’ stood for the execution of civilian populations. ‘In the general directive 
defining the “practice of wartime military Jurisdiction” in the “Barbarossa” [codename for the German 
invasion of Russia] area issued on the 13 May 1941, the civilian population was removed from the 
jurisdiction of the military courts and placed under the direct control of the ranks. Should civilians act 
as “guerrillas” exercising violence against German soldiers or installations, . . . , they were to be 
eliminated’ (Heer 2000b: 100). It was under the banner of the “war against partisans” that massively 
exaggerated acts of reprisal and collective punishment against civilians were carried out.   
26 ‘Of 5.7 million Soviet prisoners, 3.3 million died in Wehrmacht-run POW camps’ (Niven 2002: 
145).  
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Wehrmacht town commandants issued the proclamations, ordering Jewish residents 
to gather at certain points and times, often cordoning off ghettos or killing sites.27   
 
The exhibition made extensive use of private and official photographs (1,433) taken 
by soldiers and Wehrmacht propaganda units. It also included soldiers’ diaries and 
letters. In using these images, it drew attention to the perspective and mentality of 
the photographer/bystander/perpetrator. Hundreds of images showing similar crimes 
were repeated over and over ‘serv[ing] as evidence of widespread involvement in a 
murderous norm’ (Niven 2002: 153). Sociologist and psychotherapist Gabriele 
Rosenthal (1998: 116; Hüppauf 1997) notes that the exhibition would not have had 
the same impact on its visitors had it not relied so extensively on these photographs. 
Unlike in Goldhagen’s book (1996a) which invited readers to identify with the 
victims and repudiate ‘the motives and choices that underlay the horrifying acts of 
the killers’ (Caplan 2000: 161),28 the exhibition, controversially, invited its visitors to 
take the perspective of the bystanding photographer, who ‘comes to symbolize the 
position of those many German soldiers who observed crimes, or knew of them, yet 
did not protest’ (Niven 2002: 154).  
 
Like the mini-series Holocaust, Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners was 
credited with facilitating empathy with the victims by engaging in ‘repeated “thick” 
descriptions of the subjective experience of killing’ (Caplan 2000: 161), which were 
aimed at inducing ‘both negative and positive identifications’ with the perpetrators 
and victims respectively ‘on the part of the reader (ibid.). A visit to the Wehrmacht 
exhibition, on the other hand, was akin to scrolling through the grandparents’ family 
                                                
27 ‘[C]ooperation between SS Kommandos and the 6th army was a routine matter. When towns with 
sizable Jewish communities were occupied, town and city commanders conferred with the SD 
Einsatzkommando. Proclamations produced by the propaganda company and issued by the town 
commander ordered the Jewish population to gather at a certain time. SS and police escorted the 
victims from the collection point to the murder sites’ (Boll & Safrian 2000: 253). Before the most 
horrendous mass execution, perpetrated in the ravine of Babi Yar near Kiew, where 33,771 Jewish 
men, women and children were killed by police battalions, SS and the Sonderkommando 4a on 29th 
and 30th September 1941, this ‘Aktion’ was planned and discussed with the Wehrmacht town 
commandant (Niven 2002: 146; Boll & Safrian 2000: 254-255). 
28 Omer Bartov (2000: 55) makes a similar point when he writes that ‘In demonizing the perpetrators, 
Goldhagen makes no attempt to understand them; his focus is on portraying them as sadistic 
murderers who enjoy their “work” of torturing and killing Jews . . . Goldhagen, for his part, calls 
forth sympathy, pity, and compassion for the victims, and anger and frustration vis-à-vis the killers.’ 
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album, because the format of the images was that of the conventional private 
photographs of the time:  
 
‘In this way, the photographs of the Wehrmacht exhibition symbolized the 
normality and similarity of those portrayed with the viewer as well as the 
inexcusable crime. The feeling of being torn between identification and 
rejection that emerged while looking at the images must have been disturbing 
and must have decisively influenced the reactions to the Wehrmacht 
exhibition’ (Mösken 2007: 244).29 
 
 
Thus, although similar to Goldhagen’s book, in drawing attention to ‘ordinary’ 
Germans as perpetrators, who had agency and choice, yet still committed such 
horrendous acts of cruelty, the exhibition did not allow for a total or radical 
differentiation between the viewer and the perpetrator and bystander. In doing so, it 
also unsettled identifications with innocent victimhood. Furthermore, since nearly 
every second German male at the time served in the Wehrmacht, the exhibition raised 
questions of collaboration and perpetration much more forcefully than Goldhagen, 
whose focus was primarily on the police battalions. It was thus much more 
successful in raising suspicions among family members about grand/fathers (Boll 
1999: 181). Grossmann (2000: 124) asserts that, in debunking the myth of the ‘clean’ 
army, the exhibition ‘force[d] a confrontation [with the past] that Germans cannot 
divert by saying “But my family were not Nazis.”’ 
 
The exhibition is thus often credited with having ‘broke[n] the decades-long silence 
about the Eastern Front’ (Nolan 2001: 122) and having instigated dialogue between 
the generations which either led to a process of increased engagement with and 
disclosure of family histories by the younger generations, or to aggressive defensive 
reactions, such as justification, trivialization, and exculpation. While Niven (2002: 
144), Rosenthal (1998) and Heer (2004) assess the exhibition’s impact as largely 
positive, Christian Schneider (2001) and Lars Rensmann (2001) are more cautious, 
even pessimistic, in their evaluations, concerned as they are about a coalition forming 
between the grandparents and their grandchildren against the moral demands of an 
                                                
29 My own translation. 
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institutionalized cultural and official memory of the Holocaust (see also Grossmann 
2000: 127-128). Helmut Schmitz (2006a: 103) summarizes these concerns concisely 
when he writes that ‘despite its critical and controversial nature, the exhibition 
triggered communication between the generations’, thereby ‘engendering a process of 
reconciliation through empathy with the perpetrators.’ I will return to this issue of 
empathy between the generations in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Due to growing criticism about its emotionalism and one-sidedness (Nolan 2001), 
from right-wing and increasingly mainstream historians, newspapers and politicians, 
who raised doubts about the authenticity of some of the images, the exhibition was 
taken down in November 1999 and completely revised.30 It began travelling again at 
the beginning of 2000. The second exhibition, however, refrained from the extensive 
use of (perpetrator) images and was largely built around text-based exhibits, 
discussing the question of the legality of the war in the East. Thus, it lacked the 
emotional impact of the first exhibition (Heer 2004; Nolan 2001). As a member of the 
generation of 1968 and former member of the SDS, military historian Hannes Heer, 
who conceptualized the first exhibition, stood for everything that the Federal 
Republic’s effort to come to terms with its Nazi past entailed and which was now, in 
the ‘Berlin Republic’, deemed obsolete, even counterproductive (Klotz et al. 2001: 
161). Heer was accused of having ‘pursue[d] “a politics of guilt,”’ and the exhibition 
was said to have been characterized by ‘”the politics of history of the generation of 
1968”’ (Medicus cited in Klotz 2001: 161).  
 
It thus becomes apparent that the exhibition, although it had ‘profoundly positive 
effects’, also paradoxically led to strong, even aggressively defensive reactions; and in 
the way it found its end, heralded the renewed ‘disappearance of the perpetrators’ 
from cultural memory (Niven 2002: 144; Heer 2004).31 These reactions ‘to evidence 
                                                
30 Less than 20 of the 1,433 photographs were found not to show crimes committed by the 
Wehrmacht, but by the NKVD, the Soviet secret police (Bartov et al. 2000: 81). 
31 Whereas the first exhibition was premised on the assumption of the illegality of the war in the East, 
driven as it was by racist and anti-Semitic Nazi ideology, its second instalment perceived only 
aspects of the war, as criminal. By doing so it reinstated a line dividing the ordinary soldier from the 
criminal Nazi organizations. Also, by taking down most of the disturbing images, the perpetrators 
literally disappeared again.   
 42 
of complicity, however’ show, as Jarausch and Geyer (2003: 9) argue, ‘how difficult 
it [has] remained for Germans to encounter themselves in the past, prompting new 
strategies of distancing’ and erasure. While German historians roundly dismissed 
Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners as ‘simply a bad book’ (Jäckel 1996),32 
younger Germans received it very positively. They did so because, in arguing that 
Germany was now free of any trace of what he called eliminationist anti-Semitism 
and had faced up to its genocidal past, it was now not only like every other Western 
democracy, but had become the model for other transitional democracies, ‘Goldhagen 
had compiled a morally satisfying account of German guilt and redemption’ (Caplan 
2000: 159; see also Goldhagen 1996b, 1998). In this way, LaCapra (2001: 122) adds, 
Goldhagen may have made it easier for young Germans ‘to dissociate themselves 
from the perpetrators of the past, [and] cathartically identify with the victims.’ The 
Wehrmacht exhibition, on the other hand, did not lend itself as easily to such 
redemptive accounts because it made explicit a long and continuing culture of silence. 
 
 
1.3.1 European integration and the transnationalization of the memory of WWII and 
the Holocaust 
 
‘”The project of a united Europe will 
probably require the readjustment of 
historical narratives – and possibly the 
recasting of various collective memories 
from East to West”’.33 
 
Leggewie and Meyer (2005: 44) observe that ‘parallel to unification a process, which 
one could call the “globalisation of the Holocaust” occurred.’34 So while Germans 
were mired in discussions about the particular responsibility of ‘ordinary’ Germans, 
increasingly concerted political and cultural efforts to use the memory of the 
Holocaust as a (negative) founding myth for a (still lacking) cultural identity of a 
united Europe were undertaken (Diner 2003; Dubiel 2003; Probst 2003, 2006: 70; 
                                                
32 They did so, mainly because Goldhagen used a very emotionally tinged language to describe in 
graphic detail horrendous scenes of mass murder. In doing so, he did not subscribe to the objective 
and distanced approach that historians are usually proud to uphold (see Ball 2008a).  
33 Jan-Werner Müller quoted in Assmann (2007b: 11). 
34 My own translation: ‘Parallel [zur Wiedervereinigung] vollzog sich ein Prozess, den man 
“Globalisierung des Holocaust” nennen könnte.’  
 43 
Leggewie 2009). The European Holocaust Conference of 2000 in Stockholm is 
testament to such efforts by state politicians to construct and institutionalize the 
Holocaust as a transnational or cosmopolitan memory both on the pan-European as 
well as on respective national levels. At this forum, 22 heads of state decided on ‘a 
common framework for commemorating and teaching the Holocaust’ (Assmann 
2007b: 13). Thus, 27th January, the day Auschwitz was liberated, was instituted as 
‘the first (official) European commemoration of the third millennium’ (Levy & 
Sznaider 2002: 102). Furthermore, as Levy and Sznaider (2002, 2006) argue, the 
Holocaust has, in the wake of the end of the Cold War, become increasingly 
institutionalized as a moral basis of an international or global politics of human 
rights.35 It serves as an analogy in efforts to legitimate military and humanitarian 
interventions against human rights abuses and genocides around the world, for 
example during the Kosovo conflict, because it is thought to entail a universal moral 
lesson.  
 
Unified Germany, which was engaged in ‘find[ing] a new political and cultural place 
in Europe’ (Levy & Sznaider 2002: 97) during the 1990s, performed a double 
movement, in which the Holocaust was made both an integral part of its national 
identity and history, while it was at the same time displaced by positing it as a 
European historical catastrophe. Or, as the historian Wulf Kansteiner (2006: 326) 
puts it: ‘the dictum of the Holocaust’s uniqueness was only fully accepted by 
German politicians when it was recast as a common European legacy that no longer 
set Germany aside from its European partners and former victims.’ He argues that 
the move to render the memory of the Holocaust an integral part of German national 
identity was accompanied by projecting the lessons to be learnt from this historical 
catastrophe onto the European plane, on which ‘the Germans were the model 
students of history in a large collective of anti-Nazis’ (Kansteiner 2006 262). In this 
context the Germans, no longer a pariah nation, have become not only ‘memory 
partner[s]’ but also ‘occasionally memory tutor[s]’ in and of the new Europe 
                                                
35 They (2006b: 293) write that ‘The ultimate justification for Human Rights, thus, is neither human 
nature, nor some Enlightenment optimism in the rationality of mankind, but memories of catastrophe 
and trauma.’ 
 44 
(Kansteiner 2006: 278). Vergangenheitsbewältigung has become the model for dealing 
with criminal pasts around the world (Olick 2005: 338-39).  
 
Recasting the Holocaust as a European catastrophe fosters a view of Europe as the 
aggressor against the Jews, and thus of everyone as guilty. It also facilitates the 
universalization of the category of victimhood, as Levy and Sznaider (2006: 202) 
point out. The increasing universalization of the Holocaust that occurs as part of its 
appropriation by European heads of state and leaders around the world has thus 
provided German politicians, as well as Germans more generally with the 
opportunity to ‘forget’ their roles as perpetrators and collaborators, raised so 
forcefully by the Wehrmacht exhibition and during the 1990s, and to return to 
memories of German wartime suffering instead. I will return to this in the following 
section. 
 
Levy and Sznaider (2005: 6) argue that a European memory of the Holocaust is about 
the future, not the past, and not about Jews and Germans but ‘about human beings 
and the brutal and most extreme violation of their human rights.’ The Holocaust, thus 
dislocated from space and time – de-contextualized and de-historicized – has shifted 
from being an atrocity that involved Germans as perpetrators and Jews as victims, to 
an atrocity of which everyone could potentially be a victim. Yet, this account 
underestimates the extent to which the Holocaust does not become a common 
memory, but rather serves as ‘the paradigm or template through which other 
genocides and historical traumas are very often perceived and presented’ (Assmann 
2007b: 14). Meyer and Leggewie (2005: 332), much less optimistic than Levy and 
Sznaider, thus argue that the Holocaust is still far from constituting a common 
transnational European memory, because the national histories of individual 
European countries are still too strong. Also, although Levy and Sznaider 
acknowledge that the cultural globalization of the Holocaust can ‘result[ing] in its 
inscription into other acts of injustice and traumatic national memories across the 
globe’, they do not pay enough attention to how this can serve a re-nationalization of 
collective memory. Chapter 5 thus analyzes how Holocaust tropes have found their 
way into the interviewees’ family narratives of NS and are used to emphasize the 
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grandparents’ wartime suffering. In contrast to Levy and Sznaider I am thus more 
skeptical about the effects of the Europeanization and globalization of the Holocaust.  
 
 
1.4 Conclusion: The post-Wende (re-)emergence of memories of German 
wartime suffering and victimhood 
 
‘[T]he institutionalisation of the memory of the Holocaust at the heart of 
contemporary German historical identity’ (Schmitz 2007b: 4) and increasingly at the 
heart of a European cultural identity are accompanied by a roughly concurrently 
occurring ‘almost antithetical[ly]’ (ibid.) development, namely the return of 
memories of German victimhood. Although never completely vanished, the victim 
discourse returned with a vengeance in the late 1990s. Importantly, it posited that 
the generation of 1968 had instituted a long taboo on the articulation of memories of 
wartime suffering and on empathizing with the grand/parents.  
 
At the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII in 1995, it also became discernable that 
the German Left was (re-)discovering memories of wartime suffering – further 
evidence of the demise of the mnemonic orthodoxies of the FRG – when Antje 
Vollmer, then party leader of the Green Party, condemned the expulsions and 
‘pronounc[ed] a very public mea culpa on behalf of the 1968 generation for having 
ignored the plight of the expellees . . .’ (von Oppen & Wolff 2006: 204-205). While 
since the late 1960s efforts to rehabilitate Germans’ experiences of wartime suffering 
had increasingly been rejected as attempts to relativize the Holocaust, this has 
changed since 1989 and especially since the Kosovo crisis. At the time, Kosovar 
refugees were not only ‘compared to Jews, but they were also victims, like Germans 
being expelled from the homeland’ (Levy & Sznaider 2005: 7). This meant that, 
finally, ‘Germans could join the universal brotherhood of victims through the prism 
of “ethnic cleansing”’ (ibid.).  
 
During the first decade of the new millennium, debates about the expulsions erupted 
with the head of the Bund der Vertriebenen (League of Expellees) Erika Steinbach’s 
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(CDU), and Peter Glotz’s (SPD) efforts to build a ‘Centre against Expulsion’36 in 
Berlin. These attempts coincided with the final stages of the construction of the 
Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, which was opened to the public on 12th May 2005 
and show that the Germans as victims discourse often sees itself in competition with 
the memory of the Holocaust. This shift towards memories of German victimhood 
was also detectable on the cultural level: Günter Grass (2002) published his book Im 
Krebsgang [Crabwalk] and W.G. Sebald (2001) his Luftkrieg und Literatur [Air War 
and Literature], both of which were credited with breaking the ‘taboo’ on German 
wartime suffering. The publication of Jörg Friedrich’s (2002) controversial book Der 
Brand [The Fire], which draws on highly recognizable Holocaust terminology, such 
as ‘Einsatzgruppen’, ‘Zivilisationsbruch’ [rupture in civilization] and ‘Gaskeller’ 
[gas chamber] (cited in Heer 2004: 293) to describe in graphic detail the Allied 
bombings of German cities, further invigorated the debate.  
 
In addition, the cultural sphere was inundated with auto/biographies, television 
documentaries, films and talk shows in which the personal experiences of 
contemporary witnesses were the central issue. A sheer countless number of 
auto/biographies and fictional memoirs written by grand/children of Wehrmacht 
soldiers, Nazi perpetrators and followers, dealing with their family histories and the 
lives of their grand/parents swamped the book market.37 Levy and Sznaider (2006: 
133) see this migration of ‘private forms of remembrance’, such as memoirs, 
autobiographies, and testimonies, into the public space as part of the process of 
changing memory cultures in high modernity, when collective memory becomes 
individualized and denationalized. In contrast to 1968 when, as we have seen above, 
the students politicized their family past and largely viewed their parents, especially 
their fathers, as fascists, we now seem to be witnessing the privatization of the 
                                                
36 Leggewie and Meyer (2005: 323) see Steinbach’s demands for symbolic and material recognition 
and restitution as a paradoxical and unintended consequence of the debate about the Memorial for the 
Murdered Jews of Europe. ‘The main aim of the Vertriebenen-Bund is the creation of the mirror image 
of the Holocaust memorial by erecting a Centre against Expulsion, which is primarily dedicated to 
German victims and also to be located in Berlin’ (ibid.).  
37 Uwe Timm (2003) Am Beispiel meines Bruders, Reinhard Jirgl (2003) Die Unvollendeten, Stephan 
Wackwitz (2003) Ein Unsichtbares Land: Ein Familienroman, Dagmar Leupold (2004) Nach den 
Kriegen, Stephan Wackwitz (2004) In den Augen meines Großvaters, Monika Maron (1999) Pawel’s 
Briefe, Karen Himmler (2006) Die Brüder Himmler, Alexandra Senfft (2007) Schweigen tut weh, Ulla 
Hahn (2003) Unscharfe Bilder, Tanja Dückers Himmelskörper to name but a few.  
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political, as Claus Leggewie and Erik Meyer (2005: 317) assert: ‘The political has 
here become private – like the swing of the pendulum of the 1960s and 1970s, when 
the private was declared the political.’38 However, as I will argue below, this 
‘privatization’ of memory in personal but nevertheless public narratives of suffering 
is anything but apolitical and thus cannot be regarded, as Levy and Sznaider do, as 
purely positive. 
 
Ruth Wittlinger (2006b: 205) points out that the re-emergence of memories of 
German wartime suffering is novel insofar as it does not restrict victimhood to the 
family but ‘has entered mainstream’. It seems that the increasing political 
institutionalization of the memory of the Holocaust is attended by a growing 
pluralization of cultural narratives of the past. This in turn might be related to the 
growing convergence between history and memory since the 1980s, instigated by the 
successes of oral history, Alltagsgeschichte as well as the concomitant ‘general 
valorization of memories and oral transmission’ (Assmann 2006: 47).39 Furthermore, 
in the postcolonial and posttraumatic situation the history of ‘hard facts’ (Schmitz 
2007b: 5) is seen as having reached its limits, beyond which memory – above all, in 
the genre of ‘the subjective testimony’ of the witness – remains the only access to 
the past (ibid.).  
 
In their examinations of unified Germany’s cultural memory, Wittlinger (2006b: 201) 
and Schmitz (2007b) thus argue that a new consensus has been achieved: while 
Germany’s responsibility is institutionalized and Europeanized, German wartime 
suffering is increasingly recognized both on national and European levels. Wittlinger 
in particular argues that the interlude of the mid-1990s, when cultural memory was 
concerned mainly with questions and representations of collaboration and 
perpetration, was very short-lived and was soon replaced or displaced by a focus on 
German wartime suffering. She (2006b: 210; see also Heer 2004) maintains that the 
perpetrators become ‘increasingly conspicuous by their absence’, and now mainly 
                                                
38 My own translation: ‘Das Politische ist hier privat geworden – wie ein Pendelschlag der 1960er 
Jahre und 1970er Jahre, als das Private für Politisch erklärt wurde.’ 
39 My own translation: ‘grundsätzlichen Aufwertung von Erinnerungen und mündlicher Tradierung’. 
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appear in their role as victims. She is thus extremely skeptical about ‘how much the 
new consensus actually encompasses in terms of responsibility and guilt.’ She views 
the latter as primarily limited to ‘politically correct expressions of “culpability” in 
political leaders’ speeches and the construction and maintenance of memorial sites 
without having much presence in individuals’ historical consciousness.’  
 
In direct contrast to Wittlinger’s pessimistic assessment of the new consensus, which 
I to a large extent share, A. Assmann (2006b) and Levy and Sznaider (see also Niven 
2006: 20; Fuchs & Cosgrove 2006a, 2006b) assert that memories of guilt can be 
synthesized with those of suffering. Assmann (2006: 197-198) suggests a 
hierarchization of memories in order to facilitate the integration of ‘divergent and 
even contradictory memories into a generally acceptable framework.’ According to 
her (2006b: 198), the memory of the Holocaust provides ‘the normative framework 
into which all the other memories have to be integrated.’ She (ibid.) goes on to write 
that ‘as long as this framework remains in place, the diverse memories of suffering, 
guilt, and resistance can co-exist side by side without necessarily cancelling each 
other out.’ Similarly, Fuchs and Cosgrove (2006: 17) argue that ‘as long as the new 
pluralism is accompanied by a healthy critical response, this is a sign of the fruits of 
the pedagogy of remembrance that has informed unified Germany’s public discourse 
since the early 1990s.’ Furthermore, Levy and Sznaider (2005: 1) see memories of 
crimes and suffering as being entangled when they criticize ‘[m]ost interpretations of 
the destruction of European Jewry and the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland 
and Czechoslovakia and their corresponding memory cultures’ for ‘treat[ing] these 
memories as mutually exclusive manifestations of competing perceptions of national 
self understanding.’ Rather, they (ibid.) ‘suggest that memories of both the Holocaust 
and expulsions are entwined.’ These authors are thus of the opinion that the memory 
of German suffering can (harmoniously) co-exist with the memory of the Holocaust, 
without challenging, perhaps even displacing the latter. They argue that the 
institutionalization of the Holocaust memory and ‘historical responsibility of 
German perpetration’ (Schmitz 2007b: 13) provides safeguards and limits against 
revisionism and contestation.  
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These scholars, however, regard the return of memories of wartime suffering in the 
form of autobiographical and personal narratives of suffering in memoirs, films and 
documentaries, as apolitical and purely cultural and/or therapeutic. Aleida Assmann 
(2003: 138; Niven 2006: 8, 20), for example, argues that now that these memories 
have become detached from any political claims and consigned to the public, the 
German legacy of suffering can rightfully claim its space in cultural memory without 
displacing the Holocaust. I, however, argue that the cultural articulation of traumatic 
memories, even if they are expressed in personal narratives, nevertheless always 
remain political as ‘through their telling and retelling’ they ‘”enter the vocabulary of 
the larger culture where they become tools for the construction of national myths”’ 
(Tal cited in Radstone 2005: 142).  
 
Less optimistic scholars (Heer 2004; Langenbacher 2003; Salzborn 2003; Schmitz 
2006a, 2007b; Seidel-Arpaci 2005: 26; Welzer 2003a, 2003c; Wittlinger 2006b) are 
thus much more skeptical, anxious as they are about personal and family memories of 
National Socialism, challenging and contesting official and cultural memory of the 
Holocaust. Helmut Schmitz (2007b: 2), for example, regards the ‘recent surge in 
representations of German suffering’ as ‘the greatest shift in German memory 
discourse since 1979’ – the year the television series Holocaust was broadcast on 
German television. Laurel Cohen-Pfister (2005: 125) argues that this resurgence of 
memories of German wartime suffering constitutes ‘a break with official cultural 
memory of the Federal Republic and its generally sensitive reflection on the 
Holocaust.’ Welzer et al. (2002) in their study ‘The Holocaust and National 
Socialism in Family Memory’ show that, while the Holocaust is almost completely 
absent from the latter, it is particularly the memory of wartime suffering that is 
cultivated within the family. With these memories becoming increasingly inscribed 
into cultural memory, Welzer (2003a) is concerned about an impending transition 
‘from a perpetrator to a victim community’. In a similar vein, Heer (2004: 8, 248) 
speaks of a ‘reversal in the politics of history,’ and a return to the 1950s, when 
personal memories of wartime suffering shaped cultural memory of NS.  
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Schmitz (2006a: 105-106) writes that ‘[i]t is . . . possible to describe the current 
mass representation of German suffering as a form of “belated” or displaced 
collective empathy in which the children and grandchildren of the “perpetrator 
collective” empathize with their suffering ancestors’. He (ibid.) regards as ‘[t]he 
turning point . . . the issue guilt’, since ‘[w]ith the institutionalisation of the memory 
of the Holocaust as a national responsibility and the shift from second to third post-
war generation, the question of guilt and repression that determined so much of 
German memory discourse is no longer central to the historical imaginary.’ This, in 
conjunction with increasing ‘historical distance’, has ‘open[ed] up the potential for 
empathizing with the “German experience”’. Chapter 4 thus looks at how the 
interviewees narrate their NS family histories to find that these narratives are in most 
cases not recounted in the mode of critical distance, but in an empathetic mode that 
tells the story from the grandparents’, i.e. the war and perpetrator generations’, 
perspective. Chapter 5 examines the consequences this shift entails in terms of the 
content of narrative family memory of NS, to find that it implies that most 
interviewees consider their grandparents almost exclusively in their role as 
traumatized victims and/or heroes of an everyday ‘resistance’ against Nazism, while 
they often completely neglect their grandparents’ political and active roles during the 
Third Reich.  
 
Chapter 6 can be understood as a bridge between the first two empirical chapters on 
family memory and the last two on cultural memory and (national) identity. It 
returns to the questions raised in this section to explore how the interviewees relate 
their family narratives to what they learnt about NS and the Holocaust at school and 
elsewhere. Due to the at times outright rejection of the latter in their wishes to 
historicize the Holocaust in conjunction with the generally uncritical re-telling and 
valorization of the grandparents’ past suffering, I here side with those scholars, who 
are more skeptical about the recent turn to memories of German victimhood. 
Chapters 7 and 8 continue to think about the historicization of the Holocaust and its 
limits: while chapter 7 looks at the various ways in which the majority of the 
interviewees ‘normalize’ the NS past – either through relativization or regularization 
– and with it German national identity, chapter 8 analyzes a number of interviewees’ 
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experiences of shame as disruptions to such ‘normalizing’ efforts. As such the final 
chapter also functions as an empirical conclusion, as it shows how the NS past 
cannot be disposed of in ‘normalizing’ efforts. In the following chapter, I will 
provide the theoretical background that informs my argument against a wholesale 
historicization of the Holocaust and ‘normalization’ of German national identity. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Between memory and forgetting: The ‘seething presence’ of the 
past40 
 
 
‘It is the third generation in particular 
which reflects one of the contradictions of 
German society, the “constant seesaw 
between learning and forgetting”.’41  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
‘The signs are contradictory and confusing’, writes Atina Grossmann (2000: 127) in 
her appraisal of the enthusiastic reception of Daniel Goldhagen’s (1996a) book 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners among young Germans. If they were confusing in the 
mid-1990s, they are even more confusing in the new millennium: on the one hand, 
there are those for whom the Holocaust remains a pivotal part of German cultural 
memory while, on the other hand, there is a growing number of young Germans, who 
are increasingly resentful towards an institutionalized and ritualized memory of the 
Holocaust and keen to rehabilitate their grandparents’ personal memories of NS. In 
the light of studies, such as Harald Welzer et al.’s (2002) which found that the 
grandchildren are primarily interested in their grandparents’ personal experience of 
wartime suffering, rather than their active participation in the NS regime and its 
crimes, one is now, it seems, forced to reassess the perhaps overly positive 
assessments of the ‘third generation’ which circulated at the time Goldhagen’s book 
was published and which optimistically argued that its members ‘want[s] to confront 
what their parents did not want to look at’ (Körner 2000: 69).  
 
Although there are several exceptions, the interviews I conducted with ‘third 
generation’ Germans suggest the need for a broader reassessment of the way in which 
                                                
40 Gordon (1997: 17). 
41 Lars Rensmann (1999: 74). 
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this generation remembers NS and the Holocaust. They furthermore imply that the 
cultural memory of the Holocaust and NS still provokes strong – albeit increasingly 
negative – emotional reactions in the interviewees. This in turn draws attention to the 
limits of purely constructivist (and cognitivist) notions of memory, which dominate 
social memory studies and the sociology of memory. In addition, many of these 
reactions demonstrate the insufficiency of views like those of sociologists Levy and 
Sznaider (2006) – shared by many interviewees – which argue that, in integrating the 
Holocaust into its official and cultural memory, Germany and Germans have now 
finally worked through their ‘unmasterable past’ (Maier 1988) and have become 
‘normal’ again. In contrast to the widespread endorsement of this perspective, also 
within academia, I will argue that the Nazi past needs to be worked through and 
cannot be shoved aside in ‘normalizing’ or otherwise comforting and redemptive 
narratives of Germany’s triumphant return into the heart of the family of enlightened 
nations, because it will return to haunt.  
 
The interviewee Julia for example, vehemently champions such a view of Germany 
as ‘normal’ and NS as history. Yet, the limits and contradictions of her perspective 
become audible in the way she chooses to open the interview: ‘It [NS] is a topic that 
still haunts/persecutes42 [verfolgen] us’. This remark and her agitation and 
resentment towards the way the Holocaust is officially and culturally remembered 
speaks a very different language, namely that of unintegrated affect in the form of 
unacknowledged shame, which has morphed into resentment and anger (Retzinger 
1996). Thus I assert that the studies about the grandchildren of Nazi perpetrators 
and followers (Leonhard 2002a, 2002b; Kohlstruck 1997; Schneider, Co. 2004; 
Welzer et al. 2002) which draw on social theories of memory miss a vital aspect of 
how this generation remembers the NS past, when they only look at how its 
members construct it in narrative.  
 
I will begin by critically examining theories of collective, cultural and social memory, 
which leave little to no room for considerations of the presence of the past beyond 
current constructions of it. I will then proceed to discuss the literary genre and 
                                                
42 Verfolgen can mean both to haunt and to persecute. 
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historical methodology of traumatic realism as a mode of apprehending and 
representing memory, which allows us to take account of the presence of the past 
beyond its immediately visible and knowable manifestations. I will subsequently 
examine the theoretical tradition that has grown out of social-psychological concerns 
about how to affectively work through the Nazi past, as evident for example in the 
work of the four intellectual heavyweights of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, Theodor 
W. Adorno ([1959] 1986), Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich ([1967] 1975) and 
Jürgen Habermas (1989a, 1989b, 1989c). With Dominick LaCapra (1994, 1998, 
2001) and Eric Santner (1990, 1992) I will, however, argue for a less rigid and more 
fluid distinction between mourning and melancholia, than is apparent in Adorno, the 
Mitscherlichs and Habermas’ work, in order to reconfigure the concept of working-
through.  
 
In following LaCapra and Santner, I can take account of what they assert to be the 
two interrelated dimensions that working-through in ‘the double “post” of the 
postmodern and the post-Holocaust’ (Santner 1990: 18) entails, namely taking leave 
of the idea of identities as stable, essential and unfractured, i.e. structural trauma, as 
well as the recognition and mourning of the suffering caused by the Nazis, 
Wehrmacht soldiers and countless ordinary Germans, i.e. historical trauma. While 
both dimensions are equally important and, to some extent, interrelated, I think the 
former has receded into the background since unification, thus putting into question 
endeavours like Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which have degraded into efforts to be 
redeemed in and through the ritualization and institutionalization of the memory of 
the Holocaust and thereby become ‘normal’ again. In the final discussion of shame, I 
argue that especially individual efforts at Vergangenheitsbewältigung can only be 
‘successful’ if working-through structural trauma is part of the process and it is 
accepted that the past cannot be fully bewältigt [overcome]. 
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2.2 The limits of social memory studies 
 
Although written from within the discipline of sociology, this thesis – like memory43 
and Holocaust studies – is an interdisciplinary undertaking, also drawing on sources 
and debates that lie clearly beyond traditional sociological competence in the fields of 
cultural and literary theory, history and psychoanalysis. These forays into other 
disciplines have come to inform a more critical relationship to my home discipline’s 
rather reductive ideas of memory. Much, perhaps too much, has been written about 
memory of late, that assumes rather than defines and problematizes the term. Yet, 
this remains important, inspite of the exponential, even ‘metastatic growth’ (Olick 
2008: 26) of academic literature about memory, because what memory connotes still 
largely remains dependent on disciplinary and theoretical affiliations.  
 
With the help of Susannah Radstone (2005: 136-37; see also Till 2006), we can 
identify two different – albeit increasingly interrelated – strands of theory. On the 
one hand, there are the more sociological and anthropological studies, which 
concentrate on the social construction of collective and individual memory in 
discourse and practice (J. Assmann 1995, 1999; Connerton 1989; Edwards & 
Middleton 1990a, 1990b; Fentress & Wickham 1992; Halbwachs [1925] 1992; 
Misztal 2003; Narvaez 2006; Nora 1989; Olick & Robbins 1998; Olick 2007; 
Jedlowski 2001; Welzer 2001). On the other hand, studies undertaken in literary 
studies (Rothberg 2000), cultural studies (Bal 1999; Hirsch 2008; Santner 1990), 
philosophy (Lyotard 1990) and history (Friedlander 1993; LaCapra 2001, 1998, 
1994) often apply ‘terms associated with personal memory to domains beyond the 
personal’ (Radstone 2005: 137), particularly psychoanalytic notions like trauma, 
                                                
43 There is some disagreement as to whether memory studies already qualifies as an interdisciplinary 
field, with its own canon, ‘systematic methodologies and unique theoretical perspectives’ (Hoskins et 
al. 2008: 6). While Olick (2008) and Roediger and Wertsch (2008) are reluctant to describe it as 
such, still preferring the term multidisciplinary, Karen E. Till (2006: 326) identifies memory studies 
as having ‘emerged as an interdisciplinary field in its own right’ in the past decade. In any case, the 
publication of the first issue of the journal Memory Studies (January 2008), specialist degree 
programmes and conferences seem to point the way into the direction of it becoming an 
interdisciplinary field in its own right. In the light of this, Radstone (2008: 36) is already concerned 
with the ‘hardening orthodoxies’ of memory studies, by which she means writings on trauma and 
testimony and their tendency to privatize memory. Thus, she (2008: 35) suggests that ‘memory 
research might currently be most productively practiced within the disciplines from which media and 
cultural studies borrow, rather than within the transdisciplinary space of ‘memory studies.’  
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mourning and working-through, to investigate what these theories argue is a very 
complicated relationship between an (extreme) event, its experience and its 
representation (Till 2006: 331).  
 
The first strand – which Olick and Robbins (1998) call ‘social memory studies’ – 
conceives of memory as an inherently social phenomenon. This is particularly 
evident in the theory of collective memory of one of its founding fathers, the 
Durkheimian sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. In critique of Sigmund Freud’s and 
Henri Bergson’s purely psychological notions of memory as individual mental 
capacity to retrieve the past, Halbwachs’ notoriously vague notion of collective 
memory ‘lay[s] to rest the idea of an inner memory’ (Niethammer 2000: 77) by 
rendering autobiographical memory dependent on the ‘frameworks of collective 
memory’. He ([1925] 1992: 182) claims that ‘[t]he individual calls recollections to 
mind by relying on the frameworks of social memory.’ Personal memories can only 
survive if they are articulated within socially recognizable terms and conventions of 
the group(s) the individual belongs to, otherwise they are lost. This presentist view 
of memory was recently reiterated by cultural psychologist Kenneth Gergen (1994: 
90): ‘for whatever the past might have been, its present rendering must be poured 
into the mold set by the cultural rules of narrative.’ This implies that, for Halbwachs 
and his followers – among them Welzer et al. (2002), the authors of the influential 
study on ‘German’ family memory, entitled Grandpa wasn’t a Nazi – the past does 
not exist beyond present interpretations and constructions of it.  
 
Halbwachs’ ideas greatly influenced the sociology of memory and extended into 
cultural psychology (Edwards & Middleton 1990a), with many psychologists 
(Bruner 1991, 2004; Fivush & Haden 2003; Gergen 1994; Neisser 1994; Shotter 
1990) now endorsing the view of memory as social rather than individual. For 
Edwards and Middleton (1990b: 10-11), both psychologists, memory is constructed 
in casual social practices, such as ‘ordinary conversation’. They (ibid.) claim that 
‘[r]emembering and forgetting are to be taken as activities that are embodied and 
constituted within the pragmatics of ordinary social and communicative practices’. 
Discourse, especially narrative, are here seen as ‘crucial in binding an individual into 
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culture – and, in doing so, it [narrative] simultaneously re-creates culture . . . in what 
traditionally is viewed as the individual mind’ (Brockmeier 2002a: 11, 2002b). 
Cultural psychology thus however, fosters a notion of the individual as an effect of 
‘conventionalisation and acculturation’ (Papoulias 2003: 121), i.e. as more or less 
wholly determined by culture.  
 
In their study entitled Social Memory, anthropologist James Fentress and historian 
Chris Wickham (1992) similarly focus on the practice of memory in the (ritual) oral 
transmission of narrative, myth and legend and how these practices construct 
community identity. Paul Connerton (1989), whose focus is less on narrative and 
discourse (i.e. representation) than on commemorative performance and bodily habit, 
seeks to lend more specificity to Halbwachs’ general theory in his influential work 
How Societies Remember. There, he goes beyond Halbwachs’ focus on collective 
representations, to look at how individuals embody collective memory through 
commemorative ceremonies, rituals and bodily practices – i.e. through what he calls 
habit memory. Jan Assmann’s (1995: 127) notion of communicative memory,44 as 
we have seen in chapter 1, derives from Halbwachs’ idea of collective memory and 
asserts that, through everyday communication, ‘each individual composes a memory 
which . . . is (a) socially mediated, and (b) relates to a group.’ Assmann’s notion of 
cultural memory, on the other hand, is broad enough to include both representational 
and performative aspects of how societies shape their relation to their past.  
 
While Halbwachs’ idea of collective memory, however, ‘render[s] the individual a 
sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorised collective will’ (Fentress & 
Wickham 1992: viv; Gedi & Elam 1996), notions like social and cultural memory, 
which often try to avoid Halbwachs’ presentism, nevertheless tend to drown the 
individual in language-like structures.45 There is little room for considerations of 
                                                
44 Welzer et al. (2002: 19-20) endorse this notion to argue that family memory consists less in the 
content of stories transmitted, than in their ritual repetition, through which the family (re-)affirms its 
coherence and identity. 
45 Consider, for example, Fentress and Wickham’s (1992: 7) statement that ‘[i]n and of itself, then, 
memory is simply subjective. At the same time, however, memory is structured by language, by 
teaching and observing, by collectively held ideas, and by experiences shared with others.’ Or the 
cultural psychologist Brockmeier’s (2002b: 18) idea of cultural memory as ‘a connective structure 
that organizes a considerate body of thought and knowledge, beliefs and concepts,’ thereby liking it to 
notions such as Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’, or Foucault’s ‘episteme.’ Klein (2000: 130-31) in his widely 
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change and transformation other than the ‘creative reinterpretation’ (Papoulias 2003: 
124) or (re-)citation of the already given. In much of cultural psychology and the 
sociology of memory, individual subjectivity is evacuated, replaced as it is by 
narrative structure and/or other (communicative) social practices. In her defence of 
psychoanalysis against social theories of memory, Constantina Papoulias (2003: 
114-115) thus argues that the concept of social memory ‘suppress[es] and 
neutralis[es]’ ‘the more radical psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity’. This is the 
case, as social or collective memory is seen to exist only ‘between subjects and not 
within them’ (Welzer 2008: 5); ‘it emerges as a site of intersubjectivity’ (Papoulias 
2003: 117), neither purely individual nor purely collective.  
 
It is, however, not so much the location of memory in the (social) space of 
intersubjectivity that I take issue with, but rather the fact that these social theories of 
memory leave no room for considerations of forms of mediation and transmission of 
memories that occur beyond the symbolic. A host of scholars has also found this 
view of memory wanting, unable as it is to take account of what happens when 
memory fails or cannot be articulated, is denied and repressed or deliberately 
silenced. In an effort to think about such failures of memory, especially in the wake 
of the Holocaust and other extreme atrocities, many have turned to psychoanalysis 
to theorize the workings of individual and collective memory at and beyond the limits 
of what can be represented.  
 
It is in this area that literary critic Cathy Caruth’s (1995, 1996) and others’ (Felman 
1995, Laub 1995) notion of trauma as an overwhelming ‘experience that is not fully 
owned’ (Caruth 1995: 151) and cannot be represented, unfolded its now increasingly 
contested influence on memory studies (see Ball 2000, 2008a; Kansteiner 2004a; 
Mandel 2006; Leys 2000; Radstone 2005, 2007; Weigel 1999, 2003). Yet although 
contested, the notion of trauma provided memory studies with the theoretical 
framework to think about ‘gaps in the transmission of memory’ (Till 2006: 331) by 
                                                                                                                                     
cited piece ‘On the emergence of memory in historical discourse’ thus notes that often conceptions 
that consider memory as inherently social end up ‘mak[ing] memory a structural rather than 
individual phenomenon.’ 
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putting forth the idea that traumatic memories remain present (in their literality (see 
Caruth 1995, 1996)) both for the traumatized subject and posttraumatic culture in 
fantasies, dreams and compulsive re-enactments. It is, however, the idea that we as 
post-Holocaust subjects can partake in and witness the survivors’ trauma by 
listening to their testimonies, and/or by looking at Holocaust photographs or films – 
that trauma is culturally transmittable – that has met with particular opposition, for 
various theoretical, political and above all ethical reasons, which I will discuss below.  
 
This antirealist approach in Holocaust studies, as literary scholar Michael Rothberg 
(2000: 4) calls it, views the Holocaust as unknowable and unrepresentable; as an 
event ‘beyond discourse and knowledge’. Too overwhelming to be understood as it 
occurred, the Holocaust is argued to have precipitated a crisis of witnessing and 
representation. Caruth (1995: 5; emphasis in original), for example, thus appeals to 
the notion of trauma with which she tries to undertake ‘a rethinking of reference 
[that] is aimed not at eliminating history but at resituating it in our understanding, 
that is, at precisely permitting history to arise where immediate understanding may 
not.’ History is here located in the silences, gaps and fissures that speak of 
unintegrated experience and becomes per se traumatic. According to Caruth and many 
others, including intellectual historian Dominick LaCapra (2001), we can only 
‘understand’ extreme events such as the Holocaust when language and representation 
fail; we can never gain full access to this event via representation, as it will always 
exceed such efforts.  
 
To many scholars adhering to the antirealist approach, it is in ‘the “collapse of 
witnessing . . . [that] trauma opens up and challenges us to a new kind of listening, 
the witnessing, precisely, of impossibility”’ (Caruth 1995: 10; emphasis in original). 
This new kind of listening is no longer marked by choice, but by being ‘chosen by it 
[the ‘testimony’ of trauma], before the possibility of mastering it with knowledge. 
This is its danger – the danger of the “contagion”, of the traumatization of the ones 
who listen’ (ibid.). At the point when language collapses, it is argued ‘one 
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disorientatingly feels what one cannot represent’ (LaCapra 2001: 41-42),46 one is 
affected by (a muted or belated) trauma that turns those born after into secondary 
witnesses and ‘coowners of the traumatic event’ (Leys 2000: 269; Lyotard 1988; 
Ball 2003).  
 
However, the issue that divides trauma theorists in Holocaust and memory studies is 
to what extent traumatic memories can and should be worked through and integrated 
in (narrative) representation. Caruth (1995: 154; emphasis in original) tends towards 
viewing representation and speech as dangerous, containing as it does the possibility 
of misrepresentation and the loss ‘of the event’s essential incomprehensibility, the 
force of its affront to understanding.’ In her influential book Trauma: A Genealogy, 
historian of science Ruth Leys (2000: 251-54) thus charges Caruth with sacralizing 
trauma and overvaluing silence, while Gillian Rose (1996: 43; see also Mandel 2006) 
argues that the idea of the Nazi genocide as ineffable leads to a ‘Holocaust piety’, 
which dares not understand the Holocaust ‘because we fear that it may be all too 
understandable, all too continuous with what we are – human, all too human.’  
 
Yet, while I sympathize with Rose’s critique, which is reminiscent of what Rothberg 
(2000: 3-5) terms the realist position47 in Holocaust studies (which posits the 
Holocaust as understandable and representable with the means we have currently at 
our disposal, and regards the Holocaust not as a break in civilization but rather as an 
outgrowth of modern rationality), I will below examine the traumatic realism of 
Dominick LaCapra and Eric Santner as a possibly much more fruitful path to pursue. 
The latter provides a position between antirealism and traditional realism by arguing 
that even though the Holocaust represents a rupture and a serious challenge to 
knowledge and understanding, this break needs to be worked through and adequate 
ways of representation and comprehension need to be found. Representation can, 
however, only be adequate as long as it remains aware of its limits, they (LaCapra 
2001; Santner 1992) add. This position furthermore helps to avoid confusion 
                                                
46 Lyotard (1988: 13, 111, 121) similarly describes the differend as that which cannot (yet) be 
represented and rather manifests itself through a feeling. 
47 This position is represented, for example, by Hannah Arendt’s (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem A 
Report on the Banality of Evil and Zygmunt Bauman’s ([1989] 2000) Modernity and the Holocaust.  
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between a ‘Holocaust piety’ or what is also sometimes called Bilderverbot (image 
prohibition), i.e. ‘what must not be represented’ and the limits of representation, i.e. 
what remains difficult, perhaps impossible to represent (Ball 2008b: 166). 
 
In the discussion below regarding the ideas of post- and prosthetic memory, which 
are based on the idea that trauma is culturally transmittable, I will argue that the 
notion of cultural trauma is unhelpful, especially if used in the German context. This 
is especially so if it is not teamed up with an idea of working-through, not only 
because it can provide an ethical mandate for silence and encourages conceptions of 
competitive victimhood, but also because it contributes to seriously blurring the 
distinctions between victims and perpetrators, victims and non-victims. I will, 
especially in the final section on shame, draw on Avery Gordon’s (1997) notion of 
haunting as a way of knowing, or better learning about the past (of the other). 
Although also informed by the idea of an affective knowing, a way of sensing the 
past’s presence, haunting comes with less baggage, is less politically fraught and 
refrains from drawing on terms used to understand the individual psyche to the social 
and cultural sphere. In addition, haunting also allows us to avoid the assumption of 
social memory studies that memory is social only if it is transmitted and that it can 
only be transmitted if it is articulated (Fentress & Wickham 1992: 47), by 
reconsidering the process of mediation between the individual and its collective past 
as working in often unspecified sensuous ways, i.e. through hauntings.  
 
While social theories of memory display little patience for more complicated 
relationships between past and present and ‘the dialectics of presence and absence’ 
(Van Wagenen 2004: 287), and the idea of cultural trauma allows comprehension to 
arise mainly where history and representation fail (Caruth 1995, 1996; Felman 1995; 
Hirsch 1999, 2001), Gordon’s ‘epistemology of haunting’ (ibid.: 288) and traumatic 
realism make room for the ghostly matters, the traces of the past ‘that reside in the 
shadows, the margins, in the barely visible’ (ibid.) but nevertheless ‘demand to be 
read’ (Santner 1990: 12). On the other hand, social theories of memory, especially 
Assmann’s theory of communicative and cultural memory (see chapter 1) leave no 
room for considerations of ruptured processes of transmission or of traces of the 
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past that cannot find a home in an inhospitable present, which is deaf and blind to 
their presence. I am thus arguing that they are ill fitted to take account of the 
workings of memory in the context of the ruptured ‘double “post” of the 
postmodern and the post-Holocaust’ (Santner 1990: 18).  
 
 
2.3 Memory and representation in the wake of ‘the age of extremes’:48 (The 
family) Home as a ‘tangled site of memory’49 
 
This purpose is much better served, I claim, by exploring intellectual historian 
Dominick LaCapra’s (1994, 1998, 2001) and others’ (Friedlander 1992, 1993; 
Rothberg 2000, 2002; Santner 1990; Silverman 2006) traumatic realist projects 
which, not unlike Gordon’s epistemology of haunting, are lodged between a radical 
postmodern (de)constructivism and an uncritical realism. With the former, traumatic 
realism shares a ‘distrust of representation’ (Rothberg 2002: 67) while nevertheless 
being receptive to the ‘seething presence’ (Gordon 1997: 17) of the past. It also 
wants to remain committed to ‘[s]ome claim to truth’ (Friedlander 1992: 3) and the 
idea of a historical reality that can and must be – even if never fully – confronted, 
represented and documented. While it asserts that traditional realism and positivism 
are inadequate ways to represent and know the genocidal past – as is a radical 
constructivism – because they keep its affective impact at bay, traumatic realism 
must also be understood as a critique of arguments put forward by trauma theorists 
like Caruth (1995, 1996), Felman (1995) and Laub (1995) and film director Claude 
Lanzmann (1995) who declare the Holocaust incomprehensible and unrepresentable.  
 
This theoretical and ethical project not only provides a critical language that allows 
me to distinguish between various forms of narratives of the Nazi past, but also 
enables me to take account of ‘intimations, hints, suggestions’ (Radway 2008: x) and 
other traces of the past in the interviewees’ family narratives. Interviews, like the one 
with Julia, which testifies to a wide gap between what she alludes to as her family 
history, deeply marred by Nazi collaboration and perpetration – evidenced, for 
                                                
48 Eric Hobsbawm (1994). 
49 Max Silverman (2006: 8). 
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example, in a casual reference to a missing photograph, a present absence, in her 
grandfather’s album, beneath which the caption reads ‘near Treblinka’50 – and the 
way she narrates it, namely in the terms of a coherent story of her grandparents’ 
wartime experience and their suffering, convinced me of the necessity of a traumatic 
realist approach.  
 
 
Illustration 2. This is a page out of a private photo album of a Wehrmacht veteran, which documents 
the 'murderous everyday life' (Zeit Geschichte 2011: 15) of the invasion and occupation of Russia. 
The caption beneath the missing photograph reads: 'Shot partisans in Pleskau' (Zeit Geschichte 2011: 
15). 
 
However, like most other interviewees, Julia remains unhaunted by this absence and 
is uninterested in reading this trace and in ‘[f]ollow[ing] the ghost[s] [which] is about 
making a contact that changes you and refashions the social relations in which you 
are located’ (Gordon 1997: 22). Here, the encounter with the present absence of the 
past does not result in a haunting, nor does it entail a process of working-through. 
Thus it becomes clear that while such traces of the past might become hauntings, 
they do not necessarily have to do so. Chapters 6 and 7 will thus look in more detail 
at the consequences of not working-through, which can be detectable in many 
                                                
50 Treblinka was one of the extermination camps in Nazi occupied Poland. ‘[T]he camp’s precise 
location was 2.5 miles (4km) northwest of the village and railway stop of Treblinka’ (Gutman 1990: 
1482). ‘The mass extermination program at Treblinka went into effect on July 23, 1942’ and 
continued until April 1943. ‘[T]he camp was shut down, in the fall of 1943’. ‘A total of 870,000 
people’, the overwhelming majority of whom were Polish Jews, ‘had been murdered there’ (ibid.: 
1486). 
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interviewees’ rejection of cultural representations and the commemoration of the 
Holocaust because they are experienced as unjustified accusations of (collective) 
guilt.  
 
The traumatic realist approach is particularly well suited to my concerns in this 
thesis because it rejects the idea of the Holocaust as unrepresentable and, thus, of an 
absolute distinction ‘between ordinary life on the one side and its unimaginable 
opposite on the other’ (Sebald cited in Silverman 2006: 6), i.e. the industrialized mass 
murder of millions, as well as dismissing attempts to portray the extreme in the terms 
of a pastoral everyday, i.e. in traditional realist terms. Especially in Germany (see 
Erdle 1999), the idea of the Holocaust as unrepresentable and the attendant 
‘”decision for silence” [often] serves as an exculpatory mechanism through which 
rhetorical gestures toward the limits of comprehension effectively masquerade as 
ethical practice’ (Mandel 2006: 62). The Holocaust as unrepresentable then 
‘constitutes a framing in which these links [between the extreme and the everyday, 
A. H.] remain concealed as silenced or invisible facts’ (Erdle 1999: 44; emphasis and 
translations in original). 
 
Particularly Friedlander’s ([1982] 1993, 1993), LaCapra’s (1994, 1998, 2001) and 
Santner’s (1992) perspective, however, has to also be understood as aimed at 
representational strategies of historiographical methodologies like Alltagsgeschichte 
[history of the everyday], and the aesthetics of cultural products like Edgar Reitz’s 
1984 film Heimat, which marginalize the extreme, i.e. the Holocaust, in their accounts 
and portrayals of everyday life under NS. The concepts developed in their critiques, 
to which I shall turn below, are very helpful in analysing the grandchildren’s family 
narratives of NS, which, to a large extent, focus on the mundane of their 
grandparents’ experience of the Third Reich and the war both at home and at the 
front. 
 
In order to think about how the extreme remains present ‘within the otherwise 
normal domesticity of the present’ (Santner 1990: 43) the work of cultural theorists 
Silverman and Rothberg is helpful. Their emphasis on ‘the survival of the extreme 
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into the everyday world’ (Rothberg 2002: 67) of today speaks of their desire to make 
visible and audible such material and symbolic traces via representational strategies 
such as surrealist montage, which defamiliarize familiar everyday objects, thereby 
exposing hidden layers of meaning and ‘transforming the clarity of these objects into 
tangled sites of memory’ (Silverman 2006: 8). Gordon (1997: 200) adds that ‘[s]uch a 
tangle – as object and experience – is haunting.’ In this way the home, the familiar 
and heimlich, manifested in everyday objects, such as a family photograph of the 
grandparents in which the grandfather wears a Wehrmacht uniform, is rendered 
unheimlich [uncanny] when juxtaposed with perpetrator images of the Wehrmacht 
exhibition.  
 
 
 
Illustration 3. An unknown Wehrmacht soldier and his bride (private possession). The soldier 
pictured here is not the one who shoots in the scene shown in the photograph of illustration 4. 
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Illustration 4. This private photograph shows Wehrmacht soldiers committing mass executions of 
Jews in the Ukraine (Pohl 2011: 55).  
 
Furthermore, such juxtapositions of the everyday with the extreme take the 
Holocaust out of the circumscribed and separated space of the concentration camp 
(Brink 2000: 146) and do not content themselves with silence or harmonizing 
narrative, but facilitate the contamination of the present with the past. Thus focusing 
on the everyday is necessary to counter tendencies to view the Holocaust as 
unrepresentable and incomprehensible, but should not be valorized to the detriment 
of the extreme.  
 
In a similar way to Walter Benjamin’s (1968: 262) view of historical materialism 
which, unlike historicism’s ‘”eternal” image of the past’, frozen in time and 
disconnected from the present, ‘supplies a unique experience with the past’, 
traumatic realism, as a mode of representation, not only asks the question of how to 
‘represent’ past atrocities, especially the Holocaust, but also endeavours to affect the 
reader/viewer. In this sense the traumatic realist project also seeks to base 
engagements with past atrocities on an affective encounter with the latter that 
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produces knowledge of it, i.e. to restructure the relation to the past, rather than 
merely represent it. As Rothberg (2000: 140) writes: ‘The traumatic realist project is 
an attempt not to reflect the traumatic event mimetically but to produce it as an 
object of knowledge and to transform its readers so that they are forced to 
acknowledge their relationship to posttraumatic culture.’ 
 
 
2.4 What does working-through the past mean and is it still necessary? 
 
 
2.4.1 Critical theories of working-through: Between structure and history 
 
The theories reviewed below are part of an intellectual tradition that has vitally 
contributed to rendering the suffering of those murdered by German hands, especially 
that of the Jewish victims, central to postwar (West) Germany’s self-understanding. 
Furthermore, it has resulted in a large corpus of work on the question of how to work 
through the Nazi past, also in the younger generations (Brendler 1997; Rensmann 
1999, 2001, 2004; Schneider et al. 1996). I am here of course referring to Theodor W. 
Adorno’s ([1959] 1986; see also [1966] 1997) early and famous text ‘What Does 
Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?’ and psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich’s ([1967] 1975) The Inability to Mourn that have variously engaged 
with Freud’s ([1957] 2001) distinction between mourning and melancholia in order to 
analyze the lack of affective responses of Germans to the Holocaust and the end of 
the Third Reich (see also Arendt [1950] 1993). However, this approach is now 
increasingly attacked, especially because it is seen to be normatively prescribing 
mourning and thereby compounding moral and therapeutic arguments, as well as 
collectivizing and ideologizing what is seen as an at least to some extent unconscious, 
spontaneous and open-ended individual affective process (Ball 2008a; Moser 1992; 
Jureit & Schneider 2010: 173). In order to accommodate such critiques, I will endorse 
LaCapra’s and Santner’s more nuanced and less rigid ideas of working-through, to 
examine the question of what different modes of family narrative might tell us about 
the subjectivities of the narrators.  
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In drawing on what I call critical theories of working-through, the question of the 
normative inevitably arises: To what extent can and should one demand that the 
grandchildren incorporate the Holocaust as a central event into their family stories 
and thereby mourn the past? By endorsing aspects of these critical theories, I am 
arguing against Aleida Assmann’s (2006a: 202-203) suggestion of a hierarchization of 
memories, which implies that it is only on the national political level that a 
‘normative regulation’ of memories is necessary, while on the social level 
‘heterogeneous memories of suffering, guilt and resistance can exist next to each 
other, without displacing the whole structure.’ However, as I will claim below, this 
bypasses the important dimension of structural trauma. Furthermore, as indicated in 
the introduction, I will contend – especially in chapters 4 and 5 – that this view of 
family narratives of NS as purely therapeutic and apolitical misjudges the situation. 
Rather, I assert that family stories can become deeply political, especially when they 
are set in contrast to what the interviewees often perceive as an imposed public 
memory of the Holocaust, that is felt to be delimiting what and how they can speak 
about their family’s past. However, this position does not imply that what is 
practised as cultural and official memory of the Holocaust in Germany is beyond 
critique. Especially in chapter 6, I analyze how education and official and cultural 
memory of the Holocaust, in its quest to instill certain moral emotions in the 
students as the correct ones, often misses its mark of instigating the process of 
working-through.  
 
Freud ([1957] 2001: 244-45) distinguishes between a healthy and a pathological 
response to loss: while in mourning the subject gradually detaches itself from the lost 
object, thus eventually adapting to the reality of its absence; in melancholia, the lost 
object – often ‘of a more ideal kind’ (ibid.) – and what the subject has lost in the 
object remains unconscious and thus ungrievable [nicht betrauerbar]. Freud ([1914] 
1958) formulates this psychic logic slightly differently in his earlier paper 
‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’ where he distinguishes between 
repeating or acting-out and working-through. There he ([1914] 1958: 150) defines 
acting-out as a form of memory, whereby the person compulsively and 
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unconsciously repeats the past in the transference (with the analyst). He writes that 
remembering in such instances is unmediated and proceeds via action (and thus the 
performative): ‘the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and 
repressed, but acts it out.’ Crucially, Freud states that this form of memory is not 
based on representation, but on action. Working-through is the process by which 
such action is then rendered conscious and the person begins to take control of and 
integrates memory into (narrative) representation. It thus enables the remembering 
self to obtain a certain distance to the past; he or she is no longer possessed or 
haunted by it. This, however, begs the question: to what extent can the past be 
worked through? Can the subject become conscious of and take responsibility for the 
whole past in narrative and discourse, as Freud’s (1973: 112) idiom of ‘[w]here id 
was, there ego shall be’ seems to suggest, or will there always be an unconscious 
remainder, haunting us?51  
 
Although Adorno is more pessimistic about the prospects of enlightenment than the 
Mitscherlichs, these three Frankfurt School members in different ways continue in 
the Enlightenment tradition of the modernist Freud, who believed that 
psychoanalysis could render what has remained unconscious conscious by 
strengthening the ‘rational mastery of self-reflection’ (Elliott 2000: 25). They assert 
that the rupture with National Socialism in 1945 was superficial and that the latter 
was/is still present the Germans’ smoldering unconscious and thus unmourned 
identifications with the Nazi regime and its ideology, which have to be made 
conscious and mourned. According to Adorno ([1959] 1986), this can only be 
achieved through ‘conscious critical reflection’ [bearbeiten, durcharbeiten], which 
needs to be distinguished ‘from a bureaucratic Erledigung (dispatching) of an 
unpleasant obligation spurred by a longing for easy transcendence and narcissistic 
redemption’ (Ball 2008a: 151).  
                                                
51 While Habermas (1989b; Schneider & Jureit 2010: 128) sides with the modernist Freud and seems 
to suggest that we can take account of our entire past in narrative and that we only become responsible 
when we do so, in my discussion of shame, below, I tend much more towards the position Judith 
Butler (2005) takes in her book Giving an Account of Oneself. In advocating the idea of a relational 
self, she does away with the normative requirement of a fully conscious and self-transparent self, that 
Habermas champions. Yet, she argues (2005: 18-19) that the idea of a relational or split self does not 
preclude responsibility: even though the subject is disrupted by something that is external to itself, 
external norms do ‘not act unilaterally or deterministically upon the subject’, but ‘set[s] the stage for 
the subject’s self-crafting.’   
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Stunned by a total lack of any affective reckoning with the past, of any feelings of 
guilt, shame, empathy or shock, the Mitscherlichs ([1967] 1975) diagnose the 
Germans with a collective Inability to Mourn. They argue that the Germans, who had 
narcissistically identified with Hitler, now collectively denied, repressed and de-
realized the recent past to ward off a fall into melancholia and claim that Germans 
first had to mourn the loss of their collective ego-ideal, Hitler – what Santner (1990) 
below calls the structural trauma of shattering primary narcissism – in order to mourn 
the victims of the Nazi genocide (historical trauma). While Adorno ([1966] 1997) 
insisted that ‘individual enlightenment was not sufficient’ (Wood 1999: 42) and that 
one had to take the existing objective social conditions into consideration if one 
wanted to prevent the return of fascism, he also agreed with the Mitscherlichs that 
the strengthening of the subject’s self-consciousness and the development of a strong 
ego, which would be able to adapt to reality52 – a ‘reflexive, self-critical 
appropriation and working-through’ to integrate the loss of the narcissistic object 
(Lohmann 1987: 112) – nevertheless remained essential to this endeavour.  
 
Consequently, much more than the Mitscherlichs, Adorno ([1966] 1997, 1970) 
championed the importance ‘of the confrontation with Auschwitz in the public 
sphere of democratic education’ (Rothberg 2000: 58). Habermas (1989a, 1989b, 
1989c), a second generation member of the Frankfurt School, takes this much further 
in his interventions during the Historikerstreit, in which he also addresses the 
question of working-through in the younger generations. Habermas contends (1989a: 
232-233; emphasis added) that, also for the children and grandchildren of Nazi 
perpetrators and followers, there exists a transgenerational ‘collective joint liability’ 
which consists of the obligation ‘to keep alive . . . not only in an intellectual form the 
memory of the sufferings of those who were murdered by German hands.’ This, 
what he calls ‘indebted memory’ (ibid.), which is centred on the victims, grants them 
                                                
52 Adorno (2003: 20-21) thus writes: ‘Since the possibility of changing the objective – namely, 
societal and political – conditions is extremely limited today, attempts to work against repetition of 
Auschwitz are necessarily restricted to the subjective dimension. By this I also mean essentially the 
psychology of people who do such things . . . what is necessary, is what I once in this respect called 
the turn to the subject. One must labor against this lack of reflection; one must dissuade people from 
striking outward without reflecting on themselves. The only education that has any sense at all is an 
education towards critical self-reflection.’ 
 71 
‘the weak anamnestic power of a solidarity that later generations can continue to 
practice only in the medium of remembrance that is repeatedly renewed’ (ibid.).  
 
This transgenerational historical liability has another dimension: it mandates the 
critical appropriation of (national) traditions, which should only be continued if they 
can withstand the scrutiny of universal values, and the adoption of a postnational 
identity and constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1989b). Gerard Delanty (2000: 64-
66; Markell 2000) succinctly summarizes both of these notions: A state or identity 
‘is post-national in the sense that it does not attempt to anchor itself in the state as 
such or in territory or in cultural [or historical] heritage, or more generally in shared 
conceptions of cultural community.’ Postnational identity is based on residence and 
citizenship and takes shape in an identification with the abstract and normative 
foundations of the constitution, i.e. constitutional patriotism. Habermas (1989b: 257) 
describes this as a ‘more sober political identity’, which ‘has detached itself from the 
background of a past centred on national history.’ 
 
Habermas suggests that working-through the National Socialist past can only be 
effective, i.e. facilitate the development of postconventional or autonomous ego-
identities (Habermas 1984, 1989b), if it is carried out in the public sphere. As 
LaCapra (1998: 62-63) puts it, Habermas proposes public memory as ‘a prerequisite 
for any process of working-through.’ Yet, the latter’s insistence on a more abstract 
postnational identity in conjunction with obliging Germans to ‘remember their 
continuing responsibility for Auschwitz’ (Moses 2007a: 237), which implies that 
they understand themselves precisely as members of a historical cultural community 
based on descent, produces what historian Dirk Moses (ibid.) terms ‘a glaring 
contradiction’. Habermas’s position is thus increasingly not only criticized for 
rendering a critical and indebted Holocaust memory the basis of a cleansed 
[geläutert], transformed, European Germany (see Habermas 1999; Ball 2008a: 57; 
Moses 2007a, 2007c), despite his rejection of the logic of redemption and 
Sinnstiftung, but also for implying that the past can eventually be fully worked 
through (Jureit & Schneider 2010: 124-128). It is at this point that Habermas’s 
account converges with the progressive narrative of Levy and Sznaider (2006: 126), 
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in which Germany and Germans have become effectively denationalized and self-
reflexive, a ‘”skeptical” nation’. Thus, his position is sometimes in danger of 
‘cannibalizing the memory of victims for the purpose of reconstructing German 
history’ (Geyer & Hansen 1994: 190) and reconstituting postwar identity as 
European and non-German and thus attacked for using the Holocaust ‘for the 
“negative creation of meaning” (Sinnstiftung)’ (Moses 2007a: 242).  
 
While Adorno and the Mitscherlichs wrote their seminal texts in the late 1950s and 
1960s at a time when Germans were still preoccupied with their own suffering and/or 
the economic miracle, and the victims of the Nazi genocide had not yet gained official 
and public recognition, the writings of LaCapra and Santner have to be situated 
within a thoroughly different cultural, historical and theoretical context. Both 
scholars are concerned with recontextualizing the Holocaust into its specific historical 
and cultural context because, as they argue, it has become decontextualized in a 
poststructuralist discourse, such as in the work of French philosopher Jean-Francois 
Lyotard (1988, 1990) and a trauma theory, e.g. in the writings of literary critic Cathy 
Caruth (1995, 1996), which employ the trauma of the Holocaust – regarded as an 
event without witnesses (Lyotard 1988; Laub 1995) and thus not representable – as 
a ‘metaphor for the failure of representation’ generally (Kansteiner 2004a: 205). 
LaCapra and Santner are thus concerned about how poststructuralism tends to 
(mis)use Auschwitz as a metaphor for the unintegratable, nonrepresentable differend 
to exemplify an inherent gap between representation and reality.  
 
What such accounts like Lyotard’s thus argue needs to be mourned are modern man’s 
‘phantasm[s] of total mastery, full ego identity, definitive closure, “totalitarian” 
social integration, redemption, and radically positive transcendence’ (LaCapra 2001: 
71). In Lyotard’s work in particular, but in poststructuralist theory more generally, 
the search for identity, foundations, coherence, and totality, which is seen to be 
responsible for the horrors of twentieth century history, must be abandoned in 
favour of the play of difference; fantasies of mastery must be mourned and the 
subject, forever split, must be able to deal with ambivalence, difference and 
contingency. Here, the particular historical catastrophe of the Holocaust is degraded 
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into a cipher for the failure of the project of Enlightenment and modernity, while 
working-through/mourning is rejected because it is regarded as geared towards 
redemption. Mourning is said to foster redemption ‘by claiming to know the dead 
and their location, thereby silencing ghosts in the gestures of a certain present, a 
certain there’ (Gunn 2006: 82).  
 
While Santner (1990: 29) argues that poststructuralism/postmodernism thereby 
‘displace[s] and disperse[s] the particular historical tasks of mourning . . . with what 
might be called structural mourning, that is, mourning for those “catastrophes” that 
are inseparable from being in language’, both he and LaCapra nevertheless value the 
poststructuralist/postmodernist idea of a split subject, insofar as the latter thereby 
becomes open to the experiences of others. Yet, in order for the experiences of others 
not to be appropriated, they stress the importance of working-through. The 
conflation of historical trauma with structural trauma, a charge LaCapra also levels at 
Caruth, however results in melancholic or sublime acting-out. Santer’s and LaCapra’s 
appreciation of the importance of mourning historical losses grows out of the 
recognition of the importance of normative distinctions, such as between victims and 
perpetrators. Other efforts to displace the tasks of mourning historical losses (as well 
as structural absence), they see manifest in the concerted efforts to decontextualize 
and universalize the Holocaust by conservative historians during the Historians’ 
Debate in the 1980s.  
 
It is within this context that Santner and LaCapra’s concern with historical 
specificity and the particular tasks of mourning loss that their distinctions between 
structural and historical trauma, between absence and loss, are to be understood. 
Their return to aspects of the modernist Freud – evident especially in LaCapra’s 
(1994: 213) argument that ‘in post-Freudian psychoanalysis’ the idea of working-
through ‘has been underemphasized and relatively underdeveloped’ – and the critical 
theories of Adorno, the Mitscherlichs and Habermas serve several purposes. Firstly, 
it allows them to resurrect what they argue is the agentic and responsible subject 
from a poststructuralist discourse, which they charge with having buried precisely 
this subject; secondly, it permits them to reformulate the question of whether the 
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Holocaust can be represented at all into the question of how it can and should be 
represented adequately (Dean 2002: 247) and ethically; and thirdly, to connect this 
question to issues relating to subjectivity.  
 
Although LaCapra (1998: 46-47, 2001: 47) himself describes the distinction between 
structural and historical trauma as problematic and adds that it should not be 
conceived of in binary terms, both scholars argue that structural trauma is located on 
the transhistorical level and refers to the traumatic shattering of ‘those narcissistically 
charged cultural constructions’ like ‘the Volk, the nation, the clean, the healthy; but 
also: man, home, the self, being, and so on’ (Santner 1990: 18). Historical trauma and 
loss, on the other hand, are ‘the consequence of particular events’ (LaCapra 2001: 
64) and, on this historical level, losses can and should be worked through by engaging 
in enabling and reconstituting public labours and rituals of mourning. Mourning 
allows for both the recognition of the past in the present while, at the same time, also 
establishing some distance to it that permits one to distinguish past from present as 
well as facilitating critical judgment manifest in the ability to discriminate between 
victims and perpetrators, for example. While LaCapra (1998: 65) charges Habermas 
with overemphasizing mourning and historical trauma to the detriment of 
considerations of the role of the unconscious and structural trauma, poststructuralism 
is seen to gravitate too strongly in the opposite direction.  
 
Both scholars thus try ‘to create a position that avoids redemptive narrative and 
sublime acting out’ (Berger 1999: 575). In order to do so, Santner (1992) 
distinguishes between narrative fetishism and mourning and LaCapra (2001: 65-85) 
between acting-out and working-through as different responses to historical loss. 
Narrative fetishism is a strategy that avoids the labours of mourning, i.e. the ‘process 
of elaborating and repeating the reality of loss or traumatic shock by remembering 
and repeating it in symbolically and dialogically mediated doses’ (Santner 1992: 144). 
Following the Mitscherlichs, Santner (1990: 32-33) argues that such a (public) 
mourning of the victims of the Nazis is only possible if the Germans are willing to 
master the ‘more primitive labor of mourning’, which consists of shattering primary 
narcissism (structural trauma), and entails ‘the mastery of the capacity to say “we” 
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nonnarcissistically[,] [and] the integration of the unheimlich into the first person 
plural’.  
 
The response of narrative fetishism, on the other hand, renders apparent the 
consequences of not working-through the past. It is, as Santner (1992: 144) explains, 
‘the way an inability or refusal to mourn emplots traumatic events; it is a strategy of 
undoing, in fantasy, the need for mourning by simulating the condition of intactness, 
typically by situating the site of loss elsewhere.’ It refuses to reconstitute identity 
on the ruins of a shattered narcissism and rather wishes to return to untainted, pure 
forms of (national) identity. Here, the Holocaust and the memory thereof are seen to 
preclude such a return. It constitutes ‘an inclination to reinvoke prematurely a 
condition of normalcy’ (Santner 1992: 148). In chapters 4 and 5, I show how some 
interviewees’ emplotments of their families’ Nazi histories as sentimental stories of 
wartime suffering and heroism constitute a form of narrative fetishism. 
 
Although LaCapra enters the problematic from a slightly different angle – he wants 
to set certain standards for how histories of trauma are to be written – he, like 
Santner, regards harmonizing and ‘normalizing’ narratives, such as those of the 
conservative historians during the Historians’ Debate, as testaments of denials of the 
traumatic impact of the past and a refusal to work it through. This is the case, as 
such objectifying and distancing strategies deny the author’s/subject’s transferential 
relation to the past. The subject must ‘recognize its own implication in the act of 
understanding’ and representing the past (Goss & Handwerk 2002: 438), and thus 
acknowledge its transferential relation to it in what LaCapra (2001: 41-42) calls 
‘empathic unsettlement’. The latter requires ‘a disciplined empathy with the 
traumatized’ (ibid.; see also Ball 2008a) that consists of ‘attending to, even trying, in 
limited ways, to recapture the possibly split-off, affective dimension of the 
experience of others’ (LaCapra 2001: 40). It involves efforts to take on ‘the traumatic 
experience of others’ (ibid.) as a virtual and not a vicarious one, i.e. the secondary 
witness/historian should not fully identify with the survivor’s traumatic experience, 
but should recognize and respect its difference/alterity. Witnessing the testimony of 
survivors, he argues, should be experienced ‘as emotionally and intellectually 
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disruptive’ (Goss & Handwerk 2002: 438), perhaps even induce a ‘secondary 
trauma’ (LaCapra 2001: 41) in the witness/historian. It is here that the distinction 
between structural and historical trauma to some extent dissolves, involving as the 
process of working-through does, empathic unsettlement or secondary trauma in the 
witness. Yet, empathic unsettlement ‘at the very least, . . . , poses a barrier to closure 
in discourse and places in jeopardy harmonizing or spiritually uplifting accounts of 
extreme events from which we attempt to derive reassurance or a benefit’ (LaCapra 
2001: 41-42). 
 
In making empathic unsettlement or muted trauma, or in Santner’s terms the 
traumatic shattering of primary narcissism, a ‘requirement or precondition of 
working-through’ (LaCapra 2001: 71), both argue that working-through may 
necessarily involve acting-out and that the latter may ‘perhaps never [be] fully 
overcome’ (LaCapra 1994: 205); it cannot and ‘does not provide full enlightenment 
or definitive liberation from the constraints of the past’ (LaCapra 1998: 186). While 
not completely distinguishable from acting-out, working-through is nevertheless vital 
to LaCapra’s (1994: 209) account because it ‘involves a mode of repetition offering a 
measure of critical purchase on problems and responsible control in action which 
would permit desirable change.’ However, acting-out (or melancholia) can also, as he 
(1994: 213; Santner 1990) points out, hinder processes of mourning and coming to 
terms with the past. This danger becomes real when melancholia ‘becomes excessive 
or functions as an object of fixation’ (ibid.). Hence it is LaCapra’s and Santner’s 
explicit but non-binary distinction between structural and historical trauma that 
makes their theories so much more useful than those of Adorno, the Mitscherlichs 
and Habermas.  
 
This is the case as the Habermas’ focus on consciousness and rationality has led to 
the neglect, even dismissal of the role of the unconscious in processes of working-
through. Furthermore, LaCapra’s and Santner’s claim that the past can never be fully 
worked through is a welcome and necessary counterpart to an underlying redemptive 
streak in the Mitscherlichs and Habermas which suggests that in memory and 
mourning there lies freedom from the past. In particular Habermas’s emphasis on 
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historical trauma, to the detriment of structural trauma, thus leads to a privileging of 
public memory as the primary site of critical engagements with the NS past and the 
Holocaust. And although LaCapra and Santner, in a similar way to Habermas, argue 
that mourning the victims of the Holocaust must be public and associated to ‘ethical 
and political considerations’ (LaCapra 1994: 210) – it must become not only ‘a 
desirable process’ (1998: 196) but a ‘regulative ideal’ (ibid.) or obligation53 – the 
importance they accord to structural trauma for efforts to work through the past to 
be effective renders their accounts much more useful and less normatively restricting 
than Habermas’s.  
 
Although I do not want to dismiss the importance of Holocaust education and 
memory, in the section on shame, as well as in chapters 6 and 8, I will show that the 
public and institutionalized memory, especially education, often seems to be failing 
in this respect. This is corroborated by recent empirical research (Brendler 1997; 
Meseth et al. 2004b: 142; Staas 2010: 14), which shows that Holocaust education 
and institutionalized memory often only manage to instruct the young in how to 
speak about the Holocaust properly while failing to facilitate a ‘deep intellectual and 
emotional response in the pupils with serious consequences for the formation of 
identity’ (Borries 2004: 268). 
 
 
2.4.2 Post-memories in post-Wende Germany 
 
LaCapra (2001: 64) and historian Wulf Kansteiner (2004a: 195) distinguish ‘between 
trauma and the culture of trauma’ (ibid.) and the former sees arrested melancholia 
manifested in a trauma culture that renders everyone (equally) a victim and history 
per se as traumatic (see Caruth 1996). Here, particular historical atrocities and losses 
are drowned out in a memory culture that vastly generalizes specific events, which, 
in turn, remain unconscious and unmourned. The problem with Caruth’s work and, 
by extension, with the idea of culturally transmittable trauma is, that trauma becomes 
                                                
53 LaCapra (1998: 69) writes: ‘In this sense, mourning should be understood and felt to be an 
obligation as well as a gift of which not everyone deserves to be a recipient.’ 
 78 
unlocatable and the distinction between victims and perpetrators, victims and 
(secondary) witnesses becomes seriously blurred. It is in contending that ‘”victim” is 
not a psychological’ but ‘a social, political, and ethical category’, in stressing the 
distinction between historical and structural trauma and the process of working-
through, even if it can never be finalized, that LaCapra (2001: 79) tries to prevent 
such conflations between victims and perpetrators, victims and (secondary) 
witnesses.  
 
While the generation of 1968, largely congruent with the parents of the interviewees, 
tend(ed) to sacralize the Holocaust and overidentify with its victims (Jureit & 
Schneider 2010: 206; Schneider 2004), the majority of their children seem to move 
into the opposite direction of universalizing the Holocaust, which allows for a 
rehabilitation of their grandparents’ wartime suffering as (equally) traumatic as the 
Holocaust. With the decontextualization and deterritorialization of the Holocaust 
(Levy & Sznaider 2006) as part of the globalization of culture more generally, and an 
attendant universalization of the trauma concept/diagnostic in academia and popular 
culture, comparing the Holocaust to other historical and present atrocities is no 
longer the controversial undertaking it used to be. 
 
The globalization of culture and of the Holocaust in particular proceeds, however, 
not via homogeneization and the imposition of the universal onto local memories, 
that are eradicated and silenced in the process, as sociologist Anthony Smith (1990, 
1991) contends, but rather via ‘a transformation of the national through a more 
complex relationship between the global and the local’, opening up ‘new “memory 
scapes”’ that allow ‘solidarities and mutual responsibilities [to] transcend territorial 
boundaries’ (Levy & Sznaider 2006: 10). ‘Global culture does not wipe out local 
memories; instead it mixes with them’ (ibid.: 15). As Lawrence Grossberg (1996: 
185-6; Featherstone 1990, 1995) puts it, globalization is about ‘the various ways 
people are attached and attach themselves (affectively) into the world. It is a 
question of the global becoming local and the local becoming global.’ In discussing 
cultural historian Alison Landsberg’s (1997, 2004, 2009) idea of prosthetic memory 
and Marianne Hirsch’s (1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2008) notion of postmemory, I 
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want to think about the relationship between (public) memories of the Holocaust and 
(private) memories of German victimhood and wartime suffering. In particular, I 
want to reflect on the way in which some interviewees wittingly or unwittingly 
evoke an increasingly globalized Holocaust iconography – inscribed ‘as universal 
victim narrative into a (western) transnational collective memory’ (Schmitz 2007b: 6) 
– to narrate their fragmented and nebulous family histories of NS and WWII as 
stories of traumatic suffering. While the trend in memory studies is increasingly 
towards transnational and transcultural perspectives (Rothberg 2009, 2006; 
Landsberg 2004) it, however, needs to be kept in mind that decontextualized or 
gobalized historical and cultural memories can be used to strengthen not only 
transnational/cultural solidarities, but also national identities. 
 
Both post- and prosthetic memory are overdetermined notions (Long 2006: 151) as 
they describe a structure of intergenerational memory transmission that is ruptured 
by atrocity and/or migration, as well as an ethics of memory. Akin to what LaCapra 
terms empathic unsettlement, the concepts post- and prosthetic memory aim to take 
account of ways in which we can try to reembody, reactivate or ‘adopt the traumatic 
experiences of others as experiences that we might ourselves have’ (Hirsch 2008: 
114). The position of the postmemorial witness is shaped by an ‘obligatory effort to 
create an “identification with the victim or witness of trauma”’ (Heckner 2008: 68), a 
‘disciplined empathy’ (Goss & Handwerk 2002: 439).  However, unlike LaCapra, 
they (see Landsberg 1997: 83) are less concerned with how the Holocaust can be 
worked through and much more with the impossibilities of mourning. Following 
Caruth (1995, 1996) and Felman (1995) in their endorsements of performative 
theories of representation, Hirsch (2001: 236) for example argues that photographs 
of the Holocaust do not ‘represent the Nazi genocide, but they produce the traumatic 
effect that this history has had on all who grew up under its shadow.’ Landsberg 
(2004) similarly asserts that acts of receiving visual representations of traumatic 
histories, especially films, have an intrinsic potential to traumatize the spectator. It is 
thus that, through technologies of mass culture, trauma is transmitted and particular 
experiences and memories become widely available (for consumption). 
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In explicit opposition to Halbwachs’ idea of collective memory or Assmann’s notion 
of cultural memory, which have increasingly become synonymous with a concept of  
‘culture as an unproblematic, integrated pattern of common values’ (Featherstone 
1995: 89), and beliefs and practices that define a collective, Landsberg (2004: 19) 
argues that technologies of mass culture ‘creat[e] a portable, fluid and nonessentialist 
form of memory’ by opening up ‘a world of images outside a person’s lived 
experience.’ Especially Landsberg’s (2004: 23) theory sees in public and mass 
mediated memories the substance on which generations growing up with variously 
incomplete and fragmented family histories can draw to construct ‘genealogies that 
they, too, might be able to inhabit.’ Furthermore, these technologies thus help to 
‘structure “imagined communities” that are not . . . geographically or nationally 
bounded and that do not presume any kind of affinity among community members’ 
(ibid.: 152). Rather, ‘the role of “distant suffering” and newly formed “victim 
cultures”’ play a vital role in the formation of such imagined communities or what 
Levy and Sznaider (2006: 18) term cosmopolitan memoryscapes. Similarly, for 
Hirsch (2008: 114; see also Levy & Sznaider 2006: 133), ‘postmemory is not an 
identity position but a generational structure of transmission deeply embedded in’ 
personal and familial forms of mediation (i.e. testimony, family photographs, 
personal memoirs, etc.).  
 
It is, however, precisely this ‘increasingly emotionalised and individualised approach 
to history’, which coincides with the globalization of the Holocaust that Schmitz 
(2007b: 6) argues facilitates the return of memories of German wartime suffering. As 
transmission of family memory is ruptured, remembering the family’s past is not 
based on recollection but on ‘imaginative investment and creation’ (Hirsch 1997: 22), 
and ‘identification and projection’ (Hirsch 1999: 8-9) and, therefore in large parts 
shaped by fantasy. In a number of interviews, we thus find fragments of Holocaust 
narratives, with the help of which the family’s NS past is imagined. These 
imaginative investments, however, often work like screen memories (Freud 2006: 
454), insofar as they ‘associatively displace[d]’ rather than completely silence 
threatening hints and allusions to the grandparents’ active Nazi collaboration and 
perpetration. The much more comforting memory/fantasy of the grandparents as 
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having suffered a trauma is thus furnished with fragments of a memory culture, in 
which innocent victimhood is valorized, while perpetration remains utterly 
incomprehensible and radically evil (Radstone 2007: 104). However, by emplotting 
the family Nazi past in a seamless story of suffering, working-through (structural and 
historical trauma) is again displaced by engaging in a ‘[n]arrative fetishism [which] 
releases one from the burden of having to reconstitute one’s self-identity under 
“posttraumatic” conditions: in narrative fetishism, the “post” is indefinitely 
postponed’ (Santner 1992: 144). 
 
Both Landsberg (2004: 152) and Hirsch (1999: 9) contend post- or prosthetic 
memories can also ‘serve as a model’ for ‘an ethical relation to the oppressed or 
persecuted other’ (ibid.). They seek to conceptualize how one can ‘adopt the 
traumatic experience – and . . . memories – of others as one’s own’ (Hirsch 1999: 9), 
yet without appropriating the other’s experiences and ‘annihilating the distance 
between self and other, the otherness of the other’ (ibid.). Thus they want to 
counteract the kind of ‘appropriations’ described above and in chapter 5: hence, 
Hirsch’s (1999: 7-10) differentiation between heteropathic and idiopathic 
identification and Landsberg’s (2004: 149-155) between empathy and sympathy. 
Heteropathic identification/empathy signify an ‘identification-at-a-distance’ (ibid.), 
which does not incorporate the other within the self, but moves beyond the self and 
its ‘cultural norms to align [it]self, through displacement with another’ (ibid.). This 
identification ‘requires an act of imagination’ (Landsberg 2009: 222-223) which, 
however, must remain aware of the ‘unbridgeable distance that separates the 
participant from the one born after’ (Hirsch 2001: 221) in order not to turn into 
idiopathic identification/sympathy, based on narcissistic-looking and self-sameness 
(Hirsch 1999: 10). However, with LaCapra (2001: 41) and Radstone (2007: 104 see 
also Ball 2008a; Mandel 2006) I contend that ‘the position of witness is a complex 
one that can exceed an empathic identification with victimhood’ and can, perhaps 
must also include ‘heteropathic identification with perpetration’ (ibid.: 110).  
 
A memory culture based on witnessing and ‘reliving’ trauma via personal and familial 
forms of mediation can lead to such appropriations and competitive victimhood 
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(Mandel 2006: 50; Rothberg 2006, 2009). As Elke Heckner (2008: 65-66; see also 
Berlant 2007) reminds us in her discussion of the notion of postmemory: ‘an 
affective-empathetic approach will often give rise to a politics of identification.’ The 
way in which some interviewees reject the Holocaust’s place in Germany’s cultural 
memory as too prominent, and the terms in which they narrate their family histories 
of wartime suffering, which are at times uncannily reminiscent of Holocaust 
testimonies, suggests what John Movitt (2000) describes as ‘trauma envy’ to be at 
play: this shows that such transcultural memories, which concepts of post- or 
prosthetic memory describe, can furnish not only ‘cosmopolitan landscapes of 
memory’ and ‘nonessentialist nonidentity politics’ (Landsberg 2004: 152), but also 
precisely an essentialist politics of identity. Trauma envy ‘signif[ies] the 
ressentiment that seeks a wound to legitimate itself morally in keeping with the 
structure of identity politics’ (Ball 2000: 38). The trauma of German wartime 
suffering, especially if it is set in a competitive relation to the suffering of Holocaust 
victims, is often evoked in order to lend legitimacy and moral authority to a unified 
German identity and community.  
 
Composing one’s Nazi family history (exclusively) in the terms of a therapeutic 
discourse – especially the notion of trauma – can furthermore work to displace 
history with ‘individual drama’ (Antze & Lambek 1996: xxiv). Particularly relevant 
to my analysis of the grandchildren’s’ re-narrations of their grandfathers’ war 
experiences in chapters 4 and 5 is Allen Young’s (1995, 1996; see also Hacking 1996; 
Leys 2000; Tal 1996) critique of the inflationary use of the diagnostic of post-
traumatic stress disorder since the Vietnam war, which has facilitated ‘the 
medicalization of individual experience’ and the evasion of collective guilt and 
questions of collaboration and complicity in, and perpetration of, war crimes by (ex-
)soldiers and, thus, ‘a shift in moral focus from collective obligations’ and individual 
guilt ‘to narratives of individual suffering’ (cited in Antze & Lambek: xxiv). The 
medicalization and sentimentalization of historical ‘public violence’ (Seltzer 1997: 8) 
in (publicly articulated) narratives of the individual and personal suffering of veterans 
is in its undermining of ‘public concerns with private ones’ (Misztal 2004: 81); 
nevertheless deeply political, because it facilitates a belated empathy and full 
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identification with the ancestors as victims, thereby ‘produc[ing] a national 
collective’ (Schmitz 2006a: 108; Berlant 2007: 309).  
 
 
2.5 In Shame lies responsibility: Working-through reconsidered 
 
The problems associated with notions like post- and prosthetic memory become 
particularly pronounced in the complex context of postwar Germany, which clearly 
brings to light the potentially conflictual relation between postmemory as a structure 
of transmission and an ethics of memory. In rendering the postmemorial position 
universally available via the cultural transmission of trauma to secondary witnesses, 
Ruth Leys (2000: 296-97; see also Weissman 2004) writes that victimhood becomes 
‘unlocatable in any particular person or place’ and can ‘spread contagiously to 
others.’ This process of adopting the other’s experience as one’s own, is thus prone 
to various forms of unethical appropriation of the other’s suffering, as I will show in 
chapter 5.  
 
Furthermore, as Long (2006: 149-50) notes, the emphasis on the imagination stands 
in marked conflict with the ethical relation to the victims, because it ‘contain[s] the 
possibility of unregulated fantasy that need pay no attention at all either to historical 
accuracy or to the otherness of the other.’ In chapter 5, I will show how allowing 
fantasy to reign freely fosters a continued dissociation of the Nazi family past. For 
example, Anna’s refusal to engage with accessible historical and legal documentation 
about her maternal grandfather’s role as a member of an execution squad in a 
concentration camp, in favour of imagining how he must have felt at the time, results 
in her construction of him as a passive victim. Empathy’s reliance on fantasy (see 
Douglass & Vogler 2003: 38), if unchecked by some measure of distance and 
objectivity, tends to end up in such wish-fulfilling projections as Anna’s fantastic 
stories about her maternal family’s heroic resistance against Hitler and victimhood. 
The interview with Anna and others thus alerts us to the importance of working-
through.  
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Although I find LaCapra’s and Santner’s distinction between structural and historical 
trauma incredibly useful, what they term muted or secondary trauma or the 
shattering of primary narcissism (structural trauma), I argue, might in the present 
context be better described as shame. As, according to both scholars, working-
through historical loss in ‘the double “post” of the postmodern and the post-
Holocaust’ (Santner 1990: 18) must also entail a coming to terms with absence – the 
absence of absolute foundations and full identity – I suggest that some experiences of 
shame can induce just such a process of mourning structural trauma, which both 
Santner and LaCapra assert is a precondition to being able to work through historical 
trauma. I am thus to some extent, reversing Habermas’s argument, which asserts ‘that 
only memory’s constant performativity in the public sphere can’ (Wood 1999: 40) 
facilitate the development of what he (1984) calls postconventional individual 
identities that are able to tolerate and live with difference. In chapter 6, I thus try to 
demonstrate that this emphasis on public memory and historical trauma, although 
absolutely necessary and important, because victims need to be publicly named and 
recognized and anything else would be an ‘effective mandate in favor of a generalized 
melancholia’ (Butler 2004: 36-37), is not necessarily enough.  
 
Beyond public education about and commemoration of the Holocaust, I argue a blow 
to narcissistic national identification that occurs in shame is necessary to serve the 
tasks of mourning in ‘the double “post” of the postmodern and the post-Holocaust’. 
This is especially the case, as Michael Kohlstruck (1997: 10, 92; see also Schneider, 
C. 2004: 280-81) finds in his study, that an ‘im- or explicit sense of belonging 
[Zugehörigkeitsgefühle]’ plays an important role for the ‘third generation’s’ relation 
to NS. The NS past is thus often primarily relevant to them in a collective sense. 
This in turn is related to the fact that the ‘third generation’ is, as Aleida Asssmann 
(2007a: 64-66) writes, the first transnational generation, whose members are on their 
travels around the world as well as in an increasingly multicultural Germany 
confronted with difference in a way that their parents never were. It is this particular 
characteristic that shapes the experiences of most members of the ‘third generation’, 
certainly of those I interviewed, which I see contains the possibility of inaugurating a 
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more sustained working-through of the past; at the same time, if shame remains 
unacknowledged, it can also comprise the seeds for a return to defiant national pride.  
 
In my focus on shame I am here following historian Dirk Moses’ (2007a, 2007b, 
2007c) important work which has shifted the focus from discussions of (collective) 
guilt to stigma and its ‘emotional product[s]’ shame, which is seen by many (see 
Strote 2009: 333; Probyn 2005) as much more productive than guilt. The experience 
of shame is particularly well-disposed to instigate processes of working-through, 
especially structural but also historical trauma, because, as social philosopher Helen 
Lynd (1958: 37) observes, it often entails ‘[t]he loss of the identity one thought one 
had’. Elspeth Probyn (2005: 2) in her recent book on shame concurs: ‘[s]hame makes 
us feel small and somehow undone’. Philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1999: 106; see 
also Sedgwick 2003: 37) notes the ‘double movement’ of ‘both subjectification and 
desubjectification’ that the experience of shame entails. Shame tends to be 
particularly virulent when one finds oneself literally out of place (Probyn 2005: 37-
41) and in a different cultural space or, as Lynd (1958: 35) puts it ‘out of key with 
one’s environment’. ‘Shame is [thus] not only an intrapsychic process but also an 
interpersonal one; it occurs within persons as well as between them’ as Retzinger 
(1996: 17; emphasis in original) remarks. As such, it is a deeply social emotion, 
involving a real or fantasized reflection ‘of how we look in others’ eyes’ (ibid.: 13; 
emphasis in original; Taylor 1985). In shame, one sees oneself through the eyes of 
another and is thereby exposed to oneself as something or someone other than 
expected or previously known, and mostly as in some way failing (an ideal) and 
defective. Shame estranges one from oneself.  
 
Hence, it is often noted (Taylor 1985: 59; Lynd 1958; Probyn 2005) that experiences 
of shame produce a particularly heightened state of self-consciousness, as they entail 
becoming conscious of parts of our selves that have so far remained unacknowledged 
and unconscious. In distinction to Agamben (1999: 106; see also Levinas 2003 
[1982]), who regards shame as an ‘ontological sentiment’, fundamental to shaping our 
subjectivity, I want to draw attention to the productive and transformative aspects 
of acknowledged shame. Although I share Judith Butler’s (2004, 2005) view that we 
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can never be fully conscious of and transparent to ourselves, I also agree with 
LaCapra and Santner that we can try to become more conscious of ourselves. Thus I 
argue with Suzanne Retzinger (1996: 14) that as long as shame remains 
unacknowledged, it breeds resentment because ‘it is the ‘other’ who is experienced as 
the source of hostility’ while acknowledged shame can indeed ‘lead to greater 
awareness of both self and the social world’, (ibid.: 18) because it is through the other 
and with the recognition of one’s inherent social relatedness that one conducts one’s 
search for self-identity.   
 
In stressing shame’s transformative and productive aspects, Probyn and other shame 
theorists (see Sedgwick 2003) correct an often one-sided view of shame as regressive 
(e.g. Benedict [1946] 1967; Branscombe & Doosje 2004; Brendler 1997; Leys 2007, 
Rensmann 2004). The latter view is especially concerned about an implied ‘shift of 
attention away from questions of human agency to questions about the attributes of 
a subject’ that is found to be ‘at stake in the general valorization of shame and 
depreciation of guilt’ (Leys 2007: 150). While (collective) guilt is associated with 
action, cognition and intention as well as deeds judged as transgressive by an internal 
moral authority – the subject feeling guilty as the ‘largely inner-directed creature[s] of 
the Protestant conscience and Kantian moral autonomy’ (Parker 1996: 2-3) – the 
subject feeling shame is seen to be responding primarily to ‘external sanctions’ 
(Benedict: 156-57).  
 
The crucial difference between guilt and shame is, however, the notion that guilt can 
be relieved by ‘confession[,] . . . atonement’ (Benedict: 156-57), ‘punishment [and] 
forgiveness’ (Taylor 1985: 90), and/or by rituals of (inner) purification (Jaspers 
[1947] 2001), or (public) rituals of mourning (Habermas 1989a), while shame ‘lingers 
deep within the self’ (Probyn 2005: 2) leaving wide open the question whether one 
can ever ‘”deshame” oneself’ (ibid.: 7). Shame can return ‘long after the particular 
moment of shaming has passed’ (Probyn 2005: 46). However, as the experience of 
shame involves the whole subject, not only its transgressive (in)actions, the 
theoretical move to shame is anxiously viewed as an abnegation of questions of 
individual and collective responsibility because it is seen to ‘replace[s] . . . concerns 
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about accountability with an emphasis on the question of our personal attributes’ 
(Leys 2007: 185).  
 
Yet, while this view of responsibility as tied to conscious action and guilt is very 
limited, in drawing on Judith Butler’s recent work, I argue that it is precisely in 
(acknowledged) shame that responsibility emerges, albeit not necessarily a self-
consciously accepted one. The often unexpected nature of shame (Lynd 1958: 27-
34), that speaks of the capacity of something outside of ourselves to overwhelm us, 
reminds us that we are social beings and precisely not completely autonomous. In 
chapters 7 and 8, I thus suggest that ethical agency and responsibility emerge not as 
the result of our autonomy from our social context, but precisely within ‘the context 
of an enabling and limiting field of constraint’ (Butler 2005: 19) that is marked by 
what preceded the subject, i.e. by its history. It is in the experience of shame that the 
‘self [becomes] affiliated with the horrors of its history’ (Mandel 2006; 218; 
emphasis in original). I furthermore assert that we become affiliated with and aware 
of the horrors of our history in shame because it speaks of what has not yet – and 
perhaps can never be – fully mourned, worked through and incorporated into a public 
iconography of memory. The shame felt by some of the interviewees in my sample 
might be interpreted as the unassimilable remainder or the reminder of the 
unassimilable (LaCapra 1998: 187) that makes itself felt rather than immediately 
available to conscious knowledge. 
 
The way I here conceptualize experiences of shame comes close to what Avery 
Gordon (1997, 2004) specifies as haunting. Like haunting, which ‘describe[s] those 
singular yet repetitive instances when home becomes unfamiliar, when [our] bearings 
on the world lose direction, when the over-and-done-with comes alive, when what’s 
been in [our] blindspot comes into view’ (Gordon 2004: xvi), in shame ‘we become 
strangers in a world where we thought we were at home’ (Lynd 1958: 46), 
highlighting ‘hitherto unrecognized aspects of one’s personality . . . [and] one’s 
society’ (Lynd: 183). The Heim[at], the home suddenly becomes unheimlich, 
uncanny (Freud [1919] 1959). Thus, I argue that in shame we can have that unique 
experience with history that Benjamin speaks of, in which the past enters into ‘a 
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tension-filled constellation with the present’ (Buck-Morss 1989: 218) and is blasted 
out of the continuum of the ‘homogeneous, empty time’ (Benjamin 1968: 261) of 
history and becomes present.  
 
As shame is an inherently social emotion (Scheff 2003: 256) because it constitutes ‘a 
threat to the social bond’ that comes with being exposed (as defective or lacking), it 
also tells us that we care about the state of the particular social bond threatened. 
‘Without interest’ or care, Probyn (2005: 14) and Retzinger (1996) write ‘there can 
be no shame’. ‘[C]onversely, shame alerts us to things, people, and ideas that we 
didn’t even realize we wanted. It highlights unknown or unappreciated investments.’  
 
I want to end this chapter with a few remarks about reconciliation. Unlike what is 
currently practised as reconciliation in Germany, i.e. reconciliation as ‘normalization’ 
and universalization of trauma, which eradicates difference in an eagerness to render 
everyone a victim, shame, ‘[u]nlike empathy,’ Probyn (2000: 57) contends:  
 
‘does not permit any automatic sharing of commonality: it is that which 
poses deep limits to communication. Shame can be made to insist on the 
specific nature of the acts that caused it; it can be made to mark the awesome 
materiality of its own condition of possibility. It stakes out the moments of 
possible reconciliation without losing sight of the conditions, which have 
produced their specific feeling and modality. The possibilities of connection 
are many, but they are also always circumscribed by the finite localised 
action, of reconciliation performed in local realities that brings the past into 
the present.’ 
 
 
At the end of chapter 5, I thus borrow Ole Frahm’s (2004) phrase of ‘the 
shamelessness of the German victim identification’ to argue that idiopathic 
identifications with one’s Nazi perpetrator, follower and Wehrmacht soldier 
grandparents as victims are shameless, because they leave the family, the home, the 
past and national identity intact, marginalize and exclude traces of the extreme, of 
collaboration and perpetration and thus avoid the reconstitution of identity in ‘the 
double “post” of the postmodern and the post-Holocaust’ (Santner 1990: 18). ‘It is 
the shamelessness of identifying oneself as victim, in order not to have to face the 
responsibility for the deeds’ (Frahm 2004a: 375).  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I tried to lend a theoretical basis to my argument for a continued 
relevance, perhaps even urgency, of the tasks of working-through the Nazi past in 
the generation of the grandchildren. Considerations of these tasks have however 
increasingly fallen by the wayside both in academic studies and journalistic 
commentary, dismissed as they are as ideological relics of the generation of 1968 and 
the old Federal Republic. Although certain theoretical assumptions underpinning the 
idea of collective and individual working-through of the Nazi past are in need of 
serious reconsiderations and reformulations, this should not lead us to throw out the 
baby with the bathwater. In distinction to the holy trinity of the tradition of German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung – Adorno, the Mitscherlichs and Habermas – I thus 
stressed the importance of what LaCapra and Santner term structural trauma and the 
reconstitution of identity as open to relatedness and difference that occurs when 
shame is acknowledged. Only when we no longer experience haunting – as Julia does 
– as persecution but as an invitation to follow the ghosts, the present absences, and 
what they might reveal, are we able to begin with the overwhelming task of 
‘mourning’ the suffering of the victims of Nazi Germany. This focus on the limits of 
representation – on the margins and exclusions of the family stories of NS that the 
interviewees recount – that this focus on haunting entails, raises a series of 
methodological questions, which I will examine in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3:  Methods 
 
At the limits of narrative: Analysing family and life stories of 
the grandchildren of the war and Nazi perpetrator generation in 
Germany 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
Narrative has made an ‘astonishing “comeback”’ (Hinchman & Hinchman 1997: xiv) 
in the humanities and social sciences in the last two decades. Although definitions of 
narrative vary greatly, it can be broadly ‘defined as temporal sequencing of events’ 
(Andrews et al. 2000: 3). While there is much disagreement about the extent to which 
we shape narrative or narrative shapes us and the events we recount, narrative allows 
us to view the self ‘as a psychosocial phenomenon’ (ibid.: 1) at the crossroads 
between individual and society. Scholars who are dissatisfied with structuralism and 
poststructuralism, which drowns the self-shaping individual in social structures and 
discourses, thus particularly endorse the concept of narrative. Although embedded in 
and dependent on its social context, theories of narrative identity conceive of the 
individual as having a certain leeway over how it interprets its own experience. Yet, 
although the ‘narrative turn’ thus fits well with Santner’s and LaCapra’s agenda to 
resurrect some form of the agentic, responsible individual, LaCapra (2001) in 
particular takes issue with the view championed by strong narrativists in history 
(White 1992), literature (Young 1988) and psychology (Bruner 1991, 2004, 
Brockmeier 2002; Brockmeier & Harré 2001) which asserts that meaning inheres in 
narrative structures which produce historical accounts and identities. This strong 
view of narrative thus raises issues concerning historical truth and the limits of 
narrative – to which I shall return in the final section of this chapter – as it begs the 
question of how to arbitrate between competing narratives of the same event and 
whether there is a reality beyond narrative.  
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Before doing so, however, I want to devote the first part of this chapter to a method 
that is curiously absent from almost any of the academic works on the memory of 
the Holocaust written by children or grandchildren of Nazi perpetrators or fellow 
travellers, namely auto-ethnography.54 Although there has been a veritable surge of 
(fictional) autobiographies by the grand/children of the war and perpetrator 
generation, this widespread trend towards greater self-reflexivity does not seem to 
have reached German academia just yet. And while academic literary criticism and 
commentary of this autobiographical output is swelling rapidly, the old scholarly 
habit of strictly separating between the personal and professional seems to remain 
obstinately. I find this absence particularly curious not only because, as Raul Hilberg 
(cited in Welzer et al. 2002: 10) once remarked that the Holocaust is family history in 
Germany, but also ‘as far as memory . . . is concerned, private and public turn out in 
practice less readily separable than conventional wisdom would have us believe’ 
(Kuhn [1995] 2002: 4). After having considered my personal investments in this 
project and how they have shaped it, I will elucidate the recruitment process, the 
make-up of the sample and the interviews themselves, to return to the analytical 
questions raised above.         
 
 
3.2 Auto-ethnography as method: the self as a ‘fieldwork tool’55 
  
Shulamit Reinharz (1997: 4) notes that it is ‘through understanding the relevance and 
creation of different characteristics of the researcher in the setting that the self 
becomes the key fieldwork tool.’ It is thus that, in this section, I would like to pose 
two questions. Firstly, as I am writing this thesis about the grandchildren of Nazi 
perpetrators and followers while being myself such a grandchild, how did I use auto-
ethnographic/auto-biographical writing as a method during the course of this project? 
‘Being native’ furthermore raises the important issue of distance to and intimacy 
with the field. How did I navigate this fraught line between the personal and the 
                                                
54 The only exception here is Schneider et al. (1996). 
55 Reinharz (1997: 3).  
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‘professional’ academic? Secondly, to what extent and how will my own self become 
part of the text? What genres and conventions are most appropriate and useful in this 
context? However, before I can begin to think about these questions, a few 
methodological remarks about the nature of the subject itself, i.e. the Holocaust, are 
in order. 
 
 
3.2.1 The Holocaust as an object of study 
 
The Holocaust makes it very difficult, if not impossible, even for an academic, to 
approach it completely neutrally and objectively; to remain totally unaffected by it 
(see Bos 2003: 50). Dominick LaCapra (1994, 1998, 2001) has written extensively 
about the methodology of Holocaust historiography to claim that ‘[t]he Holocaust 
represents the historian with transference in the most traumatic form conceivable – 
but in a form that will vary with the difference in subject-position of the analyst’ 
(1994: 45-46). While he argues that one can neither remain completely objective 
when confronted with the Holocaust – a stance he (1994: 70-71) calls a deceptive 
objectivity – one also should not give free reign to unchecked identification with 
either victims or perpetrators when producing works about the Holocaust. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, he renders empathic unsettlement a precondition 
for working-through the past, but asserts that it should be followed by a critical 
engagement ‘with the problem of one’s relation to the past’ (ibid.: 57). While my 
problem during the course of this project was perhaps less with what LaCapra calls 
deceptive objectivity than with unchecked identification with the victims, it needs to 
be noted that the resulting ‘sense of moral obligation and selfless effort’ (Bos 2003: 
50), that informed my interviewing and writing for some time, can, however, be just 
as deceptive, particularly because it can engender a false sense of security by 
absolutely and conveniently separating oneself from the perpetrators.  
 
An overidentification with the victims can hide the fact that our positions and 
investments are in most instances ‘much more complex’ (Bos 2003: 50-51) and 
complicated than we are inclined to admit. This is particularly so, I would argue, for 
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descendants of Nazi perpetrators and followers. Questioning the un-self-reflexive 
adoption of such an identification with the victims, Bos (ibid.: 51) for example argues 
that ‘whereas our emotional investment in this work seems undeniable, the nature of 
this investment and the kinds of work to which it leads us, have often been left 
unexamined.’ My own initial, but obstinate, over-identification with the victims of 
the Holocaust and the adoption of this ‘safe’ but, in my case, at times quite 
moralistic, even dogmatic, position has sometimes made me quite self-righteous in the 
interviews and their analysis, but I shall discuss this in more detail below. Yet, as a 
young German woman, with a family history marred by active Nazi collaboration 
and perpetration, I felt obligated to side with the victims in defending an anamnestic 
memory that I consider as increasingly under threat. However, in taking this position 
and the way I remained (narcissistically) attached to it, I at the same time neglected 
the fact that in doing so I also conveniently distanced and dissociated myself from 
this family history as well as not realizing that this position was not without its own 
evasions and disavowals.  
 
This does not mean that I am rejecting an identification with the victims; rather, I 
want to show an awareness of its ambiguity and perhaps also its historicity. 
Christian Schneider (2004) helpfully puts into historical context the moralism that 
has come to guide many efforts at Vergangenheitsbewältigung and which is 
manifestly influenced by the generation of 1968. He (ibid.: 247) notes that the 
generation of 1968 engaged in what he calls a ‘hysterical identification with the 
murdered [Jews] – and . . . claim[ed] to speak accusatorily in their name.’ Yet, while 
Schneider (ibid.) argues that this counter-identification [Gegenidentifizierung] with 
the victims was a necessary social psychological passage, he agrees with LaCapra 
that it needs to be worked through to be able to distinguish between empathy and 
unchecked identification. To be able to draw that distinction and get closer to what 
LaCapra (1994: 70-71) regards as a ‘defensible mode of objectivity’, which is 
‘achieved in and through an explicit, theoretically alert resistance to projective or 
wish-fulfilling tendencies and an attempt to engage critically the problem of one’s 
transferential relation to the past’, I was thus compelled to practice ‘Wissenschaft in 
erster Person’ [‘science in the first person’] as Schneider et al. (1996: 14-15) put it.   
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3.2.2 The self in the field 
 
They (ibid.) furthermore assert that, if one wants to write a history about Germany’s 
post-Holocaust generations as a ‘native’, it is necessary to relinquish ‘the lofty 
restraint of the scientist’. It is thus that the method of auto-ethnography lent itself to 
this project, as it rejects the idea that the researcher can and should remain hidden 
from the research process and the production of the scholarly text (see Denzin 1989: 
34) and allows for the self to be ‘recognized as a salient part of the research process’ 
(Spry 2001: 711). As Reinharz (1997: 3, emphasis in original) puts it ‘we both bring 
the self to the field and create the self in the field.’ Although the precise terms of 
what auto-ethnography is or should be remain contested, I will here refrain from 
discussing matters of definition and adopt Reed-Danahay’s (1997: 9) notion of auto-
ethnography as ‘a method and a text’ which ‘can be done by either an anthropologist 
who is doing “home” or “native” ethnography’ or ‘by an autobiographer who places 
the story of his or her life within a story of the social context in which it occurs.’ 
 
Let me begin by addressing the issue of my status as ‘insider’ or ‘native’. Obviously, 
the choice (if we can really speak of choice here) of the subject for this study is in 
one sense a deeply personal one. I would thus agree with Ruth Behar’s (cited in 
Motzafi-Haller 1997: 210) statement that ‘You don’t choose to write the books you 
write, any more than you choose your mother, your father, your brother, your 
children’, more because the family metaphor she uses to describe the relation of the 
researcher to his/her subject captures so very well how I came to this project, rather 
than because of its perhaps more stringent broader methodological implications. I am 
thus not arguing that ‘being native’ provides some kind of privileged access to 
knowledge. Rather, I simply want to point out that, in a similar way to Vieda 
Skultans (1998: x), a medical anthropologist and a Latvian émigré to the United 
Kingdom, who conducted a study on biographical narratives in post-Soviet Latvia, 
this project emerged out of a mixture of ‘necessity with coincidence’. Skultans (ibid.: 
ix) recounts how being a trained anthropologist and Latvian by birth (thus speaking 
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the language) not only turned the country into ‘a natural fieldwork destination’ but 
also how her own family history pulled her to studying how Latvians narrated their 
life stories, fractured by political upheaval and terror. It is in allowing, perhaps even 
fostering, this ‘bridging of the domains of the personal and the public’ that Radstone 
(2008: 33) sees one of the great strengths – and dangers – of memory studies, as 
work in this field often emerges out of a ‘felt urgency’ of questions that arise from 
‘personal or familial links’ (ibid.).  
 
The way I came to this project has, however, an added affective dimension: my 
interest in family memory of NS was primarily instigated by the intense shame I felt 
in the wake of my move abroad. It was only in London, where I experienced my 
‘German identity’ as something shameful and to be hidden, that I gradually and 
increasingly became interested firstly in the Holocaust and secondly in my own 
family history. Only from the ‘safe’ distance of the island, was I able to ask my 
family and myself questions relating to NS.56 The fact that I grew up in Germany 
with two absent and yet very present grandfathers shaped my initial path into this 
study. Both of my grandfathers died after the war but before I was born. In 
attempting to get closer to the ‘truth’ about their past, and have my burning question 
to what extent they were actively involved in committing crimes answered, I 
submitted requests for information with the Berlin Document Centre, the Deutsche 
Dienststelle WASt57 in Berlin, and the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen 
zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen58 in Ludwigsburg about their time 
in the army as well as my paternal grandfather’s NSDAP membership. As part of 
these researches, I learnt that my paternal grandfather was an early (Nov. 1932) 
member of the SA and the National Socialist party (NSDAP), had two de-
nazification proceedings and was eventually classified as fellow traveller. He was also 
a Wehrmacht soldier in Poland, France, Luxemburg and Greece, while my maternal 
                                                
56 These questions were largely debated between my parents and myself, as my paternal grandmother 
had a severe stroke when I was twelve years old, which rendered her paralyzed and mute. I had one 
conversation with my maternal grandmother about her experiences of NS shortly before she died in 
2005.  
57 The official archive housing the records of members of the former Wehrmacht. 
58 The Central Office of the State Justice Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist 
Crimes. 
 96 
and much younger grandfather did not join the Nazis but fought for the Wehrmacht 
(6th army) on the Eastern front. My initial focus on the Wehrmacht exhibition was 
thus in many ways driven by a very personal desire to find out what my 
grandfathers had done before and especially during the war.  
 
Disappointed by the lack of more detailed information available and disheartened by 
an increasing awareness that I would not be able to get any quick answers – perhaps 
never get any answers – my method began to shift from archival research to 
psychoanalysis. My interest turned from historical questions about what ‘really’ 
happened to questions concerning the after-effects of the historical events as well as 
issues of memory transmission and the representation of the past. I began to ponder 
my grandmothers’ pasts and their relation to NS. My grandparents’ Wilhelmine and 
National Socialist childrearing practices became one way of thinking about how the 
Nazi past shaped the childhood and personal development of my parents and myself 
(see Chamberlain [1997] 2003). Then questions such as how my grandparents’, but 
also my parents’, dissociation of and silence about both family’s Nazi and war past 
influenced our family and my personal life became relevant. I became intensely 
interested in the psychopathologies of post-war family life in Germany (Schneider 
1984) and particularly in the psychological and psychodynamic defense mechanisms 
structuring the process of the transmission of the memory of National Socialism and 
the Holocaust through the generations. Devouring the psychoanalytic literature on 
this topic (Bergmann & Jucovy 1982; Bohleber 1990; Grünberg & Straub 2001; 
Eckstaedt 1982, 1986, 1989, 1992; Rosenthal et al. 1997a), I found myself 
increasingly unable to distinguish between my efforts to analyze my family and 
myself and the academic project. At that time, I saw my analytic (sociological) 
vocabulary shrink to a few basic psychoanalytic insights and my concern about 
understanding the ‘field’ drastically recede into the background.  
 
It took a long time before I could begin to disentangle the ‘personal’ from the 
professional and academic, while also recognizing that they can never be separated 
completely. Although I believe this phase of the research process was thoroughly 
necessary, the delay it caused also somehow makes me sympathetic to those arguing 
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that too much self-reflexivity has the potential to become narcissistic and self-
indulgent and hence detract from the field as well as possibly depoliticize both 
subject and object of study.59 What was helpful here was Reinharz’s (1997: 18) 
position, which, not unlike LaCapra’s, argues that ‘[u]nderstanding the self in 
fieldwork releases us from the epistemological tension between unreflexive 
positivism, on the one hand, and naval gazing on the other.’ So, what I want to stress 
here is that feminist methodological insights helped me regain some distance and 
assisted me in striking a balance between ‘unreflexive positivism’ and ‘naval gazing’, 
by allowing me to take seriously the idea that my own personal experience and self is 
not only an obstacle to be overcome, as Rosenthal (2007: 47)60 implies and is 
common in so much of ‘German’ mainstream sociology, but can, perhaps even must, 
be used as a central resource and tool.  
 
Following Coffey (1999), I find it very helpful to view this submergence in the field 
not as entailing the total loss of analytical distance, but as in potentially many 
different ways, ‘pedagogically fruitful’ (31) and ‘methodologically and personally 
significant’ (34). Her idea that there is no necessarily right or wrong way of treading 
that fraught line between the personal and the professional is thus very helpful here, 
allowing as it does for a broader view of the possibilities and limits of and in the field. 
Coffee describes the relation between the personal and the professional as ‘not an 
easily negotiated, emotional balance – between seeking and loosing an identity’ (ibid.) 
and goes on to argue that: 
  
‘[i]t is impossible to differentiate the subjective, embodied self from the 
socio-political and the researcher-professional. Our own sense of personhood 
– which will include age, race, gender, class, history, sexuality – engages 
personalities, histories and subjectivities of others present in the field. Our 
own subjective personality is part of the research and is negotiated within the 
field (ibid.: 57).’  
                                                
59 Bell (2007: 64; see also Radstone 2008) notes that this approach can be critiqued for its potential 
‘to encourage the political subject into an endless navel-gazing, [and] applauding procrastinations that 
ultimately render her apolitical.’ 
60 She (ibid.) writes that ‘[n]arratives concerning National Socialism are characterized in the first place 
by denials, reinterpretations and formation of myths, so analysis demands that the researcher exercise a 
permanent methodological doubt and overcome his or her own West German socialization.’ Although 
she is right to point out that these narratives are full of denials and evasions and that one is well 
advised to exercise permanent methodological doubt, she is unable to even allude to how the 
overcoming of one’s West German socialization would look like. 
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Easier to tackle is perhaps the methodological and aesthetic question of how to 
incorporate the self into the study itself, i.e. is it to be contained within the preface 
and the methods chapter, or is it to become part of ‘the whole text’ (Coffey 1999: 6) 
as well as ‘the subject of study or analysis’ (ibid.: 122)? Coffey (ibid.: 122) calls the 
former textual and methodological strategy ‘partial autobiographical accounts’ and 
the latter ‘tales of the self’ (ibid.: 123). Although I think it is important to be self-
reflexive, I will here refrain from taking the auto-ethnographic approach beyond the 
methods chapter, because I do not want to detract from the interviews themselves.   
 
 
3.3 Interviews 
 
 
3.3.1 Sample and recruitment 
 
Although not identical, as some constructionists (see Bruner 1991, 2004; Denzin 
2000) claim, memory and narrative are nevertheless intimately related, as much of 
what we remember is in narrative form. Furthermore, the self is to a large extent a 
narrative production. Thus, I have chosen to explore the question of how young 
Germans remember the Nazi past and how they shape and are shaped by this past 
by conducting interviews. What discourses and conventions do they draw on and 
what interpretive tools do they use to structure and give content to narratives of the 
National Socialist past, especially that of their families? Interviews seemed the most 
adequate method in this case because, interested as I am in these ‘third generation’ 
Germans’ subjectivity and how they live and experience their ‘German’ identity, this 
method would provide me with their self and family narratives. I refrained from also 
interviewing other family members of these young Germans, i.e. their parents and 
grandparents, or conduct family conversations with three-generation families, not 
only because this would have seriously prolonged the recruitment and interviewing 
process, but also because the studies by Rosenthal et al. (1997) and Welzer et al. 
(2002) have already done exactly that. Rather, it is my exclusive focus on the 
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grandchildren, which goes beyond the familial realm to include considerations about 
cultural memory and national identity that distinguishes my own study from their 
work. The unit of analysis is thus not the family, but the individual. This, however, 
does not mean that I am not interested in family memory, but rather that I am keen to 
find out how the relation between ‘private’ family memory and ‘public’ historical 
memory plays itself out in the generation of the grandchildren.  
 
It is at this point that a definition of the term generation becomes vital because it 
determines who counts as a potential interviewee. In my definition of generation I am 
following Rosenthal (1997c, 2000), whose analysis of the constitution of generations 
takes into account both people’s historical location as members of age cohorts or 
historical generations (see also Mannheim [1928] 1952; Miller 2000) as well as their 
genealogical position within the family. Accordingly, it was not only the age of the 
interviewees – they were born between 1964 and 1986 – that was decisive, but also 
that at least one of their grandfathers was a Wehrmacht soldier. The interviewees 
thus roughly coincide with what Rosenthal (1997c: 71) calls ‘the generation between 
consumption and crisis’ (1962-1970) and what A. Assmann (2007a: 64-66) labels the 
generation of 1985 (1965-1980). This generation, Assmann asserts, defines itself 
against the values and interpretations held by their political parents, the student 
rebels of 1968.  
 
I did three rounds of interviews in Germany, one in spring 2006, another in 
November 2006, and the third round in March and April of 2009. Additionally, I 
interviewed four young women (Dagmar, Yvonne, Alberta and Julia) and one young 
man (Dieter) in London between August 2006 and October 2009.61 I went on an 
initial two-month research trip to Germany, stopping in Hamburg and a smaller 
South Western town to conduct the first batch of interviews. I selected Hamburg as a 
destination because it is home to the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, which 
commissioned the Wehrmacht exhibition – one important focus of the study. The 
                                                
61 I interviewed Dagmar and Dieter in August 2006, Yvonne in May 2009, Alberta in June 2009 and 
Julia in May 2009 and again in October 2009. I am not using the interview with Dieter, because it 
was conducted in a busy café, and is of extremely poor sound quality. 
 100 
smaller South-Western town was selected because a lady (‘second generation’) I met 
at a conference in Germany was kind enough not only to volunteer to be interviewed 
but also to help me recruit a number of her friends and acquaintances in the town. 
During the first trip I conducted 20 interviews,62 of which I am using 15 in this 
study, as two of those interviewed were members of the children’s generation and the 
other three lacked the richness of later interviews. I returned to Hamburg in 
November 2006 to re-interview three interviewees (Ilka, Sebastian and Fabian).63 The 
rationale for this second trip was to learn whether the first interview had triggered 
anything in the interviewees, e.g. a desire to find out more about their Nazi family 
histories and/or instigated family conversations about NS. During these second 
interviews, I also became interested in the question if, and what difference the FIFA 
World Cup that had taken place in Germany in the summer of 2006 had made to 
these interviewees’ self-conceptions as Germans.  
 
Having begun to analyze the interviews and to write the first empirical chapter, I 
realized I had only asked a minority of those fifteen interviewees I was going to 
include in the study a host of questions that emerged as very important after the first 
close reading of the interviews. These were especially questions concerning national 
identity and belonging, the cultural memory of the Holocaust and guilt and shame. 
The earlier interviews, i.e. those conducted in Hamburg and in the South West of 
Germany and some of those in London (Dagmar, Silke), concentrated in large parts 
on the interviewees’ family dynamics and Nazi family histories. So, I went back to 
Germany for a third time in 2009, to conduct another fifteen interviews in Berlin, 
seven of which I am using. These interviews are much more extensive in their focus 
on ‘German’ national identity, Holocaust memory and guilt and shame.  
 
I interviewed 39 people altogether, 25 of which I am using. There are eleven men and 
fourteen women in the sample. Of these, twelve interviewees were in higher 
                                                
62 All names are pseudonyms and all dates and names of places have been altered to protect the 
identity of the interviewees. Fourteen of these interviews were conducted in Hamburg and five in the 
smaller South Western town. For a full list of the interviewees and their biographical data see 
Appendix I, page 289. 
63 I re-interviewed two of the Hamburg interviewees in the spring 06 – Caspar and Anna – during the 
course of my first stay there. 
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education at the time of the interview, thirteen had already graduated from university 
and one (Yvonne) has no university education, but a General Certificate of Secondary 
Education [Realschulabschluss]. So the sample consists of highly-educated,64 widely-
travelled65 young people, who come from a lower to upper middle-class background. 
With such a skewed sample, this study is obviously in danger of reproducing a 
stratification that already exists in society: well-educated people are (assumed to be) 
also the ones who decisively shape the production of cultural memory. However, 
such a view, neglects the fact that cultural memory is to various degrees shaped by all 
groups in society; that cultural memory is always ‘a field of contested meanings’ 
(Sturken 1997: 2) or ‘a field of cultural negotiation through which different stories vie 
for a place in history’ (ibid.: 1). It is thus that I need to acknowledge this 
methodological shortcoming, that prevents me from being able to make any larger  
general claims about the generation of the grandchildren, which I would be able to 
make were my sample a more representative one.  
 
What might perhaps be more problematic is that the sample is also highly skewed in 
terms of interviewees who grew up in former East or West Germany. There are four 
interviewees, Sebastian, Sabine, Johanna and Yvonne, who grew up in the former 
GDR and were children or young teenagers66 when it collapsed in 1989-90, while the 
rest of the sample grew up in various parts of former West Germany. Although there 
are differences between the former GDR and the FRG in how the Nazi past was 
spoken about in families and how it was taught at school, the work of Sabine Moeller 
(2003) shows that the Holocaust is equally marginalized in families on either side of 
the former East/West divide. Furthermore, the interviewees were quite young when 
the Wall came down and were thus mainly educated about the Holocaust and NS in 
                                                
64 Everyone in the sample, except one interviewee, already had or was in the process of doing a BA 
equivalent higher education course [Diplomstudium] at the time of the interview, two were in the 
process of doing a Masters degree and five already had or were doing a PhD. 
65 Sixteen interviewees spent at least six months living abroad, many of them much longer than that. 
Seven interviewees have travelled extensively in Europe and elsewhere but had never lived abroad and 
five do not mention any experiences of travelling or living abroad. This is however due to the fact that 
these interviewees were among the first to be interviewed and the question of national identity and 
how of they experienced themselves as Germans abroad were not yet asked. 
66 Sebastian (1977) was twelve, Sabine (1984) five, Johanna (1982) seven and Yvonne (1980) nine 
years old in 1989.  
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unified Germany, which, to a large extent, adopted the FRG’s curriculum (Moller 
2003: 186).  
 
Most interviewees are self-selected, with the exception of Horst, his wife Evelyn, 
Alexander Fiebert and Silke Turner, who were recruited through friends and 
acquaintances. Those interviewed in London were recruited via an Internet forum 
called Deutsche in London [Germans in London],67 where I posted68 two calls for 
interviewees. Most interviewees were, however, recruited via posters (see Appendix 
A, page 277) that I put up on the notice boards of the universities of Hamburg and 
Berlin (Humboldt University and Free University), stating that I was ‘looking for 
members of the generation of grandchildren (between the ages of 20 and 37 years) of 
the German war (and perpetrator) generation, who would volunteer to be interviewed 
about the National Socialist past.’ I also explained that I was doing my PhD in 
sociology at Goldsmiths College, University of London, and that my work was about 
‘German family memory of National Socialism and the Second World.’ Fabian, my 
first interviewee gave me some ‘wise’ feedback on the posters, advising me to remove 
the word perpetrator [Täter] because it had initially frightened him off. Since I was 
anything but successful in finding interviewees at the beginning, I followed his advice 
and removed the word perpetrator from all posters. Although I am hesitant to put 
the subsequent ease with which I managed to recruit interviewees down to the 
removal of this one word, I am nevertheless certain that it greatly facilitated the 
whole process. The eagerness to speak about family histories that I then encountered 
in the grandchildren was striking. 
 
The interviewees came to the interview with a host of different agendas and 
expectations (see Corbin & Morse 2003: 342). While some wanted to learn 
something about themselves and/or become aware of certain silences,69 this ‘risky’ 
endeavour, that was the interview, was at times also seriously undermined by an 
                                                
67 http://www.deutsche-in-london.net/ 
68 I submitted two calls for interviewees, one on 20th August 2006 and one on 1st May 2009. 
69 As oral historian Alessandro Portelli (1997: 4) points out in relation to the oral history interview, 
which he argues ‘implicitly enhances the authority and self-awareness of the narrator, and may raise 
questions about aspects of experience that the speaker has never spoken or even seriously thought 
about.’  
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often equally strong desire to defend and protect the grandparents and remain 
oblivious to silences and gaps in family narratives. In any case, many seemed to look 
for a protected (anonymous) space that allowed for a (relatively) open conversation 
about the Holocaust and Nazi family histories, which neither the family, nor school 
or friends could provide. The American psychologist Vamit Volkan (2002: 150), who 
has worked extensively with descendants of Holocaust victims and Nazi 
perpetrators, notes that there are still few ‘places that German people [can] go to 
discuss personal issues and psychological problems related to the Nazi era’. He 
(ibid.) continues: ‘[b]ecause contact between ethnic Germans and German Jews can 
easily be avoided in everyday life, people are rarely required to expose themselves to 
the emotional influence of the Nazi past.’ If school tends to be pervaded by a culture 
of authority and truth and the familial space often tends to be quite intolerant 
towards diverging and potentially dangerous interpretations of its Nazi past – 
dangerous because possibly threatening the community of the family with 
disintegration (see Rosenthal et al. 1997a; Welzer et al. 2002) – the question 
becomes: what kind of space did I want the interview to be?  
 
I argue that the interview provided and created another, different, space of memory – 
or, as Schneider et al. (1996: 25) put it, a ‘”space of possibility”’ – perhaps less 
impeded by these usual restrictions. It could offer such a space because it was an 
anonymous encounter between two complete strangers, and thus hospitable to 
efforts to be challenged; to exploring one’s family’s Nazi past without having to fear 
repercussions and to discussing personal issues relating to the impact of the past. It 
can be regarded as having provided the interviewees with the opportunity – which 
not everyone took – to (re-)narrate their family Nazi past in a way that was 
different, even contrary to how it is usually recounted and/or silenced in the family. 
In some instances, the interview thus had a discernible impact (see Reinharz & Chase 
2003: 77), interrupting habitual ways of narrating oneself and one’s family history. 
In the case of one interviewee (Melanie), for example, it  became a moment of 
recognition in which she became aware of her own implication in the continuation of 
the dissociation of the family’s Nazi past. 
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Yet, the fact that the interview itself also represented a kind of taboo, or at least a 
risk, with regards to family cohesion,70 problematizes this ‘naïve’ idea of the 
interview space as one of free, unrestricted speech and raises the question to what 
extent feelings of family loyalty and ideas of family honour influenced it. For many, 
the interview was nevertheless the first time they had ever put their Nazi family 
histories into words and narrative. As the oral historian Alessandro Portelli (1997: 4; 
emphasis in original) asserts:   
 
‘What is spoken in a typical oral history interview has usually never been told in 
that form before. Most personal or family tales are told in pieces and episodes, 
when the occasion arises; we learn even the lives of our closest relatives by 
fragments, repetitions, hearsay. Many stories or anecdotes may have been told 
many times within a narrator’s immediate circle, but the whole story has hardly 
ever been told in sequence as a coherent and organized whole.’       
 
The interview thus led some to the realization that they hardly knew anything or 
much less than they thought about their family’s Nazi past. However, such lack of 
reliable knowledge did not prevent many interviewees from forming a coherent 
narrative. Often, the interview was also the first time the interviewees were critically 
asked about the absence of any acknowledgement of the persecution and annihilation 
of Jews in their family narratives, and thus to consider their grandparents precisely 
within the context of the murderous NS regime from which many wanted to keep 
them separated.  
 
 
3.3.2 Between confrontational and empathic interviewing 
 
At the beginning of the interviewing process, I seemed to have been on a ‘detective’ 
mission eager to discover the ‘truth’ about the interviewees’ Nazi family histories, 
thus emphasizing ‘truth and validity rather than meaning’ (Bornat 2006). I was very 
eager to discover Nazis in my respondents’ family histories and this ‘detective’ style 
led to several quite confrontational, even antagonistic interviews, particularly with 
                                                
70 A number of interviewees did not and were not going tell their parents and/or grandparents about 
the interview, or were only going to tell them after it had already occurred. Furthermore, one potential 
interviewee was prohibited from being interviewed by her mother.   
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Sebastian and Fabian. Thus it often got in the way of my aim of wanting to provide 
an open, perhaps even therapeutic space during the interview. While I acted like an 
inquisitor rather than facilitator (see Bornat 2006) in these interviews, I slowly began 
to realize that this confrontational style might not necessarily be all that helpful. So 
my interviewing style began to oscillate between a confrontational and a more 
empathetic style. Although I do agree with Portelli’s (1997: 12) argument in favour 
of a ‘(respectfully) antagonistic interviewer’, I have come to the conclusion that this 
interviewing style is indeed helpful if the aim is to draw out someone’s ‘true’ or 
controversial political and social views, but it might be less useful if the interview is 
about the delicate matter of Nazi family histories as well as guilt and shame about 
them. With regards to the latter, I found deploying interviewer self-disclosures and 
establishing reciprocity and similarity, or what Abell et al. (2006: 225) call ‘shared 
experience’71, more helpful in getting people to open up about their Nazi family 
histories and (shameful) feelings of guilt and shame.  
 
While the confrontational interviewing style produced some rich and interesting 
interviews, it has also made me in some respects deaf, intolerant, even moralistic. 
While I condemned my own grandparents (albeit in their absence), many of my 
interviewees were eager to understand their grandparents; a desire that I, in turn, 
could not comprehend. I was afraid that, if I were to empathize too much with the 
interviewees, I was going to end up understanding their and by extension my 
grandparents and their immoral and/or criminal (in)actions and with them the entire 
war and perpetrator generation. This was the slippery slope of understanding, often 
described by members of the generation of 1968 (Schneider et al. 1996; Schneider 
1997), which I definitely wanted to avoid. Thus, the difficulties I had in relating to 
the interviewees were perhaps similar to those encountered by Schneider, Stilke and 
Leineweber (1996) in their study on families of NAPOLA72 students.  
                                                
71 They (ibid.) describe ‘establishing shared experience’ as ‘those instances where interviewer self-
disclosure is presented and received as an account of shared experience, and functions to provoke 
further talk from the respondent.’ 
72 The abbreviation for the boarding schools, founded by the Nazis after 1933 to educate and 
physically train those who were chosen to become the Nazi elite. Although officially called 
Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (NPEA) they are usually referred to as Nationalpolitische 
Lehranstalt (Napola). 
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In the introduction to their study, they describe how the question of how to relate to 
their interviewees, not so much the members of the perpetrator generation but 
especially the members of their own ‘second generation’, challenged their own 
working relationship to the core. As members of this ‘second generation’ and the 
student movement, the authors (1996: 17) characterize themselves in terms of their 
past and present ‘moral intransigence in the handling of National Socialism and the 
generation of perpetrators and fathers’, as well as ‘the categorical judgment in relation 
to political questions – and finally the secret fear to be “contaminated” by the legacy 
[Erbe] of the fathers.’ For them, the option of understanding members of the war and 
perpetrator generation, as displayed by some of their interviewees, remained a taboo 
until their tacit agreement on this issue was challenged to the point of jeopardizing 
the conclusion of the whole project by one interviewee. ‘To understand oneself 
simply as a child of a father, whose influence by National Socialism was beyond all 
doubt, to understand and identify with him, was the embodiment of the prohibited, 
while at the same time being of seductive attractiveness’ (Schneider et al. 1996: 19). I 
would argue also my ‘conflict revolved around the question of whether such an 
understanding was possible, without its subject [the subject that does the 
understanding, i.e. I, the researcher] surrendering itself as a moral person, being 
corrupted by the object [the member of the war and perpetrator generation] of 
understanding, so to speak’ (ibid.: 21). 
 
Having written a first draft of the first empirical chapter (chapter 4) and presented it 
at a seminar, I was confronted with my own ‘moral intransigence’. Having analyzed 
the interviewees’ empathetic and unsuspecting re-narrations of their grandparents’ 
exculpations in a very critical way, I was asked why I was so afraid of allowing the 
interviewees to speak for themselves and thus ‘silencing’ what were in essence re-
narrations of testimonies of Nazi perpetrators, followers and Wehrmacht soldiers. It 
seemed that I found comfort in morally judging the interviewees because, as Judith 
Butler (2005: 45) reminds us, judgment ‘establishes a clear moral distance between 
the one who judges and the one who is judged.’ In our eagerness to judge and 
condemn, Butler (ibid.; emphasis in original), although careful not advocate the 
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expendability of judgment, urges us not to ‘forget that we are related to those we 
condemn, even those we must condemn’, otherwise ‘we loose the chance to be 
ethically educated’. I was thus compelled to find a space between an easy 
condemnation of those grandchildren who were, in my view, not critical enough of 
their own grandparents, and falling into the trap of uncritically colluding with them 
(and by extension their and my own grandparents). It was at this point that I found 
Les Back’s (2007) text on the ethical and political complexities of researching racists 
and white supremacists very helpful. In the context of contemplating ‘what is at 
stake when we, as researchers, expand our moral imagination to incorporate the racist 
into the realm of understanding,’ he (ibid.: 257) writes that ‘[t]he challenge is to think 
beyond such an either/or logic, refusing both [the ‘moral high ground’ of] a 
vanguardist position and the confessional narcissism of apologia.’ He (ibid.: 260) 
points out that this approach ‘necessitates a kind of ethical ambivalence’, highlighting 
the fact that this ambivalence involves a tension (between condemnation and 
understanding) that can and should not necessarily be resolved.  
 
 
3.3.3 From the standard in-depth interview to the biographical narrative interview 
 
Until the interview with Dagmar (interview Nr. 22, 28/08/2006) in London, the 
interview questions (see Appendix D, page 281) mostly concentrated on what and 
how much the interviewees knew about their grandparents’ NS and war past, how 
the latter was talked about and/or silenced within their families, as well as on family 
dynamics, i.e. how the respondents experienced their relationship to their 
grand/parents, and so on. Before the interview with Dagmar, I changed the interview 
style from a ‘normal’ semi-structured in-depth interview to something more akin to a 
‘biographical-narrative interview’ (Rosenthal 2007: 50; see Appendix E, page 283) 
because I became increasingly conscious of how the structure of my questions was 
limiting, and perhaps even inhibiting, the narrative flow of the interviewees.  
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The ‘biographical-narrative interview’ is initiated by the interviewer’s ‘initial 
narrative question’ (Rosenthal 2007: 50),73 followed by the interviewee’s 
autobiographical narrative and his or her family narrative. After finishing with their 
family and self-narratives, I asked the interviewee ‘internal narrative questions’, i.e. 
questions that arose out of these narratives to then pose more generic questions or 
‘external narrative questions’, which were more in line with the particular interest of 
the study and derived from the ever more evolved and extended list of questions 
(Rosenthal 2007: 52). Thus, with the adoption of Rosenthal’s (2007, 1993) 
narrative-biographical interviewing style, I no longer asked a number of very specific 
questions about the interviewee’s family history but left the task of putting the past 
into a more or less coherent and meaningful narrative to the interviewees themselves. 
I also gave them the choice of whether to begin with their own life story or their 
family history. This method allows the interviewees’ to ‘structure the narration 
according to the criteria they themselves find relevant’ (ibid.). This was helpful 
insofar as it showed that what structures most of these narratives of family history is 
the perspective of the interviewees’ grandparents and, much more rarely, a distanced 
and critical perspective that includes condemnations and/or judgments of their 
grandparents’ morally reprehensible and/or criminal (in)actions during Nazism 
(Friedlander 1993; Schmitz 2007a; Welzer et al. 2002).  
 
 
3.3.4 The active interview(er) 
 
The interviews conducted in Berlin differ quite markedly from those undertaken in 
Hamburg three years earlier, not only with respect to the ‘biographical-narrative 
interview’ style, but also because the ‘external narrative questions’ of what it means 
to be German in the light of the Holocaust and NS became much more of a priority in 
the later interviews. During the earlier interviews, I often did not really listen to 
people when they wanted to talk about anything other than their family histories. 
                                                
73 I began these narrative interviews with the following question (see also Rosenthal 2007: 51): 
‘Could you please tell me about your family history and your personal history? I am interested in 
your whole life and in whatever you can think of. I won’t ask any questions to begin with and will 
only make some notes about the things I might want to ask you about later.’  
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This made me miss a number of opportunities when interviewees had a different 
agenda and wanted to speak about public Holocaust memory and/or German national 
identity and/or guilt and shame. However, as I do not think that there is anything like 
a ‘neutral’ interviewer who, by remaining as removed and unbiased as possible 
manages to produce ‘uncontaminated’ interview data (Rapley 2007: 19), I do not 
regard this ‘deafness’ necessarily as a mistake but as in part arising out of the 
particular ‘social encounter[s]’ (Holstein & Gubrium 1995: 3; see also Enosh & 
Buchbinder 2005) between the interviewer and the interviewee. Although semi-
structured, I conducted the interviews and regard the data they yield as the product 
of ‘interactional events’, ‘constructed in situ’ and ‘a product of the talk between 
interview participants’ (ibid.: 2). I would also argue with Holstein and Gubrium 
(1995: 4) in that both interviewee and interviewer are active participants in the 
interview and the construction of meaning.  
 
Although each of my various identities, became relevant during different interviews, 
it was my ethical subjectivity and with it my status as a (competent) social 
researcher that was perhaps most often and most explicitly at issue and contested. In 
the interview with Sebastian – at the time also a sociology student – we leave the 
question-answer format and slide into a discussion about how to evaluate and 
interpret the Nazi past. While I argue that NS, to some extent, remains radically evil, 
he asserts that it was not purely bad and redeems several positive and progressive 
aspects of NS. He then advises me that, ‘one should indeed look at this [NS] in a 
more differentiated way, you should perhaps also/ . . . if you write an academic 
[wissenschaftlich] work about this, then you . . . have to view it in a more 
differentiated way.’ Thus, by challenging my competence as a social researcher 
because of my lack of objectivity, my ethical subjectivity comes into conflict with 
his conceptions of what a good social scientist should be.  
 
Furthermore, I began most interviews with a self-disclosure74 (see Appendix C, page 
280) about my own Nazi family history and how it is dealt with in my family. I did 
                                                
74 Although its exact wording varied, I always told the interviewees what I knew about my 
grandfathers and often referred to my researches about their war and Nazi past. I also mentioned that I 
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this to make it easier and less embarrassing for the interviewees to tell me about their 
own grandparents’ Nazi past. Reinharz and Chase (2003: 79; see also Abell et al. 
2006) describe ‘interviewer self-disclosure’ as ‘take[ing] place when the interviewer 
shares ideas, attitudes and/or experiences concerning matters that might relate to the 
interview topic in order to encourage respondents to be more forthcoming.’ Abell et 
al. (ibid.) draw attention to the potential ‘interviewer self-disclosure’ may have, 
namely to ‘prompt reciprocal talk on the part of the respondent, especially in 
relation to potentially “delicate” matters.’ Although this strategy was successful in 
most cases, my initial self-disclosure compelled some interviewees to take up a more 
defensive position, feeling as they did that they had to defend their grandparents 
against an accusation that all Wehrmacht soldiers were perpetrators, which they 
seemed to detect in it. Furthermore, some seemed intimidated by my researches 
about my grandfathers’ past, which made them feel less entitled to speak as they 
thought they lacked enough knowledge about their grandparents’ past. 
 
So, although one could say that I engaged in what is now variously called ‘an 
engaged, active, or collaborative format of interviewing’ (Rapley 2007: 22) in which 
‘interviewer and respondent tell a story together’, I tried to contain my self-
disclosures to points when I thought that references to my own experience might be 
helpful in explaining a particular question or might make it easier for the interviewees 
to speak about a shameful or embarrassing experience.75 In the later interviews, I 
often refrained from the initial self-disclosure and took a more intuitive approach to 
self-disclosing in the interview more generally. So I eventually came to agree with 
Reinharz and Chase (2003: 80) who argue that interviewers should not adopt ‘an 
abstract commitment’ to self-disclosing, but should rather ‘think about whether, 
when, and how much disclosure makes sense’ in reference to each specific 
interaction. At the end of each interview I asked each interviewee to complete a 
questionnaire about their own, their parents’ and grandparents’ most important 
biographical data (see Appendix B, page 278). 
                                                                                                                                     
assumed that they at the very least knew about, but most probably also witnessed and were actively 
involved in war crimes and the annihilation of Jews. I furthermore informed them that this past was 
and is barely spoken about in my family. 
75 Rapley (2007:23) refers to this as ‘intimate reciprocity.’ 
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3.4 Methodology and analysis 
 
 
3.4.1 Biographical methods and narrative analysis 
 
The biographical narrative approach, which developed out of the humanist and 
idealist philosophies of science and the Verstehen-based social science methods as 
practised especially by the Chicago School and social interactionism, is often 
regarded as a reaction against positivist, functionalist and structuralist strands of 
social science (Bertaux 1981b: 31; Rustin 2000: 43). While the latter ‘have tended to 
omit the “humanity” of the individual in the pursuit of causal accounts, objective 
study of general patterns of human behaviour and standard features of individuals 
drawn from natural science . . .’ (Roberts 2002: 4), biographical methods have 
allowed for a return to some form of the self-shaping individual. The biographical 
narrative approach, ‘which responds to the disintegration of master narratives as 
people make sense of experience, claim identities, and “get a life” by telling and 
writing their stories’ (Kohler Riessman 2008: 17) thus lends itself particularly well to 
memory research, which often has a very similar agenda.  
 
Narrative has become progressively more important both as a concept that is 
employed to ‘emphasize[s] the active, self-shaping quality of human thought, the 
power of stories to create and refashion personal identity’ (Hinchman & Hinchman 
1997: xiv; Kohler Riessman 1993), as well as that which (temporally) structures the 
identities and auto/biographies of individuals (Andrews et al. 2000; Holstein & 
Gubrium 2000) but also as a form of data analysis76 (Andrews et al. 2007; Cortazzi 
1993; Lieblich et al. 1998; Kohler Riessman 1993, 2008). Narrative analysis is thus 
                                                
76 Kohler Riessman (2008: 6) makes similar distinctions between three meanings of narrative: first, 
‘the practice of storytelling,’ which is ‘a universal way of knowing and communicating,’ ‘narrative 
data’ and ‘narrative analysis’. 
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concerned with how people ‘interpret things’ and, as it emphasizes human agency, 
‘it is well suited to studies of subjectivity and identity’ (Kohler Riessman 1993: 5).  
 
Hence it comes as no surprise that many biographical researchers have found in 
psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approaches a rich resource with which to 
theorize this active subject (see Chamberlayne 2000; Hollway & Jefferson 2000). 
Chamberlayne et al. (2000: 8, citing Wrong 1961) argue that ‘to attempt to deepen 
our understanding of individual agency as historical means avoiding an excessively 
present-centred and functionalist ‘over-socialised concept of man’. Rustin (2000: 41-
42) makes the same complaint about the almost total loss of individual agency in the 
wake of the ‘cultural turn’. Yet, Chamberlayne et al. (ibid.: 9) also warn of an equally 
unhelpful overemphasis of individual agency that can come with the adoption of the 
classical, modernist model of psychoanalysis, that I critiqued in the previous chapter, 
‘in which personal self-understanding moves from self-defensive, unconscious 
mystification to self-aware understanding of real personal history, from illusion to 
truth’. The individual can only ever be conceived of as an ‘acted-upon agent’ (ibid.: 
8), never fully conscious of him or herself. 
 
The question of ‘What can be done with life stories?’ posed by one of the pioneers 
of the biographical approach Daniel Bertaux (1981a: 1), almost 30 years ago still 
remains very pertinent. What analytic status do the narratives produced during the 
interviews have? Although I am making use of a number of methodological tools in 
the ‘biographical methods’ (Apitzsch & Inowlocki 2000; Bornat et al. 2000; Miller 
2000; Roberts 2002) tool box, e.g. auto-ethnography and a version of the 
‘biographical-narrative interview’, I am thereby not stipulating that I am expressing 
my inner, true self nor am I positing the interviewee’s life stories and family 
narratives as the true reflections of their experiences and of their family’s past. As 
narratives always ‘draw on taken-for-granted discourses and values circulating in a 
particular culture’ they can never simply ‘speak for themselves, offering a window 
into an “essential self”’ (Kohler Riessman 2008: 3). Yet, narrative nevertheless 
‘grants a more radical role to individuals in the shaping of their lives’ (Skultans 1998: 
22). 
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Miller (2000) identifies three approaches to analyzing narratives: the realist, the 
neopositivist and the narrative approach. While the former two are concerned with 
validating an objective external reality, the latter deals with subjectivity and how the 
individual lends meaning to his or her life. I am here following what Miller (2000: 17, 
emphasis in original; see also Welzer 1996) terms the narrative approach:  
 
‘Realist and neo-positivist life and family histories may be contrasted with 
narrativist life and family stories. In the narrative approach it is the manner in 
which the life or family story develops and is related during the course of the 
interview, that which the realist and neo-positivist approaches strive to 
eliminate, which provides the essential avenue to understanding.’  
 
Although Miller’s classification is initially helpful, it does not allow us to perceive 
some vital analytic distinctions within the narrative approach itself as it puts Harald 
Welzer et al.’s (2002) and Gabriele Rosenthal’s (1997) methodologies in the same 
category, despite important differences. Rosenthal and Welzer et al. have each 
produced very influential studies about how families of Nazi perpetrators and 
followers remember the past. Both studies present similar findings, namely that these 
families tend to remember the anecdotal and the innocuous aspects of the 
grandparents’ everyday lives under NS, and tend to stress the latter’s experiences of 
suffering. Yet, Rosenthal and Welzer are methodologically quite far apart. While 
Welzer et al. argue that there is no reality outside narrative (and representation more 
generally), thus rejecting the idea that the denied past needs to be worked through, 
Rosenthal asserts that there is such a reality, which needs to be worked through and 
integrated in narrative. So, as Rosenthal (1994, 1995, 2006a) distinguishes between 
life history and life story and consequently also between truer and less true 
narratives, for Welzer et al. (2002) this distinction plays no role in the analysis. 
Thus, whereas Rosenthal (1991, 1997a, 2002b) is concerned with the silences, 
justifications and lies in narratives of NS recounted by members of the war and 
perpetrator generation and their offspring, Welzer et al. are only interested in the 
way the latter construct the past in narrative.  
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The life story is ‘the account given by an individual about his or her life’ (Miller 
2000: 19). While the more traditional view of a life history regards the latter as an 
externally validated life story, i.e. triangulated with official records, newspaper 
articles, etc., the more recent view of life history simply sees it as ‘a series of 
substantive events arranged in chronological order’ (ibid.) no longer requiring external 
validation. Endorsing this distinction, Rosenthal (1993: 68) argues that her analytic 
procedure can identify silences and lies by way of a very elaborate and detailed 
methodological practice called ‘hermeneutic case reconstruction’. The latter includes 
the analysis of biographical data,77 which constitutes the ‘first step’ in reconstructing 
‘the actual chronology of the life history itself’ which then ‘becomes the backdrop 
for the thematic field analysis,’ i.e. the analysis of the life story, allowing her ‘to see 
which biographical data are blown up narratively and in which sequence they are 
presented’ (ibid.).   
 
Thus, she (1995: 17) assumes a ‘correspondence of narrative structures with 
structures of experience; of the structures of the sedimentation of experience with the 
organisation of the narrative.’ So, ‘not only the presentation of the life history [the 
life story] produces the order [of the narrative] but also lived life history provides a 
structure’ (Rosenthal 1995: 20-21). This ‘does however not imply a homology 
between the narrated and the experienced’, but rather a dialectic between the two 
(ibid.). Although I agree with Rosenthal and others (see Craib 2000; Friedlander 
1992), that it remains important to distinguish between truer and less true narratives, 
I am perhaps more hesitant when it comes to sharing her (2003) enthusiasm for ‘[t]he 
healing effects of storytelling’.  
 
This will become more apparent in the analysis of the family stories in chapters 4 
and 5, where the often premature rush to narrative coherence and closure in the light 
of very fragmented knowledge about the family’s Nazi past is interpreted as a form 
of dissociation. It is thus not enough, as some (Spence 1982) argue, to attain narrative 
truth rather than historical truth. The idea of narrative truth is content with finding an 
                                                
77 Biographical data is ‘all data that can stand more or less independently of the narrator’s own 
interpretation’ and ‘are extracted from the interview’ (ibid.) itself. 
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adequate narrative fit or home for experience and memory, i.e. a coherent and 
rhetorically persuasive version of the past, which does not necessarily have to 
correspond to historical reality. I am thus arguing against Welzer, that it is not 
sufficient to simply look at how the past is constructed in narrative but one needs to 
discriminate between different ways of narrating the past, as well as to pay attention 
to what certain stories of the past leave unformulated. Rather, I agree with Holstein 
and Gubrium (1997: 113) when they state that ‘qualitative inquiry must take a 
middle ground that sustains a sharp focus on lived realities. It should appreciate 
reality’s interactional constitution while reining in postmodernism’s unbridled 
concern with representational practice.’ Welzer’s analysis not only implies a 
rejection of the idea of historical truth, but also does not leave any room for 
considerations of what cannot (yet) be contained in narrative (or discourse).  
 
Furthermore, both Welzer et al.’s (1997, 2002) ‘hermeneutic dialog analysis’ and 
Rosenthal’s hermeneutic case reconstruction are – although quite different – very 
formal analytic procedures derived from the German sociologist Ulrich Oevermann’s 
objective hermeneutics (see Jensen 2004). It was developed ‘to find qualitative 
alternatives to traditional scientific principles’ (Roberts 2002: 81) and is in its 
‘elaborate and codified procedure’ (Welzer et al. 1997: 37) and its aim of finding ‘the 
latent structures of meaning [Sinnstrukturen] of the interaction’ between the 
interlocutors not unlike conversation analysis. While Rosenthal’s (1993) rendition of 
objective hermeneutics is much more influenced by phenomenology, Welzer et al.’s 
(1997: 17-39, 2002: 216) does indeed look a lot like conversation analysis as they are 
eager to find out how meaning is intersubjectively established and maintained within 
conversation (Peräkyla 2007: 156; Psathas 1995: 45; Welzer et al. 1997). The 
emphasis is thus on the structure of the interaction, i.e. ‘to convey conversation in 
terms of observable sequential exchanges, not internal or dispositional motivations’ 
(Holstein & Gubrium 1997: 218) and its ‘descriptions of action tend to rely upon 
textual forms that distance subjectivity’ (ibid.: 217). While reality is here in danger of 
being collapsed into representation, the interest in lived experience recedes drastically 
into the background. Consequently, Welzer et al.’s interest lies in uncovering the 
structure and content of intergenerational family conversations about NS while I, on 
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the other hand, became increasingly interested in the subjectivities of young Germans 
and how they related to NS and their national identities. I chose narrative analysis 
instead of conversation or discourse analysis because it is less formal, concentrates 
less exclusively on interactional structure and more on how individuals interpret 
things, and hence lends itself better ‘to studies of subjectivity and identity’ (Kohler 
Riessman 1993: 5).  
 
 
3.4.2 Family narrative, subjectivity and national identity 
 
I first engaged in what Lieblich et al. (1998: 12; see also Kohler Riessman 2008: 53-
76) call a ‘categorical’ or thematic narrative analysis, in which ‘the original story [or 
interview] is dissected’ into fragments and the interviews are analyzed thematically 
across the sample. I used this form of analysis in chapter 4 and particularly chapter 5 
about family memory of NS, to identify the common themes in the interviewees’ 
family narratives. I summarized family stories that were similar in content and that 
frequently appeared across the sample under common themes. This showed that 
both war stories and stories about the home front can be divided into two kinds: 
firstly, narratives of wartime and postwar suffering and, secondly, narratives of 
everyday ‘resistance’ against the Nazis. While these narratives occur most frequently 
across the sample and are recounted in an elaborate way and with great pathos, 
stories or even references to the grandparents’ Nazi collaboration and perpetration 
are not only much rarer, but are usually kept vague and general and are often voiced 
in a justificatory and/or exculpatory tone. The two interviewees who spoke directly 
about especially their grandfathers’ collaboration and suspected perpetration do not 
use narrative to do so, but rather revert to the description or reporting of acts of 
atrocity, thereby disrupting seamless narratives. This thematic analysis also made 
apparent the frequent use of the term trauma to underscore the severity of the 
grandparents’ suffering. Yet, what is perhaps most striking is the employment of 
iconic Holocaust tropes, such as barbed wire, hastily-buried bodies, overcrowded 
trains, again to emphasize the grandparents’ wartime suffering. It is particularly in 
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these stories that the Holocaust in its function as a globalized cultural script for 
stories of suffering becomes apparent.  
 
What particularly struck me in the analysis not only but especially of interviews, in 
which Holocaust tropes were used, was the interviewees’ unconcern about the 
validity of their family narratives. While a small number of interviewees considered 
their grandparents’ active Nazi collaboration and perpetration and seemed much more 
self-reflexive about the limits of their family narratives and their knowledge about 
their family’s Nazi past, acknowledging gaps and silences, most interviewees were 
eager to tell a coherent story that elided precisely such gaps and absences. The 
insistence on such stories in the face of extremely flimsy evidence led me to think 
about the function such narratives of suffering and heroic resistance perform. It is 
thus that I began to think about how narrative can be employed, not only to 
construct but also to obstruct meaning (see Craib 2000; Freeman 2000; Skultans 
2001; Stern 2003). With the help of Donnel Stern’s (2003) concept of narrative 
rigidity as dissociation and Eric Santner’s (1992) idea of narrative fetishism, I 
interpret the use of such coherent and rigid narratives, despite or perhaps because of 
a fragmented and hardly known Nazi family past, as a form of dissociation that aims 
to keep insecurity and anxiety at bay by remaining within a very circumscribed and 
safe field of meaning. Especially publicly available and recognizable narratives such 
as those deriving from the history of the Holocaust, as well as the long-standing 
persistent myth of the ‘ordinary’ soldier, are drawn on to gain a coherent family 
narrative that manages to dispel the worst doubts and fears and protects the 
grandparents.78 I agree with Santner (1992: 151) who writes about representations of 
the Holocaust and NS in Germany that ‘… these events must be confronted and 
analyzed in their capacity to endanger and overwhelm the composition and coherence 
of individual and collective identities . . .’ Thus, I argue that coherence in the face of 
such histories is to be understood as a sign of an unworked through past and 
narratives that recount the grandparents’ NS past as a coherent story of suffering, 
                                                
78 Vieda Skultans (2001: 4) writes: ‘Sometimes the public narratives we take hold of can obstruct as 
well as construct meaning.’ 
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especially if they are drawing on Holocaust tropes, are shameless, as the experience 
of shame disrupts and unsettles the self and compels it to narrate its past differently.  
 
Shifting attention to the mode and form of the interviewees’ family narratives, it 
became increasingly clear that a distinction between those recounted in a critical and 
distanced way and those told in an empathic and compassionate way needed to be 
made. Although this distinction is not a categorical one, because many interviewees 
recount different parts of their family history (maternal or paternal), in these 
differing modes, it is nevertheless vital because these narrative forms decisively shape 
the content of the narrative and are thus testament to a changing relation to and 
interpretation of the Nazi past in the majority of the grandchildren interviewed for 
this study. Family narratives of NS recounted in an empathic identification with the 
grandparents are rarely disrupted by doubts, criticisms or acknowledgements of the 
limits of understanding, tend to marginalize and exclude the criminal character of the 
NS regime and bring forth the grandparents’ status as suffering victims. In terms of 
plot, this means that most family stories deal very cursorily, if at all, with the rise of 
NS and their grandparents’ actual or potential role in it, but tend to focus on the end 
and immediate aftermath of the war. While condemnation, as Judith Butler argues 
above, installs a safe distance between the condemned and the person who condemns, 
I argue with Harald Schmitz (2007a) and LaCapra (2001) for a critical empathy with 
perpetrators that nevertheless remains aware of its limits.  
 
In thinking about the function these family narratives might perform within the 
economy of the interviewees’ self-narratives, I began to perceive the limits of 
thematic narrative analysis and the way it fragments interview narratives. I argue that 
these findings about ‘third generation’ family narratives of NS can tell us something 
beyond the structure of the intergenerational familial communication about NS, 
namely about the subjectivities and identities of the narrators. It is thus that I began 
to devote attention to the interviewees’ self-narratives and descriptions. At this 
point, I began to think about the great importance many attached to their family 
stories and the emotionality with which they recounted their grandparents’ past, 
especially their suffering. What does it mean when the balance between public and 
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private memory shifts and private histories (of suffering) become the basis for 
continuity and identity? As chapter 1 showed, there has, since the early 1960s, 
always been a tension between public and private memory in West Germany. Welzer 
et al. (2002: 9-10) argue that the descendants of Nazi perpetrators and followers 
bring these differing memories into accord with each other by assigning their 
grand/parents a role within their historical consciousness that excludes them from the 
criminal aspects of NS, that feature so prominently in public memory. Emily 
Keightley (2008: 177) thus seems to agree with Welzer et al. when she writes that:  
 
‘[t]he memory text is a construction created in . . . the ‘liminal space’ between 
public and private pasts and as a result should always be considered as a 
mediation between the two . . . Memories are constructed by the multiple 
positionings of the remembering subject, but also in the communicative act, 
perform those positions and in doing so help reconcile them.’  
 
Keightley (ibid.), however, adds that although we need ‘to allow for a more 
contingent notion of memory that can incorporate our multiple social positionings’, 
we should not forget that some of these positionings ‘may conflict with each other’. 
She (ibid.) continues that memory can also ‘be an act of resistance, actively rejecting 
the collective cultural codes of which it is shot through, repositioning the subject in 
new coordinates of time and space and meaning.’ To what extent does the telling of 
these narratives of the grandparents’ suffering and victimhood (in the interview) 
perform an act of resistance against the public memory of the Holocaust, on which 
many of these narratives nevertheless draw? The fact that ‘narrative can be a form of 
resistance to dominant frameworks of understanding’ (Day Sclater & Bradbury 2000: 
197) is not sufficiently dealt with either by the analysis of Welzer et al. or Rosenthal. 
With this question in mind, I became increasingly interested in how far the shift from 
a critically distanced view of the Nazi past to one informed by full empathy with the 
bystanders, Nazi followers and perpetrators in which the ‘recovery’ of the 
grandparents’ ‘alternative’ memory of NS not only becomes an act of ‘resistance’ 
against the memory of the Holocaust, which is experienced by many interviewees as 
external obligation (chapter 6), but also in how this very act of resistance is 
legitimized by the use of tropes, images and narratives we recognize as part of the 
public history of the Holocaust. It thus seems that these narratives constitute a way 
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of reclaiming a different relation to oneself, one’s familial past and thus they are part 
of a reconfiguration of identity – or to be more precise national identity – which 
rejects the passage through alterity and desires a more immediate relation to itself. 
 
So I began to think about how to link the interviewees’ family narratives to how they 
discursively positioned themselves as Germans, Europeans, and/or cosmopolitans. In 
distinction to Rosenthal and Welzer, who both concentrate on family dialogue, I am 
here following a form of narrative analysis that is not only more hospitable to 
considerations of subjectivity, but to a subjectivity which is perhaps not fully 
captured in and by discourse and narrative. I began by ‘reading the personal 
narratives for the identity claims in the stories’ (Day Sclater 2007: 101) and thus, 
also, in a more holistic way (Lieblich 1998: 12). Furthermore, I became increasingly 
interested in how the emotions of guilt and/or shame are linked to how the 
interviewees experience their (national) identity. In chapter 7, I thus grouped the 
interviewees according to how and why they disclaim any affective impact of the 
past. While a number of interviewees do so to return to an untainted national 
identity, others reject any personal feelings of guilt and/or shame precisely because 
they claim a moral national identity through the acceptance of a collective political 
guilt or responsibility. In the third group, I discuss interviewees who claim a 
European or cosmopolitan identity and a universal moral responsibility. I interpret 
all of these identity claims as manifestations of unacknowledged shame, as they allow 
the interviewees to either leave the past behind as something that has been worked 
through on an official and political level, or ‘flee’ it in the move to a more universal 
European or cosmopolitan identity. In the final chapter, I examine those interviews in 
which the interviewees either speak about experiences of shame as transformative 
because they are disruptive of taken-for-granted identities and self-conceptions as in 
shame the past intrudes into the present, or acknowledge shame in the interview 
itself. It is thus that I argue that ‘there are always aspects of self [and the past] that 
narrative cannot capture’ (Day Sclater & Bradbury 2000: 194). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I particularly wanted to draw attention to how my own positionality 
influenced and shaped the thesis, because the subject position of the author does 
make a difference in this instance. Much of what I have mentioned here in terms of 
auto-ethnography will hopefully elucidate some of the theoretical and analytical 
choices performed throughout the thesis. In moving to the empirical chapters, the 
first two of which look at family narratives of National Socialism, I want to 
emphasize again my argument against an analytic approach that concentrates purely 
on narrative. The following chapter will argue against Rosenthal’s endorsement of the 
idea of the transgenerational transmission of trauma and its use of the notion of denial 
because it tends to foster a somewhat naïve idea of the silenced past as simply to be 
recovered or discovered rather than constructed in language (narrative). However I am 
not joining Welzer and others in their radical constructivism, which equates memory 
with language, particularly narrative, thereby implying that, memories, which are not 
articulated and put into narrative are not remembered. I will develop my position 
between a radical constructivism and a naïve realism by following Santner’s and 
LaCapra’s traumatic realism (see also Friedlander 1993; Rothberg 2000).  
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Chapter 4: “You should really ask me about the war!”79 
Reconsidering the post-war silence in families of Nazi 
perpetrators, followers and Wehrmacht soldiers 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: The paradox of denial 
 
 
If we now return to Julia’s nonchalant reference to the missing photograph and the 
caption ‘near Treblinka’ in her grandfather’s photo album, we are compelled to 
rethink both traditional psychoanalytic accounts of the transmission of the Nazi past 
in families of perpetrators and followers (Bergmann & Jucovy 1982; Bohleber 1990, 
1998; Eckstaedt 1982, 1986, 1989, 1992; Faimberg 2005a; Grünberg & Straub 2001; 
Rosenthal et al. 1997a; Eickhoff 1986; Hardtmann 1982, 1989, 1992, 1998; Hauer 
1994, Müller-Hohagen 1989, 1993, 2005; Roberts 1998; Rottgart 1993), which draw 
on theories of the transgenerational transmission of trauma, as well as those works 
that apply social theories of memory (Kohlstruck 1997; Leonhard 2002a, 2002b; 
Welzer et al. 2002) to this context. In casually telling me about the absent 
photograph without any comments, doubts or fears, Julia ‘knows’ about it, though 
without allowing herself to grasp the potential meanings and implications of it. In the 
light of this, the classic psychoanalytic theories are no longer necessarily adequate; 
firstly, because they often paint a picture of a more or less all-encompassing silence, 
in which such families envelop themselves. While this might indeed often still be the 
case, these theories remain unable to take account of the elaborate stories about the 
Nazi past that are just as frequently recounted as well as of what is ‘known’ about it 
and how this knowledge is used. Secondly, in relying on terms such as repression and 
denial, they cast the dissociation of the NS past as an individual process that, if it can 
be overcome, would render the person able to (fully) integrate the past and counter 
                                                
79 This demand was addressed to Carolin by her grandmother, a former NSDAP member, could 
perhaps be read as an emblem for the different relation the grandparents have to their grandchildren 
when it comes to speaking about their NS past. 
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the tendency to act out. However, as I argued in chapter 2, for social theories of 
memory, it becomes difficult to acknowledge such absences.  
 
Theories of the transgenerational transmission of trauma, originally devised to deal 
with the symptomatology of the children of Holocaust survivors, posit that members 
of the war and perpetrator generation have not confronted their past, which they 
unconsciously passed on to their children, who were ‘burdened with a task stemming 
from a past reality that was incomprehensible to them, . . . [and] could only act out, 
what had been engraved, but not integrated, in their [grand]parents’ memories’ 
(Eckstaedt 1982: 225). The basic claim of most of these theories is that the 
generations remain interwoven on the level of the unconscious; the past, although 
silenced, remains present in dreams, fantasies, and actions of the grand/children. The 
latter are left with a heavy burden of a dark inheritance in the form of a prior 
unintegrated fantasmatic reality and guilt feelings that are not their own (Rosenthal 
1997a: 354; Bohleber 1998: 260). Rosenthal et al. (1997a: 22-23; emphasis added) 
thus writes that, because the descendants only have very fragmented, partial 
knowledge about their grandparents’ lives during Nazism, they ‘often unconsciously 
. . . form very detailed fantasies about the not recounted stories and family secrets.’ 
She (ibid.: 355) adds that these fantasies ‘correspond in terms of their content in a 
remarkable way to the concrete experiences of the generation of the grandparents’. I 
will challenge this idea that the gaps in intergenerational memory transmission 
instigate the grand/children to develop fantasies that correspond to the denied past in 
chapter 5.  
 
In this chapter, I want to re-think the unconscious, which these theories posit as the 
‘property’ of the individual, which is colonized by the unintegrated history and 
affects of their grand/parents (Faimberg 2005a, 2005b; Kestenberg 1982, 1989), in 
social terms. I propose that we might get further if we enlarge the unconscious here 
to include social practice and material culture. Such an endeavour also needs a 
different conception of the process of denial than that put forth by the theories of 
the transgenerational transmission of trauma, which tends to skirt the paradox that is 
inherent in the term. In his book States of Denial, Stanley Cohen (2001: 5-6; see also 
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Stern 2003: 115) writes that ‘[i]n order to use the term “denial” to describe a 
person’s statement “I didn’t know”, one has to assume that she knew or knows 
about what it is, that she claims not to know – otherwise the term “denial” is 
inappropriate.’ He (ibid.: 22) adds that this ‘doubleness – knowing and not-knowing 
– is at the heart of the concept.’ The concept of denial is thus contradictory as it 
assumes that one knows about what is being denied, while remaining unconscious of 
this knowledge or even the fact that one knows. While it is often unclear what denial 
actually refers to – external reality, interpretations and ideas or emotions, and/or 
internal drives – it is vital to the idea ‘that the whole process of denial is 
unconscious,’ while allowing for ‘a partial awareness . . . of disturbing perceptions 
being banished to the zone of unawareness’ (Cohen 2001: 29-30). So ‘[a]fter an initial 
awareness (which may be denied) the ‘loss’ of information over time is unconscious’ 
(ibid.). 
 
Harald Welzer (1996: 587) shows that this use of the term denial in the context of 
studies of post-war Germans and the Nazi past implies that people on some level 
were or became aware of their guilt after 1945, but had to deny it because it was too 
difficult to confront; this is also the thesis of the Mitscherlichs. Not only can this 
perspective not account for a very sizable part of the German population that never 
saw anything wrong with much of National Socialism, but it can also lead to such 
counterintuitive arguments as the one championed by literary critic Ernestine Schlant 
(1999: 10) who is not shy to claim that because ‘every strategy, conscious or 
unconscious, employed in the service of this denial [the Germans’ denial of NS] is 
also an acknowledgement.’  
 
Psychoanalyst Donnel Stern’s (2003) notion of ‘unformulated experience’ as 
dissociation might be more helpful in the present context, because it allows us to 
think about silence and denial as social processes; the family as enacting silence rather 
than viewing each individual member as someone in denial. But, unlike the social 
theories of memory, ‘unformulated experience’ also lets us retain an idea of present 
absences or unrecognized presences. It furthermore permits us to view the 
interviewees as members of their families, actively involved in the dissociation of the 
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Nazi past and to approach ‘that-which-we-do-not-know’ ‘as a broad social 
phenomenon, not as the unexpressed implication of the individual consciousness’ 
(Stern 2003: 132). The unconscious thus becomes social (and material) rather than 
purely individual and memory becomes also ‘a culturally mediated material practice 
that is activated by embodied acts and semantically dense objects’ (Seremetakis 1994: 
9; emphasis added). My reservations about the notion of denial thus echo Avery 
Gordon’s (1997: 48-49) hesitations about Freud’s formulations of the unconscious as 
the property of individuals which, as she argues, sits uneasily with his descriptions 
of experiences of the uncanny, which is ‘where the unconscious rejoins its animistic 
and social roots, where we are reminded that what lies between society and psyche is 
hardly an inert empty space.’ 
 
 
4.2 Transmission in not of silence: Narrative and degrees of dissociation 
 
So I am here trying to re-think silence as something other than an acknowledged (and 
known) but individually denied absence; an absence which is always necessarily 
‘experienced as massively present’ (Bohleber 1998: 260). In Stern’s work, the 
content of what is repressed and denied is not known before it is denied – is not 
made up of fully-formed and interpreted perceptions – but remains unclear, shape- 
and formless until perceived and interpreted. This, however, does not mean that it 
does not exist. Stern (ibid.: 37; emphasis added) defines unformulated experience as 
‘the uninterpreted form of those raw materials of conscious, reflective experience that 
may eventually be assigned verbal interpretations and thereby brought into articulate 
form.’ ‘It is content without definite shape’ (ibid.: 39). Prior to interpretation, 
experience exists in various different modes, such as that of affect or it is encoded in 
practice, and not always is it possible, he writes, to fully translate unformulated 
experience into consciousness and language. Similarly, Gordon (1997: 46) describes 
the unconscious as ‘another region or field where things are there and yet hidden, 
where things stand gaping, where the question of how we present a world, . . . 
becomes a question of the limits of representation.’ 
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In Stern’s (2003: 87; emphasis in original) version of dissociation, then, ‘the basic 
defensive process’ is ‘the prevention of interpretation in reflective awareness, not the 
exclusion from awareness of elements that are already fully formed.’80 This is 
evident in Julia’s case: here the Nazi past is present but in an unformulated state, in a 
state of dissociation, because her account of her family’s Nazi past, although 
mentioning the absent photograph, does not interpret this absence and make it part 
of the narrative, a feat which in turn would demonstrate the insufficiency and limits 
of this very narrative. Unformulated experience can be used as defense and as a 
creative resource. In the case of the former, ‘interpretation is avoided’ (ibid.: 51), 
either by ‘Not-Spelling-Out’ – ‘dissociation in the strong sense’ – or through 
‘Narrative Rigidity’ – ‘dissociation in the weak sense’ – while in the case of the latter 
imagination and speech are allowed to reign (more) ‘freely.’ ‘Defensively 
unformulated experience is a lack of clarity and differentiation permitted or 
encouraged in conscious experience that, in more fully articulated form, would raise 
the danger of noxious (or at least undesirable) interpersonal consequences’ (ibid.: 51). 
 
What is dissociated cannot be fully known before it is not also reflected on in 
language, but its presence can often be felt. Yet, what remains dissociated and if and 
how unformulated experience can be brought into the realm of ‘reflective meaning’, 
Stern (ibid.: 101) argues, is dependent on the interpersonal field. The dissociated 
experience or memory here exists in a pre-reflective, ‘‘unstoried’ state; lingers in a 
‘”ghost” existence’’ (Stern 2003 citing Loewald (1960): 94). It is ‘a case of 
inarticulate experiences, of symptoms and screen memories, of spiraling affects, of 
more than one story at a time, of the traffic in domains of experience that are 
anything but transparent and referential’ (Gordon 1997: 25; emphasis added). This 
becomes evident in the Nazi family histories to which I shall now turn, which often 
continue to linger in a pre-reflective ghost-like existence and remain unformulated. 
These family histories are histories of forgetting, histories of ghosts, as Eng (2010: 
184) puts it and are often ‘channeled through the realm of affect in order to gain 
                                                
80 So his conception of dissociation is markedly different to how many trauma theories consider it. 
For Stern (2003: 87), dissociation is ‘an active defensive process’ while, in many trauma theories 
dissociation ‘represents an inability to reflect on experience, not an unconscious avoidance of doing 
so’.  
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epistemological and ontological traction.’ While, in this and the next chapter I am 
more interested in how family memories are dissociated, especially via rigid 
conventionalized narratives, I will return to ‘spiralling affects’ in chapter 8, to look at 
how the past makes itself felt in and through the affect of shame.  
  
In turning to how memories of National Socialism and the Holocaust are dissociated 
in families of Nazi perpetrators and followers, as well as Wehrmacht soldiers, I will 
argue that, while the members of the generation of the children mostly dissociate(d) 
their parents’ Nazi past by not spelling it out, their children engage in the double 
movement of both wanting to know more about their grandparents’ past while also 
often dissociating it by emplotting it in rigid and conventionalized narratives that 
expunge the traces of the ghosts that they themselves have often awoken. So even 
though many grandchildren are interested in their grandparents’ Nazi and war past, 
making certain connections and interpretations their parents have not dared to make – 
however, in the process often blurring fact and fiction – their imaginations frequently 
remain within certain very confined limits.  
 
In adopting Stern’s model of unformulated experience I am given the necessary tools 
with which to think through the dialectical process of an ‘opening’ of the familial 
dialogue about the Nazi past that is often assumed to have begun in the wake of the 
Wehrmacht exhibition and with the grandchildren, while also seeing this very 
‘opening’ as in many cases containing the seeds for a different form of dissociation of 
this very past. Much less rigid than the concepts of denial and repression, which 
imply that the breaking of silence reveals the ‘truth’ of the past and is thus always 
necessarily positive and liberating, unformulated experience can account for 
dissociation in narrative form. Thus, while Rosenthal et al. (1997a: 356) argues that 
the generation of the grandchildren is much more prone to acting out the symptoms 
that correspond to the Nazi past of the family than their parents, and thus begin with 
the uncovering of and dealing with the past, I would argue that this ‘uncovering’ 
often happens in the terms of sentimental stories of everyday heroism and suffering, 
rather than in following the ghosts. 
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4.3 Enacting silence in the family 
 
Stern (ibid.: 151) argues that the interpersonal field determines how the past is 
constructed, i.e. what can be spoken and imagined and what cannot. I am here 
conceptualizing the interviewees’ families (as well as the interview situation itself) as 
such a field. This implies as Stern (ibid.: 154) argues that ‘[w]hat we can imagine 
fully, and what remains dissociated, is a function of the field we are inhabiting at the 
moment.’ As implied in the title – Carolin’s grandmother, a former NSDAP member 
demanding her granddaughter to ask her about the war – in many cases it is less the 
grandparents and more the parents who the interviewees feel obstruct the dialogue 
between the generations. As we will see below, the parents’ refusal to thematize their 
own parents’ Nazi and war past with their own children and their often 
condemnatory approach to the latter can lead to what Christian Schneider (2001: 
335) calls ‘a strange coalition of a jointly affirmed innocence’ between the 
grandchildren and the grandparents. This coalition allows them to circumvent the 
moral demands of the parents’ generation and to identify with the grandparents, who 
are experienced as affectionate old people.  
 
Daniel Meier, a young history student, for example, tells me that he feels his parents 
do not know anything about their own parents’ past, but that they do read a lot of 
books about Nazism and the Holocaust. He continues by describing how his father, a 
68er, used to interrupt his own mother in indignation when she spoke positively 
about her experiences of Nazism. While he accuses his parents of having denied the 
past, he is much more conciliatory and understanding towards his grandmother’s 
collaboration with the Nazis and her positive testimony. Horst Endress, a PhD 
student of history, speaks of his father’s efforts to educate his own father, when the 
former used to get annoyed with the latter’s attempts to trivialize the past in his 
ritually repeated monologues about his war experiences at the Eastern Front. He also 
recounts how he and his brother, who was doing his PhD in history on National 
Socialism, only ever talked about the Nazi past on a ‘professional’ historical level 
with their father and between themselves, never touching the more concrete questions 
of their grandfather’s actions and whereabouts during the Third Reich. However, in a 
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similar way to Daniel, Horst, who has a very close relationship to his paternal 
grandparents is also much more understanding than his father, as we will see below.  
 
Julia Hartwig tells me how her father distanced himself from his own Nazi family 
past and demanded his mother put away the photographs of her time in the BdM 
[Bund deutscher Mädel]81 that she proudly wanted to show the family. Dagmar  
Schneider detects that the conversations between both of her parents and their 
respective parents never left the safe realm of discussing the daily routine. Carolin 
Dietrich explains that while her parents ‘were actually very drastic in terms of 
educati[ng]’ her and her brother ‘about what happened during the Second World War, 
it was always kept general, it never went into the specific family history.’ In these 
cases and most other interviews the grandparents’ active and passive support for the 
Nazis is not something that seems to be thematized between the interviewees and 
their parents, but their conversations remain confined to the abstract and general 
aspects of National Socialism as history. As Ilka Pilcher relates, she could always ask 
her father, a history teacher, whose areas of expertise are the Weimar Republic and 
the Third Reich about National Socialism ‘as long as it wasn’t linked to the family.’  
 
Unlike Ilka and Carolin, most interviewees however do not consider this as 
constituting a form of dissociation but rather as a form of confronting the past. 
Albrecht, in whose family issues relating to his grandparents’ Nazi and war past are 
hardly ever talked about, nevertheless maintains that Nazism was not ‘a taboo topic 
at home’ because it was always ‘clear that the Nazi time was a terrible time, [and] the 
crimes were never relativized.’ In a similar way, Melanie Kerner relates how the 
Third Reich played a big role in her family and that she grew up being told by her 
father that ‘the Nazis are very bad and evil’ while her mother fed her with stories of 
Melanie’s grandparents’ traumatic wartime experiences. In some respects then, the 
process of transmission also seems be gendered as the fathers are often described as 
completely silent or as only talking about historical facts, while many interviewees 
portray their mothers as very communicative. Yet, they either speak about the flight, 
                                                
81 The League of German Girls, the female section of the National Socialist youth organization, the 
Hitler Youth. 
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the bombing and wartime suffering more generally or some mothers, e.g. Carolin’s, 
Ilka’s and Teresa Helwig’s, dealt with the past of their parents by learning about the 
Holocaust and (counter-)identifying (Schneider 2004: 240) with the victims, at the 
same time as they kept this history disconnected from that of their own parents. 
Teresa, for instance, imparts that she and her mother travelled to Israel and visited 
Yad Vashem when she was about fourteen. The only personal thing, however, her 
mother told her was that her own father never talked about the past and the aim of 
the trip seems to have been an educational one.  
 
Many interviewees notice that, if their parents did at all speak about or deal with 
their own parents’ past, this happened on a rather abstract historical level. Rosenthal 
et al. (1997a: 351) confirms this observation when she asserts that the children of 
Nazis and their followers tend to focus on the ‘anonymized murder in the gas 
chambers and less on the situations, in which perpetrator and victim faced each other 
directly, during the brutalities in the ghettos, during Aktionen, during massacres and 
during mass executions.’ Furthermore, many members of the children’s generation 
dissociated their families’ NS past when they took the position of ‘a militant 
innocence and moral superiority’ against their own parents (Koenen 2001: 95;82 
Schneider, Ch. 2004; Schneider, M. 1984; Wittlinger 2006). As Michael Schneider 
(1984: 12) argues, ‘it was almost as if the children had been divinely appointed to be 
the judges of their own parents,’ and saw them ‘only as political subjects who had 
either actively or passively supported the most criminal system of this century.’ 
Thereby ‘they often forgot – or wanted to, or forced themselves to, forget – that 
these former . . . Nazis were, in spite of everything, still their fathers and mothers’ 
(ibid.).83 That this way of ‘viewing the Nazi epoch [solely] from the perspective of 
                                                
82 My own translation. The original reads: ‘einer militanten Unschuld und moralischen Superiorität.’ 
A little later in his book, Koenen (ibid.: 119) writes ‘“Our generation“ thus cleanly separated itself 
from the contaminated “Nazi-generation.“ This biological dividing line spared one to have to 
personally and concretely deal with the experiences and involvements of the parents during these 
times – and thus possibly become embroiled in painful emotional conflicts or dangerous self-reflection 
. . . One impregnated oneself with universal Fascism ideologies and made oneself invulnerable.’ 
83 In her book, Das grosse Schweigen, Gabriele von Armin (1989) writes about how she realized that 
she herself and her whole generation was engaged in a form of dissociation (see also Schneider, Ch. 
2004). Psychoanalyst Tilman Moser (1992: 400) writing about Arnim, himself and the children’s 
generation, notes: ‘Very slowly the anger of the standarized accusation is ebbing away, and gradually 
it becomes clear, that her [Arnim’s] own generation also protected itself by denial, namely by not 
wanting to descend from guilty parents. It was a purification of one’s own identity through a splitting 
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its criminal core’ (Friedlander 1993: 36) can also work to dissociate the past was, 
however, rarely acknowledged by the parents’ generation.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘double bind of having to identify with figures of power one also at 
another level needs to disavow . . . leads to what the Mitscherlichs . . . referred to as 
“Identifikationsscheu”, a resistance to identification with parents and elders in the 
second generation’ as Eric Santner (1990: 45) notes. Silke’s father, Sophie’s father 
and Anna’s mother, for example, all become communists in the 1960s and chose an 
anti-bourgeois and anti-authoritarian life style that was in direct opposition to that of 
their parents. Contact between the generations, as these interviewees remember, was 
kept to a bare minimum, while their parents’ personal relationships to their own 
parents was marked by a complete absence of emotions, even severe coldness.  
 
 
Interlude: Histories of forgetting 
 
By looking at one interview in particular, I would now like to examine in more detail 
the consequences this form of intergenerational communication has for the 
grandchildren and their way of dealing with Nazi family histories. Although this case 
is quite remarkable, I believe it shows very well how many members of the children’s 
generation refuse to spell out their parents’ Nazi past, i.e. ‘dissociate it in the strong 
sense’ to avoid the double-bind Santner that describes. This, however, leaves the task 
of formulating dissociated Nazi family histories to the grandchildren. Dissociation in 
the strong sense, Stern (2003: 114) asserts, ‘refers to an active defensive process’ 
that evades ‘the verbal articulation of certain kinds of experience that already has 
some kind of nonlinguistic unconscious structure’, an experience that exists in the 
mode of action, affect or is contained in material objects. He (ibid.) adds that ‘it is not 
                                                                                                                                     
of the image of the parents: “This is also why we are so aggressive, shaming and accusing the 
parents, assailing them with reproaches, not with questions.”’ The Väterliteratur was marked 
precisely by such reproaches and accusations, as Aleida Assmann (2005: 375) notes. It celebrated the 
break from the parents and the past and its ‘thematic centre is the confrontation, the conflict, the 
reckoning with the father . . .’   
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the nonverbally organized experience that is denied reflective consciousness, but all 
or some of the verbal interpretations that could be made of it.’ 
 
I first interviewed Julia Hartwig, a very young-looking woman in her mid twenties, in 
May 2009 in London. She had already studied in the UK and was now living and 
working in Reading. She tells me, almost proudly, that she knows quite a lot about 
her family history because her maternal grandfather carried out genealogical 
investigations and still possessed many albums containing war photographs, which 
she inherited when he died. But she also already alludes to her paternal family’s very 
active commitment to Nazism. This, she surmises, must have also been the reason 
why some members of the paternal side, in fear of being brought to justice by the 
Allies, killed themselves shortly after the war. As her paternal grandfather died in the 
1960s, what she knows about this family’s past remains limited to her grandmother’s 
positive and justificatory stories about her achievements as a BdM-Führerin and the 
fun she had going dancing with soldiers. Although hesitant to describe her 
grandmother, with whom she always had a good relationship, as a Nazi, Julia does 
admit that she was very ‘brown’ and ‘quite deeply involved.’  
 
The only other thing Julia tells me about the paternal side is that some older members 
of the family gave her father a dagger with a Nazi insignia as a present for his 
confirmation and as a reminder of ‘the good old time’. As a child, Julia found this 
dagger, whereupon, as she remembers, her father, whom she earlier in the interview 
described as a 68er, tells her ‘how crazy it was that our family continued to uphold 
this for so long.’ Like Albrecht and Melanie above, Julia is rather unphased by this 
material remnant of the past and adds that her father ‘was from the beginning, when I 
was a small child, very open with me about this and also told me a lot about the 
Nazis generally [and] also tried to show me how terrible it was.’  
 
Five months after this interview, I get a surprise email from Julia to inform me that 
she had visited her paternal grandmother in Germany, who told her the ‘whole’ story 
about the suicides. We meet for a second time in early October 2009. During this 
interview, it transpires that, this time, Julia had visited her grandmother by herself, 
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without her father or aunt, who usually accompanied her. During the course of her 
conversation with her grandmother, Julia, tells me, they spoke about her struggles to 
finance her Palestinian husband’s university studies. The two women discuss the 
advantages and perils of female independence, and the grandmother tells her 
granddaughter how she was also left to fend for herself after the war, while her 
husband was in English captivity. Her grandmother, Julia continues, then started her 
own small business, something that greatly impresses her. Trying to explain to her 
granddaughter why she could not expect any help from her husband’s family, the 
grandmother divulges that what Julia had always believed to have been suicides had 
actually been murders; her great-grandfather had killed all of his sons, except Julia’s 
grandfather who was still in captivity at that point. On that trip to Germany, Julia 
then also learns that her great-granduncle was an infamous Nazi intellectual and in 
one of her emails to me she writes: ‘All the stuff that one finds out by inquiring! 
There’s a lot of brown sauce bubbling amongst my ancestors.‘  
 
Ilka, who, like Julia was motivated by the first interview (May 2006) and requested 
archival research about her grandfathers, also finds herself confronted by her parents’ 
dissociation. To be able to request this information from the archive she needs the 
written permission and personal information about her grandfathers from her parents. 
Upon receiving the completed requests back from her parents, she reads that her 
father had written on her paternal grandfather’s form ‘My father’s career in the 
Waffen-SS.’ Both Ilka and Julia thus learn that their parents had always known about 
these aspects of the past, but had never told them about it. Yet, while Ilka does not 
learn about this directly from her father but only via the request form, and they 
subsequently never speak about it, Julia relates that her father justified his silence by 
arguing that when she was younger he did not want to burden her with it ‘“and after 
that it wasn’t really a topic anymore, it never arose”’ she paraphrases him. She 
continues: ‘He was aware of it, but as said, because he also obviously distanced 
himself very much from this whole family history . . . it wasn’t really a topic 
anymore for him later on.’ But unlike Ilka, who has a long-standing interest in the 
Holocaust and has lived in Israel for more than a year, Julia has never shown such an 
obvious interest about either the history of NS and the Holocaust or her own family 
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history. Although these ‘discoveries’ spark an interest in Julia, she regards her 
family’s past as simply a very exciting and fascinating history, which she however 
feels no longer, has anything to do with her.  
 
While Julia understands her father’s reluctance to speak about the Nazi past, Ilka 
finds it very frustrating. Yet it is not a stone walled silence, as she explains: 
 
‘He would never withhold something like that from me, well not consciously 
somehow conceal it or keep it secret . . . and it’s also not that he says ‘I don’t 
want to speak about it or something like that, but he simply doesn’t do it.’ 
He changes the subject or he doesn’t say anything but waits until my mother 
says something ((laughs)) or no idea, well, it simply creates an atmosphere 
that one doesn’t want to ask, that one doesn’t feel like it because one thinks it 
doesn’t lead anywhere.’ 
 
Many interviewees speak of this atmosphere that prevents them from asking their 
parents and/or grandparents those ‘precarious questions’ (Horst) that relate to direct, 
active collaboration with and participation in the Nazi movement and its crimes. 
Often the elders’ unwillingness to speak about such matters is used as an excuse or 
justification for never having asked at all. Unlike Ilka, and in a similar vein to Julia, 
few of the interviewees find this troubling or experience their lack of knowledge and 
the failure to thematize those ‘precarious questions’ as a silence or absence that is 
massively or intrusively present. Anna Seybold makes this explicit when she 
establishes that she did not experience her grandparents’ skirting of the Holocaust as 
a silence, because they spoke a lot about the past, especially the war and the flight.  
 
Ilka also never connected her interest in the Holocaust to her own family history 
until after the first interview, when she learnt about her grandfather’s membership in 
the Waffen-SS. However, as we will see in chapter 5, especially the grandparents’ 
reluctance to speak about matters relating to their collaboration with the Nazis, is in 
many cases no longer understood as a form of denial or dissociation and a refusal to 
admit to guilt or shame, but rather as signifying their trauma. Furthermore, for most, 
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especially the men in the sample (see also Kohlstruck 1997),84 the family’s Nazi past 
no longer represents an emotional burden. Alexander Fiebert, for example, declares 
‘my personal relation to this time is marginal’, while his interest lies much more in 
how Nazism is represented (see chapter 6). For Silke, as for the interviewees we will 
encounter in section 4.4.2, the transmission of the family past is not, like it was for 
their parents, about dishonesty and disguise, but about trying to understand ‘what 
happened to the people . . . how it felt.’ It is in frustrating such attempts at 
understanding and empathizing with the grandparents that gaps in family Nazi and 
war histories are thought to be frustrating.  
 
 
4.4 Weak dissociation and narrative rigidity: recounting the grandparents’ Nazi 
and war past 
 
In many cases, the children of Wehrmacht soldiers, Nazi perpetrators and followers 
left it to their own children to take on the dissociated Nazi past. In a similar way to 
Rosenthal above, Santner (1990: 45) places much hope in ‘the third generation’s grief 
and outrage over the effacement’ of the ghostly revenants in the form of material and 
symbolic remnants and traces of Nazism and the Holocaust ‘within the otherwise 
normal domesticity of the present’ (ibid.: 43-44) to bolster the second generation into 
confronting the past. The trace is here to be understood in the terms of Walter 
Benjamin’s (1968) philosophy of history as the discarded detritus of history, which 
resists integration into a continuous conventional (historical) narrative (see Pensky 
2004; Buck-Morss 1989) or that defy what Santner (1992) calls narrative fetishism. 
The latter is defined as ‘[t]he construction and deployment of a narrative consciously 
or unconsciously designed to expunge the traces of the trauma or loss that called that 
narrative into being the first place’ (Santner 1992: 144). Narrative is used as fetish, 
working-through is postponed and the fragmented past is emplotted in a seamless 
story that, however leaves various important parts unformulated, as Stern notes 
                                                
84 His study shows how the National Socialist past in general constitutes a personal and emotional 
issue or problem only for a minority of his sample. It must be added, however, that Kohlstruck only 
interviewed men. 
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when he elucidates dissociation in the weak sense, that works by constructing rigid 
and conventional narratives. He (2003: 133; emphasis added) writes that in weak 
dissociation:  
 
‘[t]elling a story – and listening to one – requires a “drawing in of awareness 
to a (relatively) small mental content, leaving . . . important, but to-be-
unattended-to, events sort of in a marginal, shadowy, not quite-complete 
condition. That “marginal, shadowy, not quite-complete” byproduct of telling 
a story is unformulated experience . . . It exists relative to the stories we tell, 
and thus relative to language. It is composed of all the stories that fall within 
our grasp, all those narrative roads we could have taken but did not, all the 
potential interpretations that might have been articulated and in many cases 
still might be.’  
 
Thus ‘what is unformulated in unformulated experience, . . . is meaning’ (ibid.: 48-9). 
Traces of the family’s Nazi past, more often than not remain the sole task of the 
grandchildren to read, as Ilka’s father’s refusal to speak about the past makes 
evident, or they are expunged in the construction of conventionalized and continuous 
narratives. Thus the joint effort, that also includes the grandchildren, as we will learn 
below, here consists of ‘keep[ing] certain material unformulated in order not to 
“know” it’ (Stern 2003: 56; emphasis in original). While many interviewees seek out 
or stumble on traces of their families’ Nazi past, such as for example, Fabian, who 
encounters his father’s Persilschein85 in the cellar of his parents’ house, or Horst 
who finds a pile of magazines, all featuring Hitler on the front page hidden on his 
grandparents’ farm, or Martina von Selbig who mentions her father’s allusion to a 
memory of his own father in SS-uniform, or indeed Julia’s reference to the absent 
photograph, in most cases these traces are not viewed as problematic, but are 
expunged in rigid conventional narratives which portray the grandparents as engaged 
in nothing that goes beyond ‘normal’ fellow travelling and/or are described as engaged 
in heroic actions of resistance and/or victims of the war (see chapter 5).  
 
                                                
85 Persilscheine were de-nazification certificates, which attested that the person that was issued the 
certificate had not committed any crimes and had no seriously comprised Nazi past. Fabian’s father 
(1916), who married a second time and had Fabian and his older brother when he was already in his 
50s, actively participated in WWII.  
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Yet, Fabian Hoffmann’s description of how he felt when he came across the 
Persilschein illustrates ‘a way of encountering the ghostly presence, the lingering 
past, the . . . presence of the seemingly invisible’ (Gordon 1997: 205). It shows how 
such encounters turn the home into a ‘tangled site of memory’ (Silverman 2006: 8) 
and thereby potentially render the homely uncanny. Fabian recounts how at that 
point he felt that ‘one has this National Socialism suddenly in one’s house, suddenly 
it’s no longer abstract history, suddenly it becomes touchable [anfassbar], it’s not 
something that only happens in films, but it was reality, [and] plays into the present 
of my life.’ In her anthropology of everyday life, which links material culture and the 
emotions, Nadia Seremetakis (1994: 12-13) shows how such ‘sensory-affective 
experience[s] of history’ (Claes 1995) are ‘moment[s] when the buried, the discarded, 
and the forgotten escape to the social surface of awareness . . . [i]t is the moment of 
exit from historical dust.’ She (ibid.) describes ‘[w]hat was previously imperceptible 
and now became “real”’ as ‘in fact always [having been] there as an element of the 
material culture of the unconscious.’  
 
Crucially, however, Seremetakis (ibid.) adds that what is ‘[i]mperceptible has a social 
structure based on culturally prescribed zones of non-experience and canceled 
meaning.’ While an exclusive focus on the grandparents’ everyday experience of the 
Third Reich, as I will show in the following chapter, contributes to dissociating the 
past, an awareness of how today’s everyday harbours the past is essential, as 
Seremtakis shows. She (ibid.: 20) argues that,  
 
‘[t]he split between public and private memory, the narrated and the 
unnarrated, inadvertently reveals the extent to which everyday experience is 
organized around the reproduction of inattention and therefore the extent to 
which a good deal of historical experience is relegated to forgetfulness.’ 
 
While, as we have seen, the children often distance themselves from their parents’ 
Nazi past by precisely prescinding the past from the everyday and the family home, 
by concentrating on NS and the Holocaust as abstract history, the grandchildren are 
tasked with interpreting the material and symbolic detritus of the grandparents’ NS 
past, the latter’s self-justificatory stories, the often meager fruits of their own 
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(re)searches in family and other archives as well as having to make sense of blind 
spots and gaps. In relation to the difference between the Väterliteratur and the 
literary output of the grandchildren, often called Familienromane [family novel] to 
indicate their focus on continuity rather then break, and the family as a whole rather 
than simply the (grand)father, Aleida Assmann (2005: 375) writes that the latter are 
driven by researches which are often supplemented by ‘materials of the family 
archive and other documents.’ Elsewhere, she (2006b: 193-94) notes that the 
grandchildren are:  
 
‘developing new memory profiles and [are] articulating new demands on 
identity. After the conflicts and breaks of the second generation with their 
parents, this third generation, is now much more concerned with seeking its 
place in a continuous family history, however troubled and ruptured that 
continuity might be.’  
 
Furthermore, as Alison Landsberg (2004: 23) comments on the entirely different but 
also ruptured context of African-American family histories: ‘the production and 
transmission of memory fall to the [grand]children whose task it becomes to produce 
genealogies that they, too, might be able to inhabit.’ Yet, in the context of Nazi 
perpetrator and follower families in Germany, ‘[t]he postwar generations face the 
[added – A.H.] complex task of constituting stable self-identities by way of 
identifications with parents and grandparents who, in the worst possible cases, may 
have been directly implicated in crimes of unspeakable dimensions, thereby radically 
impeding their totemic availability’ (Santner 1990: 35). 
 
In their efforts to create ‘inhabitable genealogies’ via continuous family histories, the 
grandchildren often tap their grandparents as direct sources, in most cases without 
asking those ‘precarious questions’ (Horst). Furthermore, as Kohlstruck (1997: 85) 
points out, ‘dealing with the grandparents is generally less burdened and tense’ for 
the grandchildren than for their children. Johanna, Horst and Rainer are a testament to 
that when they speak of their very close relationships with their grandparents and 
impart how the latter tell them things they would have never told their own children. 
Those without any grandparents left frequently find themselves piecing together the 
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past from sources found in archives and at home, such as documents, photographs 
and other memorabilia (Assmann 2005).  
 
The grandchildren interviewed for this study have ‘(re)solved’ the dilemma of having 
to negotiate between break and continuity in broadly two ways: Firstly, there are 
those who largely follow the example set by their parents and the ‘68 generation 
more generally and, although they are perhaps less condemnatory, they do continue 
to (emotionally) distance themselves from (some of) their grandparents, insisting as 
they do on certain ‘limits of understanding’ [‘Grenzen des Verstehens’] (Assmann 
2005) and although not completely averse to empathizing with the grandparents, this 
empathy has its boundaries. Their family stories are interspersed with critical 
comments and articulations of their doubts about their veracity and authenticity. Yet, 
unlike their parents, they are more prepared to acknowledge, spell out and picture 
more concretely their grandfathers as perpetrators and their grandmothers as 
Mitläufer, and thus to bring history and memory into contact with each other, 
without one engulfing the other. In this sense, their narrations of their grandparents’ 
Nazi past in many respects enact what Schmitz (2007a) in his analysis of recent 
exponents of the Familienroman genre has called ‘critical empathy’ in distinction to 
both a ‘sentimental and historicist empathy’ and the position ‘of condemnation or 
judgment’ (2007a: 215) of many 68ers. While ‘sentimental historicist empathy’ 
closely resembles what Hirsch and Landsberg describe as idiopathic identification or 
sympathy, and LaCapra (2001: 40) denotes as ‘unchecked identification’, critical 
empathy is more akin to what these theorists have variously called heteropathic 
identification (Hirsch 2001), empathy (Landsberg 2004) and empathic unsettlement 
(LaCapra 2001).  
 
Secondly, there are those who embed the fragmentary family past into more or less 
coherent, even rigid, narratives, such as that of the ‘normal’ soldier or stories vividly 
re-creating war-time suffering. In these narrations, the interviewees skirt absences and 
gaps and show an eagerness, even strong desire, to understand and empathize with 
their grandparents both as Nazi perpetrators, collaborators, and Wehrmacht soldiers, 
but also and especially as victims of the bombing war, flight and Nazism more 
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generally. Here, empathy with the grandparents has no limits and in many cases ends 
in full identification with perpetrators and Mitläufer as victims, and thus in what 
Schmitz (2007a) calls ‘sentimental historicist empathy’.  
 
4.4.1 Between condemnation and ‘critical empathy’86 
 
The three interviewees who recount their grandparents’ Nazi past in this critical, 
even distanced mode are Caspar Reinhart, Ilka Pilcher and, to some extent, Silke 
Turner. These interviewees, unlike the ones in the next section, are not averse to 
considering the possibility of their grandparents, especially grandfathers, having been 
at least Mitläufer, witnesses and/or perpetrators of crimes. Especially Caspar and 
Ilka are aware of and to some extent troubled by their own lack of knowledge about 
their grandparents’ past. While Silke is understanding towards her maternal 
grandmother, about whom she speaks very fondly and with whose war stories she 
grew up, she refuses to extend such a stance towards her paternal grandmother, 
whose positive BDM stories she finds totally unacceptable. This becomes evident in 
the way she recounts a family gathering at her paternal grandmother’s house:  
 
S: ‘My grandma was, when she was a teenager, in a summer camp with the 
BDM and talked very positively about this woman there, who was so 
fantastic and super and the great things she did with them and that was a 
typical situation / well the form in which she spoke about it was unacceptable 
and my uncle was also at the table I think, and it was clear to everyone there 
that the way she speaks about it was unacceptable and is a no-go and no one 
said anything about it because . . . there is no room to talk about it and then 
the topic was simply changed, [yet] this didn’t constitute a form of 
suppression but rather in the form of resignation.’ 
 
As Ilka has never known any of her biological grandfathers87 or her maternal 
grandmother and knows very few stories about either family’s past during the Third 
Reich, she has to rely to a large extent on her imagination and historical knowledge. In 
the first interview before learning about her grandfather’s Waffen-SS membership, she 
thinks aloud about what her grandparents could have been involved in: 
                                                
86 (Schmitz 2007a). 
87 Her paternal grandparents separated very shortly after the war and both married again. Since her own 
father did not know who his real father was until his early twenties, Ilka’s father’s and her whole 
family’s relationship to him was never really existent. 
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I: ‘As I said, I can hardly imagine, that one didn’t participate in anything . . . 
the question is was it normal in quotation marks warfare . . . about which one 
could say ‘well at least there was only another soldier on the other side’ or 
was it not like that and that’s difficult to say. I do believe that none of them 
was some bigwig, because I think that one/ well I can hardly imagine that they 
[grandparents and parents] would’ve totally silenced [totgeschwiegen] that. I 
think one would’ve noticed [mitbekommen] it, but I also don’t imagine that 
they were sitting there well-behaved and twirling their thumbs . . . on the 
other hand I am also of the opinion that the women who stayed home also . . . 
had their opinions and I know my grandmother . . . well, she’s not rightwing 
somehow, at least not anymore . . . but I know how shocked she was when 
my aunt had a black boyfriend.’ 
 
This extract from the first interview is relevant because it shows that Ilka never 
suspected that her family history would yield anything unexpected, or anything 
beyond normal Mitläuferschaft [fellow travelling]. But for her, ‘mere’ fellow 
travelling is not an excuse and although hesitantly, she does allude to her 
grandmother’s racism. It furthermore shows that Ilka allows for ambiguity to remain 
and is not rushing to disambiguate what is transmitted in fragmented, vague and 
uncertain terms by adopting a conventional narrative. This becomes even more 
apparent in the second interview and now, with the knowledge of her grandfather’s 
Waffen-SS membership, we talk about what she imagines he might have done during 
the war. As we will see in the next chapter, these fantasies closely match some of the 
perpetrator images displayed at the Wehrmacht exhibition, showing mass executions. 
When I ask Ilka whether she would want to know more about her grandfather’s past, 
she replies, 
 
I: ‘I would like nothing more than find this out, because I think it’s a strange 
thought to think about [that] it could perhaps be like that and not to know 
whether it’s like that or not . . . but on the other hand, I do know that there’s 
the possibility that it can’t be ascertained . . . and of course one never knows 
whether this person was then also personally involved, but one can definitely 
establish the relative likelihood or improbability if one knows he was at this 
point in time at a particular location and at that time this and this happened, 
then it’s at least within the bounds of possibility . . . that’s so weird to have 
this half-knowledge [Halbwissen], well, especially now that I know that . . . 
the possibility definitely exists that he participated in such things, which I 
never considered beforehand.’ 
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Caspar, at the time of the interview a student of pedagogy, had as a child and 
teenager an unusually close relationship with his maternal grandmother, in which, as 
he explains, he was treated as a substitute for his grandmother’s deceased husband 
and was constantly compared to him. He recounts that this relationship markedly 
cooled down after she told him that his maternal grandfather, whom she always 
portrayed in a very idealized way as an anti-fascist and member of the labour 
movement, witnessed mass executions in Poland. He says the following about how 
he reacted when his grandmother revealed this to him:  
 
C: ‘For me it was pretty unimaginable, because my grandfather was always 
portrayed to me as very idealized and at this point I could no longer 
comprehend. One somehow has a particular image in one’s head about how 
life was at the time and before I knew this I thought he was drafted and he 
would’ve risked his life if he hadn’t done that and I thought “well he laid 
tracks and he had to do that“ and at this point . . . that was indeed a shock, 
and I thought “how can one then go home on holiday and then go back there 
[to the front] and live a normal life. Well that was no longer comprehensible to 
me.‘ 
 
He is here particularly disturbed by the interrelation, ‘the awful proximity’ 
(Silverman 2006: 6) between the horror and the ordinary, between his grandfather 
witnessing mass executions and then returning to his ‘ordinary’ family life back 
home. This also becomes evident in his remark about his realization that the ‘fancy 
baby things’ which, he was told, his grandfather sent from France to his daughter, 
Caspar’s mother, must have come from plunderings. When he is told about the mass 
executions, Caspar’s empathy with his grandfather, about whom he until then always 
had a very concrete image and saw as a victim of the circumstances, has obvious 
limits and he emotionally distances himself from his grandmother. While Silke takes 
the position of condemnation and resignation that relieves her from having to further 
deal with her paternal grandparents’ Nazi past, Ilka and Caspar are clearly unsettled 
by the intrusion of the past into the present. Especially for Caspar, ‘far from being 
reassuring, the retrieval of the past into the present is profoundly dislocating, 
disorientating’ (Probyn 1996: 114) and sets in motion a long process of dealing with 
the Nazi past and his own family’s, especially his parents’, dissociation of it.   
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4.4.2 ‘Sentimental and historicist empathy’88 
 
Unlike Caspar and Ilka, Horst Endress, a PhD student in history at the time of the 
interview, Rainer Binder, a trainee accountant, and Johanna Müller, a young politics 
student who grew up in the GDR, are much more understanding. The grandfathers of 
all three interviewees were soldiers on the Eastern Front; Johanna’s was also a 
member of the infamous Hermann Göring division.89 These interviews demonstrate 
how falling back on rigid and conventionalized narratives, such as that of the ‘normal’ 
soldier,’ and others that are traded within the family and beyond, relieve these 
grandchildren of having to consider their grandfathers as having potentially witnessed 
and/or committed (war) crimes.  
 
All three relate that their grandfathers told them a lot about the war. Although 
Johanna and Rainer have seen and Horst knows about the Wehrmacht exhibition and 
all concede that one cannot separate the ‘clean’ army from the criminal SS, 
Einsatzgruppen, and Gestapo, they return to various versions of the narrative of the 
‘normal’ soldier in order to keep their doubts at bay – which, in Rainer’s and Horst’s 
cases, are quite substantial and evident in their allusions to their grandfather’s stories 
as ‘incomplete’ and lacking – in order not to have to spell out other possible 
narratives. Additionally, Horst, as a historian, is also very skeptical about relying on 
the memories of individuals, like his grandfather in order to learn about the past and 
refers to them as saturated by lies and half-truths.  
 
Rainer, whose father died when he was a small child, spent much of his childhood at 
his grandparents’ place and his grandfather became a sort of Ersatz-father for him. He 
saw the first Wehrmacht exhibition and registered absences in his grandparents’ 
stories, especially his grandfather’s depiction of the war as ‘clean.’ He says that 
‘when I visited the exhibition I was already seventeen or eighteen years old and at 
that time it was already completely clear that it’s not possible that you have one 
                                                
88 Schmitz (2007a). 
89 Various regiments of the Hermann Göring division were involved in war crimes in Italy and at the 
Eastern Front as well as in the brutal crushing of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. 
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organisation which commits all the evil and the others have nothing to do with it.‘ 
Having asked him specifically about the war stories his grandfather tells him, he 
answers:   
 
R: ‘It’s interesting, now that you mention it, I notice again how/ well it’s also 
definitely the case that what was always generally said about the Wehrmacht 
as basically a clean organization, which had nothing to do with that 
[Holocaust? – A.H.] .. actually now that you ask concretely I am  struck by 
how their [grandparents’ – A.H.] choice of topic made it actually very clear 
from the start that they had nothing to do with that, well that’s .. actually 
omitted.’ 
 
Horst has the same insight when he asserts that, ‘it was indeed clear to me that one 
has to be careful with such distinctions; the Totenkopfverbände90 were the evil guys 
and the normal Wehrmacht didn’t do anything.’ Johanna speaks of ‘deficient 
answers’ in relation to what her grandfather tells her about his past as a Wehrmacht 
soldier on the Eastern Front. All of them also admit that their grandparents’ stories 
always omitted the Holocaust and they claimed not to have known anything about it 
until after the war was over. Yet, Johanna’s grandfather also tells her that he knew 
about the Warsaw Ghetto and the uprising, in the crushing of which members of the 
Hermann Göring division were actively implicated, and how he also encountered a 
concentration camp when retreating from the front.  Horst’s grandfather speaks of 
‘partisan activities’,91 the defeats of which, he tells his grandson, ‘”of course weren’t 
always pretty”’ and that ‘”from chipping come chips“’.92 All three adopt their 
grandfathers’ narratives of themselves as ‘normal’, even particularly humane and fair 
soldiers. So, contrary to what Horst said earlier in the interview about individual 
memories as untrustworthy sources, he quotes his grandfather as having always said 
the following when asked about the Wehrmacht’s participation in the Holocaust:  
 
                                                
90 ‘SS-Death’s Head Formations’. These were self-contained divisions within the SS, whose main 
task was running the concentration and death camps within the territory of the ‘Reich’ as well as in 
annexed Austria and occupied Europe (Snyder 1976). 
91 ‘Partisanenaktivitäten’ 
92 ‘”wo gehobelt wird fallen Späne”’. This is, as Schmitz (2007a: 213) adds in his analysis of Uwe 
Timm’s Am Beispiel meines Bruders, in which the author includes ‘italicised typical vocabulary of 
the ‘war experience’ in the East like Gefrierfleischorden, Hitlersäge, Heimatschuss’ to ‘remind[s] the 
reader of how much the soldier’s jargon still accompanied his 1950s childhood, reflecting 
‘gleichermassen Verrohung und Verdrängung in der Sprache’ (AB, 96)’ [in equal measure 
brutalization and displacement within language’]. 
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H: ‘”My god we had to do with Russians and . . . with guns and pistols and 
what have you but we didn’t notice any Jews there” he [grandfather] said, 
well and these are also things, where I perhaps didn’t continue to probe him 
because it somehow fitted quite well with what I knew at the time; that 
probably many of these villages were in fact already judenfrei [lit. ‘free off 
Jews’] so to speak and . . . he was with the artillery, the artillery of course 
also well .. / that’s at least how I always imagined it, doesn’t participate in the 
really hard-core combats at the front . . . but they were lying in their 
trenches.’ 
 
So at the end of the interview, Horst, the historian, reverses his initial skepticism and 
says ‘one has to say in conclusion that I simply believed him what he told me about 
it [the war].’ In a similar vein, Rainer convinces himself that his grandfather did not 
witness and/or perpetrate any crimes: 
 
R: ‘It could of course also be like that. I believe .. my grandfather was drafted 
relatively early on as far as I know and .. during the war, if it’s true, he then 
also of course has had relatively little dealings with any Jewish fellow citizens 
[Mitbürger] .. none at all, as an officer at the front you didn’t have much to do 
with that .. except if you’d been .. / were present at Säuberungsaktionen 
[purges] which were committed, I believe, only by select groups.’ 
 
Like Rainer, who argues that his grandfather, ‘as an officer at the front,’ was far 
removed from the crimes, Johanna imagines her grandfather as having spent the war 
equally far removed from any crimes, namely ‘lying in the trenches and shooting at 
an enemy one doesn’t see’ and ‘occasionally returning a prisoner.’ In relation to the 
latter task, Johanna recounts how her grandfather told her ‘with a heavy heart‘ how 
he once had to ‘return’ a Russian soldier to a Wehrmacht-run POW-camp, those 
‘sites of mass-killing’ (Niven 2002: 145) (see introduction, page 38): 
 
J: ‘On his way he met another [soldier] and the prisoner was somehow 
injured and wanted to sit down and then the other guy: “don’t sit down, stand 
up!“ and then my grandfather said: “he you could be a bit humane for once, 
why don’t you let him sit down“ and then he only said to him “if I were you, 
I’d shoot him, no one will ever care about him afterwards.“ And that was an 
event, which really totally shocked him [grandfather] because at that point he 
still believed he was doing something just.‘ 
  
Johanna tells this story to show how her grandfather remained humane and decent 
within an otherwise unspecified historical context. The war of extermination and the 
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Wehrmacht’s treatment of Russian POWs is not an issue here; instead the aim is to 
demonstrate how her grandfather had a moment of conversion and insight. These 
three interviews also show what will become even more obvious in the analysis of 
the interviews below, namely that history and memory remain unconnected, and 
‘perpetrator’ or bystander ‘testimony’ is held as more authentic and true than 
‘history.’ In trying to question Johanna’s adoption of her grandfather’s justification 
of ‘Befehlsnotstand’93 within the context of her allusion to her grandfather’s 
knowledge of the Warsaw Ghetto and the uprising, I refer to Christopher Browning’s 
([1993] 2002) book Ordinary Men, to show that the thesis of ‘Befehlsnotstand’ is 
not necessarily persuasive, as the police men and soldiers were in many cases left 
with much more choice about whether to participate in crimes or not. She however 
counters my historical reference by arguing that:   
 
J: ‘My grandfather said that disagreeable [unliebsame] people were indeed 
assigned to such tasks and that violations of orders were handled relatively 
rigidly. Order is order, that’s how it was and I believe that there was some 
leeway within that but if someone ordered you to . . . shoot him then you had 
to do that.‘  
 
She thus validates her grandfather’s version with his ‘physical, living presence during 
the events narrated’ (Mandel 2006: 102; emphasis in original), by ‘an uncritical 
appeal to “experience”’ (LaCapra 1998: 50) and disregards her earlier qualms about 
her grandfather’s justifications. Personal experiences of historical events and by 
extension memories of these experiences thus attain a status of authenticity and 
validity that ‘overrid[es] any problems with accuracy arising from an original 
misperception or from distortions introduced in the lapse of time’ (Megill 1998: 47). 
In this way, all three grandfathers are turned into ‘normal‘ soldiers in the accounts of 
their grandchildren, who earlier on in the interviews had expressed their doubts about 
their grandfathers’ versions of events.  
 
Furthermore, both Santner (1992: 147) and Stern (2003: 60) note that narrative 
fetishism and narrative rigidity are means to avoid anxiety that could potentially 
‘throw off a whole system of self-definition’ (ibid.) that, is built around these gaps, 
                                                
93 Compulsion or necessity to obey orders. 
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and absences, as well as keep ‘noxious interpersonal consequences’ at bay. The 
‘sudden awareness of one of them could be devastating, disequilibriating’ (ibid.) for 
the self. Santner (1992: 147) adds that ‘[f]ar from providing a symbolic space for the 
recuperation of anxiety, narrative fetishism directly or indirectly offers reassurances 
that there was no need for anxiety in the first place.’ It is thus that such narratives 
signify the postponement of working-through structural trauma as the self and the 
family are kept fully intact. 
 
The grandchildren’s relationships with their grandparents are also less burdened 
because, like Johanna below, the majority of interviewees explicitly state that, in 
their conversations with their grandparents and their researches about them, they are 
no longer looking for a culprit, but want to understand their grandparents and their 
experience of NS. Johanna puts it in the following terms:  
 
J: ‘It was really very important to me and I wanted it to come through in the 
conversations, I didn’t want to find a culprit, that was never the case with me, 
I simply wanted to understand it, because it’s something I never experienced. 
I only ever saw peace in my world . . .’ 
 
This extract shows the desire to understand (even re-experience) what the 
grandparents experienced. That this often happens via a ‘sentimental historicist 
empathy’ will become clear in the following extracts, but also and particularly in 
chapter 5.  
 
Like Horst, who says he changed from an accusatory to a more understanding 
attitude towards his grandfather when he left puberty, Anna Seybold tells me about 
how she stopped challenging her grandmother’s stories when the latter’s health 
deteriorated with advancing age. She describes her paternal grandparents as life-long 
and staunch Nazis, who denied the Holocaust until they died. During her teenage 
years, Anna who, at the time of the interview was about to finish her university 
degree, considered these grandparents as ‘awful old Nazis’. Later on, however, she 
increasingly asked her grandmother about the NS past, particularly questions like 
‘how were you feeling and . . . how was it for you?’ She continues: ‘I had the feeling 
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if I had displayed doubts . . . it would’ve been condemnatory and I think she would 
not have continued to recount.’ Unlike her sister who, finds it necessary that the 
perpetrators admit to their crimes and recognize the suffering of the victims, she does 
not think in terms of victims and perpetrators and considers her grandparents 
‘equally victims, victims of the time, of the regime.’  
 
The majority of interviewees no longer want empathy with their grandparents to be 
blocked by a distanced and moral view of their past (Santner 1992: 148-9). This less 
condemnatory and more understanding way of communicating with the grandparents, 
which is detectable across the sample, with only two exceptions,94 also elicits 
different stories: Anna’s grandmother tells her about her fear of the Russians, about 
women being raped and the flight more generally; Horst and Dagmar Schneider learn 
more about their grandparents’ personal stories, particularly the stories of their 
grandparents’ love and how it withstood the adversity of war. These interviewees – 
and the majority of the sample – thus recount their grandparents’ Nazi past in a non-
judgmental and compassionate way as personal stories of mainly suffering but also 
heroism. Acknowledging their own ‘moral incapability’ (Schmitz 2006b: 159) in their 
often-total reluctance to judge and opting for an uncritical empathy, the grandchildren 
often end up accepting ‘the collective status of [their grandparents’] generation as 
victims of the war’ (ibid.). 
 
Anna extends this compassion towards her perennially silent but authoritarian 
maternal grandfather, even though she knows that he ‘worked’, as she puts it, in a 
concentration camp where he was also present at – or indeed participated in – mass 
executions.95 She learnt about this when she was in her early twenties and her 
grandfather was suddenly summoned to give evidence as a witness96 at a trial, 
shortly, after which he died. Although initially shocked by this revelation, this 
                                                
94 The exceptions are Caspar and Ilka and, to some extent, Carolin and Silke. While Silke condemns 
her paternal grandparents, she shows much more understanding towards her maternal grandparents, 
especially her grandmother. 
95 Anna is contradictory about whether her grandfather participated in or witnessed these mass 
executions. While she tells me that her mother told her that he himself never fired a shot during these 
mass executions, she also once refers to her maternal grandfather as having shot people. 
96 It remains unclear whether the grandfather was a witness or a defendant at the trial. Initially, Anna 
says he was summoned to trial as a witness, but later on in the interviews she reveals that – and she 
knows all of this from her mother – he was afraid of being convicted and sent to prison.  
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information has – unlike in Caspar’s case – no impact on her relationship with her 
grandfather, whom she describes, inspite of her earlier portrayal of him as 
obsessively pedantic and brutal, as ‘the dearest grandfather of all.’ And even though 
her father, a lawyer, had access to the files of the trial, she does not know and does 
not want to know more about her grandfather’s case, but restricts herself to the few 
bits and pieces her parents, especially her mother, tell her. She recounts that her 
mother said that her grandfather had been very young at the time, had come from a 
broken home, and was forced to witness/perpetrate these crimes. Due to the fact that 
her grandfather bound her father to professional confidentiality, by which the latter 
more or less abides, Anna’s knowledge of her maternal grandfather’s criminal past is 
very limited indeed. She shares her mother’s compassionate view of him and in doing 
so, she dismantles the distinction between victims and perpetrators, and her account, 
free of any references to the victims, portrays her grandfather as a victim of these 
‘barbarous times’.  
 
This works to disqualify history as a source and to dissociate the past, refusing as 
she does to take into account other (potentially easily) accessible information. 
Rather, she adopts the familiar family narrative, which casts her grandfather as a 
witness to these executions, who never fired a shot himself. Large parts of the 
family’s Nazi past remain defensively unformulated, which allows Anna to stay 
within ‘the well-worn channels’ of observing, feeling and thinking – within the 
familiar – and avoid interpretation (Stern 2003: 51). This becomes particularly 
evident when I ask her whether she knows the name of the concentration camp in 
which her grandfather ‘worked’, as she puts it. She answers: 
 
Anna: ‘No  
A.: Hm … doesn’t that interest you? 
Anna: No, not that much. Well, I am much more interested in how he must 
have felt at the time; to be there as a seventeen year old and to be present at 
mass executions or how it happened that he landed there, but I don’t know 
that but that’s because he simply didn’t talk about it .. but which 
concentration camp and in which city, no that never interested me, I don’t 
think that’s that important. 
A.: You also don’t know how he ended up there? 
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Anna: No, but that’s because I am not so much interested in history per se 
but more in the personal stories of the people.’  
 
More interested in the personal history of her grandparents and their emotional 
experience of National Socialism, she explicitly rejects the validity of information 
about the past derived solely from documents. Talking about her desire to know 
more about the exact life stages [‘Lebensstationen’] of her maternal grandfather, who 
as a Volga German first fought for the Russian army, then defected to the Wehrmacht 
and then ‘worked’ in a concentration camp, she says ‘that one can only get such 
information by directly talking to contemporary witnesses.’97 Like Dagmar, a young 
German living in London, who has devoured her maternal grandmother’s memoir and 
was ‘very moved’, Anna describes herself as having been deeply touched by her 
maternal grandfather’s story. Dagmar relates the memoir ‘didn’t contain many 
details, but this subjective style of writing [and] the partly very childlike naïve 
perspective . . . were nice to be able to put it into context, which is its definite 
advantage to pure school lessons.’  
 
Similar to Anna, Martina von Selbig and Karin Ingbert are also very interested in their 
family history. The interest of both women, however, ranges much broader than their 
grandparents’ experiences of the Third Reich, for example to include in Martina’s 
case her mother’s family’s Baltic German origins and in Karin’s case a strong interest 
in Silesia, the Heimat of her paternal family. Martina, who has an aristocratic 
background, is also not uninterested in her family’s Nazi past and has researched the 
latter quite extensively as part of her history studies at university. While her father 
was always adamant that none of the von Selbigs were members of the NSDAP, 
Martina finds out that her paternal grandfather was not only a party member but also 
                                                
97 In the following extract from the interview with Anna, it becomes clear that the grandchildren often 
feel frustrated about the gaps in family history not because they might harbour some dark secret but 
because these gaps exacerbate their attempts to understand how they have experienced the Third Reich 
and how they felt: ‘In relation to my paternal grandparents, I don’t feel I know little, perhaps not 
many facts.  But those can/ I would have to ask my father and then I could write down some facts, but 
somehow this isn’t my main interest, that’s why I feel that I am supplied with enough information, 
at least in relation to the topics which I am interested in; how they experienced the time. I am really 
more interested in the emotions. In relation to my maternal grandfather, I find it very sad; in his case, 
I would have liked know how it was for him to work in a concentration camp and how he dealt with 
it, if he later thought about it again, how it was to see such pictures on television when 
documentaries were on and in this case I would have liked to know much more about how he felt and 
everything that is related to it.’ 
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an early member of the SS, while her great-uncle was a member of Hitler’s cabinet 
and was tried at Nuremberg. Yet, the emphasis of her family narrative lies on her 
paternal grandfather’s death as a prisoner of the Russians in the former concentration 
camp Sachsenhausen in 1946.98 In her quest to find out who her family – the ‘von 
Selbigs’ – are, she finds an old photo album and is ecstatic ‘that we [she and her 
siblings] actually now at least have something, I think it’s great when these people 
[her grandparents] who are actually only names . . . get a life somehow . . . and then I 
prefer to see it without the uniforms, so it looks like a completely normal widely 
ramified family.’ Like Anna, she prefers to stay within the familiar and expunge the 
uncanny.  
 
The separation of the political from the personal and familial also becomes evident in 
Anna’s answer to my question about how and when she became interested in 
National Socialism and her family history:  
 
A: ‘I’ve always been interested in my own family history, I have to say . . . with 
my family, very early on we travelled to the places where my [paternal] 
grandparents were when they fled . . . and to be honest, I am actually not 
interested in National Socialism, particularly, less perhaps than other Germans 
who approach it very politically . . . I am more interested in the emotion and 
what people actually thought and felt.’ 
 
In a similar way to Martina, Karin, who condemns her maternal grandfather as a Nazi 
and has broken off all contact with him a long time ago, wants to go to Silesia and 
find the origins of her paternal family there. She adds that, because her father and 
grandfather have thoroughly closed that chapter, she finds it particularly interesting 
and ‘important to know where I come from [woher ich komme].’ Explicitly 
                                                
98 At the beginning of the interview, Martina says her researches were guided by the desire to find out 
whether her grandfather was a perpetrator or victim. Yet, in what she subsequently asserts, she seems 
to already answer that question quite decisively: ‘ . . . this split between, on the one hand, in a SS-
uniform, but on the other hand starved to death at Sachsenhausen, I can’t even hate him, I can’t even 
say “you’re guilty!” On the contrary, I have a grandfather who starved to death, who was unlawfully 
imprisoned in a concentration camp, never mind the uniform [Uniform hin oder her]. She continues 
by telling me that she gained ‘a very multifaceted image’ during the course of her researches, but it 
seems that her grandfather’s role as a victim outweighs his SS and NSDAP membership. This 
becomes evident again at the end of the interview, when she returns to her grandfather’s death at 
Sachsenhausen: ‘Well this step that I said that he was in Sachenshausen because he was a pig, I never 
thought that and I also don’t want to think that. He was in Sachsenhausen because he was the lord of 
the castle and because the Russians plugged [reinstopfen] him in there.’ 
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describing herself as feeling rootless, she has made it her new project to trace her 
paternal grandparents’ past in Silesia. These nostalgic ventures99 into the past differ 
from Ilka’s and Caspar’s endeavours into their family histories insofar as they seek a 
‘chronological ground’ (Probyn 1996: 122) to stabilize the self and its identity, rather 
than be unsettled by memory. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion: Fantasy and the uses of memory against history 
 
In this chapter I have tried to show how the parents of the young Germans I 
interviewed often left it to their children to interpret the dissociated Nazi family 
past. The grandchildren interviewed for this study have tended to do this in broadly 
two ways, which I described, following Schmitz (2007a) as firstly ranging between 
condemnation and critical empathy and secondly as a ‘sentimental historicist 
empathy’. The current popularity of and interest in family memory harbours both a 
unique opportunity to begin processes of working-through the past, as well as 
further dissociation. It is, however, especially the ‘sentimental historicist empathy’ 
that shapes the narratives of the grandchildren and, in its full identification with the 
grandparents, shows a certain disregard for other sources and the ghosts of the past, 
while staying within the narrow confines of their grandparents’ personal experiences 
of the Third Reich. However, this popularity must be linked to a more general 
valorization of memory, that has followed in the wake of ‘[t]he decline of the role of 
national and religious memories’ which ‘reopen[ed] the space for the search for both 
authentic identities and usable pasts’, as Barbara Misztal (2004: 68) notes. While for 
Caspar and Ilka, the retrieval of the past into the present is dislocating and 
disorienting, the interviewees in section 4.4.2 venture into their family pasts in search 
for continuity and identity. This is a point also made by Cornelia Blasberg (2006) 
                                                
99 See here Boym’s (2001) distinction between reflective and restorative nostalgia. I would interpret 
the above-described ventures into family history as restorative nostalgia. Reflective nostalgia ‘does 
not pretend to rebuild the mythical place called home’ and narrates the past in inconclusive and 
fragmentary ways, while restorative nostalgia ‘proposes to rebuild the lost home and patch up the 
memory gaps’ (ibid.: 41). I would here like to draw attention to the massively resurgent interest, 
especially among ‘third generation’ Germans, in the formerly Eastern provinces, such as Silesia and 
East Prussia, that accompanies the turn to family memories (see Der Spiegel Geschichte, Nr. 1, 2011, 
Die Deutschen im Osten Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit). This would however merit a thesis in 
its own right. 
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who, in relation to the popular Familienromane and their emphasis on continuity, 
argues that these literary efforts represent less what LaCapra’s and Santner’s 
theories identify as working-through but rather signify a nostalgic reaction against the 
uncertainties of late modern life (Santner 1990: 52).100 
 
With the trend moving ‘from stable ‘hard’ history’ to ‘changeable ‘soft’ memory’ 
(Douglass & Vogler 2003: 36; emphasis in original), the grandparents’ status as 
contemporary witnesses, gains significantly in importance. The privileging of the 
grandparents’ testimony by the interviewees who recount their Nazi family past in 
the ‘sentimental historicist’ mode is related to a valorization of the witness that has 
attended the rise of memory. With respect to the witness’ ‘physical, living presence 
during the events narrated’ (Mandel 2006: 102; see also Welzer & Domansky 1997: 
7) his or her testimony attains the status of authenticity and truth. It is in relation to 
the grandparent or indeed the parent as a witness that I will return to the 
grandchildren’s compassionate or ‘therapeutical mode of listening’ (Schmitz 2007a: 
200) in the following chapter in order to analyze the content of their family 
narratives of the Nazi past and look at how the term trauma is used not only to turn 
the grandparents into victims but also to authenticate highly implausible and 
inconsistent memories. 
 
In conclusion to this chapter, I would like to emphasize that the change in the 
attitude of listening from condemnation to a ‘therapeutical attitude of listening’ 
(Schmitz 2007a: 200), described in this chapter, is far from innocent. Not only does 
it facilitate a blurring of the distinction between perpetrator and victim but ‘[t]his 
“uninhibited” historicist perspective, . . . , is [also] problematic because it is always 
“pre-politicised”’; it claims to be beyond politics. Yet, as Schmitz (ibid.: 207) notes 
this claim is deceptive since ‘[i]t does not exist independently of an always already 
polarized field of public discourse of German politics of memory’, in which 
                                                
100 Eigler (2005) concurs: ‘With regard to family narratives published at the close of the 20th century, 
this tension between radical discontinuities and the search for continuities and identities helps to 
explain the popularity of these texts: at a time when the unified German state repositions itself in 
European and global contexts, these literary texts privilege the familial over the political; they seek to 
recreate and narrate family stories within a discontinuous and violent collective German history.’ 
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representations of private family memories, especially of wartime suffering ‘belong 
increasingly to a nationalising imaginary that attempts to figure National Socialism 
without its extermination politics’ (ibid.: 216). Like Landsberg (2004: 90), Schmitz 
thus draws our attention to the fact that such genealogical endeavours as those 
analyzed above are always also political. Yet, Landsberg’s optimism in respect to 
attempts to ‘re-experience’ the past of others, which rests on the subject’s ability to 
recognize difference, is not necessarily apt here, since many of these grandchildren’s 
ventures into their families’ past end in full identification with the grandparents and 
thus cannot be linked to a progressive politics. Landsberg’s (ibid.: 90) designation of 
such genealogical endeavours as progressive is related to the possibility of the 
personal and family narratives they yield to ‘expand the national narrative’. Yet, the 
pluralization of national memory in Germany is ambiguous, since these family 
narratives of NS can and often do enter into a competitive, even combative relation 
with the memory of the Holocaust and thus serve as the basis for a form of identity 
politics founded on wartime suffering and trauma.  
 
As already pointed out in chapter 2, concepts like post- and prosthetic memory 
‘describe the increasingly constructed nature of memory for generations born after 
the Holocaust’ (Fuchs & Cosgrove 2006a: 11) and other disruptive historical events. 
In the following chapter, I will look in detail at how the grandchildren interviewed for 
this study invest the remnants of the Nazi and war past, i.e. archival documents, 
family memoirs, photographs and anecdotes, ‘with varying degrees of imaginative 
fantasy and employ fictional strategies in order to produce a family narrative that 
bridges the generational gap’ (ibid.). But like Schmitz, Fuchs and Cosgrove (ibid.) add 
their reservations, when they argue that ‘the fictionalizing perspective of the belated 
generation often succumbs to the temptations of sentimentalizing narrative [and] thus 
revises history from a subjective perspective.’ Thus, I will return to the importance 
of working-through historical trauma in chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5: Family memory of National Socialism and the 
Holocaust: Trauma and the everyday experience of the Third 
Reich  
 
 
5.1 Introduction: ‘Borrowed Memories’? 
 
The infamous Holocaust ‘memoir’ Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood 
supposedly written by the Jewish child survivor Binjamin Wilkomirski about his 
experiences of the Holocaust was not too long after its publication in 1995 
discovered to be a fake, penned by Bruno Doesseker, a Swiss adoptee. I begin with 
the Wilkomirski scandal because it relates closely to my concerns in this chapter: in a 
similar way to a number of interviewees below, who recount their family narratives 
of wartime suffering by drawing on Holocaust tropes and imagery, Doesseker based 
his memoir ‘not on his experiences but on his fantasies and on the memories of 
others’ (Suleiman 2000: 549). Literary and cultural critic Susan Suleiman (2000: 554; 
Huyssen 2003), like many others, observes that the Holocaust has ‘become, in 
today’s Europe and America, the ultimate signifier of’ ‘[t]rauma, horror, [and] a 
sense of absolute victimhood.’ As such it is often inscribed into or becomes the 
vehicle for the expression of other traumatic experiences and memories. In her 
discussion of the Wilkomirski/Doesseker affair, Suleiman thus raises the question of 
who the Holocaust belongs to, as well as that of whether and to what extent it can 
and/or should be appropriated by others. This links to the discussion of the concepts 
of post- and prosthetic memory in chapter 2. Especially prosthetic memory is 
marked by the idea that technologies of mass culture render memories transportable 
and deterritorialized, thereby seriously undermining the idea and claim of familial, 
cultural or ethnic ‘”natural” ownership’ and authenticity of memories, which now, so 
it is argued, no longer belong to anyone but to everyone (Landsberg 2004: 2; Levy & 
Sznaider 2006: 8). Thus deterritorialized and decontextualized, memories of the 
Holocaust are said to have become ‘icons of destruction’ (Brink 1998, 2000), the 
Holocaust ‘a global icon’ (Levy & Sznaider 2002: 97).  
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Both Landsberg’s concept of prosthetic memory and Hirsch’s notion of postmemory 
are explicitly designed to take account of ruptured intergenerational processes of 
memory transmission. Landsberg (2004: 2), in particular, suggests technologies of 
mass culture as ‘alternative methods for the transmission and dissemination of 
memories’ to the increasingly inadequate ‘traditional modes of transmitting cultural, 
ethnic and racial memory – both memories passed from parent to child and those 
disseminated through community life’. They also contend that it is both possible and 
desirable that particular familial, cultural or ethnic memories become ‘available across 
existing stratifications of race, class and gender’ (Landsberg 2004: 22; Hirsch 2001: 
220). Both scholars thereby problematize the distinction between private, family 
memory and public cultural memory. Landsberg (2004: 19), for example, writes that 
prosthetic memories are: 
 
‘ . . . privately felt public memories that develop after an encounter with a 
mass cultural representation of the past, when new images and ideas come 
into contact with a person’s own archive of experience. Just as prosthetic 
memories blur the boundary between individual and collective memory, they 
also complicate the distinction between memory and history.’ 
 
Hirsch (2008: 114) also agrees when she contends that ‘family life, even in its most 
intimate moments, is entrenched in a collective imaginary shaped by public, 
generational structures of fantasy and projection and by a shared archive of stories 
and images that inflect the transmission of individual and family remembrance.’ As 
those living in contexts where the process of intergenerational memory transmission 
is ruptured have to rely heavily on fantasy and creation, as Hirsch and Landsberg 
point out, this chapter will look at how the grandchildren’s imaginary of their NS 
family past is structured. The essentially creative, imaginative and constructive 
nature, of especially the grandchildren’s family memory of NS, will become 
particularly evident in this chapter. This not only provides another argument against 
those theories of the transgenerational transmission of trauma that posit a 
correspondence between the grand/children’s fantasies and the denied past of the 
grandparents (see Rosenthal et al. 1997a: 355), but at the same time draws attention 
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to the limits of such theories of trans-cultural/-national memory put forward by 
Landsberg and Levy and Sznaider.  
 
Harald Welzer et al. (2002) already hint at these limits. Where Landsberg, Hirsch and 
especially Levy and Sznaider concentrate on the positive and progressive aspects of 
the Holocaust as transnational and transcultural or global memory, Welzer et al.’s 
study shows us what Welzer (2006) himself calls the ‘collateral damage’ of 
Holocaust education and a successful enlightenment [Aufklärung] that shaped 
especially the educational and cultural experiences of the grandchildren. The study 
(2002: 91) shows how, in the communication about the past within families of Nazi 
perpetrators, followers and Wehrmacht soldiers, family members wittingly or 
unwittingly draw on the cultural archive, and here particularly on representations 
that derive from the context of the history of the Holocaust to narrate their Nazi 
family histories as stories of suffering and victimhood. Welzer et al. (ibid.) argue that 
these mass-mediated representations are used as templates [‘Vorlagen’] to fill in the 
gaps and to render meaningful ‘the peculiarly fragmented and nebulous’ (ibid.: 108) 
family stories about the Nazi past. They serve to do away with contradictions and 
doubts and render the meaning of such fragmented and contradictory stories easily 
recognizable. This process of appropriating the ‘frame characteristics’ 
[‘Rahmenmerkmale’] (ibid.: 82) of representations of the Holocaust, Welzer et al. 
(ibid.: 81-105) call Wechselrahmung.  
 
Much more explicitly than Welzer et al., Helmut Schmitz (2007b: 6) links this 
phenomenon to the globalization of the Holocaust, seeing as he does the return of 
‘German memories of wartime suffering as’ an ironic consequence of the globalization 
of the Holocaust in the form of a universal victim narrative. Andreas Huyssen (2003: 
14, 16) helpfully draws our attention to the ambiguity of the Holocaust as a global 
metaphor for traumatic histories around the world: ‘While the comparison with the 
Holocaust may rhetorically energize some discourses of traumatic memory, it may 
also serve as a screen memory or simply block insight into specific local histories.’  
He (ibid.: 16) urges us to scrutinize ‘whether and how’ the Holocaust as global 
metaphor may both ‘help and hinder’ ‘local memory practices and struggles’. In the 
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present context it becomes clear that in helping to articulate memories of German 
wartime suffering, it can also contribute to hinder memories of perpetration to 
surface.  
 
So what Welzer et al. identify as the phenomenon of Wechselrahmung raises similar 
issues as those brought up during the Wilkomirski/Doesseker affair and Suleiman’s 
(2000: 554) question about whether and where we should draw a line ‘between 
personal memory and imagined “borrowed” memory’; it compels us not only to 
think about the possible ethical and political implications of the presence of such 
“borrowed memories” in the interviewees’ family narratives, but also forces us to 
critically re-examine concepts such as prosthetic and post-memory. What does the 
blurring of the boundary ‘between individual and collective memory’ that Landsberg 
(2004: 19) welcomes imply in the context of ‘third generation’ Germans and their 
family memories of National Socialism? This returns us to the last section of the 
introduction and obliges us to ask whether this constitutes a part of what some 
consider the current paradigm shift – from perpetrators to victims – in German 
memory culture and politics, or whether this is to be regarded, as Aleida Assmann 
argues, a broadening of perspectives? Does this constitute a form of appropriation or 
is James Young (1988: 133) right when he argues that it might be better to have an 
‘abused memory . . . which might then be critically qualified, than no memory at all’? 
I will return to this in the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
Since all ‘third generation’ family narratives have to rely on the imagination, I will 
begin by looking at three interviewees, who portray their grandfathers as 
perpetrators (and victims) without succumbing to ‘sentimental historicist empathy’ 
(Schmitz 2007a). However, as the previous chapter tried to show how the move 
from a more or less condemnatory and/or judgmental mode of apprehending the Nazi 
past of family members to a therapeutical or compassionate one also implies the 
return of what Schmitz (2007a: 207) calls an ‘’uninhibited’ historicism’ or Caplan 
(2000: 161) terms a ‘vulgar verstehen, a distorted and reductive form of historicism’, 
I will here return to the question of historicism to look at how it allows for the 
possibility to remember the Nazi past without needing to acknowledge National 
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Socialist discrimination, persecution and extermination; how it allows for a family 
memory of the everyday without the extreme. In doing so, I will discuss Harald 
Welzer et al.’s (2002) work, especially their concept of cumulative heroization, and 
embed the analysis within a longer trajectory of developments concerning the 
representation and historicization of NS. It is within the context of this discussion 
that I will come back to the questions raised above to look at interviews in which 
representations of the Holocaust function as Vorlagen or templates to illustrate the 
grandparents’ suffering.  
 
In the last section, I will draw attention to the frequency with which the term trauma 
is invoked in some of these narratives. I will argue that the importance of the 
discourse of trauma emerges precisely in relation to a lack of validity, working as it 
does as a rhetorical marker that establishes memory as true and authentic. As we will 
come to see, Douglass and Vogler’s (2003: 15-16) claim that ‘the belief that trauma 
provides a criterion of authenticity for the “real”, and that memories not somehow 
defined and authenticated by trauma cannot be trusted,’ is very widespread. 
References in the interviews to trauma thus perform exactly this function, i.e. to 
validate and authenticate highly suspect and implausible ‘memories’ and stories. I am 
thus in this chapter particularly interested in the interviewees’ stories of their 
grandparents’ past as performative acts, i.e. in these stories as ‘produc[ing] what 
they claim to be re-presenting and re-covering’ (Fortier 2000: 38), namely the 
grandparents as traumatized survivors of war.  
 
 
5.2 Remembering and imagining the extreme 
 
In her analysis of how the use of the idea of the Holocaust as unspeakable inhibits 
the production of meaning, literary critic Naomi Mandel (ibid.: 64) suggests that 
what is needed is ‘more meaning, not less’. I would here add that the perpetrator 
images of the Wehrmacht exhibition might perhaps be a way of doing precisely what 
Mandel proposes, namely of ‘imagining the unimaginable’ and removing this past 
from its state of total incomprehensibility and unrepresentability. As Niven (2002: 
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153) points out, these images ‘were more shocking than the films shot by the Allies 
on liberating the concentration camps’ of which many stills have become ‘icons of 
destruction’ (Brink 1998, 2000), providing an extremely condensed, even misleading 
view of Nazi extermination; ‘misleading because they show the camps at the moment 
the Allied troops marched in’ (Sontag 2003: 75), the camps had stopped functioning 
and most perpetrators, except for a few remaining ones, had already disappeared.  
 
 
 
Illustration 5. 'Survivor in Bergen-Belsen, April 1945' (Zelizer 1998: 120). 
 
The photographs displayed at the exhibition are very different to the liberation 
photographs because they ‘were photographs taken immediately before, during and 
after acts of murder’ (Niven 2002: 153). Thus, they do not allow the viewer the 
‘comfort’, which the liberation pictures usually provide, namely of ‘document[ing] 
the consequences of violence but sav[ing] the viewer the sight of killing and being 
killed’ and ‘remov[ing] the events to [the] vaguely defined places’ of the 
concentration camps (Brink 2000: 146; Mösken 2007: 241). Thus these ‘icons of 
destruction’ ‘serve[d] [and still serve] as an alibi’ (ibid.) for postwar German society. 
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The Wehrmacht images, however, do not allow for such comforts, showing as they 
do ‘victims in direct and visible relation to their perpetrators, unlike the typical 
photographs of the dead in Bergen-Belsen’ (Niven 2002: 153). They rendered the 
perpetrators and their terrible deeds visible and no longer allowed the displacement of 
the Holocaust beyond German society into the gas chambers of the death camps, 
where annihilation proceeded ‘anonymously’ (Mösken 2007: 249). Controversially, 
these images invite visitors to take the perspective of the bystanding photographer 
(or perpetrator), who ‘comes to symbolize the position of those many German 
soldiers who observed crimes, or knew of them, yet did not protest’ (Niven 2002: 
154).  
 
 
Illustration 6. Wehrmacht soldiers committing mass executions in Kragujevac, Serbia (Hamburger 
Institut für Sozialforschung 1996: 57). 
 
As Caspar Reinhart did not hesitate to call his paternal grandfather (not the one 
discussed in chapter 4) a fascist, was very critical about how this side of the family, 
including his father, glorified the Nazi time, and emphasized his emotional distance to 
his paternal family, I felt I could ask him about what he imagined his grandfather 
might have done. His reply is not in narrative form but consists of stringing together 
a host of criminal deeds: ‘ . . . one fantasy are lootings in villages, for example. Well, 
invading a village and simply to ravage and yes, to kill, to torture, to rape, to rob.’ 
Ilka is even more graphic, but also more explicit as to the source of her imagination. 
To my question of whether, since she has learnt about her paternal grandfather’s 
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Waffen-SS membership, she has ever thought about what he might have been involved 
in, she answers: 
 
I: ‘Well, honestly, when I heard Waffen-SS, I immediately thought about those 
executions [Erschiessungsaktionen] in the East . . . I thought about these big 
excavated pits and the people standing in front of it are being shot and fall 
into it, that was the first thing I thought about or, these small villages 
somewhere in Russia where they hung all the people from roof beams. . . . I 
never saw the Wehrmacht exhibition but one also got to see some of these 
images at other places, . . . I sometimes thought, . . . that he could have 
participated in things like that.’     
 
 
 
 
Illustration 7. Wehrmacht soldiers committing mass executions in Weißruthenien in the autumn of 
1941 (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (1996: 119). 
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Illustration 8. Public execution of Jews – watched and committed by Wehrmacht soldiers – in 
Shitomir, Ukraine, August 1941 (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung 1996: 71).  
 
Caspar and Ilka’s accounts are not in narrative form; rather they list criminal deeds or 
describe images. LaCapra (2001: 41) makes it clear that empathic unsettlement does 
not only relate to the experiences of victims and survivors but also to perpetrators, 
whose experiences and behaviour, he continues, should be attempted to be 
understood as far possible, without however overidentifying with them. In chapter 4, 
we saw how both Caspar and Ilka are critical of their grandparents’ stories, while not 
totally dismissive of them. In evoking the perpetrator images of the Wehrmacht 
exhibition in their efforts to imagine their grandfathers’ deeds, they do take up the 
invitation inherent in these images to position themselves as bystanders and/or 
perpetrators, yet crucially without overidentifying with this position. Furthermore, 
in Silke’s narrative about her maternal grandfather, also a soldier on the Eastern front, 
it becomes evident that it is possible, as Schmitz’s (2007a: 202) notion of critical 
empathy tries to show, that ‘attempt[s] to approach the “perpetrator generation” 
with understanding and empathy’ do not necessarily have to end up in ‘sentimental 
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historicist empathy’ (sympathy, or full/ idiopathic identification). Silke always had a 
strong bond to her maternal grandparents. Although she never spoke to her 
grandfather about his past, her mother told her, that he, upon returning home from 
the front, found his parents’ house bombed and his own father dead. He then, as 
Silke continues: 
 
S: ‘ran out of the village into a field, I believe with some other people, but I 
am not entirely sure, and there was someone, I believe a British paratrooper . . 
. anyway they shot him, [but] I am actually quite sure that my grandfather 
shot him . . . which made him a war criminal and he should’ve been officially 
convicted, [but] after the war my grandpa went to France into hiding for five 
years.’  
 
She recognizes her grandfather’s suffering without either turning it into a justification 
for his act of perpetration, nor does she trivialize the latter in exclusively focusing on 
his suffering.   
 
 
5.3 Purging family histories: From perpetrators to heroes and victims 
  
While much has been written in recent years about the return of a victim discourse in 
Germany, it is the work of Harald Welzer et al. (2002), which is particularly relevant 
in the present context. Having analyzed 40 family conversations and individual 
interviews with three generation families, the team found that particularly the 
grandchildren tend to ‘overhear’ their grandparents’ allusions to Nazi involvement, 
witnessing and perpetrating crimes, and/or their anti-Semitic statements and rather 
turn them into heroes and victims of war (see Tschuggnall & Welzer 2002: 142). The 
grandchildren’s extended knowledge of National Socialism and the Holocaust 
produces in them the desire to remove their grandparents from any involvement in 
the NS regime and adjust the latter’s past (in)actions and characters to present-day 
moral standards, they (ibid.) argue. Welzer et al. (2002) call this process of 
embellishing stories and anecdotes in the process of transmission ‘cumulative 
heroization’. Yet, I would like to go further than Welzer et al.’s claim that the 
grandchildren’s family memory of the Third Reich as one of victimhood and heroism 
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is a side-effect of a successful Holocaust education; instead I wish to draw attention 
to the fact that their family narratives have much in common with an 
Alltagsgeschichte or Heimatgeschichte that emphasizes the normal aspects of life 
under NS, concentrates on local and regional areas and seeks a more ‘differentiated’, 
less morally inflected view of the past. This is important because, as I will show in 
the following chapter, such a personal and familial view of the Nazi past is often 
counterposed to either a dry, facts-based knowledge or a too emotionalized approach 
that is propagated at school. 
 
 
5.3.1 Remembering and imagining the everyday without the extreme 
  
The interviews abound in stories about how grandparents courageously resisted the 
Nazis. However, if probed, many interviewees cannot specify how they came to 
know these stories. The interview with Albrecht Richter who works in the creative 
industries and is much more interested in how the 1968 generation represents the 
Nazi past in his eyes, in a too moral and Manichean way, provides an example of 
this. He begins to narrate his maternal family history by stating that his grandfather 
‘never sympathized with the National Socialists . . . because he was more SPD 
orientated.’ He argues that his grandparents’ antipathy towards the Nazis is evident 
in such actions as listening to BBC radio in the last months of the war and using 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf as heating fuel after the war, rather than keeping it as his 
paternal grandparents did. Although he portrays parts of his paternal family as 
having strongly ‘sympathized’ with the Nazis, he remains very vague about it. So we 
return to the maternal side and Albrecht reveals that he believes that his grandfather, 
a Wehrmacht soldier on the Eastern front who was flown out of Stalingrad because he 
had malaria [‘Sumpffieber’], became a guard in a local forced labour camp upon his 
recovery. A little later in the interview I return to this, to confirm it: 
 
A: ‘ . . . your [maternal] grandfather . . . after he came back from Stalingrad 
became an inspector I mean guard in a forced labour camp? 
U: Well, I believe he worked there in the capacity of a paramedic. 
A: Ah okay. 
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I: Well, I [said] guard earlier but I believe it was in the paramedic sector, but I 
can’t/ these are always the things which one picks up somewhere.’ 
 
Albrecht quickly retracts his statement that his grandfather was a guard in a forced 
labour camp and turns him into a paramedic, and thus into a member of the helping 
professions, and a ‘good’ German, without however knowing whether any of it is 
true. Asking Albrecht about the existence of other family stories about NS, he 
replies, that apart from anecdotes about furlough, and bombing raids:  
 
U: ‘ . . . there’re sometimes stories, which I think are very exciting, that my 
[maternal] grandmother . . . wanted to name her daughter . . . Ruth. But she 
was then of course forbidden to do so, because it was a Semitic name . . . but 
for me that’s a sign . . . that the claim that on that side one didn’t sympathize 
is actually believable because one actually didn’t buy into that ideology at all . 
. . however when we play Chinese Checkers there’re sentences like “chuck 
out the Jew“.’ 
 
Undeterred by such contradictions, Albrecht prefers to attend to indications that this 
side of the family ‘didn’t sympathize.’ Similarly, Sebastian asserts that his great-
grandfather was sent to a concentration camp because ‘what they were doing was 
already opposition’ without being able to specify what this opposition consisted of. 
When I, during the second interview, return to the alleged imprisonment of the great-
grandfather in a concentration camp, Sebastian Merle admits that when he asked his 
mother in between the interviews, this turned out to be ‘incorrect information’.  
Carolin Dietrich, although she prefaces her family narrative with the announcement 
that all her information about it is second-hand and she does not know whether any 
of it is true, then goes on to recount her paternal grandfather’s past as a continuous 
story, documenting his resistance to the Nazis. The fact that he kept a diary during 
the war, in which he noted that he heard about concentration camps but also that he 
was an ‘”upstanding German”’ is construed as resistance because it could have 
potentially landed him in a concentration camp, since it was, as Carolin believes, 
forbidden to keep diaries. In the beginning of the narrative, she alludes to her 
grandfather having perhaps been a member in the Socialist Party, while further into 
the narrative he is already a ‘diehard socialist’, who was sent threatening letters by 
the SA because he did not attend a compulsory event celebrating the incorporation of 
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the firm he worked for into the SA. Johanna Müller tells a story about how her 
grandfather and a comrade passed a concentration camp on their way home from the 
front, to portray her grandfather as a ‘loyal and solidary man,’ who was against the 
regime, because he did not, like his friend, spit against the fence of the camp. Dagmar 
proudly recounts a story about her paternal grandfather who, as a commanding 
Wehrmacht officer in occupied France, demanded to pay the bill, after his regiment 
had stayed a night in the most expensive hotel in town.  
 
The interviewees recount these stories to illustrate how courageous, moral, humane 
and fair their grandparents acted during the Third Reich. Yet, as Welzer et al. (2002: 
103) point out, ‘the frame of the described action is just as little taken to be 
problematic as the function, in which individual protagonists appear.’ Either ‘[t]he 
persecution and expulsion of the Jewish population are within these stories simply 
taken as facts, which are neither in need of further explanation nor somehow 
problematic’ (ibid.) or references to persecution and violence, if they appear at all in 
these stories, do so only at their very margins. The interview with Horst makes this 
very clear. Like many interviewees, he emphasizes that his grandparents lived in the 
countryside, where there was, according to his grandmother, no persecution because 
there were no Jews and expresses his interest in the everyday history of his local era 
in the 1920s and 30s. Both the wedding photograph of his grandparents, which 
shows his grandfather in Wehrmacht uniform and the latter’s Feldpostbriefe [field 
post letter], which Horst inherited from his grandpa, are read primarily as ‘striking 
document of their [the grandparents’] love’ and Horst explicitly states that the 
Holocaust and the war were never in the foreground of his inquiries of both his 
grandparents’ past nor of local history. 
 
Revisiting the question of the continued absence of the Holocaust and the extreme 
within ‘German family memory’, I would argue that much can be gained by returning 
to the Friedlander-Broszat debate about the historicization of National Socialism. As 
a ‘side-show’ to the Historikerstreit, historians Saul Friedlander and Martin Broszat 
discussed the issue of how and to what extent NS can and should be historicized. 
Broszat (1990: 87) in his article A Plea for the Historicization of National Socialism 
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argued for the ‘complete moral quarantine of the Hitler period’ to be lifted to be able 
to gain a more differentiated view of National Socialism. In championing an approach 
called Alltagsgeschichte – a history from below, based largely on oral history 
interviews with subjects usually excluded from traditional historical accounts – 
Broszat (ibid.: 78) wanted to reintroduce ‘the pleasure of narration’ into the 
historiography of NS. Alltagsgeschichte aims to do so by looking at NS not through 
the lens of Auschwitz and a focus ‘on the political sphere and . . . its criminal 
dimension’ (Friedlander 1993: 36) but, like these family narratives, rather endeavours 
to integrate this past ‘by reintroducing the continuities of daily life and the normal 
dimensions of those years’ (ibid.) and focusing on provincial and rural areas. In its 
emphasis on continuity, it highlights ‘the noncriminal, non-ideological, and non-
political aspects of the epoch, that is, among other things . . . daily life . . . and the 
ordinariness of many aspects of the Third Reich’ (Friedlander 1993: 76). While I 
agree with the historian Charles Meier (1988: 92-93) that historicization in the form 
of, for example, Alltagsgeschichte does not necessarily have to lead to exculpatory 
accounts and is to a certain extent necessary in order to be able to take account of the 
extreme within the everyday of the Third Reich, it must be added, as both 
Friedlander (1990, 1993) and Maier (1988: 92-93) point out, that Alltagsgeschichte 
carries the seeds of ‘a reviewed Historismus [historicism], hostage to subjectivity’ 
(Meier 1988: 93).  
 
However, what is even more relevant to our concerns here is that Alltagsgeschichte 
introduced the concept of resistance [‘Resistenz’] to conceptualize ‘an intermediate 
category of behavior, in between active opposition and total conformism’ 
(Friedlander 1993: 76). As we have seen above, it is of such forms of ‘resistance’, of 
small acts of everyday ‘resistance’ that these grandchildren’s tales of heroism speak. 
Yet, Friedlander (ibid.: 77) notes that the amorphousness of this idea of ‘resistance’ 
allows one to ‘identify the concept with tacit acquiescence or passive acceptance of 
the worst crimes of the regime, notwithstanding whispered disapproval.’ It is thus 
that actions like listening to the BBC in the last months of the war can advance to 
acts of resistance. This helps to purge one’s own family history off any Nazi 
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involvement and relegate the political and ideological aspects to the very outer 
margins of the family narrative.  
 
Both LaCapra (1998: 26, 50) and Santner (1992) identify Alltagsgeschichte with 
‘harmoninizing narration’ and narrative fetishism respectively. The ‘uncritical appeal 
to “experience”’ that LaCapra (1998: 50) criticizes Alltagsgeschichte for also shapes 
many grandchildren’s family memory of NS, as we have seen in chapter 4. 
‘”Experience” in this specific sense’ he (ibid.) continues ‘counters mourning and any 
desirable process of critically working through.’ Furthermore, this mode of narrative 
‘contains the past through a self-legitimating, even sentimental process’ which, 
LaCapra (ibid.) adds, dissociates ‘its more unsettling aspects’; dissociates those 
aspects that hint at or speak of precisely the extreme within the everyday. Christian 
Schneider (2001: 335) contends such ‘tacit “generational purification” of one’s own 
family’ is the ‘typical characteristic of the third generation’, which, in distinction to 
their parents’ split image of their own parents, has a ‘dissociated grandparents 
image’, in which suspicion tends to be projected onto other people’s grandparents.  
 
In moving on to the tales of wartime suffering which, are even more ubiquitous in the 
interviews than tales of heroism, it must be noted that they are narrated in various 
different ways. There are those, like Caspar, who mentions his mother’s stories of 
the bombing war, however not without critically commenting on the unreflective way 
in which she recounted them; or Silke (1981) who, as we have seen above, recounts 
the suffering of her maternal grandfather in a more empathic but still critical way, as 
she never fails to mention his act of perpetration and does not view her grandfather’s 
murderous response to the suffering inflicted on him a legitimate one. And then there 
are those who recount the suffering of their grandparents by telling the story solely 
from the perspective of their grandparents, i.e. in terms of a ‘sentimental historicist 
empathy.’ It is within the structure of these stories that fragments of Holocaust 
narratives, tropes and images, as well as the term trauma, play an important role and 
to which we shall now turn.  
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5.3.2 Post- or prosthetic memories as screen memories: Trauma, victimhood and 
wartime suffering 
  
At the time of the interview in spring 2009, Melanie Kerner (1976) had just finished 
her doctorate in comparative literature. I will quote extensively from her interview as 
it not only contains stories that speak of ‘resistance’ as well as wartime suffering and 
trauma, but also shows very clearly the role fantasy plays in the construction of 
family memory in the third generation. Melanie begins her story with the maternal 
side. Everything she knows about it, she learnt from her mother, who told her a lot 
about her own and Melanie’s grandmother’s experiences of the flight. In a much more 
pronounced way than in Martina von Selbig’s family narrative (see chapter 4), 
Melanie’s retelling of her maternal grandparents’ past banishes her grandfather’s SA 
membership into a subordinate clause: 
 
M: ‘ . . . they [mother’s family] were peasants / smallholders in Poland, my 
grandfather was also a member of the SA, my grandmother [had] five or then 
later six children, later received, I believe .. this Mutterkreuz.101 After the war 
was over it became clear they had to [..] clear the farm, Poles from the village 
came and said “you’ll be gone from here within an hour, otherwise you’ll be 
dead!” . . . about the flight she [Melanie’s mother] always only ever told 
things like . it was very, very exhausting, in the beginning they were evacuated 
to Schleswig-Holstein, where they were the strangers [Fremden – foreigners] . 
. . and were hated by everyone . . . and even though they were Germans the 
bottom line is they were also displaced . . .’  
 
She continues to tell her maternal family’s story of the suffering during the flight in 
very emotional terms and great detail. Above she uses the English term ‘displaced 
persons’ rather than the German word Flüchtling, signalling that for her all are 
equally victims of war. The distinction between those displaced after being liberated 
from concentration and death camps and those fleeing the advancing Russian army 
for fear of reprisals is gone. This shows how an increasing Europeanization of the 
memory of the Holocaust and WWII, although disposing of a hierarchy of victims, at 
                                                
101 Ehrenkreuz der Deutschen Mutter, usually simply translated as Mother’s Cross but the full 
translation is ‘The Cross of Honour of the German Mother’. This was an award given by the Third 
Reich to mothers of German descent who bore five or more children. It was introduced in 1938 to 
stimulate the growth of the ‘Aryan’ population.  
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the same time ‘ultimately obfuscates clear distinctions between victims and 
perpetrators’ (Levy & Sznaider 2005: 20). 
 
Although Melanie repeatedly refers to her maternal grandfather, who was also a 
Wehrmacht soldier in Russia, as ‘the Nazi grandpa’, she always adds how glad she is 
that only one of her grandfathers was ‘bad’ because he was a Nazi. It is thus that the 
narrative of her paternal grandfather as a persecuted communist becomes very 
significant to her self-understanding and might help to explain her lack of concern 
about the validity of these ‘memories’. As her paternal grandparents died when she 
was still very young, all the stories she recounts in the following paragraphs, were 
transmitted to her by her father, who was born in 1935. Her grandfather, she 
recounts, was a communist, who: 
 
M: ‘ . . . during the Nazi time . . . had to carry out forced labour . . . he was in 
the mines first and with his cousin he then almost slew someone who wanted 
to reveal them to the Nazis, with a shovel . . . and then they were kicked out 
of the mines and then he was unemployed again for quite some time . . . and 
then he had to work in the mines again because it was essential to the war 
effort.’  
 
Although much of her narrative remains vague and logically incoherent, it has, as we 
will come to see, a purpose. Directly following on from her grandfather’s life story, 
she relates how her father’s family helped forced labourers. This confuses me even 
more because, until this point in the interview, I assumed that her grandfather was 
himself a forced labourer: 
  
M: ‘In front of their [grandparents’] house – they lived on a mining estate 
[Zechensiedlung] . . . forced labour was also carried out by . . . forced 
labourers who came from Poland and France . . . and there are always .. these 
stories that one had to be very careful because my/they were all malnourished 
and my father, because he was a child, had to go to these people and whisper 
to them that in the pergola – there were these garden sheds – was soup and 
bread and they should secretly sneak away and go there and eat there . . . well, 
a secret relief action.’    
 
Jumping from how her paternal grandfather was condemned to forced labour to how 
her paternal family helped forced labourers, Melanie herself gets confused, no longer 
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sure whom – her grandfather or the foreign forced labourers – she is actually talking 
about. She then jumps to the end of the war, when:   
  
M: ‘ . . . my grandfather even learnt from someone in the NSDAP, from a 
neighbour . . . that he was supposed to have been picked up [abgeholt], 
because in [name of city] there was the [name of Gestapo prison], where 
political prisoners were sent . . . and then he was supposed to have been 
picked up and sent to the [name of prison] and it was clear that whoever was 
sent [there] will never return . . . torture was carried out there.’  
 
Continuing the family narrative, she embeds it within the local history of mass 
executions that were committed at the very end of the war, whose victims were 
mainly foreign forced labourers and POWs, but also a number of local communists 
and social democrats.  
 
M: ‘ . . . and thus my fath-/ grandfather had to go into hiding and arguably 
[wohl] went hiding in the woods, there’s a park . . . and mass executions were 
carried out there shortly before the end of the war. 
A: Uh.  
M: And there I never really know because my father has terrible memories of 
this, well he speaks about having seen dead bodies which were hastily buried 
there. 
A: Huh. 
M: When . . . the Americans invaded [einmarschieren] in the West, as they 
arrived the dead bodies had to then / and they were hastily buried and my 
father speaks about this; that their skin was torn by barbed wire and that the 
dead bodies were lying there, shot dead in caverns. 
A: Yes. 
M: And then before they were filled up/ but that’s impossible that he [her 
father] fled to the woods with his father, well his father must have told him . . 
. and presumably it was so traumatic for him. 
A: True. 
M: That he stored it as his own memory.  
A: Ah yes. 
M: That’s how I imagine it; because I can’t imagine that his mother 
[grandmother] would’ve allowed him [Melanie’s father] to go to the woods 
with his father, because there’s no food.’  
 
In trying to narrate her paternal family history, Melanie begins to stumble, 
encountering contradictions and practical impossibilities that make her story highly 
implausible. At the end of Melanie’s narrative we are forcefully reminded of the 
question of the imagination and validity or truth, as her main source, her father, is not 
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necessarily a very reliable one. Yet, she solves this problem by assuming her father to 
have been traumatized by his own father’s story. Her use of the term trauma in this 
context ‘provides a criterion of authenticity for the “real”’ (Douglas and Vogler 2003: 
15-16); it validates her story as true. This evidently works, as I endorse it by 
continuously confirming it. At the same time, she also turns her grandfather into a 
survivor of experiences that are reminiscent of the Holocaust.  
 
Although her references to skin torn by barbed wire, dead bodies lying in caverns and 
being hastily buried are reminiscent of widely-circulated images of the Holocaust – of 
‘icons of destruction’, i.e. the images of Allied troops liberating concentration camps 
– these references make no sense in terms of the plot of the story (Welzer et al. 2002: 
90). These Holocaust tropes and images are thus used to turn Melanie’s grandfather 
and father into traumatized survivors. One immediately associates her reference to 
barbed wire with concentration camps, and the story of her grandfather hiding from 
the Nazis in the woods brings to mind for example the recent film Defiance, which is 
based on Nechama Tec’s book of the same title about the Bielski brothers, who 
organized Jewish resistance from their hiding place in the woods.  
 
Welzer et al. (2002: 98) note that the closer such family stories of suffering are to 
cultural representations of the Holocaust, the more plausible they appear to the 
young listeners. The interesting point here is that Melanie is completely untroubled 
by the fact that she does not really know where these ‘memories’ ‘originate’ from. 
Hence, Landsberg’s (2004: 42) observation that ‘[w]here memories come from 
matters less than how they enable a person to live in the present’ seems apt, as these 
memories allow Melanie to say in vital situations – especially in encounters with 
Jews and non-Jews abroad – that: ‘at least I only had one bad grandfather’ and ‘I 
don’t come from a proper Nazi family.’ However, while Landsberg’s observation 
might be correct, it does not address the consequences of unchecked fantasy, i.e. of 
not working-through the past. I will discuss these in chapter 7, where I look at how 
the latter might be related to a return of an often-defiant national pride. 
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This unconcern about the validity of family narratives of NS becomes even more 
pronounced in the interview with Anna. For Anna, as for Melanie, it is very 
important to emphasize that one side of the family were victims. Already, when I 
call her to arrange the interview, she describes her family history as particularly 
interesting because of the peculiar constellation that her paternal grandparents were 
convinced Nazis, while her maternal grandparents – including her grandfather who 
perpetrated/witnessed mass executions – almost became victims ‘of these events.’  
 
Anna Seybold begins her maternal family narrative by recounting how her 
grandmother had a love child by a Russian soldier, which then disappeared and was 
probably killed by the family because, as Anna’s mother assumes, they were afraid 
of being sent to a concentration camp. By beginning with this story, she shows that 
her maternal family, unlike most Germans at the time, did not view Russians and 
‘Slavs’ more generally as Untermenschen [subhuman], but ‘had contact’ with them, 
as she puts it. Having thus set the scene, she continues by recounting how it was 
revealed that her maternal grandfather was part of an execution squad. I then proceed 
by asking her what else she knows about her grandfather, to which she replies: 
 
Anna: ‘ . . . according to the files, as my father told me, he had access to the 
files, he [grandfather] himself didn’t actually shoot but was part of execution 
squads, at the age of seventeen or so, that must’ve been really heavy . . . how 
did I get to this again? Ah, yes well on this farm where he then got to know 
my grandma, he somehow began to work in the resistance or rather there they 
then also hid Jews . . .  
A: Are there any stories about this; about how Jews were hidden, where and 
so on? 
Anna: No, well I wouldn’t know of anything that was reported to me, I believe 
most of the things come from ((laughing)) my own imagination, in some 
cellars, but no I don’t really know. 
A.: And who told you that Jews were being hidden on that farm? 
Anna: My mother and in fact the whole family and also my great-aunt who 
also witnessed this, the whole family almost ended up in a concentration 
camp because my great-grandpa, he was a very strong opponent of Hitler and 
the village-teacher once said “Heil102 Hitler” and then my grandpa or great-
grandpa said “why don’t you cure him” and the teacher reported that and 
then everything was really terrible but then they somehow still managed to 
get away with it, no idea.’ 
                                                
102 Heil can also mean to cure. 
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Oblivious to the contradiction inherent in the statement that her grandfather was a 
member of an execution squad but never fired a shot, she begins construing a rather 
fantastic story about his involvement in the rescue of Jews. Yet, this is the only thing 
she knows, everything else, where and how they were hidden stems from her 
imagination, as she admits. Furthermore, her great-grandfather is made into a ‘strong 
opponent of Hitler’, because of a dismissive remark about Hitler. In the second 
interview103 I return to this story of her maternal family’s ‘active resistance’, with 
surprising results:  
 
Anna: ‘ . . . [M]y great-aunt . . . said they were always standing with one leg 
in the concentration camp or prison, . . . because her father, my great-grandpa 
hid these people and . . . that this threat “children tomorrow Papa might not 
be here anymore” or “tomorrow we could all be in a concentration camp” 
accompanied her childhood . . . [but] how my grandfather related to this 
emotionally, I don’t know, I only know that he lived on this farm and also 
witnessed all of this and of course he never told anyone, “eh they are hiding 
Jews or Russian soldiers there” . . . I think that he also took part in this, 
that’s how my grandpa was, with the Russians, he fought for the Russians, 
with the Germans for the Germans and with the Nazis killed (all these?) 
people and then on this farm where Jews were hidden, he simply also hid 
Jews.’  
 
Asking Anna again about possible sources of this story, she reveals that these are her 
own ‘strange self-construed memories’, which she thinks:  
 
Anna: ‘ . . . come from films, in which one saw carpets being lifted, 
underneath there’s a wooden trapdoor in the roof somehow (..) a staircase 
going down, you know, and there are some people sitting there. But I believe 
that this doesn’t correspond at all to reality, well my mother for example also 
said that . . . the people they had on the farm sat at the dining table 
completely normally, they all had dinner with the family.’ 
 
To convey the danger her family found itself in to her listener, Anna here reverts to a 
narrative fragment we would rather expect to find in a story about the Holocaust, 
namely the constant impending threat of being deported to a concentration camp and 
the hidden people. Moreover, her grandfather, simply by not telling anyone about 
                                                
103 The first interview was conducted on 11th May 2006 and the second on 18th May 2006. 
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the ‘hidden people’, becomes a ‘resistance fighter.’ As in Melanie’s story, Anna’s 
family narrative of the Nazi past seems to consist of various different snippets taken 
from family conversations and cultural representations of the Holocaust. Anna even 
admits to that when she says that the places where she imagines these people were 
hidden derive from films. Yet this does not lead her to doubt the story itself. 
 
It also becomes evident that Anna is very unsure about who the people being hidden 
were and whether they were hidden at all. At the end, she puts everything she said so 
far into question by saying that these people – sometimes Jews, sometimes Russian 
soldiers, sometimes simply people – had dinner with the family. It is thus that the 
people she speaks about are likely to have been forced labourers rather than Jews or 
Russian soldiers, as the final part of the story is remarkably similar to a number of 
narratives I encountered both in my own material as well as in Welzer’s (2003: 99-
100) work, which depict the grandparents as moral and humane, because they 
allowed ‘their’ forced labourers to sit at the dinner table.  
 
The desire for narrative coherence becomes especially discernable in the interviews 
with Melanie and Anna, but is a strong feature of almost all interviews. Anna 
steadfastly, perhaps almost desperately, holds on to these highly implausible, even 
absurd, stories and does not, perhaps cannot, acknowledge that there are gaps, 
because doing so would disrupt her family narrative, the cohesion of her tight-knit 
family and her own sense of self. Welzer et al.’s (2002) finding that especially the 
grandchildren tend to miss [überhören] allusions to crimes witnessed and/or 
perpetrated and other compromising (in)actions of their grandparents in the latter’s 
stories thus corroborates my own findings, that there is a very strong tendency 
towards narrative coherence and closure, which marginalizes and/or expunges the 
ghostly traces of the past.  
 
Yet, I would here go beyond Welzer et al.’s constructivist analysis and argue that this 
finding shows how narrative becomes a means to keep experience unformulated and 
avoid working-through structural trauma; its use becomes fetishistic. ‘Narrative 
truth’ – dependent on ‘continuity’, ‘closure’, ‘aesthetic finality’ and ‘rhetorical 
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appeal’ (Spence 1982: 31-32) – is thus not, as many constructivists in (Spence 1982) 
and beyond psychoanalysis argue, sufficient when we think about remembering Nazi 
family histories, but what constructivist psychoanalyst Donald Spence rather 
dismissively calls ‘contact with the past’ (ibid.: 32), a haunting, in which the 
symbolic and material remnants of the past are recognized as potentially pointing 
towards another, hidden, layer of meaning, would (although also to some extent 
reliant on the imagination) constitute a limit to unrestricted fantasy. In such 
encounters with the past, narrative (representation) comes up against its own limits 
and is compelled to acknowledge its own failure. 
 
Furthermore, the way Anna Seybold and Dagmar Schneider portray the persecution 
of their grandfathers in Polish and Russian captivity respectively seems ‘”uncannily 
familiar”’ (Assmann, A. in Welzer et al. 2002: 93). When I ask Anna whether her 
maternal grandfather actively participated in mass executions, she answers with a no, 
to continue by describing how her paternal grandfather was subjected to games of 
Russian roulette, i.e. random mass executions in a Polish POW camp. ‘The Polish 
soldiers always positioned prisoners in front of them and then always ((makes the 
sound of machine guns)) he, thank God, never perished there.’ Dagmar makes a 
similar move, when she puts her maternal grandfather’s experiences in Russian 
captivity in the following terms:  
 
D: ‘ . . . slave labour and far below minimal calories, actually getting some 
kind of dirt to devour and really to gorge but then working all day and you 
know exactly that if you don’t  / aren’t strong enough then you don’t go but 
then go in the other direction and never return. And he was lucky to return 
from captivity.’ 
 
The allusion to the two different directions, one implying death, the other life, evokes 
a selection scene in a concentration camp. The work of historian Robert Moeller 
(1996) and Ole Frahm (2004: 373) is helpful here, showing as it does how such 
‘implicit equation[s] of German POWs with victims of the concentration camps’ has 
a long tradition in Germany and was repeatedly invoked in political and cultural 
discourse of the early Federal Republic. In both women’s narratives, their 
grandfathers only appear as victims, while their role as part of an invading and 
 178 
occupying army engaged in a war of extermination is left unattended. Or consider the 
following episode about the flight of Dagmar’s maternal grandmother: 
 
D: ‘Things which extremely moved me, even to goose bumps and also 
sometimes moved me to tears were the descriptions of how she with her 
mother and her three siblings fled . . . and such cruel things as: “No the cuddly 
teddy won’t come with us, the panties and the socks are more important”, the 
loved, too-much loved rabbit or whatever it was, has to stay, and big tears, 
terrible, harrowing, then . . . jumping on to the train, which of course was jam-
packed and no one knew where it was going and what’s happening, separated 
from the mother and her other two siblings with her little sister on her arm.’ 
 
While describing the suffering her grandmother endured during the flight, Dagmar, 
knowingly or unwittingly, recounts a situation that is reminiscent of the deportation 
of Jews, Sinti and Roma and others to the concentration and death camps: the 
limitation on luggage, the over-crowded train, the destination of which is unknown, 
getting separated from family members; these narrative devices are iconic 
representations of the Holocaust.  
 
The interview extracts analyzed in this section are prime examples of what Welzer et 
al. (2002: 90) call ‘Wechselrahmung’; the interviewees ‘imagine[s] situations of 
persecution by drawing on examples of the Holocaust.’ They, however, ‘export[s] 
these into a story about persecution in which Germans are the victims’ (ibid.). Often 
these insertions of narrative fragments derived from the history of the Holocaust 
logically make no sense within the narrative (Welzer 2003: 90); however, they do 
make sense ‘dramaturgically, because the implementation of a significant narrative 
element of stories of persecution during the Holocaust strengthens the impression of 
the listener that it must have been a seriously threatening situation’ (ibid.). Welzer et 
al. explain the ‘”uncanny familiar[ity]”’ of some parts of the stories transmitted in 
conversations about the Nazi past in families of perpetrators and followers with the 
increasing presence of images of National Socialism and the Holocaust in the cultural 
sphere in the past decades. According to them (ibid.), ‘a huge inventory of visual 
material [Bebilderungsmaterial] pushes itself in front of the interpretations of those 
stories the children and grandchildren hear from their parents and grandparents.’ Like 
Landsberg (2004: 21), who asserts that rather than imposing themselves on and 
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eradicating ‘authentic’ particular memories, mass mediated representations of the 
past ‘are the grounds on which social meanings are negotiated, contested, and 
sometimes constructed’, i.e. the grounds on which prosthetic memories are formed 
Welzer et al. (2002: 119) conclude that cultural representations ‘can become effective 
very concretely in interpretations which one develops for episodes of one’s own life 
history or the history of the family one belongs to.’  
 
However, while Welzer et al. seem to share James E. Young’s (1988: 121) view that 
‘[a]s long as these images of the Holocaust are public, they inevitably enter the 
private imagination at some level, where they are invariably evoked to order personal 
experiences’, I want to draw attention to their function as screen memories in these 
family narratives. Although both Hirsch (1999, 2001, 2008) and Landsberg (2004) 
try to counter undue appropriations by distinguishing between idiopathic/sympathy 
and heteropathic identification/empathy, their emphasis on prosthetic and post-
memories as formed through ‘imaginative investment and creation’ (Hirsch 1997: 22) 
seems to almost encourage a loose handling of the past. Especially in cases such as 
Anna’s and Julia’s, where there can be little to no doubt about the serious and 
criminal nature of particularly their grandfathers’ actions, the invocation of Holocaust 
tropes and images functions to establish ‘German’ suffering as equally traumatic as 
the Holocaust and thus sets up a relation of competitive victimhood. In such 
instances, prosthetic or post-memories take on the role of screen memories (Freud 
2006), displacing objectionable or disagreeable memories of the grandparents as Nazi 
perpetrators and/or followers with innocuous ones, which feature the grandparents as 
passive victims and/or heroes.  
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5.4 The re-interpretation of the familial silence: From denial to a symptom of 
trauma 
 
In their study The Empire of Trauma, Fassin and Rechtman (2009: 5-6) look at how 
the concept of trauma combines both medical and moral issues to create ‘this new 
condition of victimhood’ which ‘designat[es] an irrefutable reality linked to a feeling 
of empathy’. They (ibid.) furthermore point to trauma’s increasing universalization, 
which they describe as a process that is oblivious ‘to the validity of the diagnostic 
category’ in specific contexts. With ‘the metaphoric diffusion trauma’ (Levy & 
Sznaider 2006b: 289) and its subsequent adoption into German memory discourses, 
the distinction between victim and perpetrator is often obliterated, allowing for ‘the 
appropriation of the culturally celebrated status of victimhood’ (ibid.). As Levy and 
Sznaider (ibid.) maintain ‘by emphasizing the traumatic and . . . therapeutic 
dimensions . . . , the dividing line between perpetrators and victims as well as the 
distinction between historical specificity and universal applicability is frequently 
blurred.’ In analyzing the family narratives of the interviewees, I am thus not 
interested in asking whether someone was and is traumatized or not, but I, like Fassin 
and Rechtman (2009: 5), am more concerned about how and to what end ‘this new 
condition of victimhood, established through the concept of trauma’ is used in these 
narratives to elicit sympathy with the perpetrators and fellow travellers. 
 
Among the many stories about the grandparents’ wartime suffering in the interviews, 
there are a number of narratives which describe especially the grandmothers as being 
traumatized by their war and post-war experiences of the flight, bombing raids, rape 
and deprivation, while yet others depict former Wehrmacht soldiers as traumatized 
by their war experiences. Let us, however, begin with Sebastian Merle, who 
concludes that his fellow-travelling great-grandmother was traumatized by the 
Reichskristallnacht. His mother tells him that, during the demonstrations in 1989 in 
East Berlin, Sebastian’s great-grandmother gets severely agitated and frightened, 
asking whether ‘they were shooting again’. Both Sebastian and his mother then 
surmise that this reaction must be due to the fact that these demonstrations 
reactivated a trauma in her, since she ‘[great-grandmother] witnessed the 
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Reichskristallnacht . . . and for my grandmot-/ great-grandmother it must’ve been a 
trauma.’ 
 
In this inversion of a bystanding fellow traveller (a little later in the interview 
Sebastian describes his great-grandmother as the typical fellow-traveller, who sent his 
grandmother, her daughter, to join the BDM) into someone haunted by the ‘trauma’ 
of witnessing the Kristallnacht, he establishes Nazism and the Holocaust as the joint 
trauma of Jews and Germans. Paradoxically, the Nazi follower is traumatized by the 
Reichskristallnacht, the nation-wide pogrom against Jews and their property, 
perpetrated on 9th November 1938, in the main by Gestapo, SA, SS, and Hitler 
Youth, but silently or enthusiastically witnessed and supported by millions of 
Germans. Literary historian Birgit Erdle (1999: 32) detects in such talk of a common 
trauma the latent wish of ‘founding of a common place [Ort] within the after-history 
[Nachgeschichte]: a common space from which the position of belatedness is 
founded’ (ibid.). She (ibid.: 31-32) maintains that through the universalization of 
trauma a ‘continuity of human destruction’ is established. This, however, is not a 
continuity in the sense of ‘a longue durée’ but rather ‘a network of symmetries or 
analogies [Ähnlichkeiten] . . . connecting “war and genocide, racist persecution and 
ethnic cleansing”, innerfamilial violence, sexual abuse and violence in the social 
context’ (ibid.). This proliferation of trauma in turn relates to what Douglass and 
Vogler (2003: 10) have observed in relation to the broadening of the category of 
victim or traumatized subject:  
 
‘The standard dynamic of trauma makes the traumatized subject the recipient 
of the traumatic event, in categories that have moved beyond victim/survivor 
to include “onlooker trauma,” (the event of witnessing a traumatic event) and 
“secondary PTSD” (the post-traumatic stress disorder a therapist may get 
from treating a traumatized patient) to “transgenerational trauma” 
(descendents of trauma victims, ranging from Holocaust survivors and those 
of colonial regimes, slavery, apartheid, and “ethnic cleansing” to persons 
“living with AIDS”).’  
 
Such proliferation of trauma as (culturally) transmittable but also as a medical 
diagnostic, blur all differences and distinctions. As alluded to in chapter 2, one strong 
critique against the current trauma culture is that in medicalizing individual 
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experience, it privatizes collective memory and obligations into ‘narratives of 
individual suffering (Antze & Lambek 1996: xxiv). In Dagmar’s case below, taking 
recourse to the diagnostic of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to explain her mother’s 
experience of her own father as harsh and cold as well as to understand the 
psychological after-effects of the war, allows her to turn her grandfather into a 
victim, without having to acknowledge his role as part of an invading, occupying 
army, engaged in a war of extermination:  
 
D: ‘This whole Post-Traumatic Stress-Syndrome thing, back then no one 
knew about this, [but] all of them should’ve gone to therapy, . . . everyone 
who went to war and particularly those who were in captivity and I think 
that being powerless for such a long time, should it be as soldier beforehand, 
always ever only following the chain of command or even worse later in 
captivity, the permanent death threats, this powerlessness . . . led to the very 
strong urge to regain some control which was lived out in the small setting of 
the individual family . . . and I think that’s a general development which I 
believe happened in millions of households across Germany . . . and I think 
it’s also one of the reasons why he was a hard father.’ 
 
As Kali Tal (1996) and others (see Douglass & Vogler 2003; Leys 2000) observe in 
relation to Vietnam war veterans, with the official adoption of PTSD into ‘the third 
edition of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association’ (Young 1996: 96) in 1980, attention shifted from soldiers as 
perpetrators to soldiers ‘as victims of trauma, even if that trauma is the trauma of 
having inflicted trauma on others’ (Douglass & Vogler 2003: 28). This has also 
enabled the rehabilitation of Vietnam veterans, who, in the 1960s and 70s were 
regularly compared to Nazis and seen as perpetrators (Tal 1996: 11-12), into victims. 
The use of the adjective traumatic to describe the experiences of former Wehrmacht 
soldiers does the same work.  
 
Schmitz (2006a: 105-106) notes that the current mass of representations of German 
wartime suffering, especially that of former soldiers, and I might add the ubiquity of 
narratives of the grandparents’ suffering in the interviews, signifies a form of belated 
collective empathy with the ancestors’ suffering, which facilitates not only a 
reconciliation between the generations but also with the nation. Schmitz (ibid.: 108) 
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thus regards this belated empathy less as a form of collective mourning than as a way 
of ‘identity building’. Lauren Berlant (2007: 309) also shows how the public 
articulation of ‘painful feeling’ is often implicated ‘in the making of political worlds’ 
and draws attention to how a cultural politics based on feeling constructs national 
identity ‘across fields of social difference104 through channels of affective 
identification and empathy.’ Empathy with suffering soldiers and others rehabilitates 
and validates the ‘German experience’ of NS and thus allows one to speak of NS 
without needing to take account of its crimes. 
 
This becomes evident in the interview with Armin Bachmann, who saw both 
Wehrmacht exhibitions,105 and knows that his paternal grandfather, a soldier in the 
East, was engaged in what was euphemistically called ‘Partisanenbekämpfung’.106 He 
recounts the latter’s war stories in a very empathetic way, that portrays the 
grandfather and his division as fatefully caught up in a war of which they were the 
victims. His narrative ends with an episode that retells the grandfather’s last hours:  
 
A: ‘When my grandfather died . . . his wife, . . . stood by the bed and he was 
in a kind of febrile state . . . but he registered that his wife was there and then 
he shouted “Elsa, Elsa run the Russians are coming, they want to kill us all!” 
and that made it clear to us that apparently shortly before his death . . . he 
was . . . living through this again and this also suggested how traumatic these 
experiences must’ve been.’  
 
Furthermore, the critical work of Allan Young (1996) and Ruth Leys (2000: 10) in 
particular shows how the idea and diagnostic of PTSD allows one to view the 
trauma-inducing event as a purely external one, that overwhelms ‘a sovereign if 
passive victim.’ Leys (2000: 7) points out that, in applying PTSD to war veterans, 
distinctions between combatants participating and civilians caught up in war 
disappear as well as how it displaces issues of moral and political, sometimes even 
legal responsibility by regarding trauma as an overwhelming external event. This 
                                                
104 The overcoming of the difference between East and West Germans is one important aspect of this 
belated empathy. 
105 This does to some extent confirm the negative reading of the impact of the Wehrmacht exhibition, 
i.e. as having instigated conversation between the generations and thus facilitated empathy with the 
perpetrators (see introduction, p. 40-41). 
106 See footnote no. 25 on page 38. 
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conception of trauma allows Julia, like Dagmar above, to strip her great-grandparents 
and grandparents, who were deeply and actively involved in Nazism completely off 
their agency and responsibility when she turns them into recipients of a trauma. 
 
Although Julia Hartwig acknowledges that her paternal family embraced Nazi 
ideology, she never touches on the subject of active participation other than saying 
that they were ‘big shots’. In the second interview, it becomes clear that rather than 
interpreting the revelations about her family’s Nazi past as indications for an even 
more intimate and active Nazi involvement of the family, she takes the fact that her 
great-grandfather murdered his sons and wife and killed himself as signifying how 
deeply traumatized the entire family was by Nazism. Learning about these murders 
and the suicide, ‘it became even clearer to’ her ‘how much this traumatized an entire 
family, this whole Nazism and also across several generations. My great-grandpa, my 
grandpa and my father were all in a sense traumatized by this whole Nazi time’. The 
use of the term trauma to describe perpetrators (and their offspring) thus often 
facilitates a  
 
‘conception of history [Geschichtsbild] among young Germans, which allows 
to return to the long deemed obsolete strict separation between Nazis and 
Germans, which fosters an image of the Germans as ‘mislead, abused, [and] of 
their youth deprived group, . . . , who were themselves victims of National 
Socialism’ (Welzer et al. 2002: 79). 
 
 
Interlude: Silence and ineffability 
 
In his discussion of recent German literature about NS, which draws on Holocaust 
iconography, to represent German wartime suffering, Schmitz (2007a: 202) notes 
that ‘[t]he Holocaust serves as a model prototype of traumatic excess against which 
the excess of the German traumatisation needs to be valorised; its discursive model is 
the relationship between horror, trauma and the trope of ineffability in Holocaust 
discourse.’ In invoking the notion of the grandparents’ war experiences as 
unspeakable and incomprehensible, a number of interviewees below thus implicitly 
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draw on the antirealist discourse of the Holocaust as a limit event beyond history and 
representation, thereby positing their grandparents’ suffering as similarly traumatic 
and ineffable. This legitimates dissociation and puts these sufferings into a 
competitive relation. Dagmar, for example, extends the PTSD she attests to her 
grandfather to the entire German collective to justify institutional silences in schools:  
 
D: ‘Mum once said, that she envied us children for having studied this topic 
at school . . . because her teachers, mum was born in 1951, well theoretically 
it would’ve been possible for her to have had it taught in history lessons but 
that didn’t happen because the teachers themselves were so traumatized by it 
at that point in time that they of course didn’t talk about it at all.’ 
 
Of all the interviewees, Constantin Reinhart is the one who is most averse to asking 
his grandparents about the Third Reich unless they start talking on their own accord. 
Although he knows that his grandfather, also a soldier in the East, once asked what 
he did during the war, answered ‘I shot people dead!’ and was suspected of having 
been a member of the SS, Constantin says the following when I ask him what they 
speak about when he talks to his grandparents: ‘There aren’t that many 
conversations, . . . [and] I actually don’t dig any deeper because I . . . think they are 
completely traumatized, especially my grandfather . . . and I’d be damned to burden 
the old man with all this stuff.’  
 
Having asked Dagmar how she interprets her grandparents’ silence about their past, 
especially her grandfathers’ silence about their war experiences, she replies by 
referring to the unspeakability of this experience:  
 
A: ‘How do you interpret this kind of silence? 
D:  Horror . . . pure horror, I think one can’t at all imagine the kind of scars 
this left.’ 
 
What used to be condemned as denial (Mitscherlich, A. & M. 1967) is now 
diagnosed as silence in the wake of trauma. Fabian, whose father and both 
grandfathers were Wehrmacht soldiers in the East, similarly refers to the 
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unspeakability of their experiences when I ask him whether their participation in the 
war is a subject that ever comes up in his conversations with his mother:107  
 
F: ‘She’d actually like to know more about it but somehow she also can’t 
really imagine it, how it really was, but by now she’s also of the opinion that 
. . . one can probably neither put this into words nor otherwise somehow / 
that’s simply an extreme situation and I believe that any / yes any talk about 
it wouldn’t do it justice [nicht gerecht werden], one simply can’t understand 
it, I think.’ 
 
Fabian Hoffmann, like Dagmar Schneider, is much more interested in how the soldiers 
and perpetrators psychologically dealt with their past, rather than with what they 
did. In relation to the use of the idea of the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust ‘in 
the German memory discourse,’ Birgit Erdle (1999: 44; my own translations) points 
out that it often works to render invisible the multiple connections ‘between the 
everyday and the extreme’ (Rothberg 2000: 107). In Fabian’s conversations with his 
mother, the notion of extreme or traumatic experience as incomprehensible and 
unspeakable works in a very similar way: it isolates and separates the war of 
extermination in the East not only from the everyday life of the soldiers, but also 
from family life in the present. It constitutes the war of extermination as something 
unknowable and not to be known, because language and representation will never be 
able to do it justice.  
 
In addition, Schmitz (2007a: 203) notes that ‘the topos of ineffability and 
unimaginability of the soldiers’ experiences at the Eastern Front’ is important for the 
grand/children insofar as it validates the elders’ status as victims. This is confirmed 
by Fabian, who – even though he recognized the presence of the past in chapter 4 – 
ends up dissociating it by emplotting it in a harmonizing narrative that expunges NS 
as something external that was forced on the Germans. 
 
F: ‘ . . . even if they [soldiers] were probably pigs, . . . I think by now I see 
the soldiers also as victims: they are in fact humans and they do have their 
own will and their own leeway [Entscheidungsspielraum] . . . but I also 
                                                
107 All three, his father and both grandfathers, died before Fabian was old enough to ask them any 
questions. 
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believe that . . . they were really abused, abused for things by an elite . . . 
[who] had a fixed idea and could enthuse a whole Volk about it.’ 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I analyzed the grandchildren’s family narratives about the Nazi past 
with respect to how they construct and represent their grandparents, particularly 
their grandfathers as perpetrators and/or victims. In line with Welzer et al.’s (2002) 
findings, it is here also noticeable how few of the interviewees imagine their 
grandparents’ Nazi and war past as anything other than a personal story of suffering 
and/or heroism. With the exception of Ilka, Caspar and Silke, the interviewees 
dissociate and marginalize the political aspects of their grandparents’ past that speak 
of Nazi collaboration and perpetration and recount their families’ Nazi and war pasts 
by attending to their grandparents’ everyday experiences of the Third Reich and their 
personal lives. The family past is thus overwhelmingly narrated in stories of 
individual suffering. What is particularly relevant here is what Levy and Sznaider 
(2006: 5) describe as the key element of the universalization of the Holocaust and the 
attendant cosmopolitanization of collective memory, i.e. the function of the 
Holocaust as a de-contextualized concept in lending a voice to ‘other acts of injustice 
and other traumatic national memories across the globe’ (Levy & Sznaider 2006: 5).  
 
In looking at these family narratives, it becomes possible to discern how the 
globalization of the Holocaust plays itself out in the family memory of NS of these 
‘third generation’ Germans. While such reinscriptions, or ‘borrowed memories’, 
might help to articulate other silenced memories of injustice, in the case of the above 
cited grandchildren, such ‘reinscriptions’ aid the transformation of active and often 
enthusiastic Nazi perpetrators and followers as well as Wehrmacht soldiers into 
passive victims. It is thus that the paradox, which Schmitz (2007: 6) identifies, that 
the globalization of the Holocaust ‘ironically facilitates’ the return of memories of 
German wartime suffering, is to be taken very seriously. In and of itself the ‘return’ 
of memories of German wartime suffering is not necessarily a problematic 
development. However, the way in which this return often models itself on the 
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memory of the Holocaust and employs a universalized notion of trauma obliterates 
any distinctions between victims and perpetrators, facilitating a renewed 
‘disappearance of the perpetrators’ (Heer 2004).  
 
It is here that Suleiman’s (2000: 554) above-cited question of whether and where a 
line should be drawn ‘between personal memory and imagined or “borrowed” 
memory’, between public and private, family memory, becomes relevant again. While 
Landsberg (2004: 118) and Levy and Sznaider (2006) view the capacity of 
technologies of mass culture to render increasingly imperceptible and fluid the 
boundaries between authentic and inauthentic memory as enlivening nonessentialist 
and self-reflexive forms of identity politics and ethical thinking, I would be much 
more hesitant than their (see Landsberg 2004: 118) self-admittedly optimistic 
accounts. As I have argued in the introduction, and as the analysis of the interviews 
in this chapter shows, prosthetic and post-memories can also become part of a 
renationalizing politics of identity. In her Ph.D. thesis Memories and Positionalities: 
Holocaust Memory, Migration and ‘Otherness’ in Renationalised Germany, Annette 
Seidel-Arpaci (2005: 254) shows how ‘Germany’s process of renationalisation’ after 
unification is intimately connected to the return of memories of Germans and 
Germany as victim/s. With Santner and LaCapra, I want to here again draw attention 
to the importance of processes of working-through/mourning both structural and 
historical trauma, which allows for some distance to the past as well as an ability to 
make vital, if non-binary, distinctions, such as between victims and perpetrators, to 
develop. I thus agree with Ole Frahm (2004) who, in his article ‘Ein Deutsches 
Trauma?’: Zur Schamlosigkeit Deutscher Opferidentifikation calls this appropriation 
of Holocaust tropes in the perpetrator context shameless. I would add that it is 
shameless in a double sense: it avoids a working-through of structural trauma that 
begins with the acknowledgment of shame; and, in positing German wartime suffering 
and the Holocaust as equally traumatic, it remains oblivious to the important 
distinctions and differences that working-through historical trauma requires and that 
shame keeps us alert to (Probyn 2000: 57). 
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Chapter 6: National Socialism and the Holocaust: Between 
memory, history and education 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: Developments in the theory and practice of Holocaust 
education in Germany 
 
Although the boundaries between history and memory, public and private memory 
have admittedly become seriously blurred, one cannot avoid taking a closer look at 
how National Socialism and the Holocaust are taught and transmitted at school and in 
public educational institutions, such as museums and memorial sites, as well as how 
the grandchildren respond to the latter. This is especially the case as there is still a 
‘consensus about assigning public schools with the task of being the central social 
space of memory and learning’ (Meseth et al. 2004: 10-11). Moreover, directing our 
gaze towards the grandchildren’s responses to such pedagogic efforts is insofar 
imperative as they ‘are the addressees [Adressaten] of the Holocaust pedagogy’ 
(Assmann, A. 2007: 64-66) – devised in large parts by the generation of their own 
parents – which focuses, as some interviewees below assert, obsessively on the 
Third Reich and the Holocaust. An analysis of how the interviewees learn about this 
past is furthermore important as there has been a growing trend, especially in the 
wake of the Walser-Bubis debate (see footnote 22, page 34), against the normative 
tradition of officially and culturally remembering the Holocaust, i.e. of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  
 
If one wants to discuss education about and after Auschwitz in (West) Germany, one 
cannot avoid Adorno’s influential writings ‘Education after Auschwitz’ ([1967] 2003) 
and ‘What does coming to terms with the past mean’ ([1959] 1986; see Heyl 1997: 
20; Glück et al. 2004; Wood 1999). Like the Mitscherlichs (1967: 35, 42, 43), 
Adorno ([1959] 1986) was alarmed by the absence of any empathy with the victims 
of the Nazi regime in the perpetrator and follower collective. Although he does not 
refer to a lack of empathy per se but uses the words coldness and indifference to 
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describe the psychological state that was instrumental to making Auschwitz 
possible, he (1966: 8) links this to ‘[t]he inability to identify with others.’108 Yet, as 
Karyn Ball (2008a: 151) notes, Adorno’s ‘understanding of durcharbeiten as 
verarbeiten . . . is motivated by a genuine commitment to the process of coming to 
terms with the past through critical reflection’ and of making conscious what was 
unconscious. His writings have come to inform post-Holocaust educational agenda, 
with an imperative, which functions as ‘morally unassailable rationale for pedagogical 
action’ in Germany today (Glück et al. 2004), namely ‘[t]he premier demand upon all 
education is that Auschwitz not happen again’ (Adorno [1967] 2003: 19). Henke-
Bockschatz (2004: 299), professor of history didactics, informs us that ‘at the latest, 
since Adorno’s dictum of an “education after Auschwitz”, the school and educational 
system finds itself confronted with the demand to draw comprehensive conclusions 
from the National Socialist’ systematic persecution and extermination of Jews and 
others. Education, he (ibid.) continues, has to instruct the younger generations, ‘to 
civil, humane and tolerant behaviour and to immunize them against racist and 
nationalist ideas’ (see also Samuels 2007). 
 
Thus, school education about the Holocaust has been progressively shouldered with 
the task of not only transmitting historical knowledge but also with the ‘moral-
political socialization of future generations’ (Meseth et al. 2004: 10-11). The editors 
(Meseth et al. 2004: 11) of a recent study that takes stock of the successes and the 
failures of Holocaust education in Germany, show how lessons have become ‘the 
instruments of the facilitation of social integration’ by teaching youngsters about ‘the 
Federal Republic’s special historical responsibility for keeping memory alive, and 
how to draw lessons from the past for the future.’ As historian and educationalist, 
Matthias Heyl (1997a: 39; emphasis in original) notes that, this already points to the 
‘area of conflict [Spannungsfeld]’ in which the memory of the Holocaust is located in 
Germany, namely between ‘historical learning and memory [Erinnern] on the one 
                                                
108 Heyl (1997b) also makes this connection between Adorno’s (see 2003: 26-27, 29) use of the 
notion of hardness, coldness and an inability to identify with the other. Adorno states: ‘Being hard, . 
. . , means absolute indifference toward pain as such’, including one’s own pain.’ Heyl (ibid.; 
emphasis in original) writes ‘[i]dentification with the victims . . . is ideal for penetrating through that 
coldness, the incapability of putting oneself in the place of others, which according to Adorno was one 
of the prerequisites for Auschwitz.’  
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hand and remembrance [Gedenken]’, the anamnestic solidarity with the victims, on 
the other hand. In the case of the descendants of perpetrators Gedenken thus calls for 
an ‘identificatory effort, which must first establish an emotional relation to those 
perished’ (ibid.: 42). However, until the early 1980s, this was not foremost in the 
minds of educators, who rather followed the outlines of an anti-fascist education 
about NS and the Holocaust, which strongly focused on cognitive (historical) learning 
and emphasized the structural aspects of the rise of fascism, and was furthermore 
strongly influenced by critical theory and theories of fascism.  
 
This changed with the 1979 broadcast of the American television series ‘Holocaust’ 
in Germany which is often credited with having put into serious doubt the efficacy of 
antifascist and cognitive-based educational practice, and to have shifted attitudes 
about how to culturally and publicly remember the Holocaust more generally (Heyl 
1997a: 147; Huyssen 1980; Kansteiner 2006: 243; Landsberg 2004: 123-124; Meseth 
et al. 2004: 13; Zielinski 1980: 94). Huyssen (1980: 122; see also Landsberg 2004: 
123-24; Meseth et al. 2004: 13-14) argues that the success of the series resided in the 
fact that it invited its viewers to re-experience [Nacherleben/ Nachempfinden] and 
identify with the suffering of one Jewish family whose terrible fate at the hand of the 
Nazis the story of ‘Holocaust’ visually recounted. Against critiques which saw the 
series as a product of the American culture industry and thus as a dangerous 
trivialization and sentimentalization of the Nazi genocide of the Jews, Huyssen 
(1980: 120; see also Neiman 1992) counters that this fictionalized rather than 
documentary account of the suffering of individual victims has done more in 
combating widespread denial and repression of the Holocaust, than all the rational 
attempts at Vergangenheitsbewältigung and education that went before it, i.e. to 
arouse both interest in the past and empathy with the victims. It is claimed (Frei 
2004: 44) to have shocked and affected [betroffen] the nation. For the first time, it is 
argued, Germans felt empathy with the Jewish victims.  
 
The lessons that the discipline of history didactics and educators took away from 
this success and the subsequent increasingly obvious failure of relying solely on 
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social theory109 to teach NS was to include affective approaches (Heyl 1997: 147).110 
The success of the series furthermore emphasized ‘that historical enlightenment 
[Aufklärung], if it occurs at all, emanates less from school and lessons and much more 
from popular historical narrations . . . that simplify and invite identification’ (Meseth 
et al. 2004: 13). The educational aim has thus often become to instill Betroffenheit111 
and empathy with the victims in the students (Heyl 1997a: 148-150; Henke-
Bockschatz 2004: 308) by confronting them with images, films and individual 
testimonies and dead bodies, visiting concentration camp sites, or engaging in local 
history projects to make the Nazi past more concrete, immediate and personally 
relevant. Yet, this method was and is often accompanied by the ‘rigid transmission 
strategy [Vermittlungsstrategie] of instruction, which assumes the moral 
unambiguousness of the subject matter’ (Meseth et al. 2004: 16). 
 
In a similar way to Hirsch, Landsberg and LaCapra, who contend that confrontations 
with representations of the Holocaust (and other mass atrocities) that invite 
identification can and should entail a muted re-traumatization of the ‘secondary 
witness’, Shoshana Felman (1995: 56; emphasis in original) posits that, in the post-
Holocaust age, teaching must produce ‘a crisis’ or a trauma, in the students for it to 
be effective. Similar to those advocating as ‘”educational objective Betroffenheit”’ 
(Heyl 1997a: 150) instead of simply passing on (cognitive) knowledge, Felman (ibid.) 
argues that ‘teaching, . . . must . . . make something happen, not just transmit a 
passive knowledge’. She (1995: 56) suggests a similarity between the psychoanalytic 
encounter in the consultation room and the pedagogic encounter in the classroom 
insofar as ‘[b]oth are called upon to be performative’; able to produce ‘altered 
                                                
109 Adorno’s ([1967] 2003: 32) suggestion that to fight the recurrence of Auschwitz ‘education must 
transform itself into sociology, that is, it must teach about the societal play of forces that operates 
beneath the surface of political forms.’  
110 Heyl (1997a: 147) speaks in this context of a Tendenzwende [trend reversal] and cites Glaser (1980) 
as arguing: “‘As important and indispensable historical comprehension as well as individual and 
collective reflection might be: Holocaust has shown that the necessity to feel with [Mitfühlen], 
sympathize [Mitleiden] and relive [Nacherleben] had received too little attention.“’ The veteran 
historian of National Socialism Detlev Peukert (1980) also cited by Heyl (ibid.: 148) echoes this: 
‘ “Especially the debate about the film Holocaust has shown that the presentation of an emotionally 
comprehensible example is much more haunting [eindringlich] than dry documentation or the 
statistical listing of millions of NS-victims. A didactic constriction to the representation of single acts 
of terror within the nearby Heimat of the pupils and the emotionally comprehensible fate of individual 
people is thus to be aimed for.”’  
111 This term is usually translated as concern or shock. Karyn Ball (2008a: 49) translates it as ‘being 
deeply affected’. 
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subjectivities’ (Simon 2004: 186). Teaching the Holocaust, in a similar way to clinical 
psychoanalysis, should enable change and transformation in the students. However, 
as already alluded to in chapter 2, the interviews I conducted and recent empirical 
research (Brendler 1997; Borries 2004; Meseth et al. 2004b; Staas 2010) suggest that 
such transformations of subjectivity in most cases fail to materialize. 
 
Numerous scholars (Heyl 1997a; Henke-Bockschatz 2004; Meseth et al. 2004b; 
Schneider, W. L. 2004; Welzer 2004) have thus begun to take issue with such notions 
of teaching, arguing as they do that they overburden school lessons with tasks they 
cannot possibly achieve and go far beyond their limited format. Furthermore, it is 
argued that such an affective Holocaust pedagogy can lead to the appropriation 
and/or displacement of the suffering of the victims and survivors and distracts from 
historical facts to focus on the emotional reactions of students/spectators (see 
Samuels 2007: 33; Heyl 1997a: 150; Tal 1996: 53-59). I will thus in this chapter look 
at how the grandchildren responded to their school education about the Holocaust 
and will pay particular attention to the question of whether an affective Holocaust 
pedagogy is indeed conducive to processes of working-through and altering 
subjectivities.  
 
I will begin by analyzing interviews in which the grandchildren recount more or less 
strong emotional reactions to representations of the Holocaust at school as 
experiences that led them to further engage with the Nazi past. However, I will also 
point to the unethical responses such an affective pedagogy can elicit. What will 
become clear in the process is that the distinction between what LaCapra, for 
example, calls acting-out and working-through is, albeit necessary, nevertheless a 
very precarious one. Yet, how necessary this distinction is will become evident in the 
discussion of interviewees who view themselves as vicariously victimized by 
representations of the Holocaust, without however showing any empathy with the 
victims of Nazi crimes. In the last section, I will look at those who reject most if not 
all normative demands – especially the requirement of an anamnestic solidarity with 
the victims – which a Holocaust education, that is caught between historical learning, 
memory and remembrance inherently entails. It is in this context that the question of 
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whether working-through and mourning can and should function as an obligation and 
‘regulative ideal’ (LaCapra 1998: 196) becomes relevant. While I do recognize the 
shortcomings of such normative accounts, especially their inability to specify in 
more detail how public commemorative rituals and education can enable the process 
of working-through/mourning, in the last section I want to acknowledge their 
continued importance. 
 
 
6.2 The pedagogic value of (traumatic) affect 
 
 
6.2.1 Working-through and indebted memory 
 
I begin with the interview with Ilka Pilcher because she more or less stays within the 
normative framework and seems to have ‘successfully’ worked through the Nazi past 
if we go by LaCapra’s (1994: 209; 1998, 2001), Santner’s (1990) or Brendler’s 
(1997) definitions. LaCapra (ibid.) argues that, although working-through always 
involves acting-out, it ‘seem[s] to involve a mode of repetition offering a measure of 
critical purchase on problems and responsible control in action which would permit 
desirable change.’ Although Ilka’s dealing with the Nazi past works through an initial 
(over)identification with the Jewish victims of the Nazi genocide and thus via initial 
‘empathic unsettlement’ (LaCapra 2001: 41), she acknowledges the impossibility of 
ever being able to feel and experience what those persecuted and murdered have 
suffered. However, it does not remain limited to this approach: as a student of 
politics, she is also very interested in ‘the political connections’ that brought Hitler 
to power and made Auschwitz possible.  
 
Although Ilka imparts that particularly her mother ‘had dealt with 
[auseinandergesetzt] all these things, where Jews used to live [in her home town – A. 
H.] and who disappeared’, she identifies two ‘incisive’ extra-familial experiences that 
shaped her way of dealing with the Holocaust; firstly, performing Peter Weiss’s The 
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Investigation112 with her school theatre group and, secondly, her one and a half year 
stay in Israel, an experience with which she begins her life story. About the former, 
she remembers that it was the point:  
 
I: ‘ . . . when it strongly began, this engaging with the victims because we 
performed the role of the victims and then tried to empathize, how could it 
possibly have felt like? Well, it’s impossible anyway, one can think about it, 
but to at least try to take on another perspective . . . and I remember that it 
was very difficult for us not to identify too strongly with that, also not with 
the victims . . .’ 
 
So, to speak with Hirsch (1999: 7-10) and Landsberg (1997: 81-86, 2004: 149-150), 
Ilka might be considered to have achieved what the former calls heteropathic 
identification and the latter empathy; an identification that acknowledges and is based 
on difference and avoids what LaCapra (2001: 47) calls ‘surrogate victimage’ or 
‘vicarious victimhood.’ Although she experienced her lessons about NS as ‘always 
very, very historical’, she vividly remembers watching Leah Rosh’s and Eberhard 
Jäckel’s 1990 television documentary entitled ‘Death is a Master from Germany’113 
about the Holocaust at school. Watching this film and performing the play ‘deeply 
moved’ her.  
 
After finishing school, Ilka moved to Israel (where she lived in a Kibbutz that was 
specifically designed to foster Jewish-Christian and Jewish-German reconciliation) in 
order to find out how it feels to be a German in Israel. The way in which working-
through structural and historical trauma intersect becomes particularly evident in 
Ilka’s description of her time in Israel: ‘Firstly, I began to occupy myself relatively 
intensively with myself but [I] also .. very intensely dealt with German history.’ The 
question of who she is – of her identity as a German – that arises abroad, thus 
becomes part of her process of dealing with the Holocaust. She attends Holocaust 
seminars, visits Yad Vashem and meets with Holocaust survivors. Again she engages 
                                                
112 This ‘documentary play’ which ‘is based on the trial reports of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung’ (Huyssen 1980: 131) of the Auschwitz trials, which took place in Frankfurt am Main in the 
mid to late sixties (1. trial 1963-1965 2. trial 1965/66, 3. trial 1967/68). The Hessian prosecution 
service, with the help of the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltung zur Aufklärung 
nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen put members of the camp personnel on trial. 
113 This is a verse from Paul Celan’s 1948 published poem Death Fugue. 
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intensively with the suffering of the other, without however ever explicitly making 
the connection between her own family history and her interest in the Holocaust. 
Rather, she says: ‘I never had the feeling that my family wasn’t affected by it, but I 
also never explicitly felt affected by it in terms of my family. I always felt generally 
affected, that I always thought ‘I am German and live in this society.’’  
 
Caspar Reinhart and Silke Turner are much more explicit than Ilka in connecting their 
engagements with the NS past to their political views and activities in the present. 
Like Ilka’s, theirs is a position of ‘critical judgment and responsible action’ (LaCapra 
1994: 208) which is, however, as we will see in chapter 8, time and again disrupted 
by acting-out in experiences of shame. Although, in a similar way to Ilka, Caspar and 
Silke are critical of their family stories of National Socialism, they seem slightly more 
removed from this past on a general level. While Ilka’s life story is shaped by her 
repeated attempts to witness the Holocaust, Silke and Caspar, although admitting 
their political lives to be strongly influenced by the Nazi past, their affective 
connection to it seems to play a lesser role now. Caspar, for example, contends that 
since he has been intensively dealing with the Nazi past on a general level for years, 
he now sees his position more in the ‘here and now,’ where he tries to positively 
influence his environment in an ‘anti-fascist’ way. While, for Ilka National Socialism 
and the Holocaust are still highly relevant to her personal and professional life – she 
thinks about looking for a job in the commemorative sector – Silke, in a similar way 
to Caspar, maintains ‘that in the last years I was living in Germany I didn’t occupy 
myself much with fascism . . . it was rather a time in which the topic wasn’t very 
present for me.’ 
 
Silke and Caspar, unlike Ilka, use less emotionally inflected language when describing 
their responses to their education about the Holocaust, and their dealing with the 
past seems to have been shaped more by a politically motivated anti-fascist 
education rather than one explicitly aimed at fostering Betroffenheit. Describing his 
teachers as anti-fascist, Caspar says the following about his education: 
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C: ‘At my secondary school I had many former 68ers as teachers who 
emphasized the time of the NS-regime and also tried to convey to us that 
participation and political engagement is important . . . I went to school in 
[name of town] and there’s a nuclear power station and then relatively 
quickly I began to resist against that. At the age of fourteen I joined the Green 
Party . . .’ 
 
He continues by stressing his oppositional political activities, which shaped his life. 
Silke also closely links her educational experiences and her early political activism. 
Her parents are 68ers and she grew up in a community living project, where she 
learnt about the Holocaust before she went to school. In reply to my question of 
how NS was taught at her school, she asserts:  
 
S: ‘ . . . [in] the conventional way. Quite early on we read . . . The Diary of 
Anne Frank . . . At school, I’ve also dealt quite a lot with that because in sixth 
form we organized a big demonstration, a school demonstration against racism 
. . . which was also against . . . a concrete neo-Nazi thing in [name of town] . . 
. and that’s why in this context I then again dealt quite a lot with it, but it was 
also rather connected to the present [eher so im aktuellen Bezug].’ 
 
Like Caspar, she is engaged in anti-nuclear protests, anti-racist activities and left-
wing politics more generally. While for Silke the NS past becomes personally, rather 
than politically relevant only when she is in her mid-twenties and moves to the UK, 
for Caspar it does so, when he realizes that he is gay. So, unlike Ilka, neither 
experiences Holocaust education at school as a crisis, but rather they experience such 
crises outside strictly educational contexts and, as I will argue in chapter 8, 
particularly when they live or travel abroad. Furthermore, Carolin, who, although she 
criticizes her teachers for having simply confronted the students with the horrors of 
the Holocaust, without providing any adequate forum for discussion, is nonetheless 
relatively satisfied with her education about NS, which was a mixture of facts and 
testimony. Yet even though she says that NS and the Holocaust was an ‘always 
constantly present topic’, for her, in a much more pronounced way than for Silke, 
the past only becomes personally relevant and present when she moves abroad after 
finishing school.  
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For Caspar, it does so when he finds out that homosexuals were also persecuted by 
the Nazis – knowledge, he argues, his school lessons, never mentioned: 
 
C: ‘ . . . a third level became relevant, . . . [which] was when I realized that I 
am  gay and then also actually only learnt relatively late that homosexuals 
were also sent to concentration camps, something that was . . . not at all 
thematized at school. There it was actually only ever about the Jews and that 
there were also members of the opposition and homosexuals and Sinti and 
Roma didn’t really transpire. I only picked that up later on via books or the 
like and for me . . . that was another level when it was about the concrete, 
when I for myself thought: “ if I had been alive during that time, I would’ve 
also landed in a concentration camp.”’ 
 
Especially during adolescence and his attendant conflicts with his father, whom he 
describes as very conservative, bordering on fascistic, the cultural memory of 
National Socialism provides Caspar with an identificatory matrix onto which he can 
map his familial conflicts. His confrontations with the Holocaust at school and 
through mass media – he mentions Schindler’s List, for example – provoke ‘a strong 
counter reaction [Gegenreaktion]’ against his family. Caspar perceives his father (and 
the paternal side more generally) as the oppressors and strongly identifies with the 
maternal side. However, even though he here identifies with victims of Nazism, he 
identifies with victims who were like him, thus this identification is not based on 
difference nor does it have as its outcome empathy with the suffering of the other, 
but rather serves to confirm Caspar in his identity as a homosexual, as well as in his 
perception of himself as ‘interrupter and outsider’ (especially in relation to this 
family) and in a ‘general underdog identification.’ In this way, these fantasized 
projective identifications aide his distanciation and separation from the paternal 
family and allow him to view himself as a victim, i.e. ‘surrogate victimage’ (LaCapra 
2001: 40), which occurs ‘when the virtual experience involved in empathy gives way 
to vicarious victimhood, and empathy with the victim seems to become an identity’ 
(ibid.: 47; see also Samuels 2007).  
 
While Caspar does indeed here seek a concrete and personal relation to the Nazi past 
by imagining himself as a victim and/or resisting, more recently he has come to want 
to know more about the perpetrators. He contends that his lessons about NS did not 
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provide him with ‘links to an everyday reality’, nor was there any consideration on 
the part of the teachers of the fact that he and his fellow students were also ‘the 
grandchildren of those who did that’. He would have liked to have learnt more about 
‘what it meant to have been a perpetrator at that time, and how one became a 
perpetrator and these were things that were a bit suppressed.’ Although he, like the 
interviewees in section 6.3.2, also wants to historicize Nazism, he wants to do so not 
to redeem positive aspects of NS and/or to rehabilitate the grandparents, but because 
he is no longer content with demonizing the perpetrators.  
 
Ilka, Caspar and Silke could be said to more or less subscribe to the Habermasian left-
liberal model of memory based on mourning (Wolin 1989: xi), demanding both a 
critical appropriation of one’s own traditions, as well as an anamnestic solidarity 
with the victims. Their relation to the National Socialist past is to some extent marked 
by critical distance, judgment, self-reflexivity and an insistence on the distinction 
between victims and perpetrators. These interviewees, including Carolin and 
Melanie, who I will discuss in much more detail in chapter 8, have in various 
different ways emotionally distanced themselves from their families and empathized 
with the victims. In the discussion of shame in chapter 8, we will however see how 
processes of working-through are often not instigated by education and public rituals 
of commemoration, but are instead intimately related to feelings of shame that arise in 
conjunction with experiencing German national identity abroad as a stigma (Moses 
2007a, 2007c); are intimately related to receiving a blow to one’s narcissistic 
identifications with the nation. The attempts of these interviewees at working-
through can be identified as more or less ‘successful’ precisely because they also 
involve structural trauma, as we will see in chapter 8, and an acknowledgement that 
the past cannot be shed like a second skin after a temporally delimited period of 
public mourning. 
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6.2.2 Vicarious victimhood 
 
Johanna Müller, who, as we saw in chapter 5, is eager to rehabilitate her grandfather 
as a moral and humane soldier, clearly remembers learning about the Holocaust:  
 
J: ‘On my eleventh birthday I read Anne Frank the diary . . . and that was so 
terrible, I can still remember that . . . after that I watched a lot of 
documentaries . . . and there was this one documentary, most likely I was 
way too young, . . . in Bergen-Belsen, they weren’t burying the dead properly 
and I can remember that in this video they showed how these dead bodies 
were somehow pushed together with a digger . . . which upset me terribly. I 
don’t know if one is ever ready for this but I wasn’t at the time.  And that 
definitely changed me . . . but at the time it traumatized me a lot . . . I couldn’t 
bear it.’ 
 
 
 
Illustration 9. British soldiers 'burying' the dead in mass graves at the former concentration camp 
Bergen-Belsen (Hirsch 2001: 228).   
 
‘In the case of responding to the Holocaust and other cultural traumas, empathic 
identification may cause the viewer of a traumatic victimization to feel that he or she 
has also been traumatized’ (Samuels 2007: 10). Yet, as Samuels (ibid.) makes clear, 
‘[h]ere empathy creates a fixated mode of identity, which in turn effaces the victim’s 
subjectivity.’ As we have seen in the case of Ilka in particular, ‘empathic 
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identification can help people overcome . . . indifference to an event or person.’ In 
Johanna’s case, ‘however, this empathic experience . . . [is] centered on the emotional 
responses of the viewer and not on learning about the lives and possible social 
lessons of the victims’ (Samuels 2007: 33-34). Although Johanna recounts this initial 
encounter with images of the Holocaust as the starting point of a long process of 
attempting to comprehend it, she is much more interested in the perpetrators. 
Unsatisfied with the overly factual answers she is presented with at school and in 
books, she turns to her grandfather to get an answer to the one question she finds 
impossible to understand – ‘how could one vote for someone like Hitler?’  
 
Karin Ingbert also describes herself as traumatized by visual representations of the 
Holocaust. Shocked by a visit to the concentration camp Neuengamme, she begins to 
recognize not only the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust, but also how this past 
affects her. 
 
K: ‘I came out of it and was actually . . . a broken girl, I was seventeen I think, 
because this shocked me so much . . . I mean photos of course make this even 
clearer . . . and for me that was really a shock for life because the 
incomprehensible is really not comprehensible.’ 
 
It needs to be added, however, that what remains incomprehensible to Karin is not 
necessarily the Holocaust, but ‘this killing machine, which ran there, this ideological 
trimming and to really manipulate the people to such an extent that they believe, 
that’s what I find so incomprehensible.’ Like Johanna, Karin finds it difficult to 
understand how someone like Hitler could manipulate a whole people to perpetrate 
such a crime. The Germans again become the abused victims of an all-powerful Nazi 
elite. Moreover, Karin is also much more concerned with her own emotional reactions 
to what she has seen than with the victims’ suffering. So, for Johanna and Karin this 
initial ‘traumatizing’ encounter with the Holocaust does not necessarily lead to an 
engagement with the victims’ history of suffering, as it did for Ilka, nor to what 
Hirsch and Landsberg call an ethics of empathy; rather, they criticize official and 
cultural memory of National Socialism in Germany as dominated by representations 
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of Jewish suffering, as we will see below. Consequently, they refuse to grant the 
victims the ‘weak anamnestic solidarity’ Habermas and LaCapra demand.  
 
I would thus agree with Robert Samuels (2007: 33-34) who, in his books Teaching 
the Rhetoric of Resistance, writes that ‘empathic identification cannot be an effective 
pedagogical tool if it results in a purely personal emotional response’. Yet, this does 
not imply ‘that some level of empathic identification is not necessary’, but rather, 
‘that this type of response should act as a starting point for a more complicated 
learning experience’ (ibid.). Heyl (1997a: 150) and Samuels (ibid.) draw attention to 
the possibility of empathic identification to be used defensively, i.e. to detract from 
the historical event itself, the suffering of the victims and the responsibility of 
perpetrators and fellow travellers. These interview extracts make clear what I noted 
in chapter 2, namely that it would be a mistake to identify, as Long (2006: 172-73) 
suggests Hirsch does, empathic identification as ‘necessarily ethical’. Long’s (2006: 
150) critique of postmemory as an ethics of memory suggests that postmemorial 
identification ‘assumes the prior existence of an ethical subject, thereby [however] 
presupposing what it sets out to explain.’ In critique of mediation strategies that use 
photographs of victims to elicit emotional responses and thus personalize modes of 
transmission, Samuels (2007: 45), writes that ‘ . . . what is often missed from this 
strategy is an understanding of how emotional responses lead to ethical 
development.’ He (ibid.) furthermore asserts that ‘this effect of the real may serve to 
create a quick emotional identification that goes nowhere and serves no higher 
purpose other than creating a sense of authenticity.’  
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6.3 Reevaluating the National Socialist past 
 
 
6.3.1 Working-through as resented obligation 
 
For the interviewees included in this section, working-through is associated with a 
strongly moralized approach to the past, which they reject as imposed by the 
generation of 1968 and the political Left. Having grown up with books and films 
about the Holocaust, but also with their grandparents’ stories, they take issue with 
the way they learnt about the Third Reich as one that was informed by too much of a 
focus on the Holocaust and its victims, a decontextualization of the twelve years of 
the Third Reich from the longue durée of German history and a highly moralized 
view of history. I shall proceed by looking at how interviewees describe their 
confrontations with the Holocaust and NS at school and beyond as compulsory, 
prescribed and accusatory. Dagmar Schneider, for example, begins the interview with 
an unelicited scathing critique of her school education about NS. Almost enraged, she 
excoriates her history lessons as having:  
 
D: ‘ . . . consisted of jumping directly from the Roman Empire to [19]33 . . . 
then 33 to 45 was regurgitated ad nauseam sorry, but really, no end . . . and I 
think that’s mainly because my history teachers were of the generation which 
is a bit older than my parents’ generation, who had to obsessively deal with it 
. . . and impressed that on us, this really hard-core “You should never forget!” 
this very strongly guilt-burdened . . . it must stay alive in memory . . .’ 
 
She also no longer sees any (educational) need to further engage with the Holocaust 
because, as a child, she read all the children’s books about it and then learnt about it 
at school. When I ask her what she thinks about how the Holocaust is currently 
remembered in Germany, she asserts that: 
 
D: ‘I personally never felt the need to visit the Wehrmacht exhibition or go to 
any memorial . . . but in my case I don’t necessarily see an educational need 
concerning this topic. Surely, I can’t put forward many facts and dates, but 
one doesn’t have to teach me that what happened there was terrible.’ 
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Although Dagmar expresses the wish to visit Auschwitz at some point, she adds that 
this wish is also informed by a sense of duty, i.e. she feels that this is something ‘one 
has to have done.’ Similarly, Anna Seybold describes how she felt she was forced to 
deal with the Nazi past when she was a teenager, while she welcomes the fact that 
the memory of the Holocaust has become more of a private matter now:  
 
A: ‘But I also think if one isn’t interested in the topic one can walk around 
relatively unaffected, not noticing anything. I think if one’s politically engaged 
there’re many opportunities to deal with it, but . . . when I was sixteen I 
really experienced this very differently. When I was sixteen, I felt one is being 
forced to deal with it. I don’t know whether that was because of school or 
because I knew people who were members of the Antifa114 . . .’  
 
Karin is also very critical of what she considers the by now exaggerated and ‘diffuse’ 
confrontation with the National Socialist past at school. According to her, this 
confrontation is not based on facts but rather on the ‘opinions’ or ‘whims’ of the 
teachers and the ritually repeated demand that it must never happen again. Albrecht 
Richter and Fabian Hoffmann are even more explicit in their critique of the generation 
of 1968 and find the way members of this generation taught them about NS and the 
Holocaust particularly wanting. Fabian blames his school education for having 
suffocated any interest that he might have developed in the topic. While Fabian 
recounts how he enjoyed rebelling against his 68er teachers at school by annoying 
them with slogans like ‘we can be proud of our country again’, Albrecht was always 
more interested in the relation the 68 generation has to the Nazi past than in the 
historical event itself. It is thus that questions about the Holocaust as a historical 
event are replaced by questions of how it is and should be represented. Hence, 
Albrecht’s criticism of the 68 generation for its self-righteous identification with the 
victims, through which it liberated itself from any connections to the NS past.  
 
Martina von Selbig became interested in NS generally and her family history when 
she began her university studies in her late 30s. Before that, she imparts, she avoided 
the topic as best as she could. One factor that contributed to this avoidance was her 
                                                
114 Antifa is an acronym for anti-fascist and signifies leftist and radical leftist groups, whose main aim 
is the fight against right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism. 
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experience of her education about NS as a constant accusation and, in hindsight, she 
sees herself as having been ‘permanently on the defensive and in constant 
justification of a . . . past time for which I wasn’t responsible’. Julia Hartwig argues 
explicitly against the history education she received as having focused too much on 
emotions. After talking about her recent visit to the concentration camp Buchenwald, 
I ask her what she thinks about the way the Holocaust is currently publicly 
remembered in Germany. She replies: 
 
J: ‘ . . . it’s always too much tear-jerking, for example at school, we got this 
pesky book Tell ye your children [A book about the Holocaust in Europe 
1933-1945], in which large-sized images of dead people could be seen, which 
was very harrowing and we ceaselessly watched films about concentration 
camps and about the persecution of the Jews and all of that is important, but 
what would’ve also interested me . . . is the political background, how could it 
get that far at all, I mean, one has to first get that going such a National 
Socialist system, it doesn’t emerge out of nothing . . . we hardly got any 
answers to that . . .’ 
 
Similar to Caspar above, Julia would have liked to know more about the beginnings of 
NS and the perpetrators, while she explicitly attacks a pedagogy that has as its 
educational aim Betroffenheit. But, unlike Caspar, she thinks NS to be history now: 
‘it’s gruesome history, but my God, it’s also over somehow. It should never happen 
again, one shouldn’t forget it . . . and, as I said, compassion in moderation is 
important but think it’s too much exploited . . .’ She reiterates Heyl’s and Samuels’ 
reservations about empathic identification when she says that ‘this expected reaction 
“now we all have to show how shocked we are”’ not only detracts from important 
issues, such as the question of how the National Socialists could come to power in 
the first place, but also concentrates too much on the victims in their position of 
victimhood, while forgetting their lives before they became victims. She attacks her 
teachers for their ‘hypocritical concernment [Betroffenheit],’ and for instilling guilt 
feelings in their pupils by emphasising that ‘we’re all very guilty and you’re all 
guilty and you all have to feel very bad about it.’ Julia continues: 
 
J: ‘ . . . we visited concentration camps and watched films at school and I felt 
guilty for not feeling guilty. At Bergen-Belsen I stood in this field and thought 
“my God this is a field, what am I supposed to do here?” and my classmates 
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started crying and I was a bit like hm. Of course this is all very terrible but I 
honestly have to say “I am standing in a field, I can’t really” / and I felt guilty 
about that and today I’d say I wouldn’t have needed that . . .’ 
  
In his critique and rejection of his education about the Holocaust and National 
Socialism, Alexander Fierbert is the most severe:  
 
A: ‘ . . . at school always this “children, children, you have to know all of 
this, how terrible, terrible, terrible all of it was” and then  . . . this forefinger 
[Zeigefinger] and one was burdened with a guilt, with such a strange, in my 
opinion, Christian guilt as a child to which one couldn’t relate at all because 
one thought “ok what happened then, what did they do, what’s it got to do 
with me?” . . . [at] school the ever-same mantra “mind the Jews! Don’t say 
anything stupid!” and we have to be ashamed until the end of our days . . . I 
was glad [when] I no longer needed to listen to that.’  
 
It is, as Schneider (2001: 335) notes, ‘[i]n this confusing situation of having to 
confront an imposed [auferlegten] guilt which does not correspond to any psychic 
representation, [that] the function of the relationships to the grandparents’ – whether 
dead or alive – ‘was and is to provide relief [Entlastungsfunktion].’ This is 
particularly relevant in the case of those interviewees who portrayed their 
grandparents as victims or heroes in chapter 5. In these relationships, the 
grandchildren ‘are not mauled [traktieren] with moral appeals or instructed to avow 
themselves to something that happened long before they were born’ (ibid.).  
 
While Alexander also redeems his grandfathers as heroes, he feels no personal 
connection to the past and thinks his generation no longer has anything to work 
through. Like German writer Martin Walser (1998) who, in his notorious acceptance 
speech of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade (1998), fulminated against a 
‘constant representation of our disgrace’ [‘diese Dauerrepräsentation unserer 
Schande’] which the media and the intellectuals practiced in their ‘cruel 
Erinnerungsdienst’ [commemoration duty], and which repeatedly showed images and 
films of horrendous suffering – which he prefers not to look at – Alexander, refuses 
to be confronted with visual representations of the Holocaust, because:  
 
A: ‘Ultimately I find it very unpleasant to have to look at these images 
because I think one doesn’t have to look at everything. I also don’t look at 
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everything that’s on television. I don’t think much of that and as if one had to 
shock children . . . these absurd images of these heaps of glasses, heaps of 
teeth . . . heaps, heaps, totally crazy, it also repelled me . . . I thought “I don’t 
want to see this nonsense, I refu-/ well it didn’t interest me.’  
 
He goes on to say that ‘this suffering . . . leaves me unaffected [untouched]’ and 
voices his incomprehension about why one would want to continue to dwell on this. 
He considers visits to Auschwitz ‘a waste of time.’ If we agree with Santner, 
LaCapra, Hirsch and Landsberg about the necessity of empathic unsettlement or 
secondary traumatization for the process of working-through (and mourning) the 
past, however differently that might be conceived by these theorists, then these 
interviewees dissociate the past by narrating it in a particular (unaffective) way 
which, as we will now come to see, seeks an unbefitting, or deceptive objectivity (see 
LaCapra 1994: 70-71) that represses the interviewees’ own positionality and 
investments in the past.  
 
Naomi Mandel (2006: 58; see also Ball 2008a: 190), however, raises doubts about 
such normative accounts and trauma theory more generally. She (ibid.) criticizes 
LaCapra’s account because its ‘alignment of trauma with ethical engagement 
reestablishes inclusive and exclusive communities, here identified not geopolitically 
but juridically.’ She (ibid.) continues by contending that ‘[w]hen susceptibility to 
trauma becomes legislated in this way, access to the ability to be traumatized 
becomes an index of ethical commitment, whether directly, for the victim . . . or 
indirectly for the critic.’ In LaCapra’s (1994: 220-221) view, one has to endure ‘a 
process of at least muted trauma’ in one’s attempts to understand the Holocaust ‘and 
empathize with victims.’ Mandel (2006: 58) takes issue with this ethical notion of 
trauma because ‘[a]ccess to trauma’ becomes ‘also access to the attractive position of 
responsibility and empathy.’ She (ibid.) continues that if ‘access to the position of 
“traumatized” . . . is thus monitored, trauma theory becomes both the subject and the 
object of cultural and ethical surveillance.’ And Karyn Ball (2008b: 166) refers to the 
frequent ‘conflation between the Bilderverbot [(image prohibition)] and 
unrepresentability’ which often ends up turning into ‘[a] moral claim about how an 
audience must feel’ while being ‘presented as a given inherent in the traumatic event.’ 
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The historian Wulf Kansteiner (2004a: 215) similarly argues that ‘the trope of trauma 
devalues many other subject positions’ and ‘makes it difficult, for example, to 
interpret the detached curiosity, with which many consumers react to Holocaust 
media products, as anything other than an ideological screen or a psychological 
defense mechanism.’  
 
While I am sympathetic to Mandel’s criticisms of trauma theory, especially the idea 
that certain identifications with the victim(s) are not only appropriative but happen 
‘at the expense of new and potentially unsettling knowledge about the pervasiveness 
of complicity’ and about perpetration‚ that “we, heirs to the horrors of the twentieth 
century cannot afford to ignore“’ (Mandel cited in Ball 2008a: 210), she ignores 
LaCapra’s distinction between structural and historical trauma and lumps his account 
together with those of Caruth and Felman, both of whom lack a notion of working-
through. However, it must also be added that most interviewees complained that 
they did not learn (enough) about the beginnings of NS and the perpetrators and felt 
somehow circumscribed in what and how they could speak about NS. It is thus that a 
pedagogy that declares a ‘disciplined empathy’ with the victims and Betroffenheit its 
main goal cannot attain the aim of facilitating a ‘deep intellectual and emotional 
response in the pupils with serious consequences for the formation of identity’ 
(Borries 2004: 268). This is the case because, ‘in elevating the desired result to a 
precondition’ (Staas 2010: 14), such a pedagogy does not allow for a more pluralistic 
and multiperspectival approach (Borries 2004; Meseth et al. 2004, 2004b; Welzer 
2004) to the NS past, but rather teaches students how to speak about and react to 
representations of the Holocaust properly. 
 
Yet, this raises the question of how to think about some of the interviewees below 
who, rather than display shock and empathy, express an explicit fascination with 
Nazism. Are such expressions of fascination, as Friedlander (1993 [1982]) notes, the 
fruits of a ‘new’ discourse on Nazism that developed in the early 1980s, 
‘organiz[ing] itself around the same phantasms, the same seductive modes of address 
that proved so powerful during the Third Reich’ (Santner 1990: 33)? Or are Santner 
(ibid.: 34) and Brendler (1997) correct when they argue that such phantasms and 
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fascinations are better understood ‘as a matter of blocked or circumvented 
mourning’? In any event, the at times vehement rejections of the public 
commemoration of the Holocaust as prescribed and ritualized ‘Erinnerungsdienst’ 
and an increasing fascination with Nazism reminds us of the importance of working-
through the structural trauma of the shattering of a primary narcissism. Unless the 
latter is not also part of the process, narcissistic structures of identity remain intact 
and public commemorations and representations of the Holocaust are experienced as 
accusatory, as I will show in chapter 7. 
 
 
6.3.2 A more ‘differentiated view of the past:’ Historicizing the Holocaust and 
National Socialism 
 
Although some interviewees discussed below, e.g. Sebastian, Karin and Johanna, do 
express shock [‘Betroffenheit’] and incomprehension about the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews, Gypsies and others, their wish to historicize is expressed in such a way that it 
overrides any empathy with the victims of the Holocaust. This points to what 
Friedlander (1993 [1982]: 20) describes as the ‘dissonance’ between condemnation of 
and the will to understand Nazism, and furthermore relates to Welzer’s (2004: 49) 
criticism of Holocaust pedagogy in Germany as ignoring ‘the fact that each form of 
the mediation of history is accompanied by a set of – fascinating, deterring, aesthetic 
– subtexts that are interpreted within the frames of social interpretive patterns which 
always already exist beyond school.’ Welzer here draws our attention to the various 
other sources – among which family memory, he argues, reigns supreme – on which 
young Germans draw in their attempts to understand the past. In doing so, he also 
implicitly alerts us to the fact that public enlightenment and working-through 
historical trauma cannot be sufficient.  
 
For Albrecht Richter and Christian Marx, the Holocaust is now to be considered part 
of European history, as we will come to see in the next chapter. Furthermore, 
Christian rejects what he considers a current ‘sacralization of the Holocaust’ and by 
now no longer approaches the past in the terms of a ‘personal Betroffenheit,’ while 
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Albrecht speaks disdainfully of ‘the same old Betroffenheits-story 
[Betroffenheitsleier]’ that comes up in relation to the German past and resents the 
idea that the Nazi past still influences the way people judge each other in the 
present. Sebastian understands National Socialism in the terms of an abstract theory 
of fascism and as an ‘ingeniously devised system’ which left people no choice but to 
become collaborators. Very critical about the American ‘Holocaust industry’ he 
suggests one start to view the past as history and ‘that one should now simply draw 
the line’. Horst Endress, the professional historian to be, pleads for the 
‘historicization of all history’ and claims his ‘task as historian is to not once use the 
word good, evil, guilt or anything else in . . . work about the Holocaust.’ In the light 
of the revelations about her family’s very active participation in Nazism, Julia 
maintains ‘it doesn’t change anything about the fact that I view it as history and do 
not consider myself as directly affected [betroffen] . . . I don’t feel myself to be 
greatly affected in this respect.’ Karin emphasizes that it is important that one now 
views the past in an objective and sober way and begins to ‘develop a certain self-
confidence in relation to history’. Constantin asks whether one still needs to deal 
with the past because he has the impression ‘that we lacerate ourselves a bit, well it’s 
an unhealthy working-through the past [Aufarbeitung] . . . if we can’t stop beating 
our chest.’ Alexander says that, apart from a few family stories, ‘there was never a 
connection there and sure, I then view it as history.’ Fabian is of the opinion ‘that 
the Holocaust as historical event is being remembered too much,’ that ‘it’s 
emotionally remembered too much [and] that society is basically lacking the ability 
to abstract the whole thing.’  
 
Many of these interviewees echo Martin Broszat’s ‘Plea for the Historicization of 
National Socialism’ insofar as they criticize the way an understanding of this period 
‘remains bound up with’ what the historian (1988: 90) elsewhere called the 
‘monuments of mournful and accusatory memory’ which is ‘imbued with the painful 
sentiments of many individuals, in particular Jews, who remain adamant in their 
insistence on a mythical form of this remembrance.’ Hence they tend to view 
memory as the ‘”other” of history’ (LaCapra 1998: 16) and to ‘conflate memory 
with myth or ideology’ (ibid.: 17), while history is seen as unimpeded by either. 
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Johanna makes this explicit when she says that ‘museums [are] a nice thing, but we 
don’t need 20 museums on the topic of Jews and above all the Holocaust didn’t only 
claim Jews, [but] also politically and religiously dissenting people, other cultural 
groups [like] Sinti and Roma.’ This aspect, she thinks, is drowned out in the current 
debates about the Nazi past, which are conducted in too propagandist a manner.  
 
Although looking at the past objectively and trying to rationally understand it is 
important, it needs to be noted here that most of the above rejections of memory in 
favour of more ‘objective’ and differentiated approaches to the past are, as we will 
come to see, expressed in the service of quite a different agenda. I am here drawing on 
LaCapra’s (1994: 70-71) distinction between a ‘deceptive “objectivity-effect“’ 
brought about by ‘concentrat[ing] on past contexts in abstraction from their relation 
to present problems and debates’ and ‘a defensible mode of objectivity’ which can be 
‘achieved in and through an explicit, theoretically alert resistance to projective wish-
fulfilling tendencies and an attempt to engage critically the problem of one’s relation 
to the past,’ i.e. remaining aware of one’s positionality and transferential relation to 
the past. Appeals to greater differentiation and more objectivity in most of the 
above-cited cases, however, imply the former kind of objectivity rather than the 
latter. Elsewhere LaCapra (2001: 39) writes that ‘[s]uch objectifying strateg[ies] may 
well posit or assume a radical divide between objectivity and subjectivity (. . . ) and 
lead to an either/or conception of the relation between empathy and critical analysis.’ 
 
Sebastian Merle for example, takes issue with the view of National Socialism as 
something ‘unquestionably bad’, while I champion the view that it is just that, i.e. 
radically evil.115 In the ensuing discussion, I abandon my role as (detached) 
interviewer. Also a sociology student, Sebastian criticizes me for not being properly 
scientific [‘wissenschaftlich’] because my view is not differentiated and objective 
enough, while he attempts to redeem positive aspects of the NS past, such as the 
technical progress that it facilitated and the social security measures it introduced. He 
                                                
115 Since the interview, which was conducted in 2006, I have diverged from this position, insofar as I 
have come to realize that viewing NS as radically evil is also not an option, as it allows one to 
conveniently distance oneself from this past, to such an extent that continuities become invisible.  
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offers the metaphor of the Nazi past as a soup, seasoned with lots of disgusting 
spices, which render it almost inedible, even though it also contains healthy 
ingredients like vegetables. As fitting as this metaphor might be, his desire to redeem 
something positive from the past goes beyond praising the rate of technical progress 
under National Socialism to include respect for what the Nazis did in terms of 
fostering a national consciousness. Although he concedes that one cannot separate 
the Holocaust from the rest of National Socialism – ‘the Autobahn then also always 
has this Holocaust aftertaste’ – he asserts that if one separated them analytically one 
would surely also see its progressive sides. If one were to view it more objectively, 
‘including all its regressivity and aggressivity and terror which it spread, the fascist 
time is also a sign of modern societies or the advance of societies.’  
 
The interview with Horst also raises this issue when we speak about his view of 
official Holocaust memory as ritualized, and tied to what he terms a clichéd political 
correctness. He asserts: ‘I believe someone who really thinks about it, is soon no 
longer content with simply saying “pff back then they were all evil and that’s how 
all of this happened and then the Americans came and then everything was good”’. 
This critique, as we saw in chapter 5, however goes hand in hand with an interest in 
local history in which, as he explains, ‘the Holocaust would not be in the 
foreground.’ In this context, Friedlander’s (1993 [1982]: 22) fear that ‘[t]he more the 
worst aspects of Nazism are neutralized, the more the new discourse finds its way 
into our imagination’ is legitimate and apt. Horst developed a fascination for the 
Hitler as a person from quite early on: ‘I was fascinated by or interested in how 
someone like that, who comes across as ridiculous today, how someone like that 
fascinated this whole Volk, not spoken abstractly, but to which my grandpa, my 
grandma, my grandaunt and so on belonged.’  
 
Sebastian also speaks of his: 
 
S: ‘ . . . negative fascination with fascism, . . . even though it’s somehow 
something diabolical and something negative, one is still fascinated by it, one 
cannot believe it that the people at the time had this ideology; when one sees 
them on pictures one thinks “wow they were these absolute Jew haters and . . 
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. had a hell of a lot of skeletons in their closet [tierisch viel Dreck am 
Stecken], beastly [tierisch] bloody hands . . . [and then] one sees them, [and] 
they’re wearing a clean uniform and look sharp . . . that’s always such a 
discrepancy, one sees this image, . . . and knows the facts and then thinks 
“wow, they were supposed to have done that?” and one can’t see that, 
fascinating.’ 
 
While Sebastian aestheticizes Nazi power, Constantin Sievers is captivated by how 
the film The Downfall about the last days in Hitler’s bunker visualizes this ‘end time’ 
and the attendant apocalyptic coexistence of total power and the immanent 
‘annulment of all power’; a structure which Friedlander (1993 [1982]: 19) regards as 
one of the ‘foundations of the psychological hold of Nazism itself’, namely ‘of a 
particular kind of bondage nourished by the simultaneous desires for absolute 
submission and total freedom.’ Although initially speaking of his father’s continued 
captivation with Nazism, Constantin himself is quite taken with Nazism’s alluring 
power: 
 
C: ‘I have the feeling that there’s still a bit of pride there, you know, Nazis 
and Hitler and so on. Well really bizarre, . . . I think this spell, the mysticism, 
which emanates from this whole thing, it’s indeed still very fascinating. What 
really interests me is the end of the war, . . . that’s really a very fascinating 
situation, how it’s always portrayed, . . . that it actually started quite 
promisingly for these Nazis this war, . . . and then the striving to become a 
great power [Grossmachtsstreben] and the omnipotence thinking 
[Allmachtsdenken], and how this drifted apart, reality and what these people 
fabricated in their heads. ’ 
 
Rather than visiting Auschwitz, Alexander Fiebert, is also much more interested in: 
 
A: ‘ . . . how the media was used at the time, how perfectly that was done . . . 
and the propaganda and the way the masses were controlled  [lenken] by the 
media and information . . . and how all of this looks, and how it is then 
represented, how well this was done visually . . . simply in terms of images, 
how visually very powerful it was, all these Lichtdome,116 the stadiums . . . or 
these torchlight processions . . . that’s a show . . . This is a part of it which 
really absolutely interests me and . . . how can one get something like that 
started, how does that happen?’  
                                                
116 Designed by Albert Speer, these ‘Cathedrals of Light’ consisted of hundreds of army flak 
searchlights directed towards the night sky at Nazi rallies, such as the yearly Reichsparteitage. They 
had an enormous effect on the masses and were employed as an important propaganda instrument.   
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Alexander, who works in the film industry, wants to be able to look at Nazism in a 
way that is free of value judgments to be able to appreciate how perfectly it 
aestheticized power to control the masses. What becomes obvious in these three 
extracts is that there is indeed a ‘revival of a certain attraction of Nazism’ 
(Friedlander 1992 [1982]: 106) that flourishes in the wake of the progressive 
historicization of the Holocaust. Alexander furthermore argues for the historicization 
of the Holocaust to clear the way for a view of the successful postwar history that is 
unimpaired by the Holocaust. Asking him about how, in his opinion, the 
grandchildren should deal with this past, he replies that he would like to start writing 
this history anew, because what has so far been conveyed as ‘our’ history is ‘so 
bleak [düster].’ He would ‘lace up the whole thing and say “well, that was the 
history, which we were supposed to believe’ and would like Germans to begin to 
look at the positive things that have happened since 1945.  
 
Julia Hartwig is similarly interested in re-writing the past in a more ‘objective’ way. 
Alexander’s and her pleas for objectivity can, however, to use LaCapra’s words, be 
described as ‘deceptive’ insofar as they remain inattentive to ‘the problem of the 
implication of the interpreter in both the object of interpretation and in 
contemporary discussions of it’ (LaCapra 1994: 70-71). Annoyed about the 
‘sentimental guilt feelings story,’ which hinders an objective dealing with the past, 
she criticizes cultural memory of the Holocaust as representing the past in 
stereotypical ways, i.e. the evil Nazis and the good, innocent Jews. Against this 
‘stereotypical’ memory she proposes a widening of perspectives, which would 
include her grandparents’ memories of wartime suffering:  
 
J: ‘We can’t criticize anything that’s about WWII . . . and culturally I think 
the way it’s dealt with is still too uncritical and too stereotypical, for example 
when I look at my grandparents’ history . . . my grandma who was bombed 
out in Berlin had to rescue her child and my grandpa suffered in Stalingrad . . . 
then it would of course be interesting to for example, I don’t want to say to 
humanize the whole thing but simply to represent it, without of course 
forgetting that the Germans were also still perpetrators, but I believe in the 
end both sides suffered.’  
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In a similar way to Julia, Anna Seybold not only seems ambivalent about the 
imperative to remember and critically deal with the Holocaust, but also, as we saw in 
chapter 5, appropriate narrative fragments and tropes of the history of the Holocaust 
to narrate their own family histories. Dagmar would have liked to have learnt about 
the postwar time at school, especially about the political struggles to get German 
POWs home. The latter is an aspect that she distinctly missed in her history lessons 
and which relates directly to the stories she recounted about her grandfather’s time in 
Russian captivity and the physical and mental state in which he returned. Karin 
Ingbert is also concerned about limiting the national narrative of the NS past to the 
Holocaust, when she fulminates:  
 
K: ‘It can never be just that, of course there was resistance, there was the 
White Rose, there was the Confessing Church [Bekennende Kirche], there 
wasn’t only Herr Bonnhoefer, . . . he’s only one of many, . . . homosexuals 
were also persecuted, . . . priests and pastors were persecuted, . . . there were 
diverse groups who could land in the concentration camps, . . . , but it’s only 
ever the Jews about whom we hear stories [es wird immer dann nur von den 
Juden erzählt], which brings with it a total one-dimensionality of the whole 
problematic.’ 
 
Karin’s grandfather was a pastor and she seems to want to see his experience of what 
she calls resistance and persecution represented in the national narrative of the past. 
So, I if we remember how the majority of the interviewees narrated their 
grandparents’ Nazi past, we can here, following Schmitz (2007a: 208), conclude that 
‘[t]he call for a historically more differentiated view of Germans under National 
Socialism beyond the perpetrator/victim divide frequently coincides with an attempt 
to legitimize a sentimentally empathetic approach to Germans as innocent victims.’ 
Furthermore, we can conclude with Friedlander’s (1993: 95) critique of Broszat’s 
plea for the historicization of National Socialism that, even though calls for the 
removal of moral barriers are often articulated in the service of a more objective, 
differentiated and less emotionally inflected history of NS, it needs to be kept in 
mind that such demands are frequently about a cultural memory and collective 
identity that does not have to integrate the Nazi genocide of the Jews as a defining 
feature. The voices of these interviewees are, however, also a sign of the failures of 
Holocaust education in German schools, which most of them found to be crucially 
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lacking because it left them bereft of ways to understand in more concrete terms how 
the Holocaust could happen, and here in particular bereft of knowledge about the 
perpetrators that goes beyond what Julia calls the ‘stereotypical’ evil Nazi.  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
What became obvious in this chapter, is that education has in most cases neither 
managed to convey the desired knowledge about NS, nor the intended moral attitudes 
(see also Meseth et al. 2004: 13). As in chapter 4, we are here again confronted with 
young Germans’ growing desire to understand ‘a past with which they are repeatedly 
confronted as a special legacy and burden’ but which they, as Broszat (1988: 89) to 
my mind wrongfully argues, ‘can only . . . experience[d] intellectually and in 
historical terms.’ Yet, this still leaves us confronted with the question of what we are 
to make of the fact that so few interviewees respond to Holocaust pedagogy in the 
desired manner, with the desired knowledge and moral emotions of empathy and 
indignation.  
 
While educationalists have obviously not paid enough attention to other affective 
responses – ranging from shame, to indifference to outright anger and annoyance – 
other than deeming them inappropriate defenses, the aim of instilling the correct 
emotions in the students might not be the right approach to teaching, as Sara Ahmed 
(2004: 181-82) reminds us. She (ibid.) argues that although emotions are important to 
learning, a pedagogy in which they ‘become the “outcome” of . . . teaching (rather 
than part of the process)’ (ibid.) is akin to ‘instrumental and conservative practices 
of teaching’ (ibid.), insofar as it turns the students into containers, to be filled with 
the right emotions as well as turning emotions ‘into fetish objects’, that can be 
known before they are experienced. Several commentators and scholars (Borries 
2004; Henke-Bockschatz 2004; Staas 2010: 14) have thus noted an anti-
enlightenment tendency in Holocaust education, if its aims are reduced to instilling 
Betroffenheit and practising the correct way to speak about the Holocaust. 
Furthermore, Henke-Bockschatz (2004: 309) notes that removing the Holocaust 
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beyond any attempt at understanding imposes too strong a limit on pupils’ efforts to 
think about the Holocaust and NS independently. Increasingly, educationalists are 
thus calling for an end to teaching the Holocaust as an unfathomable event that 
demonizes the perpetrators (Shilling 1996; Welzer 2004), and for the educational 
objective to become ”multiperspectivity”, i.e. to abandon the idea of NS and the 
Holocaust as an a priori morally unambiguous subject (Meseth et al. 2004: 16).  
 
Another sign of the failure of Holocaust pedagogy is that, if the past does indeed 
become present and personally relevant to the interviewees, it often does so only 
(long) after they have left school or in explicitly non-educational (and non-
commemorative) contexts. As Kößler (2004: 239) points out, this raises the question 
of whether historical learning – be it in the form of critical analysis or empathic 
identification – when it has to be pressed into the format of school lessons, can be 
the ‘adequate means’ to form a ‘moral personality’. In most cases, as Borries (2004: 
268) echoing Adorno ([1959] 1986) contends, the result of school education about 
the Holocaust is ‘a rather business-like [geschäftsmässig] and superficial working-off 
[Abarbeitung]’ the past.  
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Chapter 7: Proud guilt and other ways of ‘normalizing’ national 
identity in unified Germany 
 
 
7.1 Introduction: The dialectics of ‘normalization’ 
 
While Habermas has always considered the NS past as constituting ‘a special legacy 
and burden’ (Broszat 1988: 89) for Germans, his conservative counterparts during 
the Historikerstreit tried to extricate German national identity precisely from this 
burden, by for example comparing the Holocaust with Stalin’s Gulags. Where the 
conservative historians, however, remained unsuccessful, two developments of post-
unification memory politics – firstly, the official integration of the Holocaust into 
German cultural memory and identity and, secondly, the simultaneous 
Europeanization of the Holocaust – can be said to have in large parts achieved what 
Ernst Nolte and his colleagues could only dream of. I thus want to here distinguish 
between two forms of ‘normalization’: firstly, ‘normalization’ via relativization, the 
preferred strategy of the conservatives of the old Federal Republic, and secondly, 
‘normalization’ via ritualization and regularization of Holocaust commemoration, the 
approach that has become especially apparent since unification (Olick 1998: 553). 
While the first kind of ‘normalization’ has become distinctly outmoded, but has not 
completely vanished, the second seems to be very successful (ibid.; see also 
Kansteiner 2006). I will thus in this chapter look at how the above identified two 
developments in post-unification German memory politics have variously facilitated 
the ‘normalization’ of German national identity by dispensing with the idea that NS 
constitutes a particular German legacy and responsibility.  
 
As chapter 1 tried to show, the veritable surge of commemorative events and 
scandals that followed in the wake of unification demonstrates that, contrary to 
widespread anxieties, the Holocaust was set to become an integral part of unified 
German national identity. As political scientist Lothar Probst (2006: 65) asserts, ‘the 
Holocaust has become a central point in the founding narrative of modern Germany, a 
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key component in the officially sanctioned national identity.’ Karl Wilds (2000: 94) 
confirms this in his influential article ‘Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition: 
Recasting ‘Normality’ in the Berlin Republic’. There, he shows how the politicians 
and officials of the Berlin Republic opted for the memory of the Holocaust and ‘open 
contrition’ (ibid.: 94), which has become cross-party political consensus.  
 
Having thus embraced responsibility and contrition as official policy, the Federal 
Republic is increasingly taken to be standing at the end ‘of a collective moral learning 
process’ (Moses 2007a: 5; see especially Goldhagen 1998) and having successfully 
mastered its past or indeed more sarcastically as the ‘world champion of mastering 
the past’ (Frei 2004; Garton-Ash 2002). Increasingly Germany’s leading export, 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung is regarded as an occasion for pride (see Rensmann 
2001), rather than shame. Unlike in the old Federal Republic, official admissions of 
guilt and contrition and an assertive national identity are no longer mutually exclusive 
but rather constitutive of each other (see Wilds 2000). However, as Homi Bhabha 
(1990) notes, such founding narratives – to which the progressive narrative of 
reconciliation and moral learning has now advanced (Jarausch & Geyer 2003: 31) – 
always work to exclude and displace that which ‘cannot be transcended or 
dialectically surmounted’ (Bhabha 1990: 5). In the final part of this chapter, I will 
thus look at how the ‘constitutive contradictions’ (ibid.), which this redemptive 
national narrative displaces, can come to interrupt the latter in experiences of shame.   
 
While many (see Barkan 2000; Beck 2002; Habermas 1999; Levy & Sznaider 2004, 
2006) regard such self-reflexive endorsements of national guilt across the globe as 
heralding a new age of humanitarism and cosmopolitanism, even ‘a second 
Enlightenment’ (Levy & Sznaider 2006: 204), Sarah Ahmed (2004; see also 
Kansteiner 2006; Moses 2007a; Olick 1998, 2007) draws attention to the ambiguity 
of such a politics of and with the past as not only concerned with recognizing and 
atoning for the perpetration of past injustices but as also characterized by a 
restorative and performative aspect. In her book The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 
Ahmed (2004: 102) contends that ‘[r]ecognition [also] works to restore the nation or 
reconcile the nation to itself by “coming to terms with” its own past in the 
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expression of “bad feeling.”’ So what Ahmed (2004: 112) writes about the Australian 
politics of shame might in some sense also be the case for the politics of regret (Olick 
2007) and the official culture of contrition (Wilds 2000) as it is practised in unified 
Germany. She (ibid.: 102) suggests that official gestures and expressions of moral 
feelings like guilt and shame ‘allow us “to assert our identity as a nation”’ and 
continues by posing the following question: ‘in allowing us to feel bad, does shame 
[or guilt] not also allow the nation to feel better’ and thereby reconcile itself with 
itself (in pride)? In the section entitled ‘Proud Guilt’, I will thus look at how a 
number of interviewees are reconciled with the nation through the acknowledgement 
of national guilt.  
 
Let us turn to the Europeanization (and globalization) of the memory of the 
Holocaust. The 1990s saw an increasing acknowledgement of the fact that the 
discrimination, persecution and murder of European Jewry was aided, abetted and 
perpetrated by a host of European countries, which were slowly beginning to 
acknowledge their own dark pasts. This brought to light the Holocaust’s international 
dimension, and led to it being increasingly ‘viewed as a European phenomenon’ 
(Probst 2006: 66). No longer the (sole) responsibility of the Germans, the recognition 
of the European element of the Holocaust allowed ‘Germany to be “normal” again’ 
(Levy & Sznaider 2006: 198). Thus, the integration of the Holocaust into the German 
national narrative is accompanied by its simultaneous diffusion into ‘a common 
European legacy’ (Kansteiner 2006: 326). While one of the consequences of this de-
nationalization of the collective memory of the Holocaust is the ‘normalization’ of 
German national identity, the interviews show that, although most of the 
interviewees call for and speak of an increasingly ‘normalized’ relation to their 
German nationality – perhaps contrary to expectation – they also still display a 
remarkable reluctance to describe themselves as German and a great readiness to view 
themselves as Europeans or cosmopolitans. This might perhaps be understood as an 
indication of the limits of ‘normalization’ and reconciliation evident in the persistence 
of what Huyssen (1995a) calls the post- or anti-nationalist consensus. There is thus 
a much larger number of interviewees who still seem to experience their national 
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identity as problematic and afflicted with guilt and/or shame and thus stigmatized, as 
Moses’ analysis suggests, feeling the need as they do, to distance themselves from it. 
 
Now often considered a relic of the old Federal Republic, this post nationalist 
consensus was shaped in large parts by renowned members of what is variously 
called the Hitler-Youth, or 45er generation, as well as by the generation of 1968 (see 
Assmann 2007a; Moses 2007a; Huyssen 1995a). It found its most prominent 
expression in Habermas’ notions of constitutional patriotism and postnational 
identity and the widely shared idea of an integrated Europe as the bulwark against the 
dangerous vicissitudes of German nationalism. Left-liberal intellectuals, like 
Habermas, wanted to employ the idea of Europe to transcend individual nation-states 
‘by uniting them as much as possible in the European community and having their 
populations think of themselves first and foremost as Europeans’ (Moses 2007a: 
249).  
 
Andreas Huyssen (1995a: 76) and the political scientist Wolfgang Bergem (2005: 
241) note that the post- or antinationalist consensus was so successful ‘that it 
denationalized a majority of Germans to the extent that many of them prefer to feel 
European rather than German . . .’ However, both also point towards an increasingly 
obvious contradiction and failure of this consensus, namely in rendering a 
postnationalist identity a normative requirement, it declared a continuous moratorium 
on national identifications that go beyond the political and constitutional level. 
However, at the same time, it demanded that Germans ‘underst[an]d themselves 
historically as a prepolitical national community’ (Moses 2007a: 237) and remember 
and atone for the Holocaust. Its failure thus consists not only of allowing the 
political right to highjack questions relating to national and cultural identity, but also 
– and perhaps here more importantly – that in its ‘emphatic commitment to Europe’ 
(Huyssen 1995a: 83; Bergem 2005: 241), it might be viewed as constituting a flight 
from the National Socialist past. 
 
Following on from the last chapter, I will here look at how the grandchildren draw on 
the above indicated opportunities that a post-unification and Europeanized cultural 
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memory of the Holocaust offers them to dispense with the particular legacy of the 
Holocaust and its affective implications. If Aleida Assmann (2006a: 277-78) is 
correct, when she welcomes a shift in the memory culture of the generation of 1968, 
which was affectively shaped by ‘Betroffenheit and a consciousness of guilt to the 
younger generation’s cool “ideology-free” handling of memory constructions’, then 
the question still remains why a number of interviewees admit to nevertheless feeling 
guilt and/or shame; something which they, however, in many cases resent and want 
to get rid of. Is the new coolness [Gelassenheit, Unbekümmertheit] about the NS past 
and national identity, that emerged particularly forcefully during and after the 
football World Cup in the summer of 2006 in the Germany – Armin, for example, 
describes the event as potentially ‘the definitive end of post-war history’ – a sign of 
‘inner catharsis’ [‘innere Entspannung’] (Amend 2006) among young Germans, or 
does this attitude signify a continued dissociation of and defense against the memory 
of the Holocaust (Rensmann 2001)? Did the surprising and enthusiastic display of 
national symbols that attended the World Cup inaugurate the return of a dangerous 
ethnic nationalist patriotism, or was it rather an unsuspicious, tolerant, cosmopolitan 
patriotism (Fleiß et al. 2009)?  
 
I do not intend to provide a full answer to this question in this chapter, but rather 
want to look at how those grandchildren, discussed in the last section of the previous 
chapter, construct their (national) identities as free from the constraints of the 
National Socialist past and as no longer invested with ‘bad feeling’. I will begin by 
looking at different ways in which the interviewees try to return to a proud national 
identity; starting with attempts to move from a shamefaced to a proud national 
identity, I will then look at how some interviewees re-claim a proud national identity 
through the expression of national guilt and contrition. In the final part of this 
chapter, which functions as a bridge to chapter 8, I investigate how the 
postnationalist discourse is both adopted to ‘flee’ the past but is often, at the same 
time im- or explicitly criticized, because of its above-mentioned inherent 
contradiction. It is thus that the last section discusses attempts to ‘flee’ into either 
regional or European identities also as manifestations of unacknowledged shame.  
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7.2 ‘Defiant pride’117 
 
In their empirical study, which investigates interdependencies between national 
pride, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and a Schlussstrich-Mentalität [mentality that seeks 
to draw a final line under the past], educationalists Klaus Alheim and Bardo Heger 
(2008) arrive at the unanimous conclusion that there has been an alarming return of 
national pride, especially among young Germans since unification. National pride, 
once the reserve of the right, has migrated back into the centre of society and has 
become fashionable, even among those who locate themselves on the political left 
(ibid.: 32). They (2008: 11) furthermore detect a strong relation between a 
widespread Schlussstrich-Mentalität and ‘the desire as German to finally be able to be 
proud of one’s nation and nationality again.’118 Although in the interviews discussed 
below, national guilt per se is not called into question, it is argued that ‘it is enough 
now’ which implies the rejection of a memory culture that reminds them of past 
crimes, committed by Germans. Official admissions of national guilt and shame are 
viewed as standing in the way of being able to express national pride. Sarah Ahmed’s 
(2004: 112) work is again very useful here as she draws our attention to the fact that 
‘[t]he politics of shame is contradictory’ because it ‘involves not only a sense that 
“past actions and omissions” have been unjust, but also that what makes the injustice 
unjust is that it has taken pride away . . .’ In thus being deprived of what they 
consider is their right to national pride, the interviewees here do sound reminiscent of 
the ‘normalization’ as relativization strategy.  
 
Now, if we remember that Elspeth Probyn (2005: 46) asserts that guilt can be atoned 
for and is an ‘on/off’ feeling, and ‘shame lingers deep within the self’ (ibid.: 2), then 
the potentially explosive ‘political muddle of pride, shame, and guilt’ becomes even 
more so ‘when shame is denied, when it is seen as taking away from pride . . .’ (ibid.: 
46). Interesting to our concerns here are Probyn’s (ibid.) observations that guilt can 
                                                
117 Jaspers ([1947] 2001: 102). 
118 Here they (2008: 99-100) cite a Forsa poll of May 2000, which found that 69 per cent of 18 to 29 
year-olds wanted to draw a final line under the Nazi past. They (ibid.; see also Rensmann 2001: 351-
52) add that the desire to get rid of the past is thus much higher among the young than among those 
over 60. 
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often create circumstances in which ‘shame cannot be admitted’ because it ‘leads to 
moralistic judgments’ and the polarization of public debate between those who 
endorse and those who reject guilt. Santner (1990: 51) and Werner Bohleber (cited in 
Alheim & Heger 2008: 97) might thus be right in contending that the memory culture 
of the Holocaust is resented because it reminds one of this stain that is the Nazi past 
and thus arouses shame rather than guilt, which is not as easily discarded and hence 
prevents a return to an unbroken, pure and untainted national identity (Rensmann 
2001: 369).  
 
In such instances national identity is primarily a cultural identity, which in turn is 
framed as something unchanging and essential – as ‘common historical experiences 
and shared cultural codes’ which express ‘a sort of collective “one true self”’ – which 
one seeks to recover and return to rather than as something that is in constant flux 
and which positions us and through which we ‘position ourselves within, the 
narratives of the past’ (Hall 1990: 223-225). The memory of the Holocaust thus 
seems to be experienced as disrupting and preventing such a return or recovery of 
national identity through pride. This can, as in the case of Julia below, turn into what 
Rensmann (1999), following Adorno, have variously called secondary or guilt-
defensiveness anti-Semitism. Feelings of guilt and/or shame are disclaimed, because 
they are seen as being demanded by external agencies: by the generation of 1968 
(Yvonne), by European countries and their inhabitants (Rainer), by (non-German) 
Germans themselves and Israel (Julia). These agencies are then attacked for making 
unjustified imputations of collective guilt.  
 
The interviews with Yvonne Lechner, Julia Hartwig and Rainer Binder allow us to 
think about how guilt and shame can be experienced as precluding a return to an 
untainted national identity. Here, national guilt and shame are seen as a ‘passing 
phase towards being-as-nation’ (Ahmed 2004: 113) that needs to be overcome. 
Yvonne, for example evokes the classic symbol of shame, the hanging head, when she 
asserts that it is now time to move beyond it and be proud again: 
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Y: ‘Of course it was bad what happened back then . . . but to still walk 
around with a head held low [geducktem Haupt] is also somehow a bit stupid 
because so much has happened in the meantime about which Germany could 
actually be proud, like unification and the fact that it happened without any 
bloodshed.’ 
 
She regrets the fact that she could not witness the world cup in Germany first-hand 
because she was living abroad at the time and regards the national reawakening that 
occurred during and after the event as ‘cool’ and ‘klasse’ [great, swell]. Unlike the 
interviewees I will be analyzing in the next chapter, many of whom express concerns 
or at least doubts about this return of national feeling, Yvonne and Julia cannot 
understand why one should not now be allowed to show one’s allegiance and loyalty 
to one’s country. In distinction to the interviewees included in the following section, 
Yvonne, Julia and Rainer do not incorporate an admission of guilt or historical 
responsibility into their self-conception as German. Yvonne, for example says:  
 
Y: ‘I also always find it somehow strange when people now say “oh is this 
now allowed and with our history?“ . . . it’s simply something that I can’t 
fully comprehend because we in particular – it’s now so far away from us . . . 
and I don’t accept why I should then still feel guilt about anything.‘  
 
Yet, the rational argument of a growing temporal distance that Yvonne uses in order 
to justify this rejection of guilt reaches its limits when she admits what she cannot 
stand about how the Holocaust is remembered in Germany is that it always makes 
her feel guilty: ‘the only thing that actually always annoys me is that immediately 
this feeling of guilt arises.’ In a similar way, Rainer is angered and annoyed by how 
his grandparents’ generation’s past impacts on his own life. Yet, he does not direct 
his anger towards his grandparents, whom he, as we have seen in chapter 4, protects 
and identifies with, but at people he encounters during his travels across Europe 
who, according to him, have ‘this hatred against all Germans.’ He admits that in this 
respect he feels himself to be ‘actually really almost in a defensive position.’ He sees 
himself locked into what he calls ‘this eternal role of the sinner [ewige Sünderrolle] 
and continues by saying: 
 
R: ‘I don’t at all want to dismiss this [the Holocaust] or anything like that but 
I also at the same time see that I am not responsible for it, not at all . . . I am 
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also no longer willing to defend myself in this respect, but I have the feeling 
that there are a lot of people running around who think that I am responsible 
for it or want to hold me or the country responsible for it and in this respect 
my grandparents’ deeds have an impact on my live . . . I personally don’t 
actually have any guilt feelings.’ 
 
Julia also attempts to leave this phase of guilt and shame behind by, for example, 
universalizing trauma, suffering and victimhood, so that the Allies’ bombardment of 
German cities ends up on the same scale as ‘other’ suffering, and German guilt is 
considerably lessened. During the interview, she reiterates several times that 
everyone was a victim, and states that her grandmother’s stories of war and 
immediate post-war suffering ‘showed [her] again, that it was terrible for everyone, 
which is why I find it a bit weird when people still today say “well the Germans 
should feel guilty and suffer for it” because they’ve also suffered enough . . . I think, 
slowly with my generation it’s enough now.’ In both Rainer’s and Julia’s case, we 
can here clearly see how the coalition between the grandparents and the grandchildren 
works to circumvent the moral demands of the cultural memory of the Holocaust.  
 
Julia also wants to be relieved from the constraints of the past, because in her eyes 
the memory of the Holocaust represents an injunction against her almost desperate 
wish to be able to criticize Israel and Jews more generally. In response to my specific 
question about whether the question of guilt still plays a role in her thoughts about 
her grandparents’ past actions, she does not address my question at all but responds 
evasively and incoherently by reversing the victim-perpetrator roles:  
 
J: ‘Well that would / I mean I can understand where some of this comes from / 
Israel, that’s a great example now, my husband is from Gaza, the Israelis 
don’t allow me in, they kill my family, well his family, . . . which is now also 
my family, what they do to the Palestinians is a kind of Holocaust, by far not 
as bad as what the German Reich did, but one can definitely compare it to a 
genocide, what’s happening there.’  
 
Unwilling to even broach my question, both interviews with Julia are peppered with 
very graphic depictions – during which she gets very agitated – of how either 
Germans were the victims of the Allied forces or how ‘her family’, i.e. the family of 
her Palestinian husband, is subjected to what she describes as Israel’s genocidal 
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offensives against Palestinians. Even though she is very outspoken in her criticism of 
Israel when compared to any of the other interviewees, she complains about the 
Holocaust precluding her from voicing this criticism: ‘we are responsible for this 
terrible Holocaust and we can’t criticize Israel . . . we don’t have the right to do that.’ 
Refusing to consider in any more concrete detail her grandparents’ active 
participation in Nazism, she prefers to fulminate against Israel’s murderous methods 
of ghettoization. It is thus that she not only inverts victims and perpetrators, but 
also displaces her anger for being reminded of the Nazi genocide, at Israel.  
 
Unlike traditional anti-Semitism, this secondary anti-Semitism emerges not despite 
but because of the Holocaust (Alheim & Heger 2008: 108-109) and is intimately 
related to the question of guilt and the memory of the Nazi past: ‘One feels 
disturbed, harassed, encumbered by “the Jews” because of the memory of the 
Holocaust’ (ibid.), which is regarded as preventing one from having a immediate and 
continuous relation to oneself. Feeling disturbed by the memory of the Holocaust 
has, however, wider ramifications, as Santner (1990: 51) notes, when he argues that 
the latter can also come ‘to figure as the irritating signifier of the traumas and 
disorientations of postmodernity.’ It becomes the (displaced) aim of resentment 
because it is seen as that which has rendered unavailable those ‘conventional sites of 
identity formation’ which ‘have become destabilized . . . [and] more and more 
unheimlich’ (ibid.) with the ‘fragmentation of [German] cultural identity’ (ibid.) after 
Auschwitz and an accelerated globalization.  
 
In a similar but much more radical way than Christian and Albrecht below, Julia 
expresses the wish that in Germany the Nazis should become ‘simply a part of 
European history’ and that ‘these Nazis [should] not [be] related to Germany.’ She 
tells me that she is ashamed because of WWII, but she does not feel guilty because of 
the Holocaust: 
 
J: ‘Of course I am ashamed about the Second World War, that’s a historical 
episode which no human likes [to have – A.H.] in their country . . . but I am 
not ashamed to be a German, I think that’s okay . . . If one looks at other 
countries, I believe that the Germans have also achieved a lot, I mean . . . for 
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example in art and technological development and so on, in these respects we 
have achieved a lot of things about which we can be proud . . . I don’t feel 
guilty about the Holocaust, by no means!’ 
 
She continues by contending that ‘on the other hand, I of course think that, as I said, 
it is a thing which one should remember . . . I mean the Americans also no longer feel 
guilty about the slave trade . . . the British no longer feel guilty about their colonies . . 
. and I no longer feel guilty about the Holocaust.’ The globalization and 
Europeanization of the Holocaust thus allows Julia to divest herself of the particular 
and affective legacy of the Holocaust. Like most interviewees in this chapter, Julia 
considers herself ‘actually primarily as European’. Yet she qualifies this when she 
says that ‘I do feel German [but] in a European context’ when she tells me about her 
considerations about whether to take on British citizenship when her Muslim 
Palestinian husband, with whom she lives in Reading, tried to get a British passport. 
She asserts that ‘there’s more that links me to Germany, I would say, than to Great 
Britain.‘  
 
As these interviewees regard responsibility as something strictly individual, limited 
to the guilty among the war and perpetrator generation, they experience continued 
references to the extraordinary criminality of the Nazi regime as unjustifiably 
accusatory. Rainer, Yvonne, and Julia thus all in some way feel themselves to be 
‘persecuted’ and disturbed by the Nazi past, which becomes particularly obvious 
when Julia begins the first interview by saying that ‘this is a topic that still verfolgt 
[haunts, persecutes] us.’ Critical theorist Lars Rensmann’s (1999: 66) idea of the 
‘imaginary accuser’ who, he argues, is constructed, because feelings of collective guilt 
have not been mastered but are negated, i.e. ‘are split off from the self and [are] 
aggressively turned against those who remind . . . [one] of Auschwitz, the 
perpetrators and German responsibility’ (ibid.: 71) is, although helpful, not entirely 
accurate. Rather, than the consequence of inadequately or not internalized guilt, I will 
in chapter 8 argue that the ‘imaginary accuser’ is the consequence of unacknowledged 
shame.  
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The Nazi past, so the interviewees here argue, stands in the way of the ‘free’ 
expression, even celebration of national identity. Julia thus laments ‘that the 
Germans still hide so much [sich noch viel so verstecken],’ which she finds is evident 
in the fact that there was no celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Federal 
Republic. She wants national history to be celebrated in pride not commemorated in 
shame or guilt. The ritual commemoration of the Holocaust stands in the way of such 
proud displays of the achievements of German history and culture. It however needs 
to be noted here, that Julia and Yvonne are proud of different aspects of their 
German identity than Fabian, Christian and Albrecht, below. The former are proud of 
(pre-political) cultural and historical attributes that they ascribe to the Germans. Julia 
for example lists among them punctuality, honesty, the ability to build good cars and 
play good football. Even though it is debatable to what extent constitutional 
patriotism and pride in political culture and institutions can be separated from other 
pre-political cultural and historical traditions (see Markell 2000), Fabian, Christian 
and Albrecht are primarily proud of political institutions and achievements, which 
have emerged out of a process of learning from the past. The interviewees discussed 
in this section, however, do not reconcile with the nation through proud guilt, but feel 
they can only return to it if shame and guilt are finally overcome, which can only 
occur, in their view, if the Holocaust finally becomes history. 
 
 
7.3 Proud guilt 
 
 I will now try to show how an often ambivalent, conflictual or wholly negative 
relation to the nation can be and is resolved, or rather ‘normalized’ through the 
adoption of a redemptive narrative of recovery and moral learning. Here ‘[a]dmitting 
responsibility and guilt for historical injustices . . . also become[s] a liberal marker of 
national political stability and strength rather than shame’ (Barkan 2000: xxix-xxx). 
Furthermore, as Karl Wilds (2000: 95) maintains, ‘[c]ontemporary formulations of 
the “normality” of the modern German nation appear to depend upon articulations of 
contrition for the sins of the last unitary German nation.’ In the Berlin Republic 
‘contrition and atonement for the past not only serve[s] to underline the ‘normality’ 
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of the Germans but also transform[s] into a collective act which can be unreservedly 
viewed as a source of national pride’ (Wilds 2000: 95).119 The ‘overall narrative of 
contemporary German history leading from the depths of genocide and defeat to the 
triumphant recovery of national unity and self-determination’ that Kansteiner (2006: 
277) sees increasingly employed across Germany, and that Jarausch and Geyer 
(2003: 31) argue has ‘become the official self-representation of the Federal Republic’, 
provides a convenient way ‘to contain and historicize the memory of the Holocaust’ 
(ibid.).  
 
This redemptive narrative links to Ahmed’s (2004: 112; emphasis in original) 
reservations about a reconciliatory politics of shame, which ‘involves a narrative of 
recovery’, which at the same time, also recovers the nation as a source of 
identification. In such politics, recognizing and witnessing past injustices committed 
by the nation, she (ibid.: 111) writes, ‘is implicitly constructed as the condition for 
national pride; if we recognize the brutality of that history through shame, then we 
can be proud.’ Shame, thus, becomes a passing phase, beyond which the unified 
German nation becomes an object of pride in its construction as a ‘moral nation’ 
(Olick 1998; Ahmed 2004: 111) that has learnt from its past mistakes and has made 
amends. 
 
Although Albrecht Richter prefers to be perceived as a human and describes himself 
as a Ruhrgebietler and European, in the following extract he expresses the wish to 
resurrect a certain pride or at least a more positive relation to Germany as a unified 
nation. This in turn is linked to an admission of German guilt, which then allows him 
to compare progressive ‘moral’ Germany to backward, immoral Italy that still has 
not worked through its fascist past:  
                                                
119 In a recent article in The Guardian, Princeton-based political scientist Jan-Werner Müller (2010) 
came to a similar conclusion: ‘Germany's dealing with its two difficult pasts . . . has almost 
universally been considered a success, even a model for others to emulate. . . . Not surprisingly, this 
Modell Deutschland was increasingly viewed with pride within Germany itself, especially by the left. 
Some outside observers picked up on this peculiar form of pride – a kind of anti-nationalist 
nationalism – and gently mocked it: Timothy Garton Ash, for instance, spoke of Deutsche Industrie-
Normen – a German industrial standard – in "coming to terms with the past"; others crowned the 
Germans "world champions in remembrance".’ Similarly Rensmann (2001: 336) detects ‘a meta-
discourse about the “exemplary effort to work through the past” in the social sciences in Germany, 
which regards these efforts as “’unparalleled” and “unique”’. 
 231 
 
A: ‘Generally it’s clear, of course the Germans have burdened themselves 
with guilt, which is why I don’t really ask myself the question of guilt 
anymore, because it’s actually settled [geklärt]; we voted wrongly, for a very 
long time we did too little against it [but] on the other hand I also think that 
after the war in Germany there did in fact to a certain extent occur a working-
through of the past [Aufarbeitung] – and I don’t care how much this was 
forced from outside. Now if one looks at Italy, particularly at the moment, 
one can see where it leads if one doesn’t work it through.’ 
 
While national guilt and responsibility are readily acknowledged, the focus very 
quickly shifts to the Federal Republic’s successful efforts of dealing with the past. In 
this statement, the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and a critical memory of 
the Holocaust become a source of pride rather than the aim of criticism. However, as 
Dirk Moses (2007b: 1-2) points out ‘ . . . there are good reasons to regard the 
narrative in which Germany was redeemed by the memory of murdered Jews with 
some suspicion.’ This, he (2007c: 156) argues elsewhere, is the case because it is 
within this redemptive narrative, as we will see below, that ‘the murdered Jews of 
Europe’ are ‘cast . . . as sacrificial victims,’ who ‘were killed so that a new Germany 
can be born.’120 The earliest version of this narrative can be found in Karl Jaspers’ 
([1947] 2001) Die Schuldfrage, but also shines through some of Habermas’ writings 
on the topic. Anson Rabinbach (2000: 132) here points to how Jaspers establishes a 
strong link between political as well as moral self-transformation and (inner) 
purification, and freedom and democracy to ‘”guilt,” “atonement,” “reparation”’. 
Thus Jaspers casts the Nazi genocide as an opportunity for Germans to redeem 
themselves by developing a consciousness of guilt and transform themselves into 
European, cosmopolitan or ‘non-German Germans’ (see Moses 2007b), who identify 
not with particular national traditions but with more universal and abstract values, 
such as ‘the political order and the principles of the Basic Law’, i.e. practice a 
constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1989b: 257).  
                                                
120 Moses (2007c: 179) cites Habermas’ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: ‘ . . . Habermas 
regards the remembrance of past suffering contributing to the “dissolution of guilt on the part of the 
present with respect to the past.“ Drawing on the political theology of Helmut Peukert, he wrote of 
“anamenstic redemption of an injustice, which cannot of course be undone but can at least be virtually 
reconciled through remembering . . . “’ Karyn Ball (2008a: 57) makes a very similar point when she 
criticizes Habermas’s model of an indebted memory, in which ‘Auschwitz is retroactively assessed as 
the “price” Germans paid (and will continue to pay) for a democratic future,’ thereby ‘becom[ing] the 
means to the end of rehabilitating West Germany as a European democracy.’  
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This redemptive logic also becomes evident in the interview with Albrecht. Although 
he recognizes that history is perverse, as he puts it, and acknowledges the 
Janusheaded-ness of all qualities – Auschwitz and a good social system are, in his 
words only realizable with good organizational skills and reliability – it seems that he 
wants to salvage German history from its state of discontinuity and fragmentariness, 
when he says that: 
 
A: ‘Even if it ends [ausgehen] in such a terrible way, then it’s terrible for 
everyone who witnessed it, but then afterwards it has the positive aspect that 
everyone saw how terrible it is . . . well the democratization of Germany for 
example . . . is of course completely shaped by National Socialism.’  
 
This almost Hegelian move can also be found in some of Habermas’ (1989c: 227) 
writings on the concept of constitutional patriotism, where the democratization and 
Westernization of Germany is achieved through Auschwitz:  
 
‘The only patriotism that does not alienate us from the West is a 
constitutional patriotism. Unfortunately, in the cultural nation of the 
Germans, a connection to universalist constitutional principles that was 
anchored in convictions could be formed only after – and through – 
Auschwitz.’121  
 
Although Alexander Fiebert rejects personal feelings of collective guilt and shame, he 
– surprisingly if we think about the dismay he expressed at how the Holocaust is 
remembered (chapter 6, pages 206-207) – emphatically accepts German 
responsibility for the Nazi past. Yet, if we look closer we can discern that this 
happens in the service of constructing a redemptive narrative of recovery and 
progress, in which the Holocaust, although not mentioned as such, but only as 
                                                
121 What Habermas (1989c: 227) means by constitutional patriotism becomes especially evident in the 
following quote: ‘If national symbols have lost their influence with the young, if naïve identification 
with one’s heritage has yielded to a more tentative relationship to history, if discontinuities are felt 
more strongly and continuities not celebrated at any price, if national pride and collective self-esteem 
are filtered through universalist value orientations – to the extent to which all this is really the case, 
indications of the development of a postconventional identity are increasing. In [the] Allensbach 
[Institute for Public Opinion Research] these indications are pondered in Cassandran tones; if they are 
not misleading, they reveal only one thing: that we have not completely wasted the opportunity that 
the moral catastrophe could also represent. That the Federal Republic opened itself without 
reservation to the political culture of the West is the great intellectual accomplishment of the postwar 
period, an accomplishment of which precisely my generation could be proud.’ 
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WWII, is cast as the ‘crisis’ that made ‘us’ better, more progressive and democratic, 
i.e. more moral, than everyone else. Alexander repeats several times that Germany is 
a total exception when it comes to its (collective) mentality. He states that while 
every other country is ‘mega proud about its heroic deeds in the past’, this is no 
longer the case in the Berlin Republic. Germany is not only restrained in its pride but 
also in its foreign policy and military intervention, Alexander maintains, inspite of 
the eagerness with which various recent governments deployed German troops to the 
Balkans and to Afghanistan.  
 
Alexander sees Germany’s exceptional collective mentality manifested in its ‘political 
openness and in its world view’, in political movements such as the Green Party and 
institutions such as the Zivildienst [alternative civilian service]. This mentality, he 
continues, has also led to Germany having become a ‘kind of good conscience’ of the 
world: Germany as the model (transitional) democracies around the world seek to 
emulate. He goes on to say: ‘I think that this is also a part or consequence of the war 
and actually something really good has come out of it.’ He wants Germans to look at 
‘these positive things which also emerged out of it’ while he advocates a final line to 
be drawn under the past itself:  ‘it’s good, gegessen [over], and we have learnt well 
from it and [we should] be proud of what we now have and where we now stand as 
humans.’ It is thus that Alexander’s interview makes it particularly clear what Axel 
Körner (2000: 71-72) finds to be the case across the ‘third generation’, namely the 
‘naïve hope’ or belief that in accepting guilt and responsibility one finds liberation 
from the past and redemption. 
 
In the interview with Fabian Hoffmann below we can discern a very similar dynamic, 
when he remembers a particular lesson about the Holocaust at school when two 
concentration camp survivors visited his class. They, he continues:   
 
F: ‘ . . . said “okay the people died, but we have to do everything that they 
haven’t died in vain,“ well analogously that all of us who come after it should 
learn from it . . . that the catastrophe effectuates something positive, that one 
now has individual rights, protection of minorities and all these things . . . 
how a society remembers this and that they thus didn’t die in vain, . . . the 
Holocaust has brought this about . . . that out of this catastrophe, out of this 
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heap of ash still somehow/ it stays ash and it’s daft but still that one learns 
from it.’ 
 
The ‘unassimilable remainder’ (LaCapra 1998: 187; see also Bell 2007: 54; Lyotard 
1988) is here assimilated into a narrative that justifies the suffering of the other as 
retrospectively useful. Florian here renders the ‘heap of ash’ necessary for Germany 
to be reborn as a tolerant country, with a constitution that protects individual and 
minority rights. Below, Fabian makes clear how constitutional patriotism also links 
to less abstract and universal norms and works to highlight Germany’s political 
culture as exceptional and thus Germany in its moral Sonderrolle:  
  
F: ‘Germany is actually . . . a country of which one can in some way / let’s 
say of the constitution, of these values and of this 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which can of course never be perfect, but about 
which I have the feeling that in this respect Germany is one of the societies or 
systems in the whole world which has already progressed very, very far, in 
terms of justice, learning from the past, not making mistakes that frequently 
and also that one treats all social groups equally, . . . and eventually one can 
also see it in terms of environmentalism, . . . that one tries to learn from 
history, I think one does sense that in some way and that one does of course 
continue this obligation . . . or feels this obligation and not only in the 
sermons [Sonntagsreden] of politicians, [but] we have to deal with this legacy 
responsibly . . .’ 
 
But Fabian also welcomes the fact that national pride as well as the topic of Germans 
as victims is no longer the reserve of the right. He links this to what he views as a 
‘fair European partnership’, which would imply the joint working-through of history 
and the attendant recognition that there were also German victims.  
 
The redemptive narrative, in which unified Germany stands at the end of a long but 
successful moral learning process, now allows Alexander – almost like the prodigal 
son – to return to Germany after having left behind him a phase of strong ‘antipathy’ 
and hate towards this country, which prompted him to leave Germany for five years. 
He asserts:  
 
A: ‘This step to return [to Germany] was such an epiphany for me, it’s such 
a crazy situation to suddenly be here in Berlin and to suddenly realize that 
everything that I was always looking for there [abroad – A.H.], these ideas 
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and changes and a more open approach . . . I find here and I find in Germany, . 
. . and then I thought I no longer have to search, well I’ve found a place here in 
Germany.’ 
 
Thus, the redemptive narrative allows these interviewees, who all recount phases of 
anger at or disassociation from their national belonging, usually during late 
adolescence, to reappropriate and handle national symbols more openly and in a 
more relaxed [gelassen] way. However, while it not only allows for a line to be 
drawn under the past, it also effectuates reconciliation with the nation in the pride 
about Germany’s exemplary process of working-through and democratization.  
 
 
7.4 Europe and the Europeanization of the Holocaust and its memory 
 
The new Gelassenheit, which is manifested in the above variously articulated 
stirrings of a new national pride, is furthermore facilitated by the reinterpretation of 
the Holocaust as a European phenomenon. Albrecht Richter and Christian Marx, for 
example, consider the Holocaust either as an international or European phenomenon 
respectively; whose ‘process of development’ [‘Enstehungsprozess’] as Albrecht 
argues, needs to be discussed on a ‘pan-European’ [‘gesamteuropäischen’] level. 
Christian also holds the view that:  
 
C: ‘ . . . if one [deals] with the history of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust . . . / that’s an international phenomenon. Germany did play a big 
role in this [hat da viel mit eine Rolle gespielt], a lot would’ve been different; 
wouldn’t have happened without this regime, but still in many countries there 
was a readiness to participate.’ 
  
This does, however, not mean that they reject German national guilt per se; quite the 
opposite is the case. As we have seen above, both Albrecht and Christian do 
acknowledge this guilt as responsibility. However, they then immediately go on to 
universalize it. Albrecht contends that ‘historically, we have this special position 
[Sonderrolle] because we took things, which also existed elsewhere, to the extreme 
but already back then it wasn’t isolated that there were only the Germans.’ Albrecht, 
furthermore conveys a certain desire to dispense responsibility when he first admits 
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guilt – ‘of course, for me it’s totally clear that they [the Germans] have burdened 
themselves with guilt’ – but then continues by saying that:  
 
A: ‘ . . . and the question is of course to what extent did other countries bear 
responsibility, to what extent did England for example abandon the people 
here when its foreign secretary didn’t exactly negotiate very well . . . I don’t 
know, but if one limits the question of guilt only to the Germans, one is also 
again quickly very nationalistic, that’s also not good.’  
 
Like most interviewees in the sample, Albrecht recognizes a general but diffuse 
national guilt, as we have seen in chapter 5, for he and most others are much less 
eager to acknowledge the concrete participation of their grandparents in Nazism. 
While Albrecht Europeanizes the Holocaust, Johanna Müller universalizes it by 
arguing that, although it was an extreme form, this kind of ‘annihilation of human life’ 
existed and still exists everywhere in the world. She adds that rather than focusing on 
the historical guilt of the Germans it is the continued perpetration of genocides that 
should be condemned. Alberta Michels, like Johanna, also draws attention to a whole 
host of other genocides, among which she includes the Turkish genocide of the 
Armenians, the Rwandan genocide, as well as the Kosovo conflict. At this point it 
becomes clear that the increasing de-contextualization of the Holocaust that occurs 
when it is recast as a European phenomenon and/or as a global historical analogy 
facilitates the dissociation of familial legacies of Nazi collaboration and perpetration.  
 
Although, in most instances, the interviewees assembled here acknowledge some 
form or aspect of national, political, or official responsibility, it is perhaps not 
surprising that they, like all of the above interviewees, reject what both Sebastian 
Merle and Albrecht Richter call ‘Erbsünde’ [original sin] or personal feelings of 
(collective) guilt. As we learnt in chapter 6, they advocate a more objective relation to 
the past, i.e. the historicization of the Holocaust. That this is intimately related to a 
rejection of feelings of collective guilt or shame becomes clear in the interview with 
Sebastian. He admits that the reason he volunteered to be interviewed was that, if my 
research would also further the cause of historicizing National Socialism and the end 
of guilt, he thought he might be able to contribute something. On a more cautious 
note, he adds: ‘perhaps I am totally wrong about this, but I am of the opinion that 
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slowly but surely one could stop with this guilt, this original sin, which continues to 
be passed on [‘die sich ja immer weitervererbt’] to all subsequent generations, that 
one could stop with that.’  
  
Christian Marx seems to have achieved what Sebastian wishes for. Although 
Christian used to feel shame, he has now ‘discarded’ [‘abgelegt’] this feeling. This 
returns us to the question raised by Probyn, whether one can ever deshame oneself.  
So Christian’s discarding of shame and his passionate appeal for the past to become 
history reminded me of Probyn’s (2005: 56; see also Retzinger 1996: 12) observation 
that ‘ . . . being ashamed is painful, and an easy way out is to disengage from the 
affect, to distance oneself from the object of shame . . .’ Volkan et al. (2002: 145) also 
suggest in their book The Third Reich in the Unconscious Transgenerational 
Transmission and its Consequences that emotionally distancing oneself ‘from 
aspects of the Third Reich that induce shame and guilt’ protects one’s self-esteem 
and thus circumvents structural trauma. Although Christian acknowledges the fact 
that he cannot flee the past due to his family and social history 
[Gesellschaftsgeschichte], he, like many others in the sample, speaks of a Wandel 
[change], i.e. of a ‘normalization’ that has happened in how he relates not only to the 
NS past but also to his German national identity. No longer willing or prepared to 
feel ashamed, in the context of our conversation about the World Cup 2006, he tells 
me ‘the fact that there were flags on every car and many windows . . . would have 
still annoyed me much more a couple of years ago.’ Rather, he now speaks positively 
of the World Cup and the increasing Gelassenheit it entailed.  
 
Johanna and Albrecht also refuse to feel any ‘personal guilt’ or shame. Albrecht 
Richter considers guilt only relevant in terms of the present and future, relating it as 
he does to the humanitarian and political question of ‘when does one have to 
intervene?’ In thus making memory more about the future than about the past, the 
Holocaust is no longer about German perpetrators and Jewish victims but becomes a 
decontextualized event that can potentially happen to anyone, as Levy and Sznaider 
(2006: 17) note. Johanna, on the other hand, rejects having to feel embarrassed as a 
German abroad – embarrassment is a variant of or at least closely related to shame 
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(Taylor 1985: 69-76); while she also asserts, ‘I don’t carry any guilt, well not more 
than any other human on this earth.’ Karin Ingbert also explains: ‘I personally don’t 
feel any guilt.’ She is furthermore reluctant to admit to any feelings of shame when 
she inverts shame into a lack of pride: ‘Let’s put it this way, I am not proud of my 
past or the past of my country and some of my ancestors.’ 
 
While the sons and daughters of perpetrators felt a certain pleasure in declaring 
themselves to be burdened by guilt (Arendt 1963; Schneider, Chr. 2004), most of 
their children reject this burden.122 Yet, it becomes clear that the interviewees 
discussed here reject feelings of collective guilt and/or shame, not by drawing on an 
explicitly nationalist discourse that defiantly repudiates any responsibility, but 
rather by claiming that they feel responsible as a human rather than as a German. 
Albrecht also sees collective responsibility not as something that concerns Germans 
in particular but rather all humankind, when he contends: ‘out of this arises a 
responsibility for the world’. Christian, on the other hand, admits that a couple of 
years ago he would have still acknowledged that young Germans had a particular 
responsibility and obligation; now, however, with the change in how he relates to the 
past, he ‘thinks every human has a moral obligation’ in this respect. Yet, there is a 
tension or contradiction here, insofar as these interviewees in their self-descriptions 
as individuals or Europeans also express the wish for a more ‘normalized’ German 
national identity, to be able to express national loyalty or belonging like the French, 
or the Americans. 
 
Many of the interviewees mentioned here, e.g. Johanna Müller, Alberta Michels, 
Karin Ingbert, Albrecht Richter, Sebastian Merle and to some extent Christian Marx, 
prefer to see themselves as European, cosmopolitan, human and/or individual rather 
than as German when it comes to answering the question of collective responsibility. 
It seems that in relation to this issue they prefer to distance themselves from their 
                                                
122 In Eichmann in Jerusalem Arendt (1964: 251) writes disapprovingly of the children’s generation, 
when she asserts that ‘[t]hose young German men and women who every once in a while . . . treat us 
to hysterical outbreaks of guilt feelings are not staggering under the burden of the past, their fathers’ 
guilt; rather, they are trying to escape from the pressure of very present and actual problems into a 
cheap sentimentality.’  
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German background. This becomes apparent, for example, when Albrecht declares: ‘I 
don’t see myself so much as a German . . . I am like all Germans, we see the 
negative.’ He rather perceives himself as a European, asserting that ‘culturally one is 
a European culture and as a German . . . to understand oneself in terms of culture is 
always a bit difficult because there is this strong [stark] break.’ In these instances, a 
European cultural identity is drawn on to circumvent the break in German culture. 
Unhappy about his earlier answers, Albrecht qualifies them by saying that when he 
is abroad he appears [auftreten] as himself rather than as a German. He continues: ‘I 
am  someone from the Ruhr area [‘Ich bin Ruhrgebietler’] . . . and European but I find 
it enormously difficult to imagine Germany as something meaningful.’ Andreas 
Huyssen (1995a: 72), in his critique of the postnationalist consensus, writes that:  
 
‘Europeanism or regionalism, two of the alternatives to nation privileged by 
the post-nationalists, are and have always been not really alternatives at all, 
but necessary supplements to nation and always implied in it. . . . The 
decision to opt for a European identity in order to avoid the Germanness in 
question, so typical of post-war intellectuals, was always a delusion, 
necessary perhaps in the post-war decades, but politically self-destructive 
today.’ 
 
He (ibid.: 73) suggests ‘to engage in a debate about a potentially alternative and 
positive notion of nation’, yet leaves open how exactly this could look like. The 
question here, however, remains: why do so many of the young Germans I 
interviewed prefer to see themselves as European rather than as German? Alberta, 
who has been living in the UK for the past ten years, explains that even though living 
abroad has made her more aware of her ‘Germanness’ – ‘I really notice that this is the 
culture to which I belong’– at the end of the interview she qualifies this by 
contending: ‘I mainly feel myself as Western Europe[an] . . .’ And, like Karin below, 
she is also very eager to portray herself as non-German, when she tries to explain to 
me why she never had any negative experiences abroad ‘which might  . . . be due to 
the fact that at first sight I don’t look like a typical German, [and] in terms of my 
temperament, I am  also not necessarily the typical German and I always quickly 
speak the language of the people.’ 
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Alberta, Johanna and Karin are even more vehement in distancing themselves from 
anything ‘German.’ Johanna maintains: ‘my self-perception for example is not 
German, I don’t feel German, I really feel as a European by now and anyway as a 
German abroad one is not very intent on showing, that one is German . . . because 
it’s actually embarrassing if someone notices.’ Although earlier in the interview she 
has claimed not to feel embarrassed as German, we can here glimpse that this might 
not be the case. But in terms of passing herself off as European, English or Swedish, 
Karin, who works as a translator (German-Swedish and German-English), seems 
almost proud of her ‘command of mimicry’. She tells me she ‘always adapt[s] 
perfectly to [her] surroundings.’ She continues: ‘I have a German passport, [but] am 
taken for a Swede in Sweden, . . . [and] when I go to Great Britain, everyone 
considers me a Brit.’ She emphasizes that she always cheers for the football team 
that opposes the German team – ‘that’s my kind of multinational . . . attitude 
towards life’ – even though she also mentions that she very much welcomed the 
‘patriotic’ atmosphere that erupted during the World Cup: ‘I mean, the German flags 
attached to the cars, that was just cute, that was actually amiable.’ During the 
interview at her flat, she is anxious to point out that I would neither be able to find 
any ‘German design’ in her living room, nor would I be able to discover any ‘really 
German foods’ in her kitchen. She continues in the same vein, when she tells me that 
in her circle of friends ‘the proportion of foreigners outweighs’ the number of 
Germans.  
  
K: ‘I don’t feel German, to say it plainly, I am somehow European . . . the 
German passport doesn’t mean anything to me . . . I also don’t have anything 
German . . . Well, I don’t even have German as a mother tongue, well I speak 
three languages, I have three mother tongues, if you like, I am German, 
Swedish and English . . . I mean one also doesn’t notice it by way of my 
clothes, of my movement, of so many odds and ends. Hardly anyone 
identifies me as a German . . . often they say “are you English?” Yes, I mostly 
refrain from commenting, because somehow it’s also true.’ 
  
The way the assumption of a European or other national or regional identities can 
come to serve as an escape or flight from history has been pointed out by Huyssen 
(1995a: 83-84), who wonders why ‘nobody has made the argument that the denial of 
German national identity and the emphatic commitment to Europe could itself be 
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seen as a flight from this history.’ He finds the reason for this in the fact ‘that the 
post-nationalists are also those who insist most adamantly on preserving the 
memory of German responsibility.’ But he continues by pointing to ‘an 
inconsistency’ in their argument, which he claims ‘points to the unbearable nature of 
a burden too heavy even for those who do acknowledge it.’ This becomes 
particularly evident in the following exchange between Karin and myself. Having 
asked her whether – if she does not feel any guilt – she ever feels ashamed to be 
German, particularly when she is abroad, she replies: ‘No, no, I am only German per 
passport, . . . I consider myself as a European [ich halte mich ja für einen Europäer].’ 
She goes on to deny the fact that her German background might have any relevant 
influence in an encounter between her and Jews: ‘Well, I’ve no problem to face a Jew, 
well that’s so marginal for me, it depends on whether I like him or I don’t not like 
him.’ She is very reluctant to accept the particular historical obligation of an 
anamnestic solidarity with the victims as part of her national identity, even though 
she is willing to acknowledge a present political responsibility that stems from the 
failings of the past, i.e. safeguarding democracy. 
 
While most of the interviewees discussed above, especially Johanna Müller, Karin 
Ingbert and Albrecht Richter remain unaware of the contradiction or at least tension 
that their position entails, Christian Marx, Sebastian Merle and Armin Bachmann 
become increasingly conscious of this tension during the course of the interview. By 
drawing on the interview with Sebastian, I would now like to show how these 
interviewees feel the limits of their self-conceptions as an autonomous individual, a 
European or a Weltbürger. Sebastian also distances himself in many ways from 
Germany as a nation, while he universalizes the perpetrators by taking recourse to 
the theory of the banality of evil (Arendt 1964). When we talk about the fact that 
one cannot deny that both – the Holocaust and ‘German’ culture, i.e. Goethe and the 
Volk of Dichter and Denker – need to be mentioned ‘under the same heading’, his 
‘rational’ argument for the historicization of National Socialism and the end of 
collective feelings of guilt and shame slowly unravels. He asserts that it is this 
inseparability of NS and the Holocaust from German national and cultural identity 
that ‘objectively should make one feel ashamed if one had participated in it . . . and . . 
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. when one says I am German this [the Holocaust and NS] also belongs to it . . . one 
has to avow that.’  
 
However in the following sentence Sebastian retracts that when he draws attention to 
the fact that he was not alive at the time and hence the past should no longer be of his 
concern. In the part of the interview that follows, he proceeds in the same self-
contradicting way, oscillating between claiming that the past cannot but be part of 
oneself through a familial link and socialization and vehemently and defiantly denying 
exactly this insight, by arguing the opposite when he appeals for a final line to be 
drawn under the past and reiterating that the past ‘is definitely history.’ In this 
sense, we could argue with Judith Butler that his portrayal of himself as a human or 
an autonomous individual, unconnected to the historical and cultural legacy with 
which he grew up, is continuously interrupted by this very legacy. Judith Butler 
(2005: 82) in her recent book Giving an Account of Oneself writes that:  
 
‘I am interrupted by my own social origin, and so have to find a way to take 
stock of who I am in a way that makes clear that I am authored by what 
precedes and exceeds me, and that this in no way exonerates me from having 
to give an account of myself. But it does mean that if I posture as if I could 
reconstruct the norms by which my status as a subject is installed and 
maintained, then I refuse the very disorientation and interruption of my 
narrative that the social dimension of those norms imply.’  
 
Sebastian’s attempts to narrate himself as an autonomous individual – the latter is 
also the basis on which he builds his argument that rationally there is no foundation 
or explanation for any feelings of guilt and shame in the generation of the 
grandchildren – are interrupted by the presence of feelings of shame to which he then 
finally refers and which do not easily fit into his initial narrative. Although he links 
shame to an identification with the nation, he finds himself at an impasse when he 
recognizes that he cannot rationally explain the presence of this feeling, and thus 
belittles its force when he alludes to the constructed nature of these emotions and 
compares it to the emotional euphoria during the Football World Cup. He contends 
that  
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S: ‘Still I of course have this feeling of shame, which is however also 
something that cannot be rationally explained, but which either has to do with 
a kind of emotion  . . . with a national consciousness and . . . that I am also 
happy that we got so far in the Football World Cup, even though these are all 
only constructed national emotions’. 
 
In relation to the contradictions present in the interviews with Sebastian, Saul 
Friedlander’s (1993: 2) comment about a similarly expressed ‘desire to break out of 
the entanglement of guilt’ might be helpful. He states that ‘[t]hese lines poignantly 
express what for some Germans seems to be [an] intractable predicament: the Nazi 
past is too massive to be forgotten, and too repellent to be integrated into the 
“normal” narrative of memory.’  
 
 
7.5 Conclusion: Shame and the limits of ‘normalization’ 
 
What has become clear in this chapter is that, although political national guilt and 
responsibility is hardly ever really disputed by any of the here cited interviewees, it 
is the idea of a collective moral guilt, which in turn implies personal feelings of 
collective guilt (Rensmann 2004), Betroffenheit and/or shame that they take particular 
issue with and which they reject. I would argue that, since most of the interviewees 
cited here used to be or still are very keen on downplaying their national belonging, 
by trying to pass themselves off as cosmopolitans, Europeans, individuals, or even 
British, it is not feelings of collective guilt that they are thus avoiding or rejecting but, 
in these very obvious gestures of hiding, ‘distancing and disidentification’ 
(Branscombe & Doosje 2004: 30), they are avoiding shame.  
 
On the one hand, some interviewees integrate National Socialism and the Holocaust 
into a European or global memory whereby this past becomes Europe’s or the 
world’s legacy to deal with and no longer a particular German responsibility. Yet, in 
accord with the dialectics of ‘normalization’, thereby the possibility to redeem 
positive aspects of German history and to re-validate a more ‘normal’ national 
identity via a pride in political culture or constitutional patriotism opens itself up. 
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On the other hand, others, like Karin, who view the Holocaust as unique then have to 
vehemently distance themselves from or even hide their German background, which 
is experienced as a stigma (see Moses 2007c) and thus as shameful. Lastly, there are 
those who in their desperate wish to return to an untainted national identity, free of 
any ambivalence, also have to disavow any feelings of shame. The latter are 
deposited in the past, as belonging to a different generation. By appealing to 
temporal distance, they argue that guilt should be left behind or moved beyond, so 
their generation, which cannot be held responsible, can be freed from the past. Yet, 
what became obvious in the analysis of the interviews with Yvonne and Julia is that 
this seems to be more difficult than anticipated as they experience the 
commemoration of the Holocaust as an accusation, which spoils these very efforts to 
free oneself from the past. They no longer want their self-narratives either as 
Germans or as autonomous individuals to be interrupted by the legacy of the past.  
 
Many of the interviewees, who contend that the Holocaust is to be considered the 
responsibility of Europe or humankind in some way, echo Hannah Arendt’s ([1945] 
2000: 154) statement of 1945 in which she declares her shame to be human in the 
face of the Holocaust. Arendt announces this ‘elemental shame’ while she at the same 
time downplays her Jewish background as well as the fact that she herself is a 
survivor of the Nazi genocide, when she writes that‘[f]or many years now we have 
met Germans who declare that they are ashamed of being Germans. I have often felt 
tempted to answer that I am ashamed of being human.’ In reviewing Arendt’s article 
on collective responsibility, Lillian Alweiss (2003) lauds her commitment to an 
‘elemental shame’ of being human rather than allowing herself the pleasure to simply 
blame the Germans. Yet, Alweiss pauses to point to the importance of the 
positionality of the person making such a statement. ‘It does make a difference 
whether a German or a Jew says, “men must assume responsibility for all crimes 
committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil committed by all 
others”’ (Alweiss citing Margalit 2003: 313; see also LaCapra 2001: 40). Thus, when 
it comes to collective responsibility, Alweiss (ibid.: 314; see also Moses 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c) asserts, ‘Arendt was not entirely mistaken when she argued that we 
cannot reduce collective responsibility to the language of guilt.’ In instances like the 
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ones we have discussed in this chapter, i.e. the grandchildren of Nazi perpetrators 
and followers and their conceptions of (collective) responsibility as either non-
national and universal, or as national and political but not moral or as non-existent 
and purely individual, shame might be more helpful when trying to understand what 
is at issue.  
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Chapter 8: Shame in the presence of the past 
 
 
‘“Generations come and go. Every new generation 
has to come to terms with the fact that the self 
image of the Germans is contaminated by the 
memory of Nazi excesses and that the consciences 
of others, perhaps even their own consciences are 
burdened with what Hitler and his henchmen did. 
Perhaps the only conclusion to be drawn from this 
experience is that it is impossible for the 
individual to consider himself as a completely 
autonomous subject. One is, whether one likes it 
or not, a member of a group. The language one 
speaks is a group language. One is co-responsible, 
one is made co-responsible for everything the 
group does.”123  
 
 
8.1 Introduction: Responsibility beyond ‘normalization’ and reconciliation 
  
The German cultural critic Klaus Theweleit (1995: 33) recently wrote that ‘[o]nly 
the person who can be ashamed, about things which he has done, about things that 
were committed in his vicinity, about things “humans” have done, gets access to his 
own history, to his own body history, to his own political history, also to that of 
others.’124 This, he argues, is the case because in shame the self is dis- and 
reassembled (see also Agamben 1999), thereby becoming open to others. However, in 
distinction to Arendt’s focus on ‘elemental shame’, Theweleit (ibid.) ponders the 
question why (young) Germans are seemingly incapable of feeling ashamed. With 
characteristic hyperbole, he (ibid.; emphasis in original) claims that Germans are 
unable to feel shame for anything other than their own selves; a sign, he argues, of 
their willed ignorance of their own history. Although in style reminiscent of the 
Mitscherlichs’ (1967) general imputation of a German national character incapable of 
mourning, there is nevertheless some truth to Theweleit’s thesis, as the analysis of 
the interviews in the previous chapter(s) has shown.  
                                                
123 Elias, Norbert ([1989] 1996). Translation taken from Bell (2002: 65). 
124 My own translation: ‘Nur, wer sich schämen kann, über Dinge, die er getan hat, über Dinge, die in 
seiner Nähe getan wurden, über Dinge, die ‘Menschen‘ getan haben, bekommt Zugang zur eigenen 
Geschichte, zur eigenen Körpergeschichte, zur eigenen politischen Geschichte, auch der anderen.‘  
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Theweleit’s emphasis on shame is furthermore useful here because it draws attention 
to the inadequacy of the language of (collective) guilt that has shaped the German 
memory discourse since its inception (see Jaspers ([1947] 2001; Olick 2005; 
Rabinbach [1997] 2000), which however obscures more than it illuminates. 
Rensmann (1999: 66) elucidates how representations of NS125 are frequently 
misperceived ‘”as an accusation of collective guilt”’, or of original sin [Erbsünde] or 
clan liability [Sippenhaftung]. This, he (ibid.) argues, is ‘an indication of social 
paranoia’ because the subject feels the need to reject ‘an allegation that was never 
made’ and ‘blow[s] critical assessments of the German past out of proportion by 
portraying them as accusations of collective guilt’. Yet, by doing so, the relation to 
oneself and one’s national identity is kept untainted and difference and otherness is 
perceived as something threatening that intervenes from outside. 
 
Lilian Alweiss (2003: 313; see also Arendt 1987) agrees ‘that the language of guilt 
alone does not entirely capture what we mean by a collective or shared sense of 
responsibility’ and proposes shame as much more useful in this context. This is 
especially the case, as guilt is not only a legal concept but also limited to individual 
deeds and transgressions or, if referring to collective actions, the guilty must at least 
have had some control over the outcome of the (in)actions in question (Branscombe, 
Slugoski & Kappen 2004: 28-29). It furthermore implies that the harm that has been 
done can be atoned for and can be paid back in restitution and through other forms of 
reconciliation. In relation to this, the moral philosopher Gabriele Taylor (1985: 97-
104) makes the important point that, in guilt, the thoughts of the guilty are primarily 
with him or herself rather than with the harmed, as the ultimate aim of reconciliation 
and restitution in this case is ‘that [he or] she should be rid of the burden’ of the 
past. Alweiss (2003: 315) concludes her article on Collective Guilt and Responsibility 
by arguing that ‘the language of guilt and remorse’, when used to describe collective 
responsibility, thus even ‘contradicts the duty of remembrance’. 
                                                
125 Brink (1998, 2000) shows very clearly how the German population – already immediately after the 
war – interpreted the images of the liberation of the concentration camps as unfair accusations of 
collective guilt. 
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Furthermore, as the pervious chapter showed, many interviewees featured there take 
official acts of reconciliation and commemoration by unified Germany’s successive 
governments as legitimating and authorizing a certain liberation from the past: the 
past, now securely enshrined within official national commemoration and narrative, 
thus no longer affects them. This is not to say that commemoration and reconciliation 
are bad, or that young Germans should or must feel burdened, but just to call to mind 
what Ahmed (2004) identified as the ambiguity of official acts of commemoration 
and restitution as also reconciling the repentant (nation) with him or herself (itself). It 
is from a similar insight that Karyn Ball’s (2008a: 57) critique of the Habermasian 
model of memory stems. Like Dirk Moses (2007a), she accuses Habermas of 
subscribing to the logic of Sinnstiftung when he calls ‘upon contemporary Germans 
to “pay off” the crime of Auschwitz through indebted memory, which’ she adds, 
‘additionally assumes a compensatory meaning as a herald of reconciliation.’ 
Although Habermas would vehemently deny this charge, as we have seen in chapter 
7, his writings do at times suggest such a logic.   
 
This logic views the past as something that needs to be ‘worked off’ [abarbeiten] 
(Habermas 1998) in a self-critical manner in order to remove its stain, or to convert 
the stigma into a stigmata, as Moses (2007a) puts it in his more anthropological 
language. In contrast to such an idea of working-off as eventually liberating, 
LaCapra’s (1998: 187) concept of working-through is much more helpful since it is 
based on the notion that working-through ‘requires the active recognition that there 
always remains in thought and in social life a “stain”, impurity, or residue of the past 
that cannot be entirely eliminated or made good.’ Although he argues that working-
through is necessary, in order to get some distance to the past that allows for critical 
judgment, it can never be fully completed. There remains ‘an unassimilable 
remainder’ (ibid.) that cannot be integrated into such redemptive narratives of 
successful Vergangenheitsbewältigung or domesticated, tamed and controlled in 
rituals of commemoration and/or procedures of reconciliation and restitution.  
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The unassimilable here refers to the traces of the genocidal past that have rendered 
(not only) German national identity unheimlich but have also destabilized it and 
made it unavailable as an essence. Yet this does not mean that identity and belonging 
are to be renounced in favour of nomadism and complete rootlessness, but that 
identities become ‘the unstable points of identification or suture, which are made 
within the discourses of history and culture’ (Hall 1990: 226), i.e. positionings, in 
which we are always someone in relation to someone or something else. Belonging 
and identity cannot be ‘based [on] the individual possession of an intrinsic quality’ 
(Probyn 1996: 22), but are relational and ‘in constant movement’ (ibid.: 19). Thus, 
neither a return to an untainted German national identity, nor the attainment of a final 
point of liberation from the past, are viable options here. Now, before we can return 
to the feeling of shame, which can disrupt both of these (re)turns to a self-same 
identity; we have to come to at least some kind of understanding of collective 
responsibility.  
 
If we go by Arendt’s (1987: 45) definition, it implies that firstly one ‘must be held 
responsible for something [one] has not done’ and the responsibility in question 
must refer to group membership; secondly, this membership must be one that cannot 
be dissolved voluntarily. Discussions of collective responsibility (see Alweiss 2003; 
Arendt 1987, 2000; Branscombe & Doosje 2004; Gilbert 2002; Jaspers [1947] 2001; 
Lickel et al. 2005; Margalit 2002; Olick 2005; Rensmann 2004; Schaap 2001; Striblen 
2007) in moral philosophy and social psychology usually confine themselves to 
debating to what extent such responsibility is either political or moral or both, and 
whether guilt or shame is the more appropriate moral sentiment. I do not want to be 
drawn into these discussions here but rather simply want to endorse David Eng’s 
(2010: 171; see also LaCapra 2001; Gordon 1997: 193-208; Santner 1990) view that 
responsibility for a past through which one has not lived oneself ‘is as much an 
affective affair as it is a political affair.’ This renders the strict distinction between 
private moral and public political realms inherent in Arendt’s (1987.: 46) notion of 
collective responsibility as purely political and not moral, at least problematic. It also 
puts into doubt the idea that we can ever be completely autonomous moral beings, a 
wish expressed by so many in the previous chapter.  
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Even though the German philosopher Karl Jaspers ([1947] 2001: 70-74), author of 
the famous book ‘The Question of German Guilt’, extends the idea of collective guilt 
to the moral, pre-political realm, I would argue, that shame, rather than his 
‘philosophically incoherent concept’ (Moses 2007a: 25), captures much better a 
sense of collective co-responsibility, especially when this is a transgenerational one. 
This necessarily returns us to the feeling of shame, which is much less easy to get rid 
of than guilt, as it ‘lingers deep within the self’ (Probyn 2005: 2) and can return long 
after the initial ‘moment of shaming has passed’ (ibid.: 46). It is thus a disruptive, 
even haunting, feeling. It is also a social feeling, not only because it emerges as a 
response to the other’s (fantasized and internalized) gaze, which exposes the self (as 
defective and lacking), but also because ‘experiences of shame are a painful 
uncovering of hitherto unrecognized aspects of one’s personality . . . [and] one’s 
society’ (Lynd 1958: 183) – or, as Probyn (2005: 14) puts it, ‘[i]t highlights 
unknown and unappreciated investments.’  
 
While, as we saw in the previous chapters, an increasingly globalized memory of the 
Holocaust has made it easier for ‘third generation’ Germans to repudiate their 
‘historical relation to the perpetrators’ (LaCapra 2001: 66), the experience of shame 
confronts them with ‘complicated identification[s]’ that are often ‘not of [their] 
making’ (Alweiss 2003: 314), such as with the perpetrator collective. As such, 
experiences of shame represent occasions in and through which narcissistic 
identifications with the nation (and/or the family) as untainted and pure are 
(traumatically) shattered or ruptured, i.e. rendered unheimlich. Hence, it is perhaps 
more in shame than in guilt or empathy that we are positioned in such a way that we 
become co-responsible for the deeds of members of the (political) community that 
we are identified with and identify with; that we become ‘affiliated with the horrors 
of [our] history’ (Mandel 2006: 218). This, I would argue, is the case because shame 
‘expresses an indirect and impersonal’ (Alweiss 2003: 314; emphasis in original) but 
nevertheless acutely-felt collective responsibility.   
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What unites the interviewees discussed in the present chapter is that, for them, visits 
or longer stays abroad are accompanied by at times acute and painful experiences of 
shame, which can, if acknowledged, become self-transformative and disruptive of 
redemptive narratives and practices of ‘normalization’. Thus, unlike those in the 
previous chapter, the interviewees included here, acknowledge – at times only during 
the interview itself – their shame and, by doing so, also accept that there is no 
alternative to recognizing what Santner (1990: 46) calls the ‘insuperable 
ambivalences’ that come with, on the one hand needing to identify with Germany 
(and one’s family) as a contaminated (national) collective, while at the very same 
time needing to disavow these very identifications.  
 
As shame comes in many different shades and intensities (Probyn 2005: 15), I will 
slowly work my way from less intense to more extreme cases of shame, to end with 
Carolin, who experiences a prolonged total loss of self. While the interview with 
Fabian, who alludes to his shame but does not acknowledge it, shows us how 
important an acknowledged affective response is – what LaCapra calls empathic 
unsettlement and what I argue is in the present context better described by shame – 
Carolin’s story demonstrates the limits of theories (see Agamben 1999) in which 
(traumatic) shame advances to become the model for post-Holocaust ethical 
subjecthood per se and thus reminds us of the significance of what LaCapra calls 
working-through. 
 
 
8.2 Shades of shame 
 
Several empirical studies (Kohlstruck 1997: 92; Moses 2007a: 28, 2007c: 153; 
Schneider, Connie 2004: 280-81; Schneider, Ch. 2001: 334-335) find that for ‘third 
generation’ Germans the Nazi past becomes relevant, particularly when travelling or 
living abroad, and here in particular in countries that used to be occupied by the 
Germans during WWII and/or in social encounters with Holocaust victims, survivors 
and their grand/children. This observation not only concurs with my own data and 
resonates with my own experience but, as Kohlstruck (1997: 92) asserts, it also 
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points to the fact that for ‘third generation’ Germans dealing with the NS past is 
much more strongly linked to national belonging than it was for their parents’ 
generation. These findings at least question Levy and Sznaider’s (2006: 194-95; see 
also Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002) thesis that national identity is increasingly 
becoming ‘a conscious choice’ in Second Modernity and ‘no longer plays a vital role 
in terms of autobiographical memory’ (ibid.: 197). Much more helpful than Levy and 
Sznaider’s theory, is the psychologically informed work of Dirk Moses and 
Christian Schneider, who draw important socio-psychological inferences from such 
empirical material. They argue that stays abroad can produce ‘”psychological 
dissonance”, . . . that is discomfort caused by the violation of one’s self-conception’ 
as ‘moral and socially respected but also as belonging to a group that . . . [has] 
committed the worst of all genocides’ (Moses 2007a: 28; Schneider, Ch. 2001: 334-
35).  
 
Encounters with the past which occur in a different national and cultural context can 
then provoke ‘a crisis-laden situation’ which can induce a narcissistic or structural 
trauma, which in turn manifests itself ‘in a fragile feeling of self-worth and 
pronounced shame affects’, the result of which can be that one experiences German 
national identity ‘as a negative stigma’ (Brendler 1997: 69-70; Moses 2007c). Probyn 
(2005: 64) concurs thus far when she writes that ‘shame undoubtedly makes us feel 
temporarily more fragile in ourselves’ and adds that in shame the subject ‘feel[s] 
small and somehow undone’ (Probyn 2005: 2; emphasis added; see also Theweleit 
1995). Many theorists note that shame is intimately linked to a literal and 
metaphorical feeling of being out of place. In a similar way to Probyn’s Bourdieusian 
assertion, that shame particularly erupts when the habitus is out of sync with the 
field, sociologist Helen Lynd (1958: 37) writes that in ‘[f]inding oneself in a position 
of incongruity, [of] not being accepted as the person one thought one was, [of] not 
feeling at home in a world one thought one knew’ renders one especially prone to 
shame. In much more detail than Lynd, Probyn (2005: 40) ‘explore[s] how the 
physiological experience of shame intersects with the physicality of place’, to 
analyze how being a cultural outsider is inherently shame inducing: shame as ‘the 
feeling the body registers in social and cultural contexts when it does not belong’ 
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(Probyn 2005: xvi). It can thus contribute to producing a form of ‘outside belonging’: 
a mode of belonging ‘that is, . . . performed in the knowledge of the impossibility of 
ever really and truly belonging, along with the fear that the stability . . . and . . . 
sanctity of belonging are forever past’ (Probyn 1996: 8; see also Santner 1990: 8-9); 
performed in the knowledge of ‘the very unheimlich-ness of social life’ (Probyn 
1996: 19).  
 
In the interviews below, we will see how such experiences of shame, fostered by 
being and feeling out of place, can also reignite interest in the past and instigate 
processes of working-through which, although remaining to various degrees marked 
by phases or aspects ‘that [are] uncontrolled and unconscious, involving acting-out 
and the compulsive return of the repressed’ (LaCapra 1998: 187), do allow for some 
distance to the past to emerge in the process. Thus, unlike Brendler and Rensmann, 
who endorse guilt as the more appropriate emotion in these instances, because shame 
is not predicated on the internalization of norms but on conforming to external 
sanctions, following Probyn, I view acknowledged shame as positive, transformative 
and more productive than guilt (see Probyn 2005: 46). So, although the interviewees 
assembled in this chapter engage in similar ‘avoidance behaviors’ as the interviewees 
in the previous chapter, such as hiding or disidentification, in acknowledging their 
shame, they seem to be more self-reflexive. The interviewees assembled in this 
chapter do not rationalize, but recognize that such ‘avoidance behaviors’ also 
constitute a form of hiding and flight. Apart from Fabian the interviewees mentioned 
in this chapter agree that the NS past and the Holocaust constitute a particular 
responsibility and legacy for Germans. Furthermore, even though shame is often 
related to the visual realm and a sense of being exposed in front of an audience, for 
these interviewees exposure has to do with being identified as German through their 
language. This is why many of them avoid speaking German when they are abroad.  
 
 
 254 
8.2.1 Fabian: Fear of shame 
 
Although Fabian Hoffmann is the only interviewee included here who is rather 
dismissive of his feelings of shame, these feelings are however strongly linked to 
place. He tells me how he stops at commemorative plaques scattered around the city 
he lives in and how he sneaks around synagogues. Apart from Ilka and Carolin 
perhaps, he is the only other interviewee who expresses a strong interest in Jewish 
culture and laments the loss (rather than the destruction) of it. Yet he is too afraid to 
allow his interest to flourish more freely, as he explains: 
 
F: ‘I sneak, as it were around these/ around these/ around these/ around 
synagogues, I sneak around them and look at them fascinated but to go in and 
/ I am quite / I somehow always feel a little scared [schissig] in the sense of 
how do I belong here or no idea and . . . I’ve just been to Brazil . . . and there I 
casually got to know a couple of Israelis . . . it wasn’t enough to have great 
conversations but somehow it’s weird . . . I always look at them and think to 
myself  / or I almost gape at them and think / . . . well I was on a bus, a couple 
was sitting in front of me and they were speaking in Hebrew and I thought 
‘what life stories do they have?’ well  . . . I would really like to ask them . . . 
“he you’re from Israel, where are your grandparents from? . . . yes well an 
interest in the whole . . . culture.’  
 
In the first sentence, his fear of going into the synagogue seems to manifest itself in 
his hesitation to finish the sentence. Fabian’s shame seems to be ‘born of the desire 
to fit in, of an interest in being part of a place’ (Probyn 2005: 38). And, as Probyn 
points out above, the relation between shame and belonging or rather not belonging 
becomes particularly obvious here when Fabian describes his fear of going into the 
synagogue by asking ‘how do I belong here?’ However, as Probyn (2005: 38; 
emphasis in original) also maintains, this kind of shame in its ‘”desire to avoid 
potential wrongdoing and bad consequences . . . seems to have more in common with 
fear than with guilt.”’ Yet, she (2005: xvi) also notes that this feeling ‘out-of-place 
can ignite a desire for connection.’ Although Fabian’s interest in Jewish culture 
‘propels [him] toward exposure’ (ibid.: 38), his fear of doing or saying something 
wrong seems to get the better of him and he remains silent instead. So his shame 
never really reaches the stage of becoming ‘white-hot’ (Probyn 2005: 15), when it is 
felt most intensely on the body and can lead to a shock to or questioning of one’s 
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self-conception. Unlike Carolin and Ilka, below, whose interest, repeatedly, even 
obsessively, propels them towards shameful exposure, Fabian plays it safe.  
 
 
8.2.2 Caspar, Silke, Melanie and Ilka: Transformative shame 
  
Caspar Reinhart is more explicit and self-reflexive than Fabian about the emotional 
reactions travels abroad trigger in him. When I ask him whether there are any fears or 
insecurities in his life,126 he tells me that he always felt a bit guilty vis-à-vis non-
Germans. He goes on to recount experiences abroad, which seem to point more to 
shame than to guilt:  
 
C: ‘When I was abroad for example I had huge inferiority complexes . . . No 
matter where I was / for instance when I went to Holland and it was more 
likely that someone there spoke German rather than English I nevertheless 
spoke English. I thought it was simply impertinent to speak German.’  
 
Abroad and vis-à-vis non-Germans he feels his self to be small and depleted, which in 
turn is intimately connected to his language. In this instance, feeling out of place 
makes Caspar, and even more so the interviewees discussed below, not only want to 
fit in – ‘[t]he shame of the cultural outsider is fed by a deep desire to fit in and . . . to 
belong where you don’t belong’ (2005: 39) – but also makes him ‘want to disappear’ 
by hiding his language. Britt and Heise (2000: 253) quote the psychologist 
Nathanson as ‘suggest[ing] that “true of shame is a wish to conceal.”’ Caspar here 
tells me how he preferred to remain unrecognized as a German when he spoke 
English. Yet, his reflection on his experiences of shame abroad is followed by an 
admission that, even though for some time he tried to see himself as a European or 
not to categorize himself at all because he views the nation as a construct, his ‘strong 
interest’ in how foreign media report about Germany, ‘does show a search for a 
feeling of identity.’ This clearly demonstrates that for shame to arise one needs to be 
interested in and care about what the other thinks of oneself. It is this positive aspect 
                                                
126 This being one of my very first interviews, when guilt, let alone shame were so far off my research 
radar that I did not include any questions relating to either sentiment, Caspar brings the issue of guilt 
up without me eliciting it. 
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of shame that gets lost in views like Brendler’s (1997; see also Leys 2007) who 
views it as negative and regressive.  
 
Caspar goes on to assert that, even if one wished to disavow national belonging, it 
still plays a role somehow. However, unlike Rainer, Yvonne and Julia, the kind of 
belonging that Caspar speaks of here does not contain a wish to return to an 
untainted, pure identity. Rather, although acknowledging a desire for belonging, for 
Caspar belonging and identity is not a process that can have a determinative end or an 
essence with a particular content, nor can it have as its aim a national identity that 
excludes the (memory of the) Holocaust. His search for belonging is relational 
because it proceeds via the other – via an interest in how the other perceives me – 
and is thus mediated ‘by a[ny] passage through alterity’ (Santner 1990: 5; see also 
Hall 1990; Lynd 1958).  
 
Although Silke Turner says that the question of guilt is not of much importance to 
her, she points to a more subtle way in which guilt plays a role in her life, when she 
asserts that her relation to her national identity is somehow afflicted with guilt. The 
difficulties she has in explaining this feeling becomes obvious when she goes on to 
say ‘when I think about it I would always reject this (as) guilt, that’s not mine/ that’s 
not my role but . . . I [do] have the feeling that my position, what I know about the 
world . . . is still of course massively affected by it [the past].’ Even though she does 
not know how to name this feeling, in the following paragraphs it becomes clear that 
it is probably more akin to shame than guilt. Furthermore, in her acknowledgement 
that the past massively affects her, she, unlike the interviewees in the previous 
chapter, recognizes that ‘collective histories inform how we are in the world’ 
(Probyn 2005: 39) and inform our thinking and acting in ways that are not 
necessarily always accessible to consciousness and representation. It is thus that 
notions of collective and cultural memory in the form of the theories of Halbwachs 
and Assmann, for example, fall short of helping us to illuminate and understand the 
experiences of the interviewees in this chapter, for whom the past reaches into the 
present, making itself felt in manifold ways.  
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Her secure and consolidated critical left political position and identification with the 
victims that inform her dealing with the past are, however, upset or complicated, as 
she says, when she moves to the United Kingdom, which is also where I interviewed 
her. Before her move abroad, fascism, as she puts it, was no longer something that 
particularly interested her, even though it used to when she was younger. Yet, having 
arrived in London, she says ‘it feels a bit different, it’s simply a different position . . 
. one gets a completely different relation to one’s own identity.’ Like Caspar, Silke is 
far from eager to identify herself as German and has, since having arrived in the UK, 
become ‘über-cautious’ [übervorsichtig] when it comes to speaking German, 
preferring to speak English even when she meets other Germans. Yet, she adds that 
with her move to another place, the past got ‘another presence’ which is something 
she had not expected at all. She also links this different presence of the past to her 
encounters with ‘people who come from families who were victims’, which she 
describes as experiences that she lacked in Germany and which ‘of course lend the 
topic a whole new relevance [Brisanz].’ She comes to experience herself in a different 
way in England; ‘[I] notice that I become more cautious about what I say without 
having the feeling/ well it’s not that I feel somehow guilty, that’s too strong, but I 
notice that it causes an indisposition [Unwohlsein - unease].’  
 
Not only does this feeling of unease make it more difficult for Silke to speak about 
the Nazi past – she notices she becomes more cautious about what she says – but it 
also compels her to re-consider her own political position as well as her own relation 
to herself. She tells me that this move has made her position of a critical leftist 
student more complicated than it was before. I would contend that the Unwohlsein 
that Silke speaks of is a form of shame that is borne out of a sense of being or feeling 
out of place. The way in which her body registers a particular Unwohlsein and shame 
also brings with it the recognition that certain aspects of her own politics, as well as 
both her families’ Nazi and war pasts, are much more reluctantly contained within 
certain narratives or categories, i.e. ‘the feeling body’ here seems to ‘outrun[s] the 
cognitive capture of the habitus’ (Probyn 2005: 55; see also Gordon 1997: 198; 
Thrift 2008: 237). Probyn thus locates within this very moment the possibility for 
change and transformation. I also think that she is correct in according place such a 
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prominent space in her theory of shame. Furthermore, her (2005: 56) argument that 
‘[t]hrough feeling shame, the body inaugurates an alternative way of being in the 
world,’ I think summarizes Silke’s description of her experience in England quite 
well: 
 
S: ‘Here [in the UK – A.H.] it feels as if / one point about the whole thing is 
definitely that one/ that in Germany I feel socially clearly located [verortet] 
and also feel locatable by others, that I have the feeling that I don’t have to 
explain anything about myself, in the way I appear, in what I do, people very 
quickly politically identify me in a particular direction . . . and thereby certain 
things are already said, that I’ve dealt with certain things, while here I’ve got 
the feeling that I have to explain myself more, it’s not as self-evident. That’s a 
thing . . . which became clearer to me here . . . how unclean my own position 
is . . . it has nothing to do with guilt but simply to have this feeling again of 
having profited from having grown up in this family, to have profited from 
the fact that this family could continue to live in prosperity, the fact that my 
grandfather wasn’t impr-/ wasn’t really brought to justice127 . . . brings with it 
a different consciousness about . . . / that one’s own position in it is also 
never/ [that] one always profits from things which aren’t clean.’  
 
Here it becomes evident how Silke’s left-liberal position, no longer self-evident, 
suddenly requires explanation. The impeccable moral and political credentials that 
this position usually entails at home are not as easily recognized abroad. Abroad, this 
position does not guarantee a self-evident identification with politically and socially 
progressive forces, but in the UK Silke suddenly becomes ‘German’ despite the fact 
that she does not see herself as German and finds German national identity deeply 
problematic. Yet, this forces her to leave the position of the witness, who identifies 
with the victims and renounces her belonging to the perpetrator, collective and to 
acknowledge her own position, as ‘unclean’ and stained. ‘[I]t is from this affiliation’ 
with the perpetrator collective ‘that a sense of complicity’ (Mandel 2006: 218) and a 
different sense of responsibility emerges, i.e. the sense that she profited from the 
injustice that her grandfather’s war crime was never brought to justice as well as a 
broader sense of being implicated in familial, institutional and social structures that 
cannot be completely divorced from the past and how it was subsequently 
                                                
127 Silke suspects her grandfather of having killed a British paratrooper. He escaped justice by 
spending several years as a travelling salesman in Italy. 
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dissociated. Thus, she is no longer afforded the comfort of viewing herself as 
innocent and the past as past.  
 
The shame Silke feels abroad interrupts her more or less taken-for-granted sense of 
self and, in the encounter with the other, she recognizes aspects of herself and 
society (Lynd 1958: 183) that she had not been aware of. Although ‘’shame is by 
nature recognition’’ (Sartre 1958 cited in Alweiss 2003: 315) – I recognize myself in 
and respond to how the other perceives me – the work of LaCapra (2001), Sedgwick 
(2003), Probyn (2005, 1996) and Butler (2005: 28), for example, shows that this 
recognition can never be a full and final recognition. Butler (2005: 28) for instance 
notes that the past of the subject ‘gathered and known in the act of recognition’ can 
never be the full past, but such moments of recognition can ‘alter the organization of 
that past and its meaning at the same time that [they] transform[s] the present of the 
one who receives recognition.’ In this respect, Probyn’s (2005: 72) remark that ‘. . . 
shame demands that we tell other stories’ about ourselves is very apt. This is 
especially the case if we consider Susan Suleiman’s (2000: 557; see also Probyn 
1996: 93-125) statement that ‘[i]f memory is a “shifting and many-layered thing,” 
never reaching the bedrock one longs for, then the way around that problem is not to 
keep silent, nor to confine oneself to fiction, but . . . to keep on writing and re-
writing’ – or, in this instance, telling and re-telling.  
 
While, in chapter 4 and particularly in chapter 5, we have seen how many 
interviewees confine themselves to fictions, when they narrate their family histories 
in rigid, often-repeated stories that are at the very least implausible and/or have 
resigned in the face of silence, for Silke the acknowledgement of her shame also 
requires that she modifies her family and self-narrative. She re-composes her family 
narrative and re-assembles her own self-narrative, as her so far taken-for-granted 
political and social positionality are no longer self-evident but in need of explanation. 
Thus, experiences of shame can potentially entail an increasing awareness of the 
presence of an unformulated, dissociated past, and can thus be the start of a process 
of (re)interpreting, of telling and re-telling (Stern 2003).  
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During a cycling trip through a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood in London, 
Silke furthermore realizes ‘how very little I know about this [Judaism – A.H.] and 
this not-knowing is so very / it really is so very unclean and unsavoury 
[unangenehm].’ Here the link between shame and interest becomes very evident and 
allows us to see reconciliation practised differently to the interviewees in the 
previous chapter, for whom differences are barriers and in need to be overcome. One 
such example is Albrecht Richter who, in telling me about his trips to Israel which 
were part of a school exchange, voices above all the wish to be perceived as human 
and not as German as well as to finally be able to criticize Jews (not Israelis) and 
describes these trips as primarily youth experiences, during which aspects of history 
remained in the background. Another example would be Dagmar, who no longer sees 
any need to engage with the past because, as she says: ‘one doesn’t have to teach me 
that what happened there was terrible.’ 
 
However, as Probyn (2000: 54; emphasis in original) asserts, reconciliation is better 
understood as a process rather than a fixed endpoint when she writes that 
‘[r]econciliation must be a challenge to learn, and not to know.’ For her (2000: 53) 
‘[r]econciliation is therefore placed at that intersection of ignorance and knowingness 
. . . ,’ and must remain aware of the differences and dis-connections that shape social 
relations in the aftermath of mass violence. Probyn’s (2000) interest in shame is thus 
also to be read as a stab at those feminists and queer theorists who, according to her, 
too quickly assume a commonality between the suffering of Aborigines, women, gays 
and lesbians. Rather than empathy, which can often serve ‘cultural appropriation’ 
(ibid.: 53-54) by assuming knowingness, reconciliation based on shame seems to be 
more aware of differences, reluctant to jump to premature knowingness.  
 
In a similar, perhaps initially more defensive, way than Silke, during the interview 
Melanie Kerner rejects any feelings of guilt for the Holocaust – ‘I’ve never felt 
personally responsible for the Holocaust’ – and initially also denies to have ever felt 
shame. Following her initial rejection of guilt she continues by saying that ‘[I] also 
have to say I also never really felt ashamed to be from Germany. I’ve noticed when 
we went to England/ I went to summer camps that I never liked saying that I am 
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from Germany.’ She preferred to say that she is from France, she admits, not 
realizing that she is contradicting herself. She then goes on to recognize that ‘I always 
denied this [being German – A.H.] a bit.’ Yet, while she disclaims any feelings of 
guilt or shame, she also rejects any attempts to draw a line under the past and 
acknowledges the imperative that young Germans have a particular responsibility. 
But she thinks that the past can be dealt with in such a way that it can be divorced 
from the question of whether ‘one is guilty or not.’ 
 
Whereas in the beginning of the interview she denies to have ever felt ashamed to be 
German, when we, at the end of the interview (which was conducted in Germany) 
turn to her experiences abroad, she seems to reverse her position completely. 
Melanie tells me about how she met young Jews in London when she used to visit 
her German-Turkish husband, who was studying there for a while. During these 
encounters she always felt she had to explain herself to these young Jews and assure 
them ‘that only one grandpa was bad, that I don’t come from a proper Nazi family’, 
while she now recognizes that she was the one who put this pressure on herself and 
that no one ever demanded any explanations from her. Like the young German 
journalist Christian Salewski (2009) who, in a piece about his experiences in Israel, 
writes about how he in almost every conversation he had there felt the need to 
explain himself – to tell his counterpart that he went to countless anti-Nazi 
demonstrations, that he had visited Auschwitz and many other concentration camps 
and so on – Melanie also felt the need to justify herself in anticipation of accusations 
that were actually never made. So unlike those interviewees who wish to historicize 
NS and Europeanize the Holocaust because, in their eyes, it represents an accusation 
of guilt, Melanie realizes ‘that this is my problem and not their [young Jews’ – A.H.] 
problem’, i.e. that the accusations are not levelled against her from outside but stem 
from her internalized and fantasized gaze of the other.  
 
This is why acknowledging shame as shame is so important, because ‘the 
acknowledgement of shame’ exposes the ‘imaginary accuser’ as a largely fantasmatic 
construct. Thus, acknowledging shame can become ‘a vehicle for constructive 
personal and social change’ (Retzinger 1996: 16) rather than a hotbed for anger and 
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resentment. In this respect, the connection Retzinger (1996: 14) makes between 
unacknowledged shame, anger and rage is helpful. She (ibid.) writes that ‘[w]hen 
shame is not acknowledged, the other is almost always seen as the source of 
hostility.’ When we now remember how the interviewees who desired a return to an 
unbroken national identity and pride, viewed references to the Holocaust as 
inherently accusatory, which in turn made them quite angry and resentful, Melanie 
here comes to acknowledge her shame and thus realizes that these reproaches do not 
come from outside, but are, as she says, her own problem. This then also shows us 
that the phenomenon identified by Rensmann (1999) as the ‘imaginary accuser’ 
points much more to unacknowledged shame rather than guilt.  
 
Eventually, towards the end of the interview, Melanie does indeed begin to speak 
about being ashamed of ‘com[ing] from a family that was capable of doing such 
things.’ Having in the beginning of the interview recounted her family history by 
concentrating almost exclusively on her grandparents’ experiences of suffering (see 
chapter 5, page 170-173), she now, as we come to talk about her shame-inducing 
experiences abroad, speaks of her family as a family of murderers. And when I ask 
whether she had connected her grandfather’s war past to a documentary film about 
the Wehrmacht exhibition which she and her friends had watched years ago, her 
replies become very hesitant. Although Melanie remains very vague about what her 
grandfather might have done, she does become conscious of her own complicity in 
dissociating the past when she says that, even though she and her friends did not 
know much at all about their family histories, and thought what their grandparents 
did was ‘crap’ and their own parents’ implication in the familial conspiracy of silence 
was also deplorable, she recognizes that she and her friends are just as much part of 
this conspiracy as their parents, because, as she says: ‘although we get worked up 
about it, it remains without consequences, we go to all these anti-Nazi 
demonstrations and feel good about ourselves, but that’s it.’  
 
She then quickly links her shame to national belonging when she speculates about 
how she would feel meeting Israelis:  
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M: ‘Then I would find it difficult to say “I don’t know exactly what my 
grandpa did” because then I would also think “I owe it to you to be able to 
tell you that” . . . then I would feel awkward [unangenehm] . . . I do think 
that’s shameful actually. Actually I think it’s very shameful to say to Israelis 
“I am German”, then I would even prefer to say “I am French”, something I 
used to do in the past.’ 
 
Yet, she has begun to recognize this as ‘flight’ [Flucht] – the manifestation of a wish 
to be recognized as a human, as she says, rather than having her identity determined 
by her grandfather’s past (in)actions. Like many of the interviewees in chapter 7, 
when she was a teenager, Melanie was very pleased ‘when the whole thing with the 
European Union started’ because then she could ‘simply say, “I come from 
Europe”’. However, unlike the interviewees above, she does now acknowledge this as 
having ‘pulled the wool over her eyes [sich Sand in die Augen streuen]’ because she 
now thinks that, even though she still finds it difficult, there is no other way than to 
see herself as German, ‘including all the ambivalences’ that come with it.  
 
Ilka Pilcher begins her life narrative with her stay in Israel, explaining that she went 
to live there because she always wanted to know ‘how it would be for a German to 
go to Israel’. This is however not only an experience which she, during the course of 
the interview, describes as initially full of shame, but also one that obviously had a 
transformative effect on her. This becomes evident when she begins her life narrative 
in the following: ‘the most important/ . . . when I also changed drastically was I think 
really when I lived for one and a half years in Israel . . . before that my life proceeded 
actually pretty, I would say normally.’ Not only is this time characterized by 
repeated encounters with Holocaust survivors and representations of the NS past, 
but also by an intense engagement with herself and German history, as she puts it, 
and thus by a heightened sense of self-awareness. Like Fabian, she is very interested 
in Judaism and Jewish culture and her interest is similarly accompanied by fear. Yet, 
even though Ilka is more successful in overcoming her fear, it nevertheless was a 
feeling that deeply shaped her encounters with Holocaust survivors, for instance. 
When she meets survivors for the first time, she recounts the experience in the 
following way: 
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I: ‘I had a lot of concerns before, well I was afraid that she [the survivor] 
would perhaps communicate to everyone there that we were from the land of 
the perpetrators . . . as well as a fear of a direct accusation because I didn’t 
know how I should’ve reacted to that and then I also didn’t know how 
touched I would be by what she was going to tell us.’  
 
Although her fear of being exposed as coming from the land of the perpetrators does 
not become reality, and her shame becomes less the longer she stays in Israel, she 
asserts that ‘it still remains shameful somehow, it doesn’t go away that one still . . . 
somehow feels a bit guilty or at least somehow responsible.’ And although she never 
had a single negative experience in Israel (quite to the contrary), her feelings of shame 
lingered and were re-activated especially when she visited Yad Vashem and the 
kibbutz, where many of the survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising live. 
 
I: ‘In Yad Vashem . . . one feels terrible as a German; well at least I felt the 
need to speak English. Well I somehow didn’t want to be there and around me 
lots of Americans, I don’t know and to then speak German there. Somehow I 
thought it was bad to speak German at all at this place.’ 
 
She describes her experience of visiting the kibbutz in the following way: it ‘was a 
strange feeling . . . I didn’t feel guilty in that sense but I did feel ashamed, because I 
somehow also thought ‘how terrible that I speak a language which triggers a trauma in 
them.’ The haunting quality of shame becomes evident in the following extract; Ilka 
describes how even though her feelings of shame became less intense as time wore on 
and she got accustomed to her new surroundings in Israel, they never went away 
completely and still erupt whenever she visits commemoration sites or watches films 
about the Holocaust:  
 
I: ‘It was particularly strong in the beginning, later on it wasn’t like that 
anymore because one notices more strongly that one doesn’t need it. But it 
was and still is like that at these places. I thought about visiting Dachau . . . 
and I know exactly that it will be like that when I go there. I simply know 
that when I am confronted with it or when I also watch these films / it’s even 
worse when watching American films in English and suddenly a guard speaks 
German, in that moment simply because of the language . . . I somehow feel I 
am being addressed [sich angesprochen fühlen].’  
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It is this haunting quality of shame, returning long after the initial moment of shaming 
has passed, that makes for a much happier marriage between shame and the demands 
of memory than between the latter and guilt. While the language of guilt fosters the 
desire to be forgiven for the past and thus eventually get rid of it, it becomes 
particularly obvious here how shame is much more obstinate and difficult to get rid 
of. Although it might get less intense and painful, it hardly ever dissipates 
completely. Ilka’s shame, for example, in contrast to the protestations of the end of 
guilt in the previous chapter, continues to return years after she began dealing with 
the NS past.  
 
 
8.2.3 Carolin: Shame and the loss of self 
 
While the above interviews help us recognize the importance of acknowledging shame 
and the potentially positive and transformative effects this might have, the interview 
with Carolin Dietrich draws attention to what can happen when intense 
unacknowledged shame leads to the loss of self. As Retzinger (1996: 17; emphasis in 
original) notes,  
 
‘[f]requent and intense unacknowledged shame arises from and generates 
failure of social connectedness. Under intense states of shame distortion may 
take place, rendering one unable to function; like any self-monitoring system 
that has lost its governor, it spirals endlessly. Shame is a thermostat; if it fails 
to function, regulation of relationships become impossible. With the intense 
sequences of emotion generated by shame, it may become difficult to regulate 
self in relation to other. If shame is not acknowledged it disrupts behaviour; at 
best one can go into a holding pattern, repeating routine responses rather than 
finding new responses. 128 
 
Similar to how LaCapra conceives of acting-out as compulsive repetition, which 
although necessary, needs to some extent be worked through, shame needs to be 
acknowledged to become transformative. It is at this point that Probyn’s account of 
                                                
128 Retzinger (1996: 13) adds that ‘[p]ersons in a covert state of shame function poorly as agents or 
perceivers; thought, speech or perception is obsessive. Thoughts might be divided between imaging 
the self and imaging the other. Imaging the self involves thoughts about self-identity and [the] self has 
been discredited.’  
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shame, however, falters as it concentrates more or less exclusively on the positive 
aspects of acknowledged shame and cannot tell us what happens when shame 
remains unconscious and unarticulated.  
 
I meet Carolin in Leipzig in the spring of 2009, where she had moved recently after a 
long stint abroad. The interview with her is unlike any of the other interviews I did. 
Not only do I hardly need to ask any questions, as she simply begins to recount, but 
her narratives, especially her self-narrative, are very fragmented, cryptic, incoherent 
and marked by long pauses. This shows, as she later also confirms, that she has only 
recently begun to speak about her experiences abroad. As Retzinger (1996: 15) 
points out, ‘because shame involves [a] threat to identity and loss of trust in self and 
another, and because shame is so painful it is extraordinarily difficult to 
communicate.’ Like Silke’s, Carolin’s interest in the past returns or intensifies when 
she moves abroad. Slightly dismissive of Holocaust exhibitions, museums and 
commemoration sites, which only managed to convey the past to her as history, at 
the very end of the interview, she tells me that for her the past ‘became present when 
I for the first time really . . . came into closer contact with people with a Jewish 
background and I realized “okay it’s not only history, it reaches into the present.”’  
 
It is only after having moved to Bristol after finishing school that, as she says, the 
past became burdening [belastend] and she incurs what Brendler (1997: 69) and 
Santner (1990) call a narcissistic trauma, in which the deeds of her ancestors and the 
Germans more generally ‘devalue[s] her self.’ The resulting dissonance or incongruity 
between her self-conception and how others perceive her becomes particularly 
evident in an email that Carolin sends to me about six months after the interview: ‘. . . 
when I then found myself in situations abroad, in which I was confronted with my 
German identity, a situation ensued, in which I thought I had a moral deficit . . . not 
being as inherently good as I perhaps wanted to be.’ She goes on to write that she 
tried to overcome ‘this overwhelming feeling of shame . . . through a sequence 
[Aneinanderreihung] of actions’ which, as we will see, seem to have been largely 
performed or rather acted out without much awareness of what and why she was 
doing what she was doing.  
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While studying in Bristol, she befriends and falls in love with a young French Jew, 
but her love remains unrequited and, although she knows some aspects of his family 
history, the topic of the past remains largely unarticulated. At some point he breaks 
off all contact with her, but she does not know why. She says that this got her 
seriously thinking, and concludes that he must have fallen into a serious depression 
because of his family history, which Carolin vaguely describes as very terrible. In 
trying to get to grips with the dawning insight, that the children and grandchildren of 
Holocaust victims and survivors still suffer terribly from the effects of the past – an 
insight which she describes as ‘groundbreaking [bahnbrechend]’ and ‘life-changing’ – 
she moves to France and becomes a nanny, much to the chagrin of her parents and 
the relationship between daughter and parents rapidly deteriorates. During this time 
she also loses contact with, as she says, 90 per cent of her German friends and is 
adamant not to return to Germany for longer than a holiday. While her German 
friends consider her hypersensitive and tell her to stop engaging with the past, she 
tells me that she had the feeling that she was ‘at least making an effort [sich Mühe 
geben].’ At the end of the interview, she describes these years abroad, during which 
she had to slowly reassemble her ‘world [which] totally collapsed’ as ‘highly 
emotionally straining’ and ‘psychologically very exhausting’.  
 
She considers it a great injustice that she had a carefree childhood, while many 
descendants of Holocaust survivors and victims still suffer. At this point she repeats 
several times how ‘very, very terrible’ the suffering of these children and 
grandchildren is, whose lives ‘are in the most negative way affected by the past.’ Yet, 
while she focuses obsessively on the victims, she remains very vague about her own 
family members’ implications in the Nazi movement. Even though she admits she 
was ‘totally adrift’ at the time and her parents thought she was depressed bordering 
on insane, she says she did not feel depressed, but rather had the feeling that she 
needed to find something out and was driven by ‘an unbelievable interest [Interesse]’. 
Although she remains vague about and only cursorily deals with her family history at 
the beginning of the interview, she explains how she wanted to find out what exactly 
happened in Germany during Nazism, something which, she believes, no one in 
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Germany can tell her about. She asserts how she mistrusted everything that came 
from Germany and describes her relation to Germany as ‘strongly fractured [stark 
angeknickst]’: ‘I had the feeling that I needed to live abroad for a long time, to be able 
to develop an independent relation to the German past and my own family’s past.’  
According to her, this was not possible in Germany, as she always had the 
impression that in Germany something was withheld [vorenthalten] from her, 
because her parents and their entire generation had not dealt with the past because 
they were still too close to their own parents.  
 
Perhaps ironically, inheriting a bit of money from her Nazi grandmother permits her 
to study again; she moves from Lyon to Paris, enrols in a cultural studies course and 
consciously or unconsciously chooses a subsidiary course in contemporary history 
with a Jewish professor. During one of his office hours, the professor asks her where 
she is from. At this point, she feels for the first time that she is consciously telling a 
Jew that she is German. As with her friend in Bristol, she has the feeling that the 
professor is very affected by the past. Undecided about which topic to choose for 
her oral exam in history with this professor, she first opts for WWI, because, as she 
thinks, it is a more neutral subject. Having studied WWI for two weeks, she suddenly 
comes to the conclusion that ‘that won’t work, you have to go there now, for 
whatever reason, and talk about National Socialism.’ Unaware of the reason why, she 
feels she has to put herself into this situation, she describes the exam in the following 
words: 
 
C: ‘ . . . that’s a situation ((laughs a bit)) which I will never in my life forget . . 
. in this beautiful Paris I then walked to this terrible exam and then of course I 
said and did everything totally wrong and ((laughs)) it was terrible because he 
[the Jewish professor – A.H.] was really sitting in front me like a judge and 
was absolutely tense and I was also totally nervous.’ 
 
Although she felt he greatly appreciated that she had the courage to choose NS as her 
exam topic, she ‘judge[s] herself adversely’ (Taylor 1985: 68) when she says that she 
was ‘erratic, said things wrongly, put [her]self in a defensive position.’ After this 
experience, she hides for two weeks and hopes to never see the professor again. Not 
long after the exam, however, she runs into him again in the library, where she 
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suddenly finds herself overwhelmed and starts crying. This is all too much for her; 
she becomes unable to handle her studies, begins to read about NS and the Holocaust 
for herself, completely losing connection to what is relevant to her university course 
and what is not. She attempts several times to get in touch with the professor, 
writing him several letters asking to meet him to clear the air. Even though they 
occasionally run into each other at the library, they never speak, because, as Carolin 
puts it, ‘there was a total barrier’ and she describes ‘the whole thing’ as very 
burdensome for her. Eventually the professor agrees to meet her, yet she is 
emotionally so tense that she can hardly talk and runs away, after he had invited her 
to a coffee. After this she begins to what can only be described as stalking the 
professor, until he threatens to get the university rector and the police involved. She 
flees France, like she had fled the UK years earlier, to return to Bristol to work as a 
nanny of mainly Jewish children, to eventually move back to Germany.  
 
In the context of telling me about her meeting with the professor, she reveals that it 
was what she calls ‘this perpetrator-victim thinking’, which really got to her, since it 
gave her ‘the feeling that [she] needed to behave especially heroically . . . to actually 
get out of this situation in a moral way, and it demanded a more than possible 
strength of me.’ Being affiliated with the perpetrators arouses in her the need to 
behave particularly heroically in order be a moral person, while she also at times 
assumes the voice of the descendants of victims and survivors, thus failing to 
recognize that their loss is not hers (see LaCapra 2001: 79). At these points she 
conflates structural trauma – the loss of an identity and ‘Heimat, to which I now lack 
an immediate relation’ and the process of separating and becoming more autonomous 
from her family – with working-through the historical trauma of the Holocaust. 
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8.3 Conclusion 
 
 
While Carolin’s case shows us, in a very extreme way, how in shame we ‘become 
strangers in a world where we thought we were at home’ (Lynd 1958: 46), the more 
general point here is that the shame of the interviewees in this chapter points to 
attempts to integrate the unheimlich (Freud 1919; Santner 1990: 33) into a 
reconstituted German cultural or national identity. Their shame has unsettled and 
made unheimlich an unfractured, homely sense of familial, cultural and/or national 
belonging – Santner (1990) terms this a narcissistically specularized identity – and 
they acknowledge, very much unlike Julia, Rainer and Yvonne that there is no return 
to a pure, untainted national identity that expunges the Holocaust and the memory 
thereof. They also recognize that there is no complete freedom from the past. 
Although the way in which the interviewees examined in this chapter engage with the 
Nazi past does at times conflate structural and historical trauma, they do find 
themselves in various different phases or stages of a process of working-through, 
which seems to me to be more fruitful precisely because it also involves the 
shattering of narcissistic identifications with a Heimat, that exclude not only the 
Holocaust but otherness more generally.    
 
Although some interviewees mentioned in this chapter tend to contain their family 
histories in stories of suffering and heroism, I would nevertheless argue that 
experiences of shame can become the starting point for processes of working-through 
and (re)interpretation. In Melanie’s case for example, the interview itself becomes a 
moment of recognition and acknowledgement of shame and a point when she realizes 
her own implication in the dissociation of her family’s Nazi past. And although 
Carolin’s naïve family anecdotes offered at the beginning of the interview sit 
strangely uneasily with her hyper-identification with Jewish suffering, her 
subsequent email correspondence shows how she is becoming increasingly aware of 
her conflation between what I have in this thesis called structural and historical 
trauma. 
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The last point I want to make here is related to reconciliation. The kind of 
reconciliation that I have in mind must be distinguished from the kind of 
reconciliation with oneself and the nation that Ahmed (2004; see also Berlant 2007) 
draws attention to, when she criticizes a certain cultural politics of emotion that has 
increasingly come to shape the politics of memory in unified Germany. If the aim of 
remembrance, of witnessing past atrocity and injustice, is to reconcile the nation with 
itself – which it increasingly seems to be – then I think what Olick (1998: 553) has 
called the ‘well-oiled machine’ that is the German ‘commemorative apparatus’ has 
clearly failed its initially critical, educational, progressive and enlightening mission, 
that Adorno had envisioned for it, as part of an education after Auschwitz. The work 
of both Santner (1990) and LaCapra (1994, 1998, 2001; see also Lyotard 1990) 
makes very clear that after the Holocaust there can be no return to a pure, untainted 
specular national identity; there can be no reconciling oneself with oneself. As 
pointed out above, reconciliation must take place at the ‘intersection of ignorance and 
knowingness’ (Probyn 2000: 53) and thus, although engaging in building connections 
and establishing commonalities, must at the same time remain acutely aware of 
disconnections and differences. As the interviews with Caspar, Silke, Melanie and 
Ilka show, shame seems much better equipped to remind us of such dis-connections 
and differences; to keep us from eliding them by drawing on an increasingly 
Europeanized, even globalized, but definitely decontextualized memory of the 
Holocaust, that levels distinctions between victims and perpetrators and between 
very different kinds of sufferings. Critical of the possible consequences of ‘the 
reinvention of the Holocaust as a European human rights catastrophe’, Wulf 
Kansteiner (2006: 332-333) very aptly states that ‘[g]iven the opportunity, most 
collectives in Germany, from the politicians in Berlin to the grandchildren of the 
ordinary bystander of the Third Reich, use the globalization of the German past to 
shield themselves from moral self-doubt.’ 
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Rebelling against the Rebellious? Attempting to draw some 
preliminary conclusions about the ‘third generation’ 
  
 
This study started as an attempt to get an idea about how the Nazi past is 
transmitted across generations in families of Nazi perpetrators, followers and 
Wehrmacht soldiers. Initially, I attempted to do so by exclusively focusing on the 
family and its modes of transmission, only to realize that this focus was much too 
limiting and that family memory never exists in separation from some form of 
‘public’ memory. Yet, I had to further expand my perspective, needing to include as I 
did, an acknowledgment of the Holocaust as an increasingly global icon, to be able to 
make sense of various interview extracts, in which fragments of Holocaust narratives 
are reinserted into the local and familial. This recontextualizing or indeed 
renationalizing of the global has as its consequence the growing dissolution of 
distinctions between victims and perpetrators.  
 
This dissolution relates to one of the main findings of this and other studies (see 
Schneider, Co. 2004), namely that the grandchildren, very much unlike their parents, 
actively refrain from passing judgment on their grandparents’ deeds and dispense 
with their parents’ too categorical and Manichean vision of the Nazi past. Yet, while 
this opens up new and fruitful ways of exploring Nazi family pasts via a focus on 
the concrete and everyday experiences of the grandparents, this perspective, if it is 
not accompanied by an awareness of the extreme within the everyday, also harbours, 
as I argued in chapter 4, new forms of dissociation. In this case, family narratives of 
Nazism often turn into accounts of a pastoral idyll ravaged by war but devoid of 
Jews and thus also devoid of the grandparents’ participation in their discrimination, 
persecution and deportation. 
 
On the one hand the grandchildren’s reluctance to jump to judgment and 
condemnation represents, as Judith Butler (2005: 45-46) notes a possibility to be 
‘ethically educated’, on the other hand, it can lead to full identification and idiopathic 
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or ‘pure empathy’ (sympathy), which, as Novák (2010: 497-498) points out in his 
article ‘Understanding and Judging History’, results in a relativism or rather a 
historicism, that posits all historical perspectives as equally valid. As we have seen 
in chapter 4, many grandchildren have come to recognize that the ‘condemnation, 
denunciation, and excoriation’ (Butler 2005: 46) their parents practised in relation to 
their own parents, has another side to it, insofar as it relieves the members of the 
‘second generation’ from having to understand themselves as in some ways related to 
those who committed Nazi crimes or passively stood by. As Butler (ibid.) argues:  
 
‘Condemnation, denunciation, and excoriation work as quick ways to posit an 
ontological difference between judge and judged, even to purge oneself of 
another. Condemnation becomes the way in which we establish the other as 
nonrecognizable or jettison some aspect of ourselves that we lodge in the 
other, whom we condemn. In this sense, condemnation can work against self-
knowledge, in as much as it moralizes a self by disavowing commonality with 
the judged.’ 
 
The vehement and at times violent dissociation of the children from their Nazi 
parents that was/is contained in their condemnations also works to keep Nazi family 
pasts under wraps – constitutes a melancholic response – because it forecloses any 
further engagement with this past, as chapter 4 showed. In chapters 4 and 5, 
however, I also tried to elucidate how an approach to the grandparents’ NS past that 
is based on understanding must not ‘rest solely on empathy’ because if it does, 
understanding ‘tends to lead toward an indulgent or even forgiving stance toward’ the 
(historical) actors, whose (in)actions one tries to understand (Novák 2010: 494-95). 
This also constitutes a melancholic response, because the relativism, Novák (ibid.: 
497-98) argues, that such an understanding entails, keeps what is to be worked 
through unformulated and thus unconscious. This became especially evident in the 
interview with Anna, whose idiopathic identification or full empathy with her 
perpetrator and Mitläufer grandparents, whom she describes as ‘equally victims’, 
renders an engagement with and confrontation of aspects of their past, that point to 
their role as collaborators and perpetrators, in her eyes, redundant. This eagerness to 
understand the past via full empathy contains the Nazi past in narratives that 
overemphasize continuity.  
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At this point it becomes clear that family narratives of the NS past that marginalize 
and expunge unsettling traces of the extreme by focusing more or less exclusively on 
the mundane everyday or on traumatic wartime suffering, especially if the latter is 
told in the terms of ‘uncannily familiar’ Holocaust survivor narratives, are often 
invoked as a form of contestation of what LaCapra, following Habermas, calls the 
obligation to publicly mourn the victims of the Holocaust. One thing this study 
showed and which I repeatedly detected in my numerous conversations with German 
friends and acquaintances is a tremendous weariness [Überdruss] in the generation of 
the grandchildren of public forms of Holocaust memory, because they feel the latter 
prescribes how and what can be said about the Nazi past. Many argue that the 
official and cultural memory of the Holocaust, to a large extent shaped and 
institutionalized by the generation of 1968, has far outlived its necessity: the 
grandchildren reject the idea of the Holocaust as a singular historical catastrophe and 
no longer want to be guided in their interpretations of it, but want to approach the 
Nazi past on their own terms. Thus they contest their parents’ claim to a monopoly 
on the interpretation of the Holocaust (Schneider, Ch. 2004). And, unlike their 
parents, who at times overeagerly took on their own parents’ guilt, the majority of 
the grandchildren, interviewed for this study, refuse any personal feelings of guilt and 
do not view themselves to be affected by the past.  
 
The increased dialogue between grandchildren and grandparents about the latter’s’ 
experiences of the Third Reich thus takes on a very important role: it provides both 
the old and the young with the opportunity to circumvent the moral demands of an 
official and institutionalized memory of NS and the Holocaust in the name of 
‘authentic experience.’ In thus abnegating a distanced relation to the past in favour of 
a more immediate and empathetic one, the grandchildren might be seen to be closer to 
the NS past than their parents ever were. Attentive listeners to their grandparents’ 
stories, the members of the ‘third generation’ are however much less plagued by 
doubts about these stories and thus often take on their elders’ viewpoints, including 
their justifications, evasions and exculpations, as well as their stereotypes.  
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Taking this into account, it is perhaps less surprising that the historical imagination 
of many grandchildren is in some respects reminiscent of the view of history 
prevalent in 1950s West-Germany, in which Nazis and Germans feature as too 
entirely different groups. At this point, the outlines of yet another – much less 
overtly political and violent – generational conflict become detectable, in which the 
grandchildren in solidarity with their grandparents and the war and perpetrator 
generation more generally, rebel against the 1968 generation’s politicization of the 
private, by privatizing the political and historical. Here the personal and social use of 
the idea and diagnostic of trauma plays an interesting and double-edged role: in having 
‘become . . . [the] entreebillet with which every individual, regardless of his or her 
specific historical position, gains access to the great drama called history’ (Weigel 
2002: 270), it opens up, indeed democratizes history, while at the same time vitally 
contributing to the increasing universalization of victimhood and thus to the 
disappearance of the perpetrators and collaborators, not only from family, but also 
from cultural memory. Thus, the interviewees’ use of the concept of trauma reveals 
itself to be deeply political. 
 
In this thesis I argued that the idea of working-through structural trauma is very 
important if we are serious about the continued significance of commemorating and 
remembering the Holocaust. While the members of the children’s generation viewed 
national identity as deeply problematic, even pathological (Schneider, Co. 2004: 290) 
and preferred to view themselves as postnational, there is a great desire for national 
belonging, even pride in the generation of the grandchildren. The flight into 
postnational, especially European forms of identification, as I tried to show in 
chapter 7, avoids a vital aspect of any process of working-through, namely the 
shattering of a primary narcissism or structural trauma. Thus, such postnational 
identifications can sit alongside or be usurped by national identifications, which, 
because they remain unrevised, can end up producing versions of German history 
that in different ways marginalize the Holocaust or are eager to do away with 
institutionalized and ritualized forms of Holocaust memory, in an attempt to keep 
one’s self-image as German ‘clean’. In a similar way, in which the historicization that 
many members of the grandchildren advocate, represents both a chance to begin 
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dealing with Nazi family histories as well as the danger of further dissociation, the 
return of national identifications harbours the opportunity to have them fractured in 
experiences of shame, especially abroad, as well as the danger of a return of a defiant 
national pride, that seeks to re-establish the nation as an untainted, innocent and pure 
origin.     
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Appendix A 
 
Poster calling for interviewees 
 
I’m looking for members of the generation of the grandchildren (ca. 20-37 years of 
age) of the German war (and perpetrator) generation, who would be willing to be 
interviewed about the National Socialist past. 
 
I’m doing my PhD in sociology at Goldsmiths College, University of London. My 
thesis is about German family memory of National Socialism and the Second World 
War, especially that of the grandchildren. From [date] to [date], I will be in [town] on 
a research trip and would be very grateful, if, in case you are interested, you would 
contact me via the following email address and/or telephone number: 
so001ah@gold.ac.uk or 0172/6044257.  
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Appendix B 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
Interview Nr.: 
Date:  
Place: 
 
Interviewee 
 
First name (optional): 
Last name (optional): 
Pseudonym: 
Sex: 
Date of Birth: 
Place of Birth: 
Place of residence: 
Education:  
If applicable, field of study: 
Occupation: 
 
Military or alternative civilian service (please underline appropriate): 
 
Number of siblings (including sex and year of birth): 
 
I have / have not visited the Wehrmacht exhibition (please underline appropriate) 
 
 
 
Parents 
 
Mother: 
Year of Birth: 
Education: 
If applicable, field of study: 
Number of siblings:  
 
Father:  
Year of Birth: 
Education: 
If applicable, field of study: 
Number of siblings:  
 
 
Grandparents 
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Paternal grandparents 
 
Paternal grandfather: 
Year of birth: 
Year of death, if applicable: 
Education: 
Occupation: 
Year of marriage:  
Place of residence: 
Member of Wehrmacht and if applicable, respective division: 
Stationed at the following locations during the war: 
Member of a NS-organization (HJ, SA, SS, Waffen-SS, etc.):  
 
Paternal grandmother:  
Year of birth: 
Year of death, if applicable: 
Education: 
Occupation: 
Year of marriage:  
Place of residence: 
Member of NS-organization: 
 
 
Maternal grandparents 
 
Maternal grandfather: 
Year of birth: 
Year of death, if applicable: 
Education: 
Occupation: 
Place of residence: 
Member of Wehrmacht and if, applicable, respective division: 
Stationed at the following locations during the war: 
Member of a NS-organization (HJ, SA, SS, Waffen-SS, etc.):  
 
Paternal grandmother:  
Year of birth: 
Year of death, if applicable: 
Education: 
Occupation: 
Year of marriage:  
Place of residence: 
Member of NS-organization: 
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Appendix C 
 
Initial Self-Disclosure 
 
 
Before we begin, I want to briefly tell you what my project is about. I’m writing my 
thesis about German family memory of National Socialism and the Second World 
War and here I’m particularly interested in how the grandchildren remember their 
grandparents’ past. I’m more than happy to tell you a little bit about my own 
grandparents, so the interview will not be as one-sided and you know how I became 
interested in the topic. I have done some research and found out that both of my 
grandfathers were Wehrmacht soldiers, one on the Eastern Front, the other in Poland 
and Greece. This means that both were stationed at places where I must assume that 
they at the very least knew of the crimes that were committed there, if not directly 
witnessed and/or indeed perpetrated crimes themselves. One of my grandfathers was 
also an early NSDAP and SA member. In my family this is hardly ever spoken 
about. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Standard in-depth interview: Initial catalogue of questions 
 
I) Interviewee 
 
1) How did you come to the decision to volunteer to be interviewed for this 
study? 
2) Could I ask you to tell me about your life, anything that you might think 
might be relevant? 
3) Could you tell about your political life? (Are you politically active?) 
 
 
II) Transmission of NS past within the family  
 
1) Do you remember situations when the Second World War, National Socialism 
and/or the Holocaust were talked about in your family? 
2) Grandparents  
• What did your paternal/maternal grandfather/grandmother tell you 
about the Nazi time? 
• Did s/he engage you in conversations or did you have to ask her/him 
about the Nazi time? 
• What was his/her reaction to your questions? Could you speak to 
him/her about the Nazi past? 
• In their stories, did your grandparents mention Jewish citizens, their 
persecution and deportation?  
• How did you feel during conversations with your grandparents about 
the Nazi past? 
• Do you know what role your grandfathers had during the war? 
• Are there things you know about your grandparents’ past that you 
didn’t learn through their stories or family stories more generally but 
got from other sources? (Which were they?) 
• Have you ever thought about researching about your grandfathers’ 
time as a Wehrmacht soldier/ member of NS-organization? 
• How do you live with not knowing (much) about your grandparents’ 
Nazi and war past? 
• Are there any photographs of your grandfathers in Wehrmacht or any 
other uniform at your or their home? (Where is this image 
placed/kept? What exactly does it show?) 
3) Family more generally 
• With whom do speak most frequently and intensively about the Nazi 
past in your family? Why this person? 
• Do you articulate your doubts and questions in your conversations 
about the family Nazi past in your conversations with your parents 
and/or grandparents? 
• How do you interpret the silence in your family about the Nazi past? 
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III) Family Dynamics 
 
1) How did you experience your childhood and youth in your family? 
2) How did you experience your relationship to your grandparents during your 
childhood and youth? How, if at all, did this change, with growing up? How 
is your relationship to your grandparents presently? 
3) How was and is your relationship with your parents? 
4) How did you experience the relationship between your father/mother and 
his/her own parents? 
5) Can you tell me about how your father/mother dealt with their own parents’ 
past? 
 
IV) The interviewee’s dealing with the NS past and the Holocaust 
 
1) Can you remember the situation when you learned about the Holocaust for 
the first time? 
2) How did you experience your school education about National Socialism and 
the Holocaust? 
3) How did you start dealing with questions relating to National Socialism and 
the Holocaust? 
4) How do learn about National Socialism and the Holocaust primarily (films, 
books, television documentaries, visits to museums and/or former 
concentration camp sites)? 
5) Have you seen the Wehrmacht exhibition? (How did you respond? Did you 
speak with your grandparents about the exhibition? ) 
6) What do you think about how the Holocaust is currently being remembered in 
Germany? (added after the 5th interview) 
7) How do you feel as German abroad? (added after the 5th interview) 
 
V) Final Questions 
 
1) How was the interview for you? 
2) Have you and/or will tell anyone in your family about the interview? Who? 
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Appendix E 
 
Biographical Narrative Interview 
 
 
Used from the interview with Dagmar (interview Nr. 22, 28/08/2006) onwards. 
 
1) Initial narrative question 
 
‘Please can you tell me your family history and your personal history. I’m interested 
in your whole life and in whatever you can think of. I won’t ask any questions to 
begin with and will only make some notes about the things I might want to ask you 
about later.’  
 
2) Internal narrative questions 
 
These questions varied with each interview. 
 
3) External narrative questions 
 
I) Transmission of NS past within the family 
 
I added the following questions to the existing catalogue of questions (see Appendix 
D) Initial Catalogue of Questions): 
 
1) Can and/or could you speak with your grandparents about the Holocaust? 
2) What do your parents tell about their own parents’ NS past? 
 
II) Political Self-conception 
 
1) How did you experience the World Cup 2006 in Germany? 
2) Can you tell me a bit about your political self-conception: Where would you 
position yourself on the political spectrum (left-right)? 
3) How do you feel as German abroad? 
4) How do you feel as German generally? Does national identity have any 
relevance for you? And if so, how? 
 
III) Public Memory  
 
1) What do you think about how the Holocaust and National Socialism are 
currently being remembered in Germany? 
2) What do you think about the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin? 
3) How did you experience your school education about the Holocaust and 
National Socialism? (What exactly were you being taught and how?) 
4) Did your parents and/or teachers attempt to influence your dealing with the 
National Socialist past and the Holocaust? If so, how? 
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5) Do you think that there arises a particular responsibility for young Germans 
in respect to the National Socialist past and its memory? If so, what would 
this responsibility imply? 
6) Wehrmacht exhibition:  - How did you respond? 
- Did the exhibition raise any questions for 
you? What were they? 
- Did you speak with your grandparents about 
the exhibition? 
- Did you connect what you saw in the 
exhibition to your grandfathers’ experiences of 
the war? 
 
IV) The interviewee’s dealing with the NS past and the Holocaust 
 
1) Can you remember the situation when you learned about the Holocaust for 
the first time? 
2) How did it begin that you started dealing with questions relating to National 
Socialism and the Holocaust? 
3) How do learn about National Socialism and the Holocaust primarily (films, 
books, television documentaries, visits to museums and/or former 
concentration camp sites)? 
4) What does it mean to you not to know much/anything about your 
grandparents’ past during the Nazi time? Are there things, which you would 
prefer not to know? What would they be? 
5) Does the question of guilt still play a role in your dealing with the National 
Socialist past generally? (If not, does the feeling of shame in any way 
influence your dealing with the past?) 
6) And does the question of gandparents’ guilt still play a role? 
7) In how far, do you think your grandparents’ past has an influence on your 
life? 
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Appendix F 
 
Research Consent Form 
 
 
Title of study: Family Memory of National Socialism in the generation of the  
grandchildren of the war generation 
 
My name is Alice Hohenlohe and I am currently doing my PhD in sociology at 
Goldsmiths College, University of London. My research seeks to find out how the 
grandchildren of those who lived through WWII and the ‘Third Reich’ remember 
National Socialism and the Second World War. I am particularly interested in how the 
NS past is spoken about and dealt with in families and here I am particularly keen to 
examine to what extent and how the way the grandchildren relate to the National 
Socialist past differs to how their parents remember it. I am also interested in how 
members of the grandchildren’s generation learnt about National Socialism and the 
Holocaust at school and elsewhere. 
 
I will be recording the interview and might be taking notes. The interview material 
(recording, transcription) will be accessible only to myself and no one else. Personal 
data, such as names, names of places, dates, etc. that could reveal the identity of the 
interviewee will be omitted or anonymized should sections of the transcription be 
used in the PhD thesis (which will be publicly accessible) or any other publications 
arising from this research project. I will provide audio-recordings (on CD) and/or 
transcriptions of the interview upon request. 
 
Alice Hohenlohe 
Warmington Tower, Room 805 
Goldsmiths College  
University of London 
London SE14 6NW 
Tel.: 07780531381 
so001ah@gold.ac.uk 
 
I have read and understood this consent form and hereby agree to be interviewed as 
part of the above described study. I understand that the interview will be recorded 
and that anonymized sections of the interview might be used for publication. I am 
aware that I am free to withdraw from the interview at any time.  
 
Signature: ___________________________   
 
Date:________________ 
 
 
Print: ________________________________ 
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Appendix G 
 
Transcription Signs: 
 
 
..: two seconds pause  
...: three seconds pause  
((pause)): longer pause  
/: speaker interrupting him- or herself or being interrupted  
(..): not understandable  
( ?): difficult to understand  
(( )): non-verbal or acoustic accompaniment  
Yes: emphasis 
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Appendix H 
 
 
The externalization of NS and the Holocaust: Anti-fascism in the GDR 
 
 
While in the FRG the process of dealing with the Nazi past was carried out in an 
evolving democratic and pluralistic public culture, the ‘East German universalization 
of the past has to be seen within the context of a totalitarian system’ (Kattago 2001: 
79) of a one party state which lacked such a forum. Thus, its history of memory is 
largely devoid of the public disputes and the transformations that shaped the FRG’s 
memory. Although de-nazification was more rigorous in the Soviet-occupied zone 
than in those occupied by the Western Allies, as soon as it was declared completed, 
‘National Socialism no longer belonged to the history of the GDR, but only to the 
history of the capitalist Federal Republic’ (Wolfrum 2002: 142-3).129 The state, in 
the guise of the SED (Socialist Unity Party [Sozialistische Einheitspartei]) became 
the ‘custodian of national memory’, fabricating the master-narrative of antifascism 
for its own self-legitimation (Kattago: 111). By embedding NS within the historical 
development of capitalism and thus universalizing it as fascism, official memory did 
not provide space for the commemoration of the Nazi genocide as an atrocity 
motivated by anti-Semitic ideology and aimed at annihilating Jews in particular (Herf 
1997). Within this anti-fascist framework Nazism appeared not as part of East 
Germany’s history but as integral to ‘a larger historical process in which late 
monopoly capitalism necessarily culminated in fascism’ (Kattago 2001: 7). Rainer 
Lepsius (1993) thus argues that, while West Germany internalized NS as an anti-
democratic threat, the GDR externalized it as a capitalist threat. 
 
The myth of antifascism furthermore ‘provided a framework of social integration’ 
(Kattago: 86) relieving the citizens of East Germany of questions of individual and 
collective responsibility by portraying the GDR as having emerged out of a heroic 
communist resistance against Hitler’s fascism. ‘[P]ublic ceremonies, political 
speeches, history books and the socialization of youth’ (Moeller 2005: 155) focused 
                                                
129 My own translation.   
 288 
on this heroism of the anti-fascist movement while suppressing the annihilation of 
the Jews. The antifascist myth increasingly turned into an ‘undifferentiated 
confessional ideology’ [‘entdifferenzierten Bekenntnisideologie’] (Danyel 1995: 42) 
without much resonance in the communicative memory of the people,130 and was 
thus forced to rely heavily on ‘cultural means of communication’ 
[‘Vermittlungsformen’] to be collectively remembered (Wolfrum: 143). Hence, the 
dissonance between cultural memory and communicative memory was much more 
pronounced in the GDR than it ever was in the FRG, as studies like Sabine Moller’s 
(2003) show. However, she also finds that people still spoke about their suffering at 
the hands of the Red Army. Yet, such talk was banished to the private space, since 
the articulation of such memories always implied a challenge to the myth of anti-
fascism, which portrayed the Soviet army as liberator and friend. 
 
 
 
                                                
130 Moller (2003: 50) calls this ‘ “petrified remembrance “‘.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
All names, names of places, dates and other personal data that could identify the 
interviewees have been changed or omitted, to protect their anonymity. Any 
similarities with real persons, living or dead, are purely coincidental.  
 
Female Interviewees:  
 
1) Silke Turner (non self-selected) 
Born: 1981, grew up in Wiesbaden, former FRG.  
 After her A-levels (Gymnasium), she studied Psychology and Anthropology.  
 At the time of the interview, she was doing a semester abroad (UK). 
 I interviewed her in London in December 2007.  
 
2) Sabine Schwabach (self-selected) 
Born: 1984, grew up in Magdeburg, former GDR. 
After finishing her A-levels (Gymnasium), she began studying Comparative 
Literature in Hamburg. She was still studying when I interviewed her. 
She was interviewed in Hamburg in May 2006. 
 
3) Carolin Dietrich (self-selected) 
Born: 1978, grew up in a town close to Cologne, former FRG. 
After finishing her A-levels (Gymnasium), she moved to Bristol, UK, to 
study Cultural Studies (Kulturwissenschaften). She dropped out of her course 
and moved to Lyon, France, to work there as a nanny. After a couple of 
years, she moved to Paris to take up her studies again. Having graduated, she 
moved back to Bristol, to work as a nanny and then, a year before the 
interview, she moved back to Germany.  
I interviewed her in Leipzig in April 2009, where she was doing a Masters in 
Kulturwissenschaften.  
 
4) Melanie Kerner (self-selected) 
Born: 1976, grew up in Essen, former FRG. 
After her A-levels (Gymnasium), she studied Comparative Litertaure. Shortly 
before the interview, she had finished her doctorate and began her tenure as a 
postdoctoral research fellow at the university. 
I interviewed her in Berlin in April 2009.  
 
5) Johanna Müller (self-selected) 
Born: 1982, grew up in Dresden, former GDR.  
After her A-levels (Gymnasium), she began studying Philosophy and 
Sociology. At the time of the interview, she was in the process of finishing 
her studies. 
I interviewed her in Hamburg in May 2006. 
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6) Dagmar Schneider (self-selected) 
Born: 1979, grew up in Hamburg, former FRG. 
She did her A-levels (Gymasium) and studied Economics in Germany and the 
UK, where she also lived and worked for a big consultancy firm at the time of 
the interview.  
I interviewed her in London in August 2006. 
 
7) Anna Seybold (self-selected) 
Born: 1978, grew up in Hamburg, former FRG. 
After finishing her A-levels (Gymnasium) she studied Psychology. She was 
about to finish her university degree at the time of the interview. 
I interviewed her twice in May 2006 in Hamburg. 
 
8) Ilka Pilcher (self-selected) 
Born: 1978, grew up in a small town close to Kiel (Schleswig-Holstein), 
former FRG. 
After her A-levels (Gymnasium), she moved to Israel for one and a half years. 
Upon her return to Germany, she began studying Sociology and was at the 
time of the interview about to graduate from university.  
I interviewed her twice in Hamburg in May and November 2006. 
 
9) Julia Hartwig (self-selected) 
Born: 1984, grew up in a small town in Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen), 
former FRG. 
After finishing her A-levels (Gymnasium), she moved to the UK and studied 
Media & Communications. At the time of the interview, she worked as 
journalist in the UK.  
I interviewed her in London in May 2009. 
 
10) Alberta Michels (self-selected) 
Born: 1970, grew up in a small town in Schleswig-Holstein, North-West 
Germany and former FRG. 
After finishing her A-levels (Gymnasium), she studied languages and trained 
and worked as an accountant in different European countries. She has lived in 
the UK for seven years at the time of the interview. 
I interviewed her in London in June 2009. 
 
11) Martina von Selbig (self-selected) 
Born: 1964, grew up in a small town in Rhineland-Palatinate, former FRG.  
After finishing her A-levels (Gymnasium), she receiving training in the 
catering and hospitality business but worked for many years as a personal 
assistant. In her early forties, she decided to study History and 
Anthropology at university. At the time of the interview, she was still 
studying. 
I interviewed her in Berlin in March 2009. 
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12) Karin Ingbert (self-selected) 
Born: 1972, grew up in Bremen, North Germany, former FRG. 
Although she finished her A-levels, she did not go to university but trained in 
the hotel and catering trade. Later on, she went into further education to 
become a translator. She worked as a translator at the time of the interview. 
I interiewed her in Berlin in April 2009. 
 
13) Yvonne Lechner (self-selected) 
Born: 1980, grew up in a small town in Thuringia, former GDR. 
She did her GCSEs and went to work in the accounting departments of 
several firms in Germany, before moving to the UK, where she continued in 
that line of work.  
I interviewed her in London in May 2009. 
 
14) Teresa Helwig (self-selected) 
Born: 1980, grew up in Lübeck in the North of Germany, former FRG. 
After her A-levels (Gymnasium), she began studying American Studies. At 
the time of the interview, she was half-way through her course.  
I interviewed her twice in May 2006 in Hamburg. 
 
 
Male Interviewees: 
 
1) Caspar Reinhart (self-selected) 
Born: 1977, grew up in small town close to Hamburg, former FRG. 
After his A-levels (Gymnasium), he studied several different subjects at 
university (Sociology, Philosophy, History) and temporarily worked as a 
sales assistant. At the time of the interview, he was in the process of finishing 
his studies. 
I interviewed him twice in April and May 2006 in Hamburg. 
 
2) Constantin Sievers (self-selected) 
Born: 1977, grew up in a small town in Saarland, former FRG.  
He finished his A-levels (Gymnasium), then studied Biology and was 
working as a research assistant in a medical laboratory at the time of the 
interview.  
I interviewed him in Hamburg in April 2006. 
 
3) Daniel Meier (self-selected) 
Born: 1981, grew up in Hamburg, former FRG. 
After finishing his A-levels (Gymnasium), he began to study History. At the 
time of the interview, he was in the process of finishing his studies. 
 I interviewed him in Hamburg in April 2006. 
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4) Horst Endress (non self-selected) 
Born: 1975, grew up in a small town in Hesse, former FRG. 
He finished his A-levels (Gymnasium) and was in the process of finishing his 
PhD in History at the time of the interview. 
I interviewed him in his home town in June 2006. 
 
5) Rainer Binder (self-selected) 
Born: 1976, grew up in West Berlin, former FRG. 
After his A-levels (Gymnasium), he studied law and at the time of the 
interview he was training to become a lawyer.  
I interviewed him in Hamburg in April 2006. 
 
6) Armin Bachmann (self-selected) 
Born: 1970, grew up in a small town in North Rhine-Westphalia, former 
FRG. 
After his A-levels (Gymnasium), he studied History in order to become a 
history teacher. At the time of the interview, he was working as an assistant 
teacher in training in a school in a Realschule in Berlin. 
I interviewed him in Berlin in April 2009. 
 
7) Sebastian Merle (self-selected) 
Born: 1977, grew up in Leipzig, former GDR. 
After finishing his A-levels (Gymnasium) he began to study Sociology. He 
was in process of finishing his studies at the time of the interview. 
I interviewed him twice – in May and November of 2006 – in Hamburg. 
 
8) Albrecht Richter (self-selected) 
Born: 1972, grew up in Essen, former FRG. 
After finishing his A-levels (Gynmasium) and his Media & Communications 
studies at university, he began working as a freelance web designer and film 
production assistant. At the time of the interview, he worked mainly as a 
production manager for various television channels. 
I interviewed him in Berlin in April 2009.  
 
9) Alexander Fiebert (self-selected) 
Born:1975, grew up in Bremen, former FRG. 
After finishing his A-levels (Gynmasium), he trained as an assistant producer 
on various film sets. He then moved to France and the UK for several years 
to study film. At the time of the interview, he had lived in Germany again 
from two years and was working as a (film) set designer. 
He was interviewed in Berlin in April 2009. 
 
10) Christian Marx (self-selected) 
Born: 1975, grew up in Stuttgart, former FRG. 
After finishing his A-levels (Gymnasium), he studied History and Literature 
and was at the time of the interview working as a professional historian at a 
think tank. 
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I interviewed him in Berlin in April 2009. 
 
11) Fabian Hoffmann (self-selected) 
Born: 1978, grew up in Frankfurt, former FRG. 
After his A-levels (Gymnasium), he first studied Agriculture, but then 
changed to Media & Communications. After working in an ad agency for a 
while, he returned to university to finish his Media & Comms. studies 
shortly before the interview.  
I interviewed him twice in Hamburg in May and November 2006. 
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